















Logic of Experimentation offers several innovative and ground-
breaking perspectives on music performance, music ontology, research 
methodologies, and ethics of performance. It proposes new modes of 
thinking and exposing past musical works to contemporary audiences, 
arguing for a new kind of performer, emancipated from authoritative 
texts and traditions, whose creativity is propelled by intensive research 
and inventive imagination. Moving beyond the work concept, this book 
presents a new image of musical works, based upon the notions of 
strata, assemblage, and diagram, advancing innovative practice-based 
methodologies that integrate archival and musicological research into 
the creative process leading to a performance. This volume appropriates 
concepts for music performance from post-structural philosophy, 
psychoanalytical theory, science and technology studies, epistemology, 
and semiotics, showing how transdisciplinarity is central to artistic 
research. An indispensable contribution to artistic research in music, 
Logic of Experimentation is compelling reading for music performers, 
composers, musicologists, philosophers, and artistic researchers alike.
Paulo de Assis is an experimental performer, pianist, and artistic researcher with 
transdisciplinary interests in composition, philosophy, psychoanalytical theory, and 
epistemology. A research fellow at the Orpheus Institute, Ghent, he was the Principal 
Investigator of the EU project “Experimentation versus Interpretation: Exploring New 
Paths in Music Performance in the Twenty-first Century,” is the Chair of the international 
conference series Deleuze and Artistic Research (DARE), and is the editor of the book 
series Artistic Research (Rowman & Littlefield International). 
“This is an outstanding book in every way. It demarcates a new field—that of artistic 
research as an experimental activity—and then provides an original theoretical 
framework within which to relate the field to music. All the chapters address issues 
that transcend music and are of great import for aesthetics, ethics, epistemology, 
ontology, psychoanalytic theory, and cultural theory.”
―Ronald Bogue, University of Georgia, US
“Reading Logic of Experimentation is an intellectual adventure. The reader comes 
away with a much more flexible and more powerful context for engaging in 
performance as scholarship, corporeality, and the manifestation of energy.”
―Neely Bruce, Wesleyan University, US
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I am an experimenter in the sense that I write in order  
to change myself and in order not to think the same thing  
as before. 
Michel Foucault, 1978
Experimentation on oneself . . . is our only identity,  









This book was primarily composed in the second half of 2017 and during January 
2018, in the final months of the five-year research programme Experimentation 
versus Interpretation: Exploring New Paths in Music Performance in the Twenty-
First Century (in short, MusicExperiment21), of which it is the last and final 
outcome. As one of MusicExperiment21’s outputs among many others, this 
book focuses on the musical- and performance-related conceptual achievements 
of the project. Thus, it is not about the project. It is not its summary, nor is it 
intended as its theoretical explanation, justification, or foundation. It collects 
the most relevant conceptual inventions I have made in the last five years, which 
have a certain autonomy and independence from the various performances, 
compositions, and installations created, as well as from the other essays and 
articles generated within the project, which also included texts written by other 
team members. All those other outputs, which expose the concrete practice 
of MusicExperiment21, and most of its artistic realisations, are available on 
diverse media and multimedia formats, such as CD, DVD, LP, and on the web 
platform Research Catalogue. They exist in a different space of inscription and 
representation, often conveying fewer conceptual and more sensuous aspects 
of the project. They are accessible online at www.musicexperiment21.eu, where 
the interested reader will find connections to and resonances with the ideas 
presented in this volume.
Significantly, the concepts presented here would not have been articulated 
without the specific set-up of persons, institutions, and new configurations of 
systems of knowledge production that created the conditions for the five years 
of work that finally led to their formulation. Thus, to write about this book, its 
context, situatedness, and rationale, is to write about MusicExperiment21. 
This programme, funded by the European Research Council, hosted at the 
Orpheus Institute, Ghent, Belgium, and led by myself, developed foundational 
work in relation to the use of diverse notions of experimentation in music, aim-
ing to advance innovative performance practices of Western notated art music. 
Concluded at the end of January 2018, MusicExperiment21 is being continued 
and even expanded under the acronym MusicExperimentX. In hindsight, 
MusicExperiment21 functioned as the first phase in a broader research endeav-
our bringing together diverse artistic, performative, historical, methodo-
logical, epistemological, and philosophical perspectives, contributing to a new 
attitude and discourse, crucially moving from interpretation towards experimenta-
tion. The notion of experimentation is not used in relation to measurable quan-




thoughts and practices, to operate new distributions of the sensible, affording 
unpredictable reconfigurations of musical, artistic, social, and conceptual prac-
tices. More concretely, the project generated new modes of musical perform-
ance, and offered innovative channels for the presentation and dissemination 
of artistic research in music. It had a transdisciplinary structure, with specific 
research foci on music performance, composition, musicology, philosophy, and 
epistemology.
Seen from a bird’s-eye perspective, both MusicExperiment21 and this book 
reflect a specific artistic and academic conjuncture, made of (at least) four 
components: (1) the emergence of artistic research in the European higher 
education area; (2) the renewed attention given to music performance within 
contemporary musicology, music philosophy, and performance studies; (3) 
recent developments in contemporary philosophy, particularly related to a 
reassessment of the experimental thought of Gilles Deleuze and post-Deleuz-
ian discourses; and (4) the growing affirmation of practice-driven epistemol-
ogies, specifically in relation to experimental science as described by the his-
torian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997). Critically, MusicExperiment21 
approached this conjuncture not from a purely theoretical point of view but 
from the perspective of music practitioners, all team members being perform-
ers, composers, or artists. Furthermore, this book also reflects the locus where 
it was conceived and written: the Orpheus Institute, Ghent, its research centre, 
and its international community of artist researchers.
The consolidation of artistic research
In terms of the conjuncture mentioned above, the perspective offered by 
MusicExperiment21 stresses the possibility of situating artistic practices beyond 
conventional disciplinary boundaries, making a case for the establishment of a 
vibrant relation to contemporary philosophical and epistemological debates. This 
implies a widening of horizons that is indebted primarily to artistic research, an 
alternative mode of making art and producing knowledge that has gained sig-
nificant relevance in the last two decades. While there is no universally accepted 
definition of artistic research, there is some consensus that it describes a particu-
lar mode of artistic practice and of knowledge production in which scholarly 
research and artistic activity become inextricably intertwined. Questioning the 
boundaries between art, academia, philosophy, and science, artistic research 
enables the exploration and generation of new modes of thought and sensible 
experience. Crucially, artistic research is not to be confused with research on 
the arts, or research on aesthetic matters, or research about the arts. Artistic 
research is not a subdiscipline of musicology, art history, or philosophy. It is a 
specific field of activity where practitioners actively engage with and participate 
in discursive formations emanating from their concrete artistic practice. Artistic 
research is mostly conducted by artists; however, these artists have the capacity 
to infuse research with a particular kind of intensity, which comes from the 
intensive processes they know and daily use while making art. Fundamentally 




ontologies, developing different epistemologies and creating varied modes of 
presentation. It does not necessarily present objects of conclusive knowledge but 
rather insists on unfinished thinking, on a permanent fluidity between thoughts 
and practices, triggering sensible processes as an interplay between conceptual 
and artistic thinking, between abstract thought and physical engagement with 
things, materialities, and institutions. Concurrent with the growing recognition of 
artistic research, recent developments in musicology, philosophy, and epistemology 
enabled the development of specific conceptual alliances of transdisciplinary 
nature, which proved to be highly stimulating for MusicExperiment21. 
Emergent discourses and practices in music 
performance
The renewed focus on music performance recently observable within the music 
industry itself, but also in musicological and music philosophical debates since 
the last decade of the twentieth century, played an important role in the conjunc-
ture that created the concrete operational conditions for MusicExperiment21. 
On the one hand, the growing availability of primary musical sources (sketches, 
historical editions, period instruments, recordings, etc.) and the continuous 
development of sophisticated multimedia tools enabled the emergence of 
extended performance practices. These practices might include conventional concert 
renderings as one component, but they crucially enable the creative composition 
of performances as complex arrangements of diverse and multiple components. 
On the other hand, music philosophers and musicologists like Lydia Goehr 
(1992), Richard Taruskin (1995), Carolyn Abbate (2004), and Nicholas Cook (1998) 
offered fundamental critiques of certain dominant concepts and practices, not 
only of the work concept and its regulative function but also of the dominance of 
text-based renderings of highly idealised musical works. A shift to the study of 
concrete practices of music performance took shape in the late 1990s, leading 
to the establishment of new fields of inquiry, which centred the discourse on 
elements of music that might be labelled as operating with, but beyond text. By 
thinking of music scores as scripts rather than texts, Nicholas Cook proposes 
a new understanding of performance, opening up perspectives that had been 
undervalued by text-oriented renderings: “The text-based orientation of trad-
itional musicology and theory hampers thinking about music as a performance 
art. Music can be understood as both process and product, but it is the relation-
ship between the two that defines ‘performance’ in the Western ‘art’ tradition” 
(Cook 2001, 1). All these developments and renewed attitudes towards musical 
works and their performances were beneficial for creating the conditions for 
MusicExperiment21 to emerge. However, it is absolutely crucial to stress the 
fundamental difference between MusicExperiment21 and all those theoretical 
constructions. MusicExperiment21 operates on a totally different level, aiming 
not at analysis or comparison of data (be it scores, recordings, or performances), 
but at the generation of new and unprecedented sonic events—events that 
are designed, composed, and performed by its team members, all of whom are 




ance studies trend established itself as a subdiscipline of musicology (analysing 
already existing technical objects,1 such as scores, recordings, or performances), 
the endeavour articulated by MusicExperiment21 is situated in the creative field 
of artistic research, aiming at the generation of new phenomena relevant to 
knowledge and artistic development. MusicExperiment21 team members write 
articles and essays, but regularly go onstage and doubly expose themselves: as 
bodies in action in a purely performative sense, and as highly informed performers 
proposing challenging readings of past musical works. Thus, MusicExperiment21 
effectively embodies the turn to the “making of art as research” in music. Its 
team members not only analyse works or performances done by others but also 
crucially make them themselves.
Experimental thought and post-Deleuzian 
philosophy
In philosophy, the last decade observed a profound reassessment of the work 
of Gilles Deleuze, whose concepts and ideas seem to have productive impli-
cations for almost every conceivable field of knowledge and artistic practice. 
Indeed, the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Gilbert Simondon, 
and other authors who had an impact on Deleuze, and the wider field of more 
recent post-Deleuzian thinkers, have become increasingly relevant to artistic 
research, acting as a key reference for many artist-researchers, not the least of 
whom are those involved in MusicExperiment21. Gilles Deleuze’s move from 
interpretation towards experimentation which happened around the compos-
ition of Logic of Sense (first published 1969), and his insistence on the creative 
powers of an experimental attitude towards thought, art, and life (“Experiment, 
never interpret!” [Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 48]), have been a major source of 
inspiration to us. But beyond that particular aspect, and on a more structural 
level, Deleuze’s central claim that philosophy is the creation of concepts is 
probably even more relevant to the appropriations of his thought made by artist 
researchers. In fact, such a claim reverses a whole philosophical tradition that 
considers knowledge as the discovery, the recognition, or the rememberance of 
something prior to our enquiries. Contrary to this view, Deleuze understands 
concepts as being invented, constructed, and fabricated, as being the result of 
a process of thinking that generates an event. Considered in this creative mode, 
concepts become almost literary characters, having their specific history, moment 
of birth, development, inflections, and death. This dynamic notion of concepts is 
profoundly connected with the view that thought always starts with an encoun-
ter between something and something else exterior to it. To have a thought is 
to go outside oneself, outside a particular discipline, outside a given system of 
coordinates, outside socially constructed images of thought. While there is a 
definite discipline of philosophy and several definite disciplines in the arts, these 
disciplines can only productively operate by reaching out beyond themselves. 





For philosophy, this means an encounter with that which is not philosophy; for 
the arts, an encounter with that which is not art; for music, with that which is 
not music (see Somers-Hall 2012, 5). Moreover, as Deleuze and Guattari wrote 
“even science has a relation with a nonscience that echoes its effects” (1994, 
218). This idea resonates with Nietzsche’s famous remark that “the problem of 
science cannot be recognized within the territory of science” (Nietzsche 1999, 5), 
an observation to which artistic research might contribute with a renewed set of 
problems and unexpected territories for enquiry. Both MusicExperiment21 and 
this book explore practical and conceptual encounters that go well beyond the 
confines of music, addressing issues that relate to the contemporary situation 
in performance and in the arts in general, as well as proposing new concepts for 
performance, such as those of virtual/actual, assemblage, strata, and diagram (Chapters 
1 and 2), transduction and micro-haecceity (Chapter 5), somatheme (Chapter 6), the 
emancipated performer (Chapter 7), and the contemporary (Chapter 8). 
New epistemologies—experimental systems
Another key element for MusicExperiment21’s strategic positioning at the cross-
roads of art, philosophy, and science came from post-Kuhnian epistemological 
discourses, such as those presented by Ian Hacking (1983), Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar ([1979] 1992), Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985), and—most 
importantly—Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997). Beyond their differences, all these 
authors move away from the hegemony of theory, considering science to func-
tion not on a theory-driven basis but rather on a practice-driven one, an aspect 
that intimately resonates with practice-led modes of artistic research. For them, 
there is no science “in general,” only concrete, ever-changing, and, to a certain 
extent, unpredictable reconfigurations of matters, connectors, and functions. 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, who is himself interested in the potential usefulness of 
his thinking for other disciplines, has twice visited the Orpheus Institute during 
the lifetime of MusicExperiment21 (in 2012 and 2017), including to present a 
keynote lecture at the Second International Conference on Deleuze and Artistic 
Research, held at the Orpheus Institute in November 2017, and has contributed 
an interview (Rheinberger and Schwab 2013) and an essay (Rheinberger 2018) 
to publications from the project (Schwab 2013, 2017). The appropriation of his 
findings from the history of science to recent developments in artistic research 
enabled the development of a creative notion of experimentation, based upon 
sequential series of research outcomes and performances, which became one of 
the hallmarks of MusicExperiment21 (see, for example, the series Rasch, which 
has had twenty-five instantiations so far, its twenty-sixth being Chapter 6 of this 
book). This effective hybridisation of research strategies (from life sciences to 
artistic research), and its intrinsic search for future possibilities of the materials 
at hand, seems to confirm Rheinberger’s statement that “the minds of inventors 
and scientists, much like those of artists, are not oriented toward recognizing 
what exists; they ‘turn more upon future possibilities, whose speculations and 




linked progression of experiments composing a formal sequence’” (Rheinberger 
1997, 80, interpolating quotation from Kubler 1962, 33).
The Orpheus Institute
Finally, some words about the place where this book was written. I have been 
associated with the Orpheus Institute since 2008, first on a remote and sporadic 
basis, then, since 2013, as a fully affiliated member of its faculty and research 
centre. The Orpheus Institute is a pioneer and leading centre for artistic research 
in music, providing postgraduate education for musicians since 1996, and oper-
ating a world-leading research centre since 2008. Its absolute commitment to 
innovative modes of musical practice and research, and more specifically its 
embracing of “music experimentation” as its core research focus for the period 
2010–17, were fundamental triggers for the design, definition, and unfolding of 
MusicExperiment21. Without the Orpheus Institute and the invaluable discussions 
with its international community of artist researchers, MusicExperiment21 would 
not have happened and this book would not have been written. This book is not 
about abstract ideas or aprioristic concepts and definitions. On the contrary, it 
is the result of the most concrete work with the basic materials of music-making 
(scores, editions, instruments), and of a substantial series of debates, rehears-
als, performances, recordings, and writings. While composing the chapters 
and organising their sequence, I frequently experienced two complementary 
sensations: that of writing about results and findings from the past five years, 
on the one hand, and that of laying the foundations for the future, of opening 
avenues for work to come, on the other. In this sense, this book functions as a 
pivotal achievement, summarising work already done and paving the way for 
upcoming research activities and even more challenging performance practices.
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Beyond representation: performance as 
problematisation
The performance of Western notated art music is usually associated with the 
notions of execution, recitation, transmission, reproduction, or interpretation, 
relying on the existence of a commonly accepted, sedimented musical text, and 
on a set of stabilised conventions that regulate the communication between 
composer, performer, and audience. From this perspective, performance is 
the moment for the concrete sonic representation of an already known sound 
structure. This book challenges this view, proposing a different perspective, 
understanding performance first as a space of problematisation, not of rep-
resentation. It proposes a critical stance on the diversity of the available musical 
sources and materials, stressing their epistemic complexity and their potential 
for productive reconfigurations, suggesting new modes of creatively operating 
with them. Moving beyond the work concept, the book presents a new image of 
musical works, based upon the notions of strata, assemblage, and diagram, and 
proposing innovative practice-based methodologies that integrate archival and 
musicological research into the creative process leading to a performance. This 
view is not primarily intended as a rejection of interpretation, but as a movement 
towards a space of problematisation that is situated beyond interpretation, and 
that might include interpretation as one component of its fabric. Thus, my effort 
is to push interpretation into post-interpretation. It is, however, important to 
make clear that post here is to be understood neither as an epochal category, nor 
simply as chronologically following interpretation, but rather as a rupture and a 
beyond that continue to entertain relationships with interpretation. It involves 
subjecting the traditional relationship between music and interpretation to a 
critical reconsideration. This critical deconstruction of interpretation creates a 
productive tension with representational models, which resist change, and it is 
a proposal for critical renderings infused by research and inventiveness. Musical 
practice becomes primarily a critical act, allowing performances to be critical 
studies of the works performed, significantly in, by, and through the means of 
performance itself. In this sense, performance gains a supplementary dimension, 
and can be thought of as an independent form of art: independent of works of 
music, of supposedly uncorrupted traditions, and of idealised reconstructions of 
past practices and instruments. Consequently, this view also argues for a new kind 
of performer, emancipated from authoritative texts and traditions, and open to 
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critical reconfigurations of past musical objects, which ought to be questioned 
rather than uncritically reproduced and consumed. More than an executant 
or an interpreter, the performer becomes an operator,1 activating unexpected 
assemblages of forces and materials, and overcoming the distinction between 
performer and composer. Beyond representational modes of performance—be 
it mainstream or historically informed performance practices—this book aims 
at creating an ontological, methodological, and ethical space for experimental 
performance practices, suggesting a new mode of performance that is sustained 
by thorough research and driven by inventive imagination. Music performance 
becomes both a critical and a constructive act: critical in the sense that it renegoti-
ates the boundaries of pre-existing knowledges and practices, constructive in 
that, through practice, it creates anew its own conditions and materialities.
Experimentation
Experimentation is the key concept to operate the intended shift from representa-
tion to problematisation. While representation in music is fundamentally tied to 
the notion of musical interpretation, to the permanent discovery or rediscovery 
of previously unnoticed qualities of a pregiven, well-defined musical work, an 
approach that fosters problematisation must remain open and flexible in terms 
of its starting objects of inquiry (which are not seen as pre-existing the inquiry 
itself, nor as well defined in advance), but also in terms of methods, outputs, and 
modes of communication—in a word, a problematising approach must remain 
experimental. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I want to clarify straight 
away that this book is neither about experimental music nor about the realisation 
of measurable experiments, made with the purpose of supporting a given theory 
or hypothesis. What was known in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s as experimental 
music generically referred to compositional practices that consciously intended to 
be situated outside dominant modes of music production and reception.2 It was 
a term coined, and mostly used by composers and critics, who saw its potential 
to overcome academicism and any form of rigidity of thought. Its focus was the 
production of new, experimental compositions radically departing from main-
stream compositional approaches, and of performances thereof. My research 
endeavour is completely different in that it focuses on performance, aiming at 
establishing an experimental regime for the performance of any past musical 
work, critically including pieces that have not been consciously composed to 
be “experimental.” Only on a higher level of thought is there a common thread 
to these two positions: they both aim to criticise, challenge, and deconstruct 
prevailing practices and concepts through concrete musical practice: through 
the making of new pieces in the first case, of innovative performances in my 
case. On the other hand, the notion of experiment in music—understood as the 
realisation of tests in order to confirm or deny certain theories or hypotheses—has 
 
 1 For further substantial consideration of the notion of a musical operator, see D’Errico (2018, 125–27). 
 2 For a short, yet thorough introduction to experimental music, see Gilmore (2014).
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gained visibility within the musicological subfields of performance science and 
performance studies, at least since the 1990s. In his essay “From Experimental 
Music to Musical Experiment,” Frank X. Mauceri (1997, 193), distinguishing 
between the use of the word experiment as a historical or stylistic category and 
its use in science, states: “Experiment is a technique by which evidence is gath-
ered in support of a theory. It is a method that tests hypotheses.” This might 
be relevant for musicologists interested in data collection, measurement, and 
external observation of performances, potentially leading to new insights into 
performance practices, past and present. But again, this has nothing to do with 
the aim and topic of this book, which is centred on the constitution, definition, 
and critical presentation of an aesthetico-epistemic set of references, enabling 
the emergence of spaces of experimentation in and for performance.
Experimental thought and practice
The notion of experimentation that lies at the origin of this book is one concerned 
with creating the conditions to overcome representation and interpretation in music 
performance. Crucially, it does this not through negativity, nor by criticising or 
overtly rejecting those notions, but positively, by proposing conceptual tools for 
open-endedness, for a research practice that, without knowing or foreseeing 
its precise outcome, still knows enough to want to embark on a process that 
has the potential to move practices and thoughts towards something different. 
Particularly in relation to artistic research, experimentation permits communi-
cation between heterogeneous systems, creating new couplings between diverse 
materials that are rigorous rather than accidental—even if they are indeterminate. 
An experimental method follows neither the arrangement of structures nor the 
transformation of structures into other structures, but makes transversal modes 
of communication thinkable and materially graspable. Such a notion enhances 
several experimental approaches, including experimental musical practices, 
experimental modes of writing, and an “experimental thought,” going beyond 
disciplinary, methodological, and institutional boundaries, which are crossed 
transversally. Inter-, trans-, or anti-disciplinary strategies are embraced not to 
deny existing disciplines, but rather to redefine the starting discipline, and 
productively come back to it with new tools. At the core of this perspective lies 
a profound willingness to reshape thoughts and practices, to operate new dis-
tributions of the sensible, affording unpredictable reconfigurations of musical, 
artistic, and conceptual practices. This search is not primordially motivated by a 
quest for newness, or for unprecedented results, but first by a will to extend, enlarge, 
and, if possible, reconfigure the field of the visible, of the utterable, and of the 
audible. Such an endeavour implies a break, a suspension, and an overcoming 
of the given parameters of specific aesthetic and conceptual practices. In this 
sense, my own activity as a practitioner and as a researcher emerges within a 
field of aesthetico-epistemic experimentation. It is aesthetic because the kind of 
performances I propose must and can be assessed in aesthetic terms; epistemic 
because they claim to take part in a broader discourse that contributes to the 
production, discussion, and transmission of knowledge; and, finally, experimental 
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because they are open to the creative exploration of inconsistencies in the 
materials and concepts of my own practice. 
At the very foundation of this perspective, one arrives at the necessity of 
changing oneself, of becoming something different, of not being reducible 
to an imprisoning “I am” that undermines so many other possible selves. It is 
precisely in this sense that my research in general and this book in particular 
strongly relate and are deeply indebted to the philosophical work of Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. The double epigraph at the front of this book 
makes it explicit, referring to the fundamental multiplicity of the I as a source 
of inventiveness and creativity. In an interview from 1978, Foucault (2001, 240) 
affirms experimentation as a mode of writing and thinking that enables us “not 
to think the same thing as before”; while Deleuze, in 1977, directly addresses 
the infinite larval selves that populate our brain and body, which diverse systems 
of codes and rules try to repress and keep silent, and to which experimenta-
tion offers a liberating way out: “experimentation on oneself . . . is our only 
identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us” (Deleuze 
and Parnet 2007, 11). In place of interpreting an idealised and uncorrupted I, 
both Foucault and Deleuze propose the notion and practice of experimenta-
tion, disclosing the positivity of the split ego as an opportunity for new modes 
of affect and rhizomic interconnection. This obviously relates to the notion of 
schizoanalysis developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus in 1972 (see 
[1977] 1983), which focuses on the concrete, material, and machinic operations 
of the unconscious, insisting on their creative power rather than on their 
unhealthy function, which Freud thought was a problem requiring therapy. 
Instead of therapy, schizoanalysis suggests infinite modes of experimentation, 
offering innumerable possibilities to understand how desire produces the real. 
Experimentation, thus, concerns the emergent fractality of the unconscious 
and the immanent plurality of the I. It is in this specific sense that experimen-
tation is so crucial, so fundamental, and so promising for artistic research. 
Logic of experimentation
Experimentation fosters communication between systems that might be 
heterogeneous and full of inconsistencies. Nonetheless, when communication 
occurs—when the “dark precursor” (Deleuze 1994, 119) opens a productive path 
for energetic transfer—what emerges in the world as the result of artistic action 
does have some kind of “sense.” It defines certain sorts of intensities, events, 
structures, and entities that can become objects of thought. What was factually 
unforeseeable a priori becomes somehow graspable a posteriori. There seems 
to be some kind of “logic” that enables the articulation of thought, creation, and 
events. Such logic cannot be prior to experimentation itself; it is only a secondary 
form that accounts for the links, connectors, and relationships at work within the 
experimental field. This logic is neither exterior nor prior to the experimental 
system; it is not a formal logic. It relates to the network of distributed struc-
tures and encounters generated by concrete clashes between things, actions, 
and concepts. Even if one cannot be sure of the outcomes of such clashes, one 
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can describe where and how they have reverberated. It is not about revealing 
a closed logical consistency, but about challenging thought through problem-
atic conjunctures, bifurcations, hybridisations, contradictions, and paradoxes 
that, despite everything, still “make sense.” The logic behind this sense is not 
necessarily rational; it can actually include irrational and aberrant components, 
as long as they are not arbitrary. When something anomalous appears in a given 
system, it enables the formation of a new synthesis, of new conjunctures, thus, 
of new sense. Critically, for artistic research, any productive practice can only 
make sense if it also generates sensations, if it directly addresses the nervous system, 
overflowing and traversing it before cognition happens and before meaning is 
discerned. Sensation is the immediate encounter of a force with a body exterior 
to it. Sensation affects bodies, effectively impinging on them and moving them 
into new configurations. In art, sensation shifts attention from formal aspects 
of the artwork to the nature of its encounter with other bodies. In short, sensa-
tion concerns a vital movement of matter upon matter, taking place before the 
brain captures it. Yet, here too, there is a logic at play. It might be a logic of the 
non-discursive, a logic of intensive (thus, non-verbal) forces; nevertheless, it is 
a logic. Experimentation also constructs its own logic, a logic of experimentation, 
which is precisely situated between a logic of sense and a logic of sensation. It 
creates new sense and new sensations, productively including sense and non-
sense, under-sense and paradoxes, defined and dividual bodies, discursive 
and non-discursive signs, rationality and irrationality, precise calculation and 
unpredictable results. A logic of experimentation is the contrary of a system 
designed to replicate experiments and tests; it is more like an “apparatus of 
capture” employed to capture colours, sounds, vibrations, forces, and intensities. 
It deals with matter and materialities, always starting from concrete practices 
that are exerted upon concrete objects and things. It articulates thought and 
corporeality beyond interpretation, beyond linguistic games, and beyond her-
meneutics. In it, the actual body of the practitioner (the artist researcher), with 
its constituted I, coexists with its virtual (yet really existing), dividual modes of 
existence. It is exactly in this tension between the formed body and its infinite 
compossible formations that lies the force and potential of experimentation in 
and for artistic research, positively stressing the Lacanian gap between the I and 
the I. Instead of closing the gap, or of healing the wounds it creates, this can be 
the locus for the emergence of unprecedented sensations and of unpredictable 
sense. In this gap, something happens. This is the place where a logic of experi-
mentation starts unfolding.
A major reference in my work for the past ten years has been Gilles Deleuze, 
and the logic of experimentation proposed in this book implicitly refers to 
his two logics: a logic of sense, expressed in 1969 in the book of the same name 
(Deleuze 1990), in which Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud play a central role; 
and a logic of sensation, which is the subtitle of Deleuze’s monograph from 1981 
on the painter Francis Bacon (Deleuze 2003). These two logics define a space 
“in between” sense and sensation that is particularly well suited to experimen-
tation. If understood as a practice, experimentation discloses a powerful logic 
of bodies in action and of actions leading to new thoughts, senses, and sensa-
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tions. It enables experimental thought, which is a possible descriptor of the 
kind of thinking developed by Deleuze—alone or in conjunction with Félix 
Guattari—throughout the 1970s and 1980s, thought that would lead him away 
from his early focus on interpretation (with his books on Hume, Nietzsche, 
Proust, Kant, Bergson, and Sacher-Masoch) to a profound critique of inter-
pretation (starting with Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense), through a 
focus on schizoanalysis and politics (with Guattari, since 1970), up until a deep 
engagement with art and creativity (from Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
onwards, including the books on cinema, on the Baroque, and on literature). In 
the overarching architecture of Deleuze’s complete oeuvre, the period between 
Logic of Sense and Logic of Sensation (1969–81) is the moment of significant con-
ceptual inventions that find profound resonance in the present book. One of 
them, extremely characteristic of the interplay between sense and sensation, 
is the notion of body without organs (BwO), which finds its first formulation in 
the thirteenth series of Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1990, 88), in direct relation to 
Artaud’s original phrasing from 1947 of the corps sans organes (Artaud [1976] 
1988, 571), and its very last appearance in the ninth chapter of Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation (Deleuze 2003, 72), after which it is subsumed in the notion 
of figure. The body without organs is the pivotal conceptual invention for the 
introduction of a visceral corporeal dimension that positively destabilises any 
linguistic, propositional, or rational logic. It enables a totally renewed relation 
between thought and body. It articulates the actual body of a person, the body 
that resulted from ontogenetical, social, and biographical pre-conditions, 
with its virtual body, the infinite possible and compossible manifestations of 
that body under precise stimulating conditions. Both bodies coexist in a pro-
ductive tension that leads to the emergence of previously unforeseen forces 
and intensities. This is the body that allows art to pass from sense to production, 
enabling the abandonment of meaning, hermeneutics, analysis, historiography, and 
interpretation. Writings, paintings, sculptures, compositions, or performances 
are produced through concrete operations of the body. In the sharp formulation 
of Anne Sauvagnargues, “sense is an excremental element emitted by the voice 
and deposited by the hand, and is nothing more than an expelled, physical frag-
ment” (2005, 96, my translation). There is no “superior” sense to achieve, or 
from which to deduce art objects. Deleuze’s logic of sense bypasses any notion 
of truth, refusing to consider truth as a crucial factor of thought (see Bouaniche 
2007, 120). This permits a new philosophical perspective that also rejects the 
heights of Platonic transcendental Ideas, in favour of a flattened exploration 
of topological surfaces. This new perspective combines sense and non-sense to 
express events that happen outside the domain of propositions. Thus, Deleuze’s 
theory of sense is inseparable from a theory of the event (see Bouaniche 2007, 
123), which again relates to continuous experimentation and to intensive 
unfoldings of energies and materialities. This, in turn, is precisely the link to 
Deleuze’s theory of sensation. Sensation is understood materially “as a force 
that is exerted upon a body, but through modulation, rendering perceptible 
[those] heterogeneous forces that it captures in a previously unheard material” 
(Sauvagnargues 2005, 107, my translation). Materiality and the body’s work with 
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it are the crucial elements for connecting sense and sensation: sense understood 
as made of sense, non-sense, paradoxes, inconsistencies, and uncertainties; sen-
sation understood as made of impacts, clashes, waves, and invisible/inaudible 
forces. Their encounter happens through continuous experimentation, and 
their effect is directly felt in the nervous system through a conjunction of two 
faces (Deleuze 2003, 34): “Sensation has one face turned toward the subject 
(the nervous system, vital movement, ‘instinct’ . . . ) and one face turned toward 
the object (the ‘fact,’ the place, the event).” Thus, there is always a coupling of 
sense and sensation. In order to produce sense and sensation, it is necessary 
that a force exerts its intensity on a body. Sense and sensation, Lewis Carroll’s 
paradoxes, Artaud’s schizo-screamings, and Francis Bacon’s hysterical postures 
are nothing more than renewed expressions of the Spinozan aphorism “no 
one knows what a body can do” (as translated in Baugh 2010, 36; see Spinoza 
[1994] 1996, 71). A logic of experimentation precisely addresses this doing, aim-
ing at expanding what a body can do. As such, in its vitalist and reinvigorating 
dimension toward artistic and aesthetic practices, a logic of experimentation is 
another mode of affirming the “kind of declaration of faith in life” that Deleuze 
(2003, 61) identified in the paintings of Francis Bacon. 
Structure of the book
Four lines of research lie at the origin of this book. They emerged during the 
last five years as increasingly central to my own research and musical activities, 
defining fields of inquiry that broadly establish the starting conditions, the 
operative modes, and the wider horizon of possible results and consequences 
of my practice. They have been addressed on different occasions, including in 
diverse modes of presentation (oral communications, written essays, perform-
ances), and are here presented close to one another for the first time, defining 
the four parts of this book. 
Part 1 concerns a fundamental redefinition of musical works, presenting a new 
image of the musical work,3 critically conceived as a fluid multiplicity, and not as 
a solid monument, thus questioning traditional ontological accounts and argu-
ing for wider ontological perspectives. Moving away from the work concept, 
and grounded in the notions of strata, assemblage, and diagram, I propose to 
understand musical works as assemblages, as complex conglomerates of things 
and intensities, containing innumerable and potentially never-ending additional 
components, which are continuously rearranged and reassembled in their 
specific modes of appearance throughout history. More than refuting conven-
 3 The proposed neologism work is used in this book with a particular meaning. Work appears whenever 
I am referring to the notion of “work” as it is understood in the classical paradigm (Davies), which is 
grounded around the work concept (Goehr). To designate the kind of entities that I bring forward in this 
book—which have the potential to replace this classical notion of work—I propose the notions of assem-
blage and multiplicity. Thus, when thinking about my new image of “work,” it is immediately obvious that 
it is a new image not of the classical work but of something different. Yet, this difference unavoidably 
recalls the classical notion, which is still active when conceiving its own dismantling. Thus, by work, I 
mean the positive and constructive deconstruction of the old term; it is still there, but its foundations 
are being dismantled piece by piece. In this sense, it is a transient and provisory term.
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tional theories, this notion of work as assemblage has the capacity to include con-
ventional music ontological accounts as particular cases, as historically situated 
subsets, which take only a reduced number of parameters into consideration. 
Those simpler accounts are perfectly functional for musical practices that fol-
low the mainstream notions of work concept, authenticity, interpretation, and 
textual fidelity, as well as for those other practices that focus on historically 
informed investigations. Only when one moves beyond historicity and beyond 
interpretation, entering the realm of more adventurous experimental perform-
ance practices, can there be an expanded perspective on musical entities that 
seems to me to be necessary and inescapable. Importantly, this new view was 
born out of my practice, resulting from daily work, from material activity and 
interaction with innumerable sources, documents, recordings, and performa-
tive options. All this work demonstrated that traditional ontological views have 
acted as repressive and limiting frameworks of reference, drastically reducing 
the accepted horizon of the possible and of the thinkable. Dominant images of 
musical works had—and still have—an enormous impact on what is perform-
able and how it is concretely performed. They exert a policing control over art-
istic practices, allowing certain things to happen, and forbidding many others. 
When music philosophers talk about qualified and fully qualified performances of 
musical works, they are explicitly excluding several others as not qualified. And 
they do it based upon obscure syllogisms and highly complex propositions that 
are used as powerful guardians of an idealised temple of pure works. This is 
the world of the classical paradigm of music ontology, sharply described on many 
occasions by David Davies (see, for example Davies 2011, 24), within which the 
notion of the work concept perfectly operates. However, as long as the critique 
has not been carried to the heart of that image of work (and not only at the 
level of its regulative function, as Lydia Goehr importantly did in 1992 [see Goehr 
(1992) 2007]), it is difficult to conceive of compositions and performances that 
operate beyond the propositional mode. A new image of musical work, critic-
ally replacing work (noun) with work (verb), equals a liberation of practices and 
performance from those conventional images that imprison them.
 Chapter 1, “Virtual Works, Actual Things,” presents the basic ontological 
conditions, concepts, and definitions of this new image of musical work. 
Introducing one of my artistic projects—RaschX, which will reappear at differ-
ent moments throughout the book—this chapter critically reflects upon exist-
ing musical ontologies, exposing their limits and the way in which they impose 
specific modes of conceiving and performing past musical works. Next, after an 
introduction to Gilles Deleuze’s basic ontological commitments, it describes 
musical works as consisting of innumerable component parts, as a collection of 
heterogeneous elements, and, at the same time, as being full of intensive con-
nectors that make those elements vibrate and develop an affective and effective 
relationship with one another. In this light, musical works are fundamentally 
reconceived as having properties that are actual, and capacities that are real but 
not necessarily actual, even if they are not being exercised in a specific here-
and-now of performance, listening, or reflection. Musical works are then seen 
as having two main basic parts: actual things, which are to be found in the actual 
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world (sketches, manuscripts, editions, theoretical essays, recordings, perform-
ances, etc.), and virtual diagrams, highly individual abstract constructions based 
upon particular singularities, which enable us to think about those works. 
Chapter 2, “Assemblage, Strata, Diagram,” introduces the notion of assem-
blage, which is situated within a complex ecology of several other concepts. It 
addresses the notions of agencement, strata, and diagram, revealing them as central 
conceptual operators for an understanding of musical works as assemblages. I 
describe the path that led to the historical emergence of such concepts, placing 
them within a crucial move away from structuralism and phenomenology, and 
directed towards far-from-equilibrium complex systems. The chapter includes 
references to other disciplines—geology, paleo-anthropology, and linguis-
tics—as well as a note on the problems of translating the word agencement.
Together, these two chapters define a new ontology of musical works, an ontol-
ogy that is better described as a “becomology,” or as an “onto-genealogy,” focus-
ing on the ontogenetical properties of any given musical artefact. 
Part 2 deals with epistemological questions, mainly related to a quest for innov-
ative methodologies for artistic research in music. If Part 1 investigated what 
kind of objects we are willing to accept and to produce in artistic research, Part 
2 moves the focus of attention toward the kind of epistemological operations we 
exert upon those objects: how can we know them? How can we reduce their 
epistemic complexity while keeping their full intensity? Which of their char-
acteristic properties must we operationally retain, eliminate, or transform? 
What kind of daily praxis can we develop that is adequate to the new image of 
work as assemblage? These questions imply a search for an allagmatics of artistic 
research.4 More than disclosing structural traits and properties of the objects 
under investigation, this new perspective enables an understanding of how those 
properties came into being: “a structure is the result of a construction, and an 
operation is that which makes a structure appear, or that which modifies a struc-
ture” (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 529, my translation, my emphasis). Through 
this shift of focus from a theory of laws and axioms to a differentiated system of 
operative functions, an epistemology of the concrete takes shape. Simondon’s 
doctoral thesis (from 1958) was not published until 1995 (partially) and 2005 (in 
full). Thus, most of his ideas and concepts had little influence for almost half a 
century; only in the last decade have they become relevant to philosophers and 
historians of science. Therefore, and even if Simondon appears to me today to 
be a central reference for contemporary discourses on science and technology, 
my starting references for an epistemological account that could suit artistic 
research came originally from a different source: first, from the work done by 
 
 4 Allagmatics is Gilbert Simondon’s word for a “theory of operations” that critically moves beyond the 
search for the generic structures of conventional science and creatively looks for genetic operations. Simon-
don used the term as the title of the second supplement that was added to the edition of L’individuation 
à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information prepared by Jacques Garelli in 2005 (Simondon [1954–58] 
2013, 529–36). Its original text was found among Simondon’s draft manuscripts for his dissertation from 
1958. See also Barthélémy (2012, 203).
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the historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, particularly from his notion of 
experimental systems (Rheinberger 1997b). Such systems are extremely concrete, 
defining units of research that operate in a specific time and place, with specific 
individuals, and under specific social, institutional, technical, and instrumental 
arrangements. Through their radical concreteness, they indicate that there is 
no science “in general,” only particular, ever-changing, and to a certain extent 
unpredictable reconfigurations of matters, functions, and operations. Within 
them, sequences or series of experimental activities take place, replicating and 
changing conditions, parameters, scales, and observations. Given a research 
problem, infinite experimental iterations of precisely calibrated experiments 
generate expected results (predictable), but crucially also generate unexpected 
ones (unknown). It is through this unexpected and unknown part of the results 
that science advances. An experimental system becomes a machine for making 
the future. This epistemology of the concrete was adopted and appropriated 
for music, functioning as a basic model for the daily practice and routines of 
my research team and me. This created a unique modus operandi, based upon a 
precise mapping of the research materials and components in terms of technical 
objects, epistemic things, space of representation, space of graphematicity, and machines 
for making the future (on these notions, see Rheinberger 1997b, especially 27–31 
and 223–29). 
Chapter 3, “Experimental Systems and Artistic Research,” describes these 
notions and explains how they have been appropriated for musical practice. It 
offers a compact overview of the notion of experimental systems, making some 
terminological clarifications, and suggesting modes of appropriating such sys-
tems for artistic research. Next, it presents MusicExperiment21 as a thought col-
lective, as an ensemble of experimental systems, and as a proliferating machine, 
enhancing the generation of differential repetition and the establishment of 
links and connectors between different projects, both within the project and in 
terms of the project’s integration within a wider research environment such as 
that of its host institution. In the last section of the chapter, the diversity of aes-
thetic and research practices is displayed, presenting selected examples from 
the project’s use of series of aesthetico-epistemic experiments, and of specific mod-
ules of research, each resulting from a different research method or perspective.
Chapter 4, “Epistemic Complexity and Experimental Systems,” discusses the 
notions of complexity and reduction of complexity, which are mentioned by 
Rheinberger but not really addressed in his writings. In fact, Rheinberger often 
reiterates the idea that “reduction of complexity is a prerequisite for experi-
mental research” (Rheinberger 1997a, S245, my emphasis); however, he doesn’t 
address the topic of complexity for the simple reason that his central concern is 
the concrete experimental situation. Even when he writes that “experimental 
systems are machines for reducing complexity” (ibid., S247) he does not enter 
a discussion on what makes and what characterises this complexity or how it 
can be reduced. Thus, further elaboration of the notions of complexity and of 
reduction of complexity became inescapable, and Chapter 4 includes extensions 
to biology, science and technology studies, and computer science.
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While the first two parts are devoted to material objects and things (Chapter 1), 
strata and assemblages (Chapter 2), and functions and operations (Chapters 3 
and 4), Part 3 turns to the performing body, the body-in-action of the musician. 
This body is not only a measurable form or a quantifiable addition of functions 
(external or internal). More importantly, it is “a complex relation between differ-
ential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles,” as Deleuze 
(1988, 123) wrote about the concept of body in Spinoza. It possesses, primarily, 
the capacity for affecting and being affected by other bodies. It is a dynamic body, 
affectively and informationally charged. This body will be perceived with that 
which it makes perceptible in the world, as it proceeds in it at changing paces, 
step-by-step, point after point. The form or the functional mechanism of a body 
might be exactly described and minutely registered in a collection of data, but 
all these numbers and figures will not reveal anything about the effective mode 
of existence of that body in the world, of its energetic interaction with other 
bodies. The famous example offered by Deleuze is illuminating: “there are 
greater differences between a plow horse or draft horse and a racehorse than 
between an ox and a plow horse. This is because the racehorse and the plow 
horse do not have the same affects nor the same capacity for being affected; the 
plow horse has affects in common rather with the ox” (Deleuze 1988, 124). Thus, 
to think about bodies-in-action in a more stimulating way, one has to turn to their 
intensive modes of existence (their intensive properties) and to their immanent 
modes of expression in the world. Bodies certainly do have extensive properties 
(which are dividable, like weight, length, or volume), but it is their intensive 
properties (pressure, temperature, density, genetic information, or—crucial 
to the arts—their will, desire, drives, speeds, and directions) that enable their 
apprehensibility in the world. The less intense a body is, the less it acts, and the 
less it is acted upon in the world. The diversity of bodies that we can perceive 
in the world are, thus, entities bounded in extension but that are generated by 
invisible processes governed by differences of intensity.5 Crucially, intensities are 
not graspable entities, they are “virtual yet real events whose mode of existence 
is to actualise themselves in states of affairs” (Boundas 2005, 131). This actuali-
sation, this concrete emergence of extension out of intensive processes, defines 
the expressivity of matter, things, stars and rocks, animals, individuals, landscapes, 
technical devices, and works of art. Every intensive process has and generates 
its own expression, but, critically, “that which is ‘expressed’ exists only by virtue 
of its expression” (Young 2014, 118). Contrary to the common-sense meaning of 
expression as the expression of something that exists prior to the expression itself 
(an interior world, a subjectivity, a feeling), expression gains a totally different 
force if understood as the unfolding of an action in the world. Expression, then, 
is the production of an affect that knows nothing about those producing it; it 
is the generation of something that didn’t exist before its own expression. In 
this sense, expression always expresses something that could not be expressed in 
another way. It constitutes itself in that which is being expressed. Thus, we can 




say with Spinoza and with Deleuze, “you do not know beforehand what a body 
or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combina-
tion” (Deleuze 1988, 125). If one understands ethics not in its restrictive sense 
of a morality or a code of behaviour but instead as the study of the modes by 
which different bodies act and interact with each other in the world, then Part 
3 of this book is about an ethics of performance focused on the body-in-action of 
the musician. It is about the performer’s capacity to move, to change its speed 
of movement, to intensify energetic flows, and to establish connectors between 
fields of forces with different energetic potentials.
Chapter 5 scrutinises Gilbert Simondon’s central notion of transduction as a 
possible way to overcome both subjectivity-based approaches and “scientific” 
analytical measurements of performance. Transduction refers to a dynamic 
operation by which energy is actualised, moving from one state to the next, in 
a process that individuates new materialities. It is Simondon’s key concept for 
understanding processes of differentiation and of individuation in a number 
of fields, including scientific disciplines, social and human sciences, techno-
logical devices, and artistic domains. This chapter appropriates Simondon’s 
concept for performance in general, and for musical practice in particular. It 
aims at establishing a foundational conceptual layer for a broader research 
effort that crucially includes performance and composition under the unifying 
notion of energetic transductive processes. 
Chapter 6 is an in-depth exploration of the somatheme, an overlooked con-
cept invented by Roland Barthes in 1975 in an essay on the music of Robert 
Schumann (see Barthes 1985). The somatheme (somatème), which is presented 
by Barthes in the plural (somathemes), is defined as describing “the figures of 
the body” (ibid., 307); it relates to a claimed “second semiology, that of the body 
in a state of music” (ibid., 312). This is one of the rare texts in which Barthes is 
quite explicitly opposed to structural, propositional semiology, clearly advocat-
ing “a second semiology” (semiotics) based upon intensive processes: “let the 
first semiology manage, if it can, with the system of notes, scales, tones, chords, 
and rhythms; what we want to perceive and to follow is the effervescence of the 
beats [the second semiology]” (ibid.). The first semiology aims to understand 
structures and propositions (intelligibility), the second to perceive and follow 
forces and intensities (drives and desire). Moreover, Chapter 6 discusses the 
relation of the somatheme to Jacques Lacan’s graphs of desire, situating music 
performance beyond verbal articulation, in a territory situated between verbal 
and non-verbal modes of communication, whereby the unspeakable body-in-
action of the performer gains absolute centrality. 
Finally, Part 4 proposes a new artistic and social role for the performer of Western 
notated art music. More than an executant and more than an interpreter, this 
new kind of performer is understood as a critical and creative operator, exposing 
in unprecedented ways selected sources and materials related to a given musical 
piece. Instead of performances of musical works, this new mode of performance 
offers problematisations of such works, exposing some of the tensions and potential 
inconsistencies latent in them. Beyond representing a work, the performances 
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made by an operator investigate how those works work, suggesting a fundamental 
move away from musical works (noun) toward the work (verb) of performance. 
Where an interpreter aims at reproducing the musical work (with more or less 
faithfulness to a score and more or less subjective expressivity), an operator aims 
at creating a performative situation that can be regarded as a critical study of 
that work through the means of performance itself. This implies a twofold 
displacement in relation to conventional practices. First, it requires an eman-
cipation from the multiple authorities that regulate, control, and police the 
performance of Western notated art music: composers, musical texts, qualified 
or even “authorised” performers, teachers and music directors, performing 
traditions, musicological rectitude, musical structure, even common sense, 
which is invoked as soon as something slightly different than usual is proposed.6 
Second, it demands profound knowledge of the existing sources and discourses 
around a musical work, as well as a sharp sense to detect “symptoms,” to grasp 
in a given work its own immanent points of rupture, its lines of flight, its planes 
of vertigo, in short: all those inconsistencies point to what is outside the work, 
to other planes of consistency, planes whose loose structure the operator makes 
(somehow) perceptible. There is nothing obscure about the operations made, 
they are always very concrete: a given passage from a score enters into dialogue 
(or into tension) with a specific text, image, or yet another musical passage; it 
is not about “hidden” meanings, nor about inscrutable intentions: it is about 
immediate clashes between different materials, inducing affective responses in 
the nervous systems of the audience members. On some occasions, the operator 
might seem close to a composer, but he or she does not aim at producing new 
“compositions” but rather at problematising existing ones. Some might claim that 
the kind of performances offered by a musical operator as defined here might be 
seen as composed performances, similar to composed theatre. Nevertheless, this would 
reduce these performances to conventional paradigms of reception, restating 
once again the idea of a work. The specificity of the operator is that he or she 
works beyond conventional notions of performance, execution, interpretation, 
and composition, which all merge together in the operator’s daily practice and in 
his or her presence onstage. This practice and presence constitute a critical act 
against the commonplace and the clichéd, and generate an aesthetico-epistemic 
space of experimentation, overcoming both interpretation and representation. 
Moreover, traditional musical interpretation presupposes and constitutes a kind 
of reality, both artistic and social, which is defined by pre-given images of musical 
works, and clearly distributed social partitions. The experimental performance 
practice of a musical operator permits the emergence of other realities, fostering 
an image of the musical work as a multiplicity, establishing a working methodology 
that brings together research and artistic skills, and arguing for a new ethics of 
performance and music reception. 
Inspired by Jacques Rancière’s The Emancipated Spectator (2011), by Deleuze’s 
short essay from 1990 on societies of control (Deleuze 1995), and by Nietzsche’s 
“On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (Nietzsche 1997), Chapter 
 6 For an overview of these tacit authorities, see Dreyfus (2007, 254).
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7 introduces the notion of the emancipated performer, first disclosing the 
strong power relations implicit in conventional interpretative approaches, 
then comparing such relations with systems of policing, control, and punish-
ment from the old feudal and disciplinary societies, finally arguing for a critical 
mode of relating to history and to historical artefacts, which is opposed to what 
Nietzsche called the monumental and the antiquarian modes of understanding 
the past. 
Starting precisely from Nietzsche’s notion of the untimely, Chapter 8 develops 
reflections on time, temporality, and the contemporary, extending Nietzsche’s 
remarks on history to other concepts, such as Barthes’s contemporary, Foucault’s 
actual, Péguy’s aternal, and Deleuze’s haecceity. All these notions help define a 
new regime of temporality, a proto-theory of time in which the musical oper-
ator can most effectively operate and generate new problematisations of (and 
at) any given historical time. To live in a given time is to be contemporaneous 
with it, which is a piece of factual evidence and does not carry any critical stance 
over one’s own presence in that particular time in which we live. Establishing 
a critique of one’s own time is the role of the contemporary, and it is crucial for 
any single musical operator to develop a sense of it—otherwise the musical 
operator’s contemporaneousness will condemn him or her to historicism. 
Critically, if distinguished from the contemporaneous of a given historically situ-
ated present, the contemporary becomes an ahistorical mode of relating to any 
given presence. It gains a critical function (on the identity of the present), 
enabling a clinical glance (symptomatology) at our own time. The present, and 
our presence within that present, is surrounded and over-layered by a multi-
plicity of temporalities, which are at work in every single thinkable and experi-
enceable here-and-now, and which are perceptible as otherness or uncanni-
ness. The present is not One, and it is not a stable entity. Like the inner eye of 
a hurricane, it is a complex arrangement of different temporalities moving at 
different paces (fast and slow), with different accelerations (strata and becom-
ings), and different temperatures (hot and cold). Problematising the archive, 
Michel Foucault ([1972] 2002, 147) identified a “border of time that surrounds 
our presence,” a particular zone in which human beings problematise what 
they are, what they do, and the world in which they live. But this differential 
critical temporality can also be explored and creatively expanded in relation to 
the future. The fundamental step is to grasp the extent to which those borders 
of time are out of phase with the zeitgeist of their present, which they surround 
and latently threaten. To be at the border of time is to resist the centre, to resist 
death, servitude, habits, clichés, intolerance, common sense, consensuality, 
that is, the present. Looking toward the future (and not to the archive), aim-
ing at constructing futures (and not at idealising them), is simply the desire to 
actualise different configurations of materials, connectors, and affects in a new 
present, which exists in the present but remains concealed to itself. As the last 
chapter in the book, wider extra-musical reflections are offered, pushing the 
discourse towards what is outside disciplinary divisions with the aim of ques-
tioning our own presence and our responsibility within any given temporality. 




Figure 0.1. The rhizomic-arborescent model. Photograph by Christoph Bachofen, Swiss 
Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research (WSL), entered in the first 
SNSF Scientific Image Competition, May 2017.
unknown regions, which are situated “at the border of time that surrounds our 
presence.” 
If read in this sequence, from Part 1 to 4, this book roughly follows a typ-
ical philosophical itinerary, moving from ontology (1) to epistemology (2), and to 
two kinds of ethics, an ethics of the performing body (3) and an ethics of the 
performer in the world (4). If one adds to these four parts all the available 
documentation and audio and video recordings of the artistic activities of the 
MusicExperiment21 project (which is available at musicexperiment21.eu), one 
would have a “Part 5” that presents aesthetic achievements and questionings. 
However, there is another way of reading this book, which is more experimental 
and more closely linked to the mode of working developed by the project itself.
Every chapter, a book
Every single chapter in this book is a particular instantiation and elaboration 
of a specific research topic that has been discussed, presented, and sometimes 
even published in other contexts and on other occasions. It is part of a longer 
series of outputs on the same theme. Thus, every chapter is like a shoot sharing 
a common subterranean root with other shoots based upon the same genetic 
material and pertaining to a common rhizomatic network. At the same time, 
every single chapter is also constructed as a draft for a future book, the possible 
start of a tree trunk capable of producing branches, forks, and leaves; or as a 
linking bough between distinct, yet related trees. In this sense, the highly varied 
topics presented in this book work simultaneously on a rhizomatic and on an 
arborescent plane of composition. Subterranean, disparate roots and connectors 
emerge at the surface as markers and signals of a specific territory and modes 
of coding. Beyond the opposition between rhizome and tree, this suggests a 
rhizomic-arborescent model. Trees are more rhizomatic and rhizomes more 
arborescent than we think. Figure 1 depicts what might normally escape the eye: 
the delicate inter-twinning of the roots of ten young Scots pine trees. 
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This explains the chapter’s highly condensed style of writing, which aims to 
contain the maximum possible amount of seminal information on its respective 
topic. In turn, this relates to my artistic practice, which is characterised by series 
of experiments that take a common set of materials as their starting objects of 
inquiry; these sets are constantly exposed to ever-changing arrangements, com-
binations, and reconfigurations. Contrary to conventional music interpretation, 
which despite admitting and even welcoming a certain degree of variability, rests 
on a “unique,” highly idiosyncratic ideal of personal interpretation, my proposal 
for performance is to consciously and pro-actively produce differential repetition. 
To achieve this goal, the same starting materials are presented in a variety of 
formats and media, including live performances, recordings, CDs, DVDs, oral 
presentations, lectures, articles and essays, interviews, and web pages. From my 
point of view, and from my daily work, each of these different modes of expres-
sion pertains to the same path and trajectory. They all revolve around the same 
materials, putting the same questions in different formats and supports. They 
are like topological transformations of the same topological figure, appearing 
in ever-changing shapes while keeping the same fundamental questions. Each 
performance, presentation, installation, or publication coming from a case study 
defined one more instantiation in a long process of inquiry, being best seen as 
part of a potentially never-ending continuum. This modus operandi enables an 
always renewed attention to specific aesthetic and epistemic qualities of a given 
clash of materials, creating a process of experimentation that doesn’t aim—in 
the first instance—at the generation of solely aesthetic or purely theoretical 
results. Every instantiation must be assessed locally, in terms of its concrete 
impact, and yet globally, as part of wider epistemic research. This methodology, 
which was first devised for work on musical pieces, is here expanded and applied 
also to conceptual constructions such as the main themes of each chapter in this 
book. A footnote at the beginning of every chapter provides further details on 
its positioning in these series of outputs. 
Two appendices
Finally, this book is complemented with two appendices, which were written 
nine and seven years ago, respectively. They relate to seminal stages of the 
research that led to this book, manifesting early attempts to expand musical 
concepts and practices from dominant modes of thought toward exploratory and 
experimental perspectives on music editions (Appendix 1) and on the relations 
between a specific take on contemporary composition and selected concepts by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Appendix 2). They can be seen as sort of “basic 
research,” which was explored in more practical terms—and in more depth—in 
the last five years, leading to the kind of performances and the kind of musical 
thought reflected upon and expressed in this book. 
The first appendix, “Beyond Urtext,” was written in 2009 as a result of a 
research project developed at the Orpheus Institute on “the musician’s rela-
tion to notation.” That project followed a period of work on critical editions of 
contemporary music that allowed me to understand the ephemeral and tran-
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sient character of music editions in general. The essay places the notion of 
music editing in the realm of history, underlining its fundamental function as a 
meeting point between the fixed time of the composer and the movable time 
of the performer. Arguing that critical editions should generate critical users, 
this paper makes a claim for a new kind of editor and performer. The essay is 
clearly written from the perspective of a performer obeying the “classical para-
digm,” and it presents a line of argumentation (especially its conclusion) that 
has been superseded by my own later research (which moved away from such 
a paradigm). Nonetheless, it documents an important passage in my musical 
thought, which moved from forms of textual fixity to more flexible understand-
ings of musical scores and inscriptions. Without this step, rooted in a critical 
assessment of music editorial practices, my broader subsequent critique of 
interpretation would probably not have been formulated. 
The second appendix, “The Conditions of Creation and the Haecceity of 
Musical Material” (2011), explores connections between the compositional 
theories of the German composer Helmut Lachenmann and selected con-
cepts by Gilles Deleuze. It was my first attempt at a Deleuzian perspective on 
music, looking for resonances between two bodies of work that had never been 
brought into communication before.
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On the evening of 21 November 2017, during the second International Conference 
on Deleuze and Artistic Research, together with other musicians of the 
MusicExperiment21 Collective,1 I performed a new iteration of RaschX, an artistic 
research project around Robert Schumann’s set of piano fantasies Kreisleriana 
(1838, 1850). RaschX is a series of mutational performances, lectures, and essays 
grounded in two fundamental materials: Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana, op. 16, 
and Roland Barthes’s essays on the music of Schumann, written in 1970, 1975, 
and 1979 (see Barthes 1985a, 1985b, 1985c), particularly “Rasch,” a text exclusively 
dedicated to Schumann’s Kreisleriana. To these materials other components are 
added for each particular version: visual elements, other texts, or further aural 
elements.2 Under the title Rasch25: . . . vers la nuit, the complete musical score of 
Schumann’s piece was played on a modern grand piano and on an upright piano. 
Additionally, the performance included pre-recorded sounds and live electronics, 
as well as video projections of texts, images, and film fragments. The perform-
ance had no perceptible beginning: when the doors opened, a sonic and visual 
installation submersed the listener within a complex, multi-layered texture of film 
fragments, projected texts, fragments of other piano pieces, and audio extracts 
from different materials that would reappear throughout the performance. A 
 * Earlier and partial presentations of the ideas exposed here were made at two conferences and in one 
publication: (1) as a lecture at the Thirteenth International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory, 
Orpheus Institute, Ghent, Belgium, 5 April 2016; (2) as a keynote speech at the interdisciplinary 
conference Music, Art and Philosophy in Dialogue, convened by Marcello Ruta, Zentrum Paul Klee, 
Bern, Switzerland, 20 May 2016; and (3) as a book chapter in the collected volume Virtual Works—Actual 
Things: Essays in Music Ontology (Assis 2018), edited by me, with contributions by Andreas Dorschel, 
David Davies, Gunnar Hindrichs, John Rink, and Lydia Goehr. I wish to express my gratitude to Lydia 
Goehr, David Davies, and Lucia D’Errico for their extensive and precise comments on earlier versions of 
this chapter.
 1 The MusicExperiment21 Collective (in short, ME21 Collective) is composed of artistic researchers in-
volved in or collaborating with the research project MusicExperiment21, and is the project’s performa-
tive extension. It is made up of musicians, performers, composers, dancers, actors, and philosophers, 
and it has no stable formation. Its modes of communication include not only conventional formats such 
as concerts, performances, and installations, but also lectures, publications, and web expositions. It has 
performed in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
On this particular occasion, the performers were me (concept and piano), Lucia D’Errico (concept, 
guitars, video and sound projection), Juan Parra Cancino (live electronics and sound projection), and 
Marlene Monteiro Freitas (dance). 
 2 An overview of the complete instantiations of the Rasch series is available at Research Catalogue, 
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/64319/64320. A full-length video recording of Rasch11: Loving 
Barthes[1] can be watched online at https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/99320/99321.
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recorded reading of Roland Barthes’s 1979 essay “Loving Schumann” was diffused 
over four loudspeakers, and another essay by Barthes—“Rasch,” from 1975—
functioned as a constant, recurrent conceptual layer throughout the complete 
performance, fragments of which were projected onto the walls or heard through 
the loudspeakers. At some points, the pianist (me), while scrupulously playing 
all the notes prescribed in the score, played them in extreme slow motion. At 
other times, I sustained a chord, or even stopped playing for more than a minute. 
Other pieces of music were played live or through the loudspeakers at specific 
moments of the performance: Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte (especially number 
6, “Nimm sie hin denn, diese Lieder”), Ignaz Moscheles’s Etude caractéristique pour 
piano, op. 95, no. 1, Bach’s Gigue from the second French Suite, BWV 813, and 
very short fragments of the Goldberg Variations, BWV 988, and also recordings 
of pianists like Yves Nat and Vladimir Horowitz playing Schumann’s Kreisleriana. 
Instead of the customary thirty or so minutes of a rendering of Kreisleriana, this 
performance lasted fifty-five minutes.
Clearly, this was not a performance “of ” Kreisleriana, though all its pitches, 
rhythms, dynamics, and formal proportions were played and faithfully respected. 
It was also not a performance “about” Kreisleriana, as it had no pedagogical 
intention of revealing to the audience anything it didn’t know before (even 
if that happened as a side effect). And it was also not a performance “after” 
Kreisleriana, for the simple reason that the full score was played in an intended 
mainstream, modern mode of musical interpretation. Significantly, all mater-
ials external to Schumann’s score, all the various layers that were brought into 
dialogue with it, were not chosen incidentally or associatively, but rather follow-
ing a precise and rigorous research process. Every single component of the per-
formance had a close relation to Schumann’s piece, whether prior to the com-
position, as a fertile humus that had an impact on the compositional process, 
or a posteriori, as reflective exercises directly inspired by the piece.3
Kreisleriana, an iconic piece of the mainstream pianistic repertoire, is regarded 
as well known; thus, normally, there would be many fully qualified4 performances 
and recordings of it. However, as we now know, this is not the case.5 Not only 
are there two versions of the score (the first from 1838, the second from 1850), 
but also four different editions were printed in the nineteenth century, two 
prepared by Schumann, the other two by Clara Schumann (see Rostagno 2007, 
 3 As examples of such materials, one can mention the following: Roland Barthes’s essay “Rasch,” which is 
exclusively dedicated to Kreisleriana (see Barthes 1985b); his text “Loving Schumann,” which is devoted 
to more than the German composer as it was first published as the introduction to Marcel Beaufils’s 
monograph on Schumann’s piano music (see Barthes 1985a; Beaufils 1979); Beethoven’s An die ferne 
Geliebte, which is literally quoted in Schumann’s Fantasie, op. 17 (composed immediately before Kreis-
leriana), in a passage with close melodic resemblance to the end of Kreisleriana no. 2; Moscheles’s piano 
study Zorn [Anger] that served as direct inspiration for Kreisleriana no. 5 (see Rostagno 2007, 98–102); 
and Bach’s Gigue from the second French Suite, whose rhythmical pattern is exactly the same as the 
rhythm of the main theme of Kreisleriana no. 8. 
 4 On the notion of fully qualified performances, see David Davies (2018, 47), where he states that “some-
thing is fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork X at a time t just 
in case at t it possesses all those experienceable properties that are necessary, according to the practices 
of the art form in question, to fully play this role.”
 5 For details on the two versions of the score, see Antonio Rostagno’s (2007) detailed account of the 
compositional and editorial history of this piece. 
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205–8). In the twentieth century, attempts were made to offer the reader a com-
bination of all these disparate bits of information. The result was that, with the 
exception of Charles Rosen, every single pianist plays the version of 1850, but 
does not really play everything as it was notated by Schumann—some possible 
alternative passages from the 1838 version “infiltrate” these renderings, so that 
most performances we hear today are of a musical object that was not exactly 
designed in that manner by the composer. So much for fully qualified illusions.6 
But, beyond the specific problem of “the score,” the question that the per-
formance made by the ME21 Collective raises is of a different nature: what kind 
of relation is there between all these things—which were part of the perform-
ance and have an umbilical relation with the piece—and Schumann’s work? 
What are these things in relation to this piece? In an orthodox ontological 
account, they have nothing to do with Kreisleriana. Yet, they obviously do have 
something to do with it.7 Ontological questions were not part of the original 
research plan of MusicExperiment21, and I did not turn to them out of a philo-
sophical will to clarify the nature of my objects of daily work. Nor did I aim 
at developing a new aesthetic model for the reception of past musical works. 
More simply, but—I suspect—with deeper consequences, I found myself in 
a situation where my own practice could not be aesthetically assessed on the 
basis of existing ontological accounts, and where our ways of working with the 
materials started suggesting new and alternative views of what a musical work 
is, which component parts it might have, and how its material constitutive 
parts allow for the individual and collective construction of an image of work.
Crucially, my mode of operating clearly considers the performative moment 
as a place for representation not of already known sound structures but of a 
critical problematisation of the musical objects under consideration. With the 
project RaschX, a major breakthrough happened: it seemed to me and my team 
members that musical works could be considered from a completely new per-
spective, moving beyond currently available music ontologies, which are based 
on a representational mode of thinking about musical works.8 Is it possible to 
 6 I am referring here to those ontological accounts that determine a work’s qualification solely on the basis 
of a score or a plurality of scores, per se. This view must be differentiated from other accounts (such as 
the one mentioned in footnote 4), which are less essentialist and that take into account the modalities 
through which a given musical community frames and receives performance practices. 
 7 David Davies has pointed out that this statement depends on which particular ontological account I 
am referring to. As he wrote to me (pers. comm., 15 January 2018): “For a contextualist like Levinson 
or myself, at least some of the things included in the performance do enter into the work. To cite the 
most obvious example, the Beethoven passage quoted by Schumann in the earlier piece [Fantasie, op. 
17] would be, for the contextualist, partly constitutive of the earlier piece, in the sense that the passage 
features in Schumann’s work as a quotation, and a failure to grasp this is a flaw in a listener’s grasp 
of that piece. Whether this also extends to Kreisleriana will depend, for the contextualist, on how she 
takes this to itself relate to the earlier piece.” In any case, Davies agrees with me in that “even for such a 
contextualist, most of the things incorporated in to the performance of Rasch would not enter into the 
appreciation of Kreisleriana as a work.” As an example of relative openness to the inclusion of heterogen-
eous components into a work, Davies mentions Jerrold Levinson, who “thinks that the ways in which 
future composers or performers take up elements in a given piece do enter into a full engagement with 
the latter.” I thank David for this precise and important comment. 
 8 By representation, I refer to the performance of something, or, more precisely, the performance of some - 
thing as something, which implies the existence of something original, prior to the performance, 
something that is then rendered perceptible through some sort of representation in the moment of the 
performance. In this sense, the performance functions as a representation of something exterior to it. Thus, 
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think about those entities that we usually call “musical works” in another 
way? Is there another way of conceiving musical renderings of past musical 
objects? Is it possible to move beyond the classical paradigm of music perform-
ance and reception? How could all those materials that are not supposed to be 
played in a performance, but which obviously relate to a given musical work, 
be considered as being part of that work? What kind of image of work would 
that imply? It seemed to me that there are multiple ways of conceiving musical 
works, and that every specific image of work has implications for its renderings 
in concerts, recordings, performances, or installations. Thus, to my own sur-
prise, I found myself in the middle of ontological questions, as new views on 
ontological issues seemed to be necessary.9
2. The limits of music philosophy and the role of 
artistic research
Lydia Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works ([1992] 2007), with its 
profound analysis of the regulative force of the work concept, its historically 
situated emergence, and its powerful impact on the legitimation of certain 
musical practices, was a major attempt to break down dominant modes of think-
ing, particularly in the face of several musical practices that were demolishing 
concepts and conventions, forcing people to revisit their mental categories, 
in a period (the late 1980s) where musicians and aestheticians seemed to have 
no hold on their concepts. Later, David Davies (2011) developed the notion 
of the classical paradigm, an important construction that aimed at defining the 
best possible ontological account that could accommodate Goehr’s notion of 
the work concept. Today, almost entering the third decade of the twenty-first 
century, musical practices are demolishing the ontological establishment even 
more than in the late 1980s; however, the most recent analytic philosophy tries to 
make things and musical “works” more transparent, grasping or explaining them 
better, mapping their position in an overall transcendentally defined territory. 
Some of the contemporary defenders of music ontologies, such as Andrew Kania 
(2012) or Julian Dodd (2007), for example, reaffirm the authority of the work, 
“improving” propositional judgements, but not challenging concepts or practi-
ces. Music ontology seems to be caught within dominant conservative views on 
music, and even conservative views on the world beyond music. Because of this 
state of affairs, most music practitioners, whether performers or composers, are 
extremely sceptical of music ontologies, which appear to them to be profoundly 
I am not referring to the old aesthetic question of music’s “resistance to representation,” related to the 
absence of the signified in musical pitches, rhythms, or formal structures. In any case, music theory and 
music philosophy have a long tradition of thinking about musical entities in representational terms. As 
Christopher Hasty (2010, 4) has put it, “[even] if music seems to defy representation and has occasionally 
challenged the claims of representation, music theory has embraced representation as a way of fixing the 
musical object.”
 9 This was actually the trigger for the organisation of the Thirteenth International Orpheus Academy 
for Music and Theory (2016), to which the Orpheus Institute invited Andreas Dorschel, David Davies, 
Gunnar Hindrichs, John Rink, and Lydia Goehr. A volume containing expanded and revised versions of 




sterile and unrelated to their practices. However, practical musicians should be 
aware that currently existing ontologies have a tremendous influence on what 
they play and how they are supposed to play it. The argument that ontological 
judgements have no aesthetic consequences (as claimed for example by James 
O. Young [2014–15, 1]) is unashamedly ideological because it aims to reinforce 
musical practices subsumed under the strong work concept, tamed by authorita-
tive texts and sources, whose production is the property of a caste of privileged 
musicologists and music philosophers. The way one defines what counts as a 
work establishes profound constraints on what is considered as acceptable and 
unacceptable, as possible and impossible, what is allowed and what is forbidden, thus 
providing the musical market with precise instruments of survey and control. 
Therefore, ontological judgements, which are a priori judgements, do have 
empirical consequences—at least in the empirical world of music performance. 
According to Lydia Goehr (2001, 601), most philosophical engagement with 
music has been done by three different kinds of thinkers: (1) by philosophers 
developing metaphysical systems “in which each subject and type of phenom-
enon, including music, is assigned its proper place” (ibid.); (2) by “philosophers 
treating music as one of the arts within their different philosophical systems 
of aesthetics” (ibid.); and (3) by “musicians—composers, performers, theor-
ists and critics—drawing on and thus contributing to explain the foundations, 
rationale and more esoteric aspects of their theories, practices and products” 
(ibid.).10 At the same time, several contemporary performance practices, of 
which those developed by myself and MusicExperiment21 are one example 
among others, suggest renewed ontological accounts—accounts that come 
from a fourth group, namely that of performers working in the context of 
Western art music who are working within a creative and research-based mode 
of performance. These are artist-researchers, who are proactively contributing 
to a redefinition of our mental categories, namely in respect of ontological def-
initions of those entities usually called musical works. I am not saying that our 
practice “needs” an ontological rooting, nor am I saying that performers long 
for music ontologies; I am simply saying that the concrete, creative practice 
of music generates philosophical insights that “pure” philosophy or applied 
musicology are not delivering. In this sense, it seems to me that the necessary 
renewal of the ontological discourse will not come from music philosophers, 
nor from musicologists, but precisely from this new kind of performer, trained 
and oriented towards artistic research. Through our critical apparatus and cre-
ative mode of making music, new images of thought and new images of the 
musical work are emerging. 
In my particular case, and resulting from my work within MusicExperiment21, 
my ideas developed into music ontological thought,11 which is significantly 
 10 These three kinds of positions are clearly observable in the volume Virtual Works—Actual Things (Assis 
2018): Gunnar Hindrichs presents his own metaphysical system and David Davies his own system of 
aesthetics, while John Rink and Andreas Dorschel centre the discourse on performative issues.
 11 I presented draft versions of this proposed ontological perspective in several venues over the last three 
years. Particularly in 2016, I had the opportunity to discuss these perspectives with many music ontolo-
gists, including those present at the Orpheus Academy in Ghent, as well as those participating at the 
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inspired by the differential ontology of Gilles Deleuze, and which I present 
in the next sections of this chapter. I proceed in three steps: First (section 3), 
I point out some of the problems with currently available music ontologies, 
as they have been discussed in recent years (mostly) by analytic philosophers. 
Next (section 4), I present some basic components of a Deleuzian ontology as 
it has been extracted from his writings by post-Deleuzian philosophers. Finally 
(section 5), I present a novel way of thinking about musical entities, suggesting 
a new image of work, and, consequently, an alternative music ontology. I would 
like to emphasise that I do not claim to offer a complete and perfectly finished 
ontological account, as this would actually be contrary to its fundamental 
claims.
3. Music ontologies: some problems
To start with, one has to register that currently existing music ontologies are 
in an impasse, not to say in a deep crisis. In a recent collective volume on the 
appeal to abstract objects in art ontology generally, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir 
(2012), Guy Rohrbaugh (2012) enthusiastically opens his chapter (the first in the 
collection) by stating “we surely live in a golden age for the ontology of art” (29). 
However, throughout the chapter, he presents us with a series of burning issues 
that seem to condemn music ontology to irrelevance, even concluding that “an 
ontology ultimately driven by a description of what it is we already do, as it must 
if it is to be an ontology of art at all, looks like it will be unable to turn around 
and informatively explain or justify any of those doings we described. . . . One 
might say that there is no such endeavor as the ontology of art” (37). Along the 
way, Rohrbaugh addresses several problems around pragmatist and deflationist 
views, comparing various positions, authors, and recent debates, not hesitating to 
openly discuss critical problems that might endanger the field of music ontology 
itself. First, he observes that ontologists are motivated to preserve the appearances 
of dominant practices (32), which remain by and large unquestioned. Second, 
he identifies a serious problem in the fact that music ontologists are squeezed 
between traditional metaphysics and traditional musical practices (33), not 
taking into account alternative or innovative approaches. Third, expressing a 
dilemma he shares with Jerrold Levinson, Rohrbaugh confesses that “We describe 
objects that fit our practices to a tee and then proceed to claim that there are 
such objects. Unfortunately, they are not there. Any number of critics, myself 
included, have pointed out that the idea of an indicated type does not really 
make much sense” (33). Fourth, he acknowledges that music ontology often ends 
up with two discourses: one is obvious, and thus unnecessary; the other is of a 
hermetic character, and thus highly elitist: “At the object-level, our practices may 
be recognized as going on just as they do, while our deflationary attitude at the 
meta-level need only be known to the philosophical elite for whom it matters. 
conference “Music, Art, and Philosophy in Dialogue,”, organised by Marcello Ruta, which took place at 
the Paul Klee Zentrum, Bern, Switzerland, 20–21 May 2016. Among the invited speakers were Peter Kivy, 
Ulrich Mosch, Alessandro Arbo, and myself.
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. . . But instead of ending up with a picture on which our practices give rise to 
the very objects of their own concern, we instead end up with, quite literally, 
nothing” (34–35).12 Thus, what had been announced as living in a “golden age” 
seems to be more pertinently described as a discipline fading away in a sombre 
corner of the humanities.
A summary of all existing ontological positions would go beyond the scope 
of this chapter,13 but a very important observation—one that cannot be over-
looked—is that the vast majority of music ontologists are philosophers attached 
to analytic philosophy, focusing on and presenting their arguments principally 
in logical propositions, to which they claim most forms of human knowledge 
are reducible.14 In the last decade a significant number of philosophers, such 
as Ross P. Cameron, Ben Caplan, Carl Matheson, David Davies, Julian Dodd, 
Andrew Kania, Chris Tillman, and Guy Rohrbaugh (among others), have con-
tributed major essays on art and musical ontology, renewing an analytic dis-
course initiated in the 1960s and continued until the 1980s by music philoso-
phers and theoreticians such as Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Jerrold Levinson, Stanley Cavell, Peter Kivy, and Stephen Davies 
(among others). Despite some considerable differences within this analytic 
tradition, its problem is that the basic structure of its arguments—so funda-
mentally concerned with the conditions of identity—is incompatible with the 
objects it pretends to define and explain (see Butt 2002, 62). Analytic philoso-
phers define the identity of things by the necessary conditions that enable such 
things to belong to a general category, that is to say, they must have an essence. 15 
It was this kind of analytical landscape that Lydia Goehr, back in 1992, managed 
to call into question. Her critical perspective primarily addressed not whether 
musical “works” exist but the particular moment in history when a specific way 
of conceiving musical works became the regulative force for musical practices. 
Goehr first and foremost disclosed the regulative function of the work con-
cept, showing its profound historicity. Consequently, and in a second (though 
 
 12 Guy Rohrbaugh’s ontological arguments have been of personal interest to me, especially his notions 
of continuants and historical individuals (that he vaguely retrieves from biology and from processes of 
speciation), which makes his position—among all other currently available accounts—the one that 
comes closest to my own practice and perspective (even if still with substantial differences). Further-
more, I also share with him his declared scepticism about music ontologies, a scepticism related to the 
widespread use of philosophical terminology that has lost its connection to the modes of existence of 
musical works and practices of our day.
 13 For a precise and concise description of Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism, perdurantism, endu-
rantism, and eliminativism, see Davies (2018). Another excellent overview of ongoing positions and 
discussions, including viewpoints from several authors, is the volume Art and Abstract Objects, edited by 
Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), particularly Andrew Kania’s essay “Platonism vs. Nominalism in Contempor-
ary Musical Ontology” (2012). A further recent edited volume on music ontology is Alessandro Arbo and 
Marcello Ruta’s Ontologie Musicale: Perspectives et débats (2014).
 14 As David Davies mentioned to me (pers. comm.), analytic philosophers do acknowledge the existence of 
some practical “knowledge [of ] how [to do things],” “and many would recognize that some knowledge 
is irreducibly embodied.” For a detailed account of the complex field of analytic philosophy in relation 
to music, see David Davies’s forthcoming essay “Analytic Philosophy of Music,” which will be part of the 
Oxford Handbook on Western Music and Philosophy. 
 15 In this respect, David Davies (pers. comm.) reminded me that that both Goodman’s and Wolheim’s 
writings “explicitly reject the project of defining art, any of the arts, and limit themselves to the more 
modest task of providing necessary conditions” for the existence of an artwork. 
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critical) moment, the work concept itself appears as dependent on a historical 
point of view. As John Butt (2002, 62–63) expressed it, “In Goehr’s account, no 
analytic theory adequately accounts for the historical boundary of the music 
that it concerns.16 . . . According to Goehr [the work concept] is an ‘open con-
cept,’ allowing for the subtraction or addition of defining characteristics pro-
vided that its continuity is assured and that it is consistently recognisable over 
its period of operation.” Goehr was simply trying to get hold of the innumer-
able musical practices that were obviously incompatible with analytic con-
structions deprived of any sense of historical situatedness and ideally placed 
in a world without time and imperfections. As Goehr ([1992] 2007, 86) put it, 
“The lurking danger remains that the [analytic] theories will probably become 
forever divorced from the phenomena and practices they purportedly seek to 
explain. . . . The problem with the search for identity conditions resides in the 
incompatibility between the theoretical demands of identity conditions and 
the phenomena to be accounted for.” Moreover, the theoretical abstraction of 
analytic philosophies is not only divorced from musical practice, it is also com-
pletely removed from philological studies, from research on sketches, music 
editorial practices, changes in execution and interpretation paradigms—in a 
nutshell, from the complexities of history, and from the concrete, processual, 
and immanent fabrication of all those documents that enable us to think about 
“musical works” in the first place.
A second problem with contemporary ontologies has to do with the prob-
lem of representation. Despite their profound differences and quarrels, the three 
main existing umbrella theories—Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism—share 
a common trait: they are all sustained by a representational model of thought 
and by representational musical practices. There is always the performance 
or the listening to of something as something, or the performance of some-
thing. Whatever one perceives in any specific here-and-now (a performance, 
a recording, a description), it is a representation of something else. Platonists 
insist on the primacy of an original idea and of perfectly encapsulated sound 
structures (Wollheim’s types) that can be represented through performances 
(Wollheim’s tokens, which can be qualified or fully qualified). Nominalists focus 
on the material entities internal to musical practice, rejecting abstracta but 
keeping the central assumption of performance as based upon the repeatabil-
ity and variablity of an immanently generated but clearly well-articulated work, 
which crucially pre-exists the performance and to which the performance is 
 
 16 If one takes into account recent developments in analytic philosophy, a more nuanced formulation 
could probably be presented. But the point is that such recent developments will take many years 
until they reach the vast majority of music practitioners and musicologists. And even “nuanced” the 
core problem remains the same, namely that most analytic philosophers think in eternal qualities and 
categories, not taking history and historicity as the starting point of the investigations. As David Davies 
expressed to me (pers. comm.), “I think this is the important criticism of much of the analytic work on 
music (e.g., Kivy), although it is not true of all the writers you cite [in this chapter]. Levinson, for ex-
ample, restricts his account of ‘what a musical work is’ to musical works of a certain period, and recent 
work by analytic philosophers has been much more sensitive to differences between musical practices. 
But it is also true that when Lydia Goehr wrote her book [late 1980s], analytic philosophy of music was, 
for the most part, guilty of the things she charged.”
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compared, thus reintroducing a transcendental entity into the picture. For fic-
tionalists there are no works as such, but through their construction of works 
“as if they existed” they commit—in practical terms—to the same model of 
performance as presenting (or representing) a pre-given musical entity (even if 
phantasmatic). They all agree that there are musical works (the exception being 
the eliminativists), and they all look for “what kind of things they are.” However, 
despite their considerable differences, these three main currents of music 
ontology further share a common set of fundamental questions that relate to 
the conditions of identity of musical works: What exactly is a musical work? Are 
musical works abstract ideas or concrete things? How can a musical work be iden-
tified as this musical work? How can an instantiation of a work be considered 
as adequate, legitimate, or, to use the language of ontologists, fully qualified? In 
addition to the conditions of identity, these questions also relate to the criteria of 
judgement of any given appearance of a musical work, thus doubly pertaining 
to a representational mode of thinking, a mode that is actually of Aristotelian 
imprint, more than Platonic. 
In this double sense, the vast majority of current music ontologies could be 
seen as actually relying on the Aristotelian world of representation. But this 
world is umbilically related to Plato’s theory of ideas. The very notion of rep-
resentation implies something prior to it that has the capacity to be represented. 
As Gilles Deleuze argued in a long section of Difference and Repetition (1994, 262–
304), the Aristotelian world of representation is enabled first by Plato’s theory 
of ideas, and crucially by its intrinsic moral motivation. 
Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves within a theory of Ideas 
which will allow the deployment of representation. In his case, however, a moral 
motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms 
has no motivation apart from the moral. . . . Later, the world of representation will 
more or less forget its moral origin and presuppositions. These will nevertheless 
continue to act in the distinction between the originary and the derived, the original 
and the sequel, the ground and the grounded, which animates the hierarchies of 
a representative theology by extending the complementarity between model and 
copy. Representation[, thus,] is a site of transcendental illusion. (Deleuze 1994, 265, 
my emphasis)
While discussing and critically challenging Plato’s notions of copy and simula-
crum, Deleuze observes—in the conclusion to Difference and Repetition—that from 
a Platonist perspective the copy can always be systematically distinguished from 
the simulacrum by subordinating its own difference to a fourfold principle: of the 
Same, the Similar, the Analogous, and the Opposed (ibid.). According to Deleuze, 
these strict verifiable correspondences do not per se imply a system based upon 
representation: “with Plato these instances are not yet distributed as they will 
be in the deployed world of representation (from Aristotle onwards)” (ibid.). It 
is in the transition from the Platonic world to the world of representation that 
“a slippage occurs” (ibid.). As Miguel de Beistegui (analysing and paraphrasing 
Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism) makes clear: 
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It is only superficially that the Platonic method involves dividing something 
according to its natural articulations, that is, according to genus and species. In 
other words, the operation of specification, from genus to species and all the way to 
what Aristotle calls “differences,” with which Plato’s work is sometimes associated, 
is only a preliminary step towards a more significant goal. Or, to put it differently, 
the Aristotelian operation of division and specification is itself an effect of, and 
a response to, the image of thought that Plato had identified for philosophy. 
(Beistegui 2012, 59–60) 
Thus, it was actually after Plato that “the sameness of the Platonic Idea . . . 
gives way to the identity of the concept, oriented towards the form of identity in 
the object, and grounded in a self-identical thinking subject” (ibid., 61). A “thinking 
subject” that “brings to the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, rec-
ognition and self-consciousness” (Deleuze 1994, 266). In this new representa-
tional model, both objects and subjects are taken as being perfectly defined, 
transparent, and uncorrupted. This is what permits analytical investigations 
(of the objects, but also of their coded, i.e., linguistic articulations), on the one 
side, and for phenomenological considerations (of and by the subjects), on the 
other. The main operation for knowing the world becomes recognition, and dif-
ference in thought disappears because, as Beistegui (2012, 61) observes, “the 
image of thought as recognition . . . requires the concordance and collabora-
tion of all faculties (perception, memory, reason, imagination, judgment, etc.) 
in the presentation of the same object, or the object in the form of self-identity. 
Far from breaking with the doxa, and becoming paradoxical, the dominant image 
of thought inherited from Platonism solidifies into an orthodoxy, all the more 
difficult to shake off in that its hidden, underlying presupposition is moral 
through and through.”
In this light, and strictly in this particular sense, one can appropriate for 
musical ontology the Deleuzian qualifications regarding the problem of rep-
resentation in Plato and Aristotle. Surprisingly, the major existing musical 
ontologies (even those not officially labelled Platonic) can be traced back to 
Plato’s theory of Ideas. The fundamental questions of the diverse music ontol-
ogies assume the existence of identifiable and stabilised musical works (be it 
abstracta or concreta), of uncorrupted subjects capable of immaculately appre-
hending them, and of a transparent link between a work’s written codification 
and its sonic manifestation in performance. They do not take into account the 
energetic, intensive conditions and processes of their coming into being, nor 
the intricacies of their transmission throughout time and history. They rely on 
a foundational model based upon the notions of original, copy, and simulacra, 
even if they disagree in the concrete definitions of these notions. And they 
agree on an ontological partition of the world in genera, species, and individuals, 
fully adhering to an Aristotelian conception of categories and hierarchies. The 
danger of falling into scholastic “great chains of being” is lurking at the door.17 
The difficulty is to overcome rigidly entrenched beliefs, which keep many 
 17 In this respect, Gunnar Hindrichs writes that “Every ontology manifests a conceptual scheme that 
articulates the great chain of being” (see Hindrichs 2018, 67, my emphasis). 
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positions jailed in the sterile prisons of analytical logic and language games. As 
philosopher Manuel DeLanda (2012, 223) has put it, “For many analytical phil-
osophers abandoning the categories of the general and the particular is a dif-
ficult step because many of them were trained to believe that all of mathematics 
had been reduced to logic18 . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that realist analytical 
philosophers tend to speak like Aristotle, defining the identity of things by the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to belong to a general category. In other 
words, defining identity by the possession of an essence.”
This Aristotelian influence is manifest in some music ontological accounts, 
which explicitly refer to Aristotelian categories to ground their arguments. 
Curiously, this is particularly observable among the so-called Platonists. Julian 
Dodd, for example, when discussing norm-types, directly uses arguments from 
the field of biological species and individuals—his example being the domestic 
dog (Canis familiaris), about which he observes that even a dog missing an ear or 
a leg is still a token of the species (type) dog: “There can certainly be improperly 
formed tokens of The Domestic Dog (Canis familiaris): albino dogs and dogs 
missing an ear or a leg are nevertheless tokens of the type. And it is a truism that, 
just as long as an inscription is sufficiently close to being correctly formed, it 
counts as an inscription of a certain word, albeit one of which its author should 
not feel particularly proud” (Dodd 2007, 33). Jerrold Levinson defends a softer 
version of Platonism, accepting that composers are the “creators” of their own 
compositions (something that pure Platonists do not accept, instead claiming 
that musical works exist even prior to being written down, thus being merely 
“discovered” by composers); in turn, he recurs to the hedgehog as his example: 
“The creatures we call ‘hedgehogs’ possess a certain structure and stand in cer-
tain causal relations to some particular creatures that came into existence at a 
given past date . . . Musical works . . . are indicated structures too, and thus 
types that do not already exist but must instead be initiated. The same is true of 
poems, plays, and novels—each of these is an entity more individual and tem-
porally bound than the pure verbal structure embodied in it” (Levinson 1990, 
81–82, my emphasis).
 Music ontologists, thus, talk about species, claiming them as means to fur-
ther support their own art theories. As Rohrbaugh (2012, 36) wrote, “Orthodox 
views hold that species membership is a part-whole relation and that species 
are scattered individuals, perhaps four-dimensional sums.” Critically, the prob-
lem with these views is that they don’t allow, and they actually repress, any 
thought that could lead to the consideration of concrete and historical indi-
viduals as fundamental constitutive parts of musical works. 19 On the contrary, 
works become fixed, petrified, and highly reified generalities. Unfortunately, 
 18 Against DeLanda, David Davies (pers. comm.) claims that he is describing something closer to logicism, 
a view of mathematics to which “very few analytic philosophers [would] subscribe.” 
 19 In my view, this is the point where Rohrbaugh could have found a way out of the analytic tradition, 
making a critique of what he just so precisely described. Unfortunately, he continues alluding to the 
Aristotelian kind of way of thinking about species as scattered individuals whose constitutive parts are 
individual creatures (his constituants, which have been strongly criticised by music Platonists). Within 
the ontological account that I propose further down, Rohrbaugh’s continuants can find a new mode of 
existence, independent of transcendent systems and from hierarchical categorisations. 
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as Rohrbaugh (ibid., 37) puts it, “when one asks, ‘What sort of thing is a sym-
phony?’ what one really gets in response is just an expression of the speaker’s 
own aesthetic views about what is and is not important about symphonies, in 
short, ideology.” Attempts to emphasise, or simply to propose the centrality of 
historical individuals, of elements that appear in a precise moment in time, that 
undergo changes throughout historical time, that disappear or that reappear in 
another century, are boldly excluded and rejected. This was the case with Guy 
Rohrbaugh’s concept of the continuants, which found resistances so strong that 
he himself (in a kind of externally induced self-critique) was forced to admit 
several shortcomings of his own (in my view interesting) formulations.20 
Thus, if one is aiming at a renewal of ontological discourses, if one wishes to 
propose and sustain a new image of work, one has to look farther away from the 
field of available music ontologies. One has to search for something capable of 
replacing Aristotelian metaphysics, for some sort of “image of thought” that 
doesn’t operate under the rules of the three Aristotelian categories of entities: 
genus, species, and individual. Moreover, such an image of thought must also over-
turn Platonism, in the strict sense of readdressing the fundamental distinction 
between icons and phantasms, between images and simulacra. In a nutshell, it 
must exclude both categorical hierarchies and idealist transcendence.
4. Beyond transcendence: approaching a Deleuzian 
ontology 
The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, 
to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning. (Deleuze 1998, 137) 
If one is looking for some kind of ally in the search for a novel, nonhierarchical, 
and fully immanent ontology, Gilles Deleuze seems to be one of the best placed 
philosophers to help us. As is well known, the overturning of Platonism (in the 
wake of Nietzsche’s famous claim) and the overcoming of representation were two 
of Deleuze’s life-long projects, and they are at the very core of his primary thesis 
for his Doctorat d’État, his famous book from 1968, Différence et répétition (see 
Deleuze 1994). Deleuze himself did not “officially” write texts specifically devoted 
to ontological issues, but, as Constantin V. Boundas (2005b, 191) has written, “For 
Deleuze, philosophy is ontology,” and one could even claim that his books (also 
those co-authored with Félix Guattari) make significant contributions, not to 
one ontology but to several, multiple ontologies. Crucially, Deleuze’s philosophy 
is one of difference, a difference that remains unsubordinated to identity and to 
being, rejecting hierarchical categories, and insisting on the profound reality (and 
realism) of his concepts of the virtual, the intensive, and the actual, which manifest 
themselves in various assemblages of energies, forces, and tendencies, making 
the world in which humans and non-humans live. 
 20 P. D. Magnus (2012, 108) even writes that Julian Dodd pronounced an “accusation” against Rohrbaugh’s 
idea that “historical individuals are familiar parts of the world.”
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Among other philosophies of difference (such as Derrida’s), one must stress 
the point that while rejecting laws and axioms, Deleuze “offers us principles 
and methods . . . whereas Derrida offers us an ethos and style of writing about 
difference explicitly resistant to the emergence of principles or methods” 
(Williams 2013, 27). For someone operating in the creative field of artistic 
research, which is by definition a constructivist field of activity (as it generates 
objects or events of artistic nature), a permanent resistance to principles and 
methods would be counterproductive, if not simply sterile. That’s why philoso-
phers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, or Félix Guattari are so relevant to 
artistic research: they offer a possibility for thought and practice outside laws 
and axiomatic principles, but they also enable the positive fabrication of mater-
ialities issuing from intensive processes. “Deleuze’s ontology,” as Constantin V. 
Boundas (2005b, 191) makes clear, “is a rigorous attempt to think of process and 
metamorphosis—becoming—not as a transition or transformation from one 
substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather as 
an attempt to think of the real as a process” (my emphasis). If the real is thought 
of as a process, its processuality simultaneously is fed by and generates a con-
tinuous flux of forces and intensities, which reveal themselves only in the very 
moment of their transductive actualisation. These forces and intensities gener-
ate forms and matter, but it would be a mistake to think of them exclusively in 
terms of things and their qualities. Extension and extended magnitudes are only 
the result of the intensive genesis of the extended. Becoming is not becoming- 
Being, but a much more complex and elaborated process of permanent actuali-
sation, of endlessly becoming-something-different. Instead of a linear process from 
one actual state to another, becoming is better conceived as an intensive move-
ment from an actual state of affairs, through a dynamic field of virtual tenden-
cies, to the actualisation of this field in a new state of affairs.21
In what follows, I will briefly introduce five key notions that enable us to 
grasp the ontology of Gilles Deleuze, including the couple actual–virtual, 
intensity, individual and universal singularities, topological unfoldings, and 
multiplicities.22
Actual/virtual
The terminological doublet virtual–actual is central to the ontology of Gilles 
Deleuze, being present in his books and essays since his first published texts 
on Henri Bergson in 1956. Actual and virtual describe the fundamental domains 
of Deleuze’s differential ontology. According to Anne Sauvagnargues (2003, 
22, my translation), “the actual designates the present and material state of 
things, while the virtual refers to everything that is not currently/presently here 
(including incorporeal, past, or ideal events).” It is the exchange and communi-
cation between the actual and the virtual that enable a dynamics of becoming as 
 21 For a thorough discussion of the relations between the couple virtual–real and the notion of becoming, 
see Boundas (2007, 489–91).
 22 Other concepts, such as the couple molar–molecular, the dark precursor, the quasi-cause, transduction, or the 




different/ciation and creation. Primary differences of energy and energetic 
potentials generate “differentiation” (virtual structure) and “differenciation” (the 
genesis of actuality). Such dynamics always happen in the form of an event—an 
event being the individuation of differentiation, and the actualisation of differ-
enciation. One cannot overstress that for Deleuze, both the virtual and the actual 
are real. As Deleuze (1994, 208–9) himself has put it: “The virtual is opposed not 
to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real. . . . Indeed, the virtual must be 
defined as strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one part of 
itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension. 
. . . The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations 
along with the singular points which correspond to them.”
Importantly, Deleuze’s virtual is by no means to be understood in terms of 
virtual reality, but, on the contrary, as something absolutely real, that is even 
actually perceived as tension or inconsistencies in/of the actual, as a diagram-
matic reservoir of effectively potential actualisations (some of which will affect 
the world, some of which not), but that exist in a topological space of possi-
bilities.23 Moreover, the distinction between the virtual and the actual is not 
unilateral, nor is it ontologically black-boxed. This distinction is processual 
and differential, making the “a priori and the a posteriori . . . a product of indi-
viduating processes rather than their condition” (Toscano 2009, 389). The vir-
tual–real might lead (under precise, yet unforeseeable transductive conditions) 
to an actual–real, which in turn (as soon as it emerges-in-the-world) fabricates a 
new virtual–real. Without resembling the actual, the virtual nonetheless has the 
capacity to bring about actualisation, and yet the virtual never coincides or can 
be identified with its actualisation. The virtual is the whole set of forces, ener-
gies, potentials, and intensities that exist, that are real, yet that are not actual-
ised in the here-and-now of the present. The actual are all the forces, energies, 
potentials, and intensities that are currently happening in the here-and-now of 
our presence. There is no actual without virtual, and no virtual that cannot be 
actualised. 
Intensity 
Both the virtual and the actual appear, then, as the result of concrete energetic 
processes, involving the passage, the relay, or the transformation of one type of 
energy into another, crucially establishing a connection between two or more 
series with different energetic potentials. The virtual does not exist a priori to 
the intensive processes that generate it; it does not pre-deterministically define 
the processes of its actualisation (which would imply a kind of neo-Platonism). 
At the same time, the actual is not an image (a copy) of a pre-existing model, 
but it emerges progressively as the result of concrete intensive processes of 
onto- and morphogenesis. Before the definition of any ontological category, there 
 23 It is in this sense that Deleuze, directly inspired by Bergson, could talk of a past that has never been 
present (the virtual as immemorial past), and of a future that will never be present (the virtual as a 
never-attainable messianic future). This link between the couple virtual–real and past–future tem-
poralities prevents any reification of the past (as in Plato’s recollection), or of the future (as in some 
teleological ideologies) as it presupposes non-determining and non-deterministic tendencies.
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are several constantly ongoing ontological processes, which are summarised— 
in Deleuze’s terminology—under the notion of the intensive. Intensive processes 
generate singularities in the two sides of the real: individual singularities in the 
actual–real, and universal singularities in the virtual–real. Thus, Deleuze’s notion 
of intensity, the pre-individual relationship between two or more fields with 
different potentials, gains centrality within his ontological scheme. Intensities 
are not ontological entities or categories (as the virtual and the actual can be 
considered to be), they are real events “whose mode of existence is to actualise 
themselves in states of affairs” (Boundas 2005a, 131).
A thorough discussion of the complex relations between the virtual, the 
actual, and the intensive would lie outside the scope of this chapter, especially 
as there have been several attempts to clarify this topic, each leading to signifi-
cantly different understandings.24 Be that as it may, what seems clear from all 
these different understandings of Deleuze’s ontology is that “intensity holds 
the true key for Deleuze’s metaphysical system,” as Clisby (2017, 251) point-
edly summarises. Critically, Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces and of 
actualisations, not an ontology of actualised phenomena. As its object, it takes 
not the completed form (be it ideal or nominal) but formation itself. In the 
words of James Williams (2013, 42), “Deleuze’s view is that no object is fully 
accounted for through its actual properties since the changes that it has under-
gone and will undergo, and the differences implied in those changes, must be 
considered to be part of the object.” In this sense, as long as we insist on the 
existence of well-defined things, Deleuze’s position will not be grasped, and 
his case to overturn Plato and Aristotle will not prevail. With Williams (ibid., 
69), one can say that “to be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognisable 
limits [but] on the contrary, it is to be a pure movement or variation in relation 
to well-defined things.” The process of actualisation does not occur in a vac-
uum: “at every moment there exists a field of intensity implicated in the expli-
cated objects of experience” (Clisby 2017, 254).
Within a dynamic system, any process of individuation starts from intensity, 
leading to the emergence of singularities: be it actual singularities, or virtual 
ones. In the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994, 247) clearly 
states that individuation precedes and gives rise to actualisation: “Individuation 
does not presuppose any differenciation; it gives rise to it.” Thus, “every differ-
enciation presupposes a prior intense field of individuation” (ibid.). Critically, 
this “prior intense field of individuation” is a problematic field. There is no 
transparent nor straightforward correspondence between the prior field of 
individuation, the field of individuation itself, and the individuated singularity 
 24 In fact, there is no consensus about the precise placement of these three notions within Deleuze’s onto-
logical system. Dale Clisby’s recent essay “Intensity in Context: Thermodynamics and Transcendental 
Philosophy” (2017, especially 250–55) offers a short, yet precise, overview of the three main currently 
available positions: (1) those that align the intensive with the virtual, which is the (critical) position of 
Peter Hallward (2006) and Alain Badiou (2000); (2) those that think the intensive as a third ontological 
domain, as has been convincingly proposed by Manuel DeLanda (2002) and John Protevi (2013), who 
excavated the precise scientific influences in the writings of Deleuze; and (3) those who consider the in-
tensive as being part of the actual, or as “the being of the actual” as Jon Roffe (2012, as quoted in Clisby 
2017, 253) has suggested.
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it affords. In all phases and at all moments of the individuating process there 
are multiple and incommensurable forces playing a complex game of intensive 
tendencies and unfoldings. Any intensive process is a metastable flux of ener-
getic discharges, potentials, and tendencies. And whereas this differentiation 
establishes a problematisation, the concrete actualisations of that virtual field 
express differenciations as the constitution of solutions (by local integrations), 
leading to the formation of actual things. Such things are formed by different 
sets of specific individual singularities that are actualised in the here-and-now, 
in the present. The process of differenciation happens through transduction, 
changing one type of energy into another, critically leading to the formation of 
new and unexpected individuations, which contain emergent properties that 
were not predetermined in advance. These actualisations result in individual 
singularities, which can be things, objects, or documents, all with two parts: 
an extensive part (quantitatively measurable and divisible) and an intensive 
part (qualitatively active and non-divisible). The actual things in the world are 
thus not just the result of an intensive genesis, as they remain processual, even 
within their physical constraints. They are never (or only very rarely) petrified 
in a final state of zero energy. Intensive processes never stop and never come to 
an end.
Singularities 
From the working together of the notions virtual–actual, intensity, and transduction 
(or modulation as Anne Sauvagnargues prefers to call it),25 one starts grasping the 
virtual diagrams and the actual things that populate Deleuze’s materialist world—a 
world that radically departs and is totally different from the Aristotelian system 
of categories.26 With the couple virtual–actual and with intensity, we have the 
ontological domains of Deleuze’s system. I will now turn to those entities that 
Deleuze acknowledges as existing in the world.27 For Deleuze, the actual world 
is populated only by individual singularities that often appear as populations of 
individual singularities, which exist in different spatio-temporal scales and 
in different modes of interaction among individual components. The actual 
world is the world of actual things, and all these things have the same ontological 
status—thus, no hierarchies, but a flat ontology to start with. As DeLanda (2010, 
83) makes clear: “In [Deleuze’s] approach all actual entities are considered 
to be individual singularities, that is, all belong to the lowest level of Aristotle’s 
 25 See Sauvagnargues (2016, especially chapter 4, “The Concept of Modulation in Deleuze, and the Im-
portance of Simondon to the Deleuzian Aesthetic,” 61–84).
 26 Deleuze’s extremely dense critique of Aristotle—which essentially focuses on his concept of difference, 
and which aims at showing that Aristotle’s definition of difference is problematic and misses a deeper 
understanding of the term—is to be found in paragraphs three to five of the second section of the 
first chapter (“Difference in Itself ”) of Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994, 38–44). On this difficult 
passage, see also Williams (2013, 64–68), Somers-Hall (2013, 23–30), and Hughes (2009, 40–42).
 27 As this is a notoriously difficult task, I support my inquiry with reference to authors who have already 
dealt with this topic in great depth. In addition to Constantin V. Boundas, I am deeply indebted to Man-
uel DeLanda’s several accounts of Deleuzian ontology, to Anne Sauvagnargues on its implications for 
art, and to Arkady Plotnitsky for his invaluable clarifications in relation to mathematics (see Boundas 




ontological hierarchy, while the roles of the two upper levels are performed by 
universal singularities.” 
Every individual singularity emerges as the outcome of a historical process, it 
is the concrete result of intensive processes that occur in the world. Every sin-
gularity is produced or fabricated in a specific point in time and space. So, for 
example, atoms of hydrogen are fabricated inside stars; there is no “hydrogen 
in general,” but a concrete population of materially existing hydrogen atoms 
(DeLanda 2010, 85). Likewise, there is no canis familiaris in general, but rather 
a population of single dogs, each of which is an individual singularity, unique 
and unrepeatable (as a simple DNA test can prove). As every individual singu-
larity is unique, special, and remarkable, what deserves attention are not the 
species but the moment of speciation, that particular moment when something 
changes state or phase, when a mutation occurs, when a cosmic phenomenon 
happens. Larger populations of singular individuals define larger individuals, 
and what matters are those moments when a new species appears, and when 
it disappears. Species are historical entities that depend on the concrete evo-
lution, transformation, and mutations of all the individual singularities that 
define them—one individual at a time, one by one. The focus on such onto-
genetic processes, on intensive individuations, enables Deleuze to populate 
reality exclusively with immanent entities, eliminating transcendent ones, 
such as the essences of Aristotle’s two upper categories, genus and species. For 
Aristotle the world is already divided by general and specific categories that are 
eternal, unchangeable, and not subject to corruption and decay. For Deleuze, 
on the other hand, the world of discrete things emerges constantly, as solutions 
to problems that are defined by conditions that do not determine a result, nor 
impose consistency. Finally, as DeLanda writes, “as these ontological problems 
undergo a process of actualization they become progressively differentiated 
into a multiplicity of actual solutions. This differentiation proceeds in a fully 
historical way, and may only reveal a portion of the possibility space at a time” 
(2012, 236, my emphasis). Thus, the Aristotelian categories of the general and 
the particular (in musical Platonism: the types and the tokens) can be replaced 
in a Deleuzian ontology by two radically immanent entities: the universal singu-
lar and the individual singular.
Topological unfoldings
Influenced by theories from mathematics and embryology, Deleuze thinks of 
the actualisations that lead to the individuation of singularities as happening 
through a sequence of topological unfoldings. In very simple mathematical terms, 
a topological entity is one that can be folded into another form without losing 
its identity. As philosopher and mathematician Arkady Plotnitsky (2006, 191) 
defined it, “Geometry has to do with measurements, while topology disregards 
measurement, and deals only with the structure of space qua space and with 
the essential shapes and figures.” Differently than in Euclidian geometry, in 
topological geometry a circle, for example, can be stretched into an ellipse 
or into a quasi-square without losing its topological identity. A sphere can be 
compressed into a cylinder, a cone, or a pear-like shape, its topological identity 
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remaining untouched. In an essay on mathematician Bernhard Riemann (who, 
together with his teacher Gauss, was one of the inventors of topology), Plotnitsky 
(2009, 201) is very precise about this identity: “Insofar as one deforms a given 
figure continuously (that is, insofar as one does not separate points previously 
connected and, conversely, does not connect points previously separated) the 
resulting figure is considered the same.” However, spheres are topologically dif-
ferent from tori, and they cannot be converted into each other without disjoining 
their connected points. If one extends these mathematical notions to biology, 
genetics, and embryology, one can think of the unfolding of an embryo as a 
matter of topological transformations, or of a vertebrate animal as the result of 
topological changes and developments. French naturalist Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
thought (at the beginning of the nineteenth century, i.e., before Darwin) that 
species could be conceived without genera, as transformation (transmutation was 
his word) from one into the other. This leads to the perspective that the world can 
be conceived primarily as a continuum of intensity that becomes segmented into 
species only as certain tendencies are manifested and certain capacities exercised 
(see DeLanda 2010, 91). These remarks are extremely relevant as we attempt to 
eliminate transcendent entities from the world. Every single animal or embryo 
is the result of concrete, immanent, intensive processes, and is absolutely not an 
“instantiation” of an idea, of a “genus,” or of a “species.” We need to think of an 
animal as a topological animal (ibid., 96), which can be folded and stretched into 
the multitude of different animal species that exist on Earth. Of course, this is 
only physically possible at the level of the embryos, which are flexible enough to 
endure these transformations. Moreover, every topological or “virtual” animal 
must have the capacity to be divergently actualised (leading to concrete divergent 
individual singularities), and each actualisation must be inheritable with a slight 
degree of unpredictability. We come close to describing DNA structures, and 
it is indeed “the structure of the space of possible body plans that replaces the 
genus ‘Animal’” (ibid., 97). The relevant causal agents (chromosomes, genes, 
genes marking axes of longitude and latitude, cellular populations, etc.) do not 
operate and act as formal causes, but as efficient causes. As DeLanda highlights, 
“Aristotelian species like ‘Horse’ and ‘Human’ should be replaced by historically 
constituted species that have the same ontological status as the organisms that 
compose them, that is, that are individual singularities; and the genus ‘Animal’ 
should be replaced by a space of possibilities in which the different body plans are 
universal singularities, capable of being divergently actualized into a large number 
of sub-phyla and classes” (DeLanda 2010, 102, my emphasis). 
On a higher scale, biological populations of individuals (what we use to call 
species in common language) are “as singular, as unique, and as historically con-
tingent as individual organisms: species are born when their gene pool is closed 
to external flows of genetic materials through reproductive isolation, and they 
die through extinction” (ibid., 93–94). As is widely accepted today, no species is 
sempiternal, they are all historically contingent and ephemeral. Even stars are 
ephemeral: they exist for a limited amount of time, even if this is beyond our 
human capacity to imagine. Everything is ephemeral, everything is contingent, 
everything is part of a continuous relay of intensive energies from one actual-
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isation to the next, without being predetermined and without being predict-
able. The diversity of entities that populate the world are bounded in exten-
sion, but they are generated by invisible and temporal processes set in motion 
by immanent differences of intensity—not by any transcendental “substance” 
or “essence,” which are no more than unreal reified generalities.
Multiplicities
In addition to the singularities and topological intensive transductive processes, 
the concept of multiplicity is absolutely crucial for a Deleuzian ontology. It is one 
of the most recurrent concepts in Deleuze’s works—alone or in collaboration 
with Félix Guattari—and it finds its roots not in philosophy or linguistics, but 
in mathematics, particularly in the subfields of differential geometry, group 
theory, and dynamical systems theory.28 Deleuze mentioned it early on, in his 1966 
book Bergsonism, where the subtitle of the second chapter is precisely “Théorie 
des multiplicités”29 (Deleuze 1991, 37–49). Although originally derived from 
Bernhard Riemann’s differential mathematics, Deleuze first uses it in relation 
to time (duration) and space, particularly focusing on the notion that time is the 
condition for change or becoming. As Eugene B. Young (2013, 210) observed, 
this has profound consequences: “If [time] is taken as the foundation for con-
ceiving space, then space (or objects and subjects within it) is not subjected to 
transcendent criteria but must be conceived in terms of difference and intensity.” 
For Deleuze, an important part of the role played by the concept of multipli-
city is to further enable a replacement of the Aristotelian concept of essence. 
The essence of a thing is what explains its identity, and consequently how many 
different objects resemble each other by the fact that they share such an essence. 
However, in a Deleuzian ontology, “a species . . . is not defined by its essential 
traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave rise to it” (DeLanda 2002, 
9–10). As we have seen before, species are historically and contingently consti-
tuted entities, not the representatives of timeless categories. While an essen-
tialist worldview sees species as static, a morphogenetic account, such as the 
one offered by Deleuze, is inherently dynamic. As Boundas (2007, 489–90) has 
put it: “Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces attempting to correct the 
mistake we make whenever we think exclusively in terms of things and their 
qualities: in privileging extension and extended magnitudes, we overlook the 
intensive genesis of the extended.” 
Critically, Deleuze’s notion of space, surfaces, and points on a surface is 
directly indebted to the mathematical constructions of Gauss and Riemann, 
particularly to their surfaces, which are spaces in themselves and thus do 
not need to have an additional (n+1) dimension perceived. These are purely 
immanent surfaces; they are not placed within a transcendent space. In such 
surfaces, which build a dynamical system, each point in the surface becomes a 
possible state for the system—be it in an actual or virtual mode of existence in the 
 28 This has been exhaustively disclosed and explained by DeLanda (2002, 2010). A very different perspec-
tive, critical of DeLanda’s assumptions and interpretation, has been offered by Mary Beth Mader (2017).
 29 A subtitle that, unfortunately, is not rendered in the 1991 English translation of the book.
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present moment. The complete space is a collection of all possible states that 
the system can have. Crucially, Riemann also discovered that some points more 
probably occur than others—these are called topological singularities. As there are 
too many possible points in a system (all its universal singularities), we cannot 
map them all. Instead, we can map the topological singularities (also called 
attractors). This is what permits a replacement of hierarchical categories and of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for those categories: a topological space 
of possibilities, where individual singularities are actualised entities, and uni-
versal singularities are virtual points.30 It is the virtual network of connectors 
between those topological singularities that makes the structure (the diagram) 
of a dynamic system. As Deleuze famously stated, “the reality of the virtual is 
structure” (Deleuze 1994, 209, my emphasis). 
To avoid any possible misunderstanding over Deleuze’s use of this term, 
one has to stress right away that structure is understood by Deleuze in its math-
ematical and anthropological sense, not in the conventional musicological 
sense of the “fixed system of relations” or “infra-structure” of a given piece. As 
Christopher Hasty (2010, 10n23) has put it, “Deleuze’s understanding of struc-
ture is quite different from that of musicology or linguistics, in which structure 
is regarded as a fixed form, a substance underlying the accidents of perform-
ance. Structure for Deleuze points to the differentiated multiplicity of Idea.”31 
James Williams (2013, 160) expressed a similar remark, clarifying that “structure 
as multiplicity is in movement and does not give priority to fixed structures.” 
Multiplicities specify the structure of spaces of possibilities, which, in turn, offer an 
explanation for the regularities and inconsistencies in the morphogenetic pro-
cesses, and in the concrete, material actualisations of the individual singular-
ities. “The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and rela-
tions along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of 
the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations which 
form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from 
them a reality which they have” (Deleuze 1994, 209). 
In the last sentence of this quotation we find crucial arguments against the 
two dominant schools of music ontology. Nominalists should not insist in 
defending at all costs the actuality of all singularities that are part of a musical 
work (“we must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure 
an actuality which they do not have” [ibid., my emphasis]), and Platonists should 
not axiomatically deny the material and real existence of singularities that are 
part of a musical work (“we must avoid . . . withdrawing from them a reality which 
they have” [ibid., my emphasis]). As multiplicities, what we usually call “musical 
 30 I insist on the crucial aspect that these universal singularities are by no means to be confused with Pla-
tonic ideas. They are real and effective parts of a dynamic system, and they can be actualised instantly at 
any given time of the system’s lifespan. They are not the result of predeterminations, nor do they point 
towards necessary or unidirectional solutions.
 31 Deleuze’s use of the term Idea would also require some further explanations, which unfortunately I 
cannot undertake here. In short, I simply stress that Deleuze’s Idea is mobile and changeable, thus 
very different from the reified Ideas of traditional idealisms and from the Kantian concepts of the 
understanding, which Deleuze discusses in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition, in relation to Salomon 
Maïmon’s reading of Kant (see Deleuze 1994, 168–76).
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works” are diagrams of the virtual, that is, they are real but not actual, and they 
are capable of divergent actualisations in several different media, times, and 
modes of appearance. 
To conclude this section, one can summarise Deleuze’s ontological proposal 
as defining a world view made of three separate, but intrinsically interrelated 
domains. One is the domain of actual individual singularities, of materially exist-
ing and observable products of natural and human invention, which can be 
defined by their extensive properties, by their length, area, volume, weight, 
number of components, and so on. Next there is a domain of intensive processes 
(transduction), defined by differences of potential, flows of energy, phase 
shifts, and critical thresholds, which change quantity into quality, and quality 
into quantity. They link the individual singularities to the universal singularities 
that remain virtual, some of which are more likely to be actualised than others 
(topological singularities). Finally, there is the domain of virtual structure, the topo-
logical space of possibilities, which diagrammatically maps the universal singular-
ities, and that accounts in a purely immanent way for the regularities (but also 
for the inconsistencies) in the processes and in the individuations. The virtual 
diagram cannot exist without the actual and virtual singularities that build it. 
Nothing would happen in the world without the continuous relay of intensities 
from the virtual to the actual, and vice versa. 
This leads to an ontology that is processual, immanentist, and based upon 
difference (different/ciation), a difference that is conceived not negatively, as 
lack of resemblance, but productively, as that which drives dynamic processes. 
Epistemologically, it defines a problematic epistemology (or an epistemology of 
problems and problematisations), one that gets rid of the general laws of axio-
matic epistemologies without denying the objectivity of physical knowledge, 
which is now investigated by immanent distributions of the singular. The notion 
of truth is also devalued, as the dynamic processes are not predetermined, nor 
are they predictable. Ethically, the world emerges as profoundly transformed: a 
closed, finished, and authoritative world pervaded by transcendental ideas and 
categories gives place to an open world of immanent events and singularities, 
“full of divergent processes yielding novel and unexpected entities, the kind 
of world that would not sit still long enough for us to take a snapshot of it and 
present it as the final truth” (DeLanda 2002, 6).
5. Virtual works, actual things: towards a new image 
of musical work
At this point, the choice of the title of this chapter should be clear to the reader. 
What traditionally, or at least for the last two hundred years, have been called 
“musical works” are specific zones, or partial elements of something that can be 
more aptly described and thought about in terms of musical multiplicities, which 
are fabricated by intensive processes that generate virtual structures and actual 
things. Music Platonists focus only on the structures, the reality of which they 
deny and which they conceive as purely abstract, fixed, immobile, and eternal. 
For their part, nominalists rely only on extensive individual singularities, his-
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torically contingent, but also fixed and totally defined, to which they deny a 
virtual (intensive) component. For a Deleuzian-inspired music ontology, musical 
multiplicities must be grounded in the actual, even as some of the forces that the 
actual summons might remain virtual. Both—abstract structures and petrified 
strata—have to be overcome. Structures are mobile and fluid, while strata are 
constantly being dismantled and reshaped. As Michael Gallope stated, in his 
attempt to define “a Deleuzian musical work,” 
Deleuze offers a glimpse of something different: music for him is certainly based in a 
materiality of sound, but is not reducible to any social or perceptual situation. It has 
a strange kind of autonomy, one that is oriented towards the absolute, but not as a 
vehicle for the actual work’s content. Incredibly, he tries to think a musical work that 
is once more ideal and more empirical than the common perspectives. A Deleuzian 
musical work would be more ideal than a Platonist view since the logic of sensation 
has no “fallen” or exterior moment like performance external to itself. And it would 
be more empirical than a historicist perspective since it takes no recourse to the 
regulative norms of any historical moment. (Gallope 2008, 117–18)
Michael Gallope’s essay “Is There a Deleuzian Musical Work?” (2008) is, to 
my knowledge, the only serious attempt so far to think about music ontology 
from a Deleuzian perspective. However, he places his inquiry within currently 
available ontologies, using Peter Kivy and Lydia Goehr as two examples of the 
polarisation of the debate between Platonism and historicising views. My take is 
different: I think it is indispensable to think outside existing music ontologies, 
to come up with a new image of work (which replaces the word work itself ), and 
to appropriate for music ontology the basic features of Deleuze’s ontology—and 
not so much what Deleuze said or wrote about music. So, I don’t think there is 
“a Deleuzian musical work,” which is Gallope’s central concern. There cannot 
be a Deleuzian musical “work.” There can only be a Deleuzian musical work, 
which is a multiplicity made of virtual topological singularities, actual individ-
ual singularities (containing a virtual component in themselves), and intensive 
transductive processes (generating the virtual and the actual).
Under this new image of work, every musical multiplicity has two halves: a 
virtual image and an actual image, resonating with Deleuze’s statement that 
“every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble 
one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image” (1994, 209, 
my emphasis).
If we consider these two images in relation to musical works, one can think 
of the virtual image as the one relating to the flexible structure, to the diagram of 
a musical work, with all its topological singularities. It remains abstract with-
out being ideal (because those singularities are real; that is, they exist), and is 
dependent on the quantity and quality of the concrete mapping of its univer-
sal singularities made by every single person. Thus, there are as many virtual 
images of a musical work as persons thinking of it. Every single person has his or 
her own and unique diagram of any given musical work. This diagram is always 
individual, and can only be thought about if one starts from the topological sin-
gularities that enable us to think of it in the first place. It is by no means some-
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thing prior to our mapping of the singularities; it is not an abstract or tran-
scendental entity. On the contrary, it is the most extreme immanently generated 
construction, being dependent on an innumerable amount of concrete sin-
gularities working together in a specific assemblage of forces, intensities, and 
tendencies (remember that every singularity is the result of intensive energetic 
processes of individuation, thus, not sempiternal Platonic fictions). In order to 
emerge, this structural image requires a transcendental empiricism, an enormous 
(transcendental) amount of events, of individual and topological singularities, of 
intensive processes, of forces and tendencies empirically experienced by every 
single agent (performer, listener, reader, etc.). Thus, virtual images of a musical 
work are potentially infinite—there are no “absolute” or universally intelligible 
musical works. Every musical work is a space in itself, which has to be navigated 
internally by every single actant—it is not placed within an overarching (n+1) 
transcendental space containing it. Thus, a musical work is as many “works” as 
the people thinking of it. The virtual image, thus defines a problematic field, 
determining the virtual content of a musical work as a problem, as an ideal 
(though not abstract) constellation of differential topological singularities.
Whereas this differentiation (with a t) establishes a problematisation, the 
concrete actualisations of that virtual field express differenciations (with a c) 
as the constitution of solutions, leading to the formation of actual images. 
Such images are formed by different sets of specific individual singularities 
that are actualised in the here-and-now, in the present (and in the presence) 
of a receiver, be it a reader of a score, a listener of a recording or concert, or an 
active performer of the music (or a non-human for non-human forms of expres-
sion). The process of differenciation happens through transduction, changing 
one type of energy into another, critically leading to the formation of new and 
unexpected individuations, which contain emergent properties that were not 
predetermined in advance.
As we have seen, current music ontologies primarily insist on the conditions 
of identity and recognition of a given musical work. Their common basic ques-
tions are of the type: what is a musical work? Are musical works abstract ideas 
or concrete things? How can a musical work be identified as this musical work? 
How can an instantiation of a work be considered as adequate, legitimate, or 
fully qualified? However, these questions take for granted precisely what needs 
to be explained: namely, the fact that those objects they label “musical works” 
emerged at a given historical time, were defined by innumerable sets of physical 
documents, were the result of intensive processes of generation, and continue 
to undergo constant redefinitions throughout time. Anyone with experience 
of editions of musical works (for print), or in research on sketches (in archives), 
just to give two simple examples, knows that any fixed “definition” of a work is 
highly problematic, open to criticism, and the object of change over time. Not 
only do traditions of musical practice and reception change, but the very defin-
ition of a musical text is constantly shifting.32 Musical works from the past have 
 
 32 I addressed this topic in detail in “Beyond Urtext: A Dynamic Conception of Musical Editing” (Assis 
2009, 7–18; republished as Appendix 1 at the end of this volume).
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been different entities throughout time. Think of a symphony by Beethoven 
and its many, varied, and literally different editions over the last two hundred 
years. There have been instruments added or changed, even pitches have not 
been totally indisputable. And the more one looks into its sketches, more prob-
lems arise and more options seem acceptable. Musical works don’t possess a 
final, definitive, and sempiternal formal definition and unchangeable identity. 
If anything, they are mobile entities.
Traditional ontological accounts seem to ignore this, they treat musical works 
as perfectly defined entities, which are to be played by perfect performers, and 
which can be apprehended by perfectly intentionally oriented listeners. Instead 
of relying on such traditional ontologies (focused on Being), one needs to focus 
on the onto- and morphogenesis of musical works. The starting questions 
are, then, quite different: How are musical works effectively generated, con-
structed, formalised? Which intensive processes lead to their individuation? 
Which pre-individuating forces and materials create the humus where they will 
emerge? On which material basis are they transmitted throughout time? Which 
parts of them remain hidden and which ones are disclosed to a specific disci-
pline, perspective, goal? What is the affective power of their extensive parts? 
Which concrete documents allow for their performance? How are they con-
cretely performed? What other things influence their passive reception by an 
audience? Which things build their special topological singularities? Which are 
the modes of existence of such multiplicities? How can their diagrams/structures 
be thought? In the place of fundamental or higher order ontology, one urgently 
needs an ontogenesis, an account of the modes of individuation and continuous 
historical change of musical “works.” 
From this perspective, one cannot ignore the intensive energetic pro-
cesses that lead to the emergence, that is to say, to the factual production of 
sketches, scores, editions, recordings, analyses, and theoretical reflections on 
a given “work.” Critically, one cannot forget the innumerable material objects 
and things that enable the construction of any possible image of work in the 
first place. Before gaining their identity, their unmistakable modes of appear-
ance, their enduring character, or their aura, musical works are constituted as 
energetic tendencies that generate complex conglomerates of things, such as 
sketches, drafts, manuscripts, scores, editions, recordings, transcriptions, trea-
tises, manuals, instruments, depictions, contracts, commissions, letters, post-
cards, scribbles, diagrams, analytical charts, theoretical essays, articles, books, 
memories, and so on. These innumerable things are actual, they have been 
historically actualised at some precise point in time, and they persist existing, 
even if remaining modally and temporally flexible. Any single item from the 
list presented above can be differently read, interpreted, exposed, presented, 
or assembled as part of a book, an edition, a performance, a lecture, an instal-
lation, or whatever format. At this level, the individual singularities pertaining to 
a musical multiplicity function in a similar way to Guy Rohrbaugh’s continu-
ants, possessing three qualities that Platonic entities do not: they are modally 
flexible (they might have had different intensive properties than the ones they 
currently afford), they are temporally flexible (their intensive properties might 
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differ over time), and they can come into and go out of exposure. Thus, they are 
not ideal and sempiternal, nor are they materially fixed once and for all. When 
Julian Dodd asks Rohrbaugh, “where are those historical individuals you claim 
to identify?” (quoted in Rohrbaugh 2012, 33), well, here they are! But they are 
not the full story, they are not “the work,” they are transient, partial, and not 
always actualised components of the wider construction not of “works,” but of 
works as multiplicities.
6. Strata
In very concrete terms, we have to be clear about which things we consider to be 
a legitimate part of the actual components of our musical multiplicities. In this 
sense, and as a useful tool for music practitioners creating innovative modes of 
performance, I have been proposing a terminology based upon strata and pro-
cesses of stratification, which is vaguely inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s use 
of these terms in A Thousand Plateaus (1987, 39–74, 637–39).33 Appropriating their 
terminology, and remaining aware of the unavoidable anisomorphism between 
philosophy and art, one can divide all those musical materials that physically exist 
in the real world into diverse types of strata. Substrata are materials that already 
existed in the world before the first traits of instantiation of a new piece were 
produced; among them one finds other musical pieces, instruments, instrumental 
and compositional manuals, spoken and unspoken rules, codes of behaviour 
and practice, lists of personnel, payment sheets, and so on. Parastrata refer to 
documents produced while composing or preparing a performance, produced in 
view of the generation of a new piece, directly leading to the emergence of a new 
musical entity; they include sketches, drafts, first editions, letters, and writings 
or annotations by composers and performers. From that particular moment in 
time, when a piece has been first defined, many other future materials become 
thinkable and possible: new and renewed editions, all sorts of catalogues (of the 
sketches, of the variants, of the renderings), technical analysis of the piece or 
parts of it, reflexive texts about it, theoretical contextualisations, recordings, and 
so on—these are epistrata, they appear from the first materials that defined the 
piece and evolve from them in ever-growing circles. Next, there are metastrata, 
new materials generated at every future historical time, by practitioners aiming 
to present or, better, expose specific sets of materials from a given multiplicity 
in a new way; such strata include performances, recordings, transcriptions, 
expositions, or any other mode of critical reflection on the available sources. 
Furthermore, there are also interstrata, particular singularities that function in more 
 33 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 522n14) acknowledge their appropriation of these concepts from Italian 
paleoanthropologist Pia Laviosa Zambotti, more specifically from her book Les origines et la diffusion 
de la civilisation (1949), where she develops a whole theory on nomadic cultures and their progressive 
diffusion over the Earth’s ecumene. Especially in chapter four, she addresses the topic of strata, 
substrata, and parastrata, illuminating the processes by which a nomadic culture interfered with, and 
was influenced by, the sedentary cultures it met. A set of substrata, which were part of the structures of 
a sedentary population or of its milieu, starts being challenged, while new configurations (parastrata) 
begin to emerge. The concrete planetary movements and migrations of human populations described 
by Zambotti proved to be wrong by the late 1950s, but her descriptions of the kind of interactions 
between humans, and between humans and their milieu, still have validity and are worth reading.
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than one register, being sometimes part of one strata, sometimes part of another. 
Finally, materials that have apparently nothing to do with a given piece, but that 
might under certain circumstances create relations to it are called allostrata.34 
Significantly, all these different strata are not ontologically predefined, that is, 
their belonging to this or that stratum is more functional than existential. It all 
depends on the specific use made of them by the musical actants.
7. Rasch25: .  .  .  vers la nuit 
We can now understand some of the strata at work in my performance Rasch25: 
. . . Vers la nuit. Moscheles’s piano étude Zorn, which Schumann notated in his 
sketchbook to Kreisleriana, acted as a substratum, a piece of music that existed in 
the world prior to the composition of Kreisleriana and that had an impact on it. 
The same applies to Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte, which is literally quoted 
in Schumann’s immediately preceding work (the Fantasie, op. 17) and evoked at 
the end of the second number of Kreisleriana. Roland Barthes’s essays operated 
first as metastrata (when Barthes was writing them), and now as epistrata, adding 
new individual singularities to the multiplicity called “Robert Schumann’s 
Kreisleriana.” If one thinks of musical works as multiplicities, their constitutive 
parts become not only innumerable but also unpredictable, an aspect that enables 
infinite differential and experimental reconfigurations of their connectors and 
relationships. 
In fact, one of the goals of my RaschX series is to generate an intricate net-
work of aesthetico-epistemic cross-references, through which the listener has 
the freedom to focus on different layers of perception: be it on the music, on 
the texts being projected or read, on the images, or on the voices. Situated 
beyond interpretation, hermeneutics, and aesthetics, the RaschX series is part of 
wider research on what might be labelled experimental performance practices. Such 
practices offer a tangible mode of exposing musical works as multiplicities. On 
the contrary, if one sticks to a traditional image of work based upon the One 
(or Idea), one has necessarily to stick also to notions of work concept, interpret-
ation, authenticity, fidelity to the composer’s intentions, and other highly pre-
scriptive rules that originated in the nineteenth century. And if one sticks only 
to the historical situatedness of practices and codes of the time of the original 
compositions, then one is condemned to historicism, to the cultivation of rel-
ics and fetishes from other epochs (even if “historically informed practices” are 
a highly modern invention, as Richard Taruskin sharply demonstrated in sev-
eral passages of his book Text and Act [1995]). What I mean is that every musical 
practice, every way of doing performance depends on, or is the direct result of, 
a specific ontological commitment. If one’s goal is the passive reproduction 
of a particular edition of a musical piece from the early nineteenth century, 
one is indeed better advised to remain within the classical paradigm, with all its 
associated practices of survey, discipline, and control. But if one is willing to 
expose the richness of the available materials that irradiate from that piece, 
 34 A simple example of this is a concert situation where a piece by Schumann enters into an unexpected 
relation with a piece by Ligeti, or a work of Haydn with one by Schoenberg. 
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one has to move towards new ontological accounts, such as the one proposed 
in this chapter.
Critically, different disciplines look at the different strata differently, each 
discipline constructing its own specific image of work. Robert Schumann’s 
Kreisleriana is a different entity for a music sociologist, a music analyst, a clinical 
psychologist, or a pianist. They all take into account different actual things relat-
ing to that multiplicity, and they all build different virtual diagrams of it. And 
each individual person, even from the same discipline, sees different things and 
articulates them differently, thus constructing his or her own image of work. The 
(impossible to grasp) totality of materials pertaining to a work can only be con-
sidered as being virtual in the Deleuzian sense I explained above. Any actual-
isation of the virtual music singularities is a snapshot of wider images of work, 
the particular snapshot that a person, a group, or a community perceives for a 
certain duration of time. Brought together in specific configurations (histor-
ically, geographically, and disciplinarily situated), every imaginable individual 
stratum in its interaction with other strata enables the material, psychological, 
and sociocultural construction of diverse images of work, which have the poten-
tial to replace those reified generalities that we usually call “musical works.” 
Works appear then as multiplicities, as highly complex, historically constructed 
assemblages defined by virtual structures and actual things. While traditional 
musical ontologies remain attached to hermeneutic, analytical, and interpret-
ative approaches, the new image of work enhances the emergence of creative, 
performative, and experimental events. Beyond transcendental typologies, 
beyond extreme or qualified versions of Platonism, beyond functional theories 
of operative concepts, and beyond aesthetic considerations coming from the 
ivory towers of academia, this new image of work offers a redefinition of musical 
works as highly flexible, mobile multiplicities with potentially infinite consti-
tutive parts that can be exposed in different modes, to different audiences, and 
at different times. The shift from a work-centred perspective to a vision of an 
exploded continuum made of innumerable objects and things, in steady inten-
sive interaction with one another, creates fields of discourse, practice, and per-
ception based on pure difference, leading to processes of differential repeti-
tion. Every single performance then becomes different—not different from any 
original transcendental idea, but different from difference itself. It is only one 
ephemeral solution to the problematic field defined by a musical multiplicity. 
When looking at those exploded things, a musician or a scholar has two 
options: one is analytical, remaining at a certain distance from the materials 
of musical practice, questioning things in terms of what they are, how they 
appear, which properties they have, and what relations they entertain with 
each other; the other option is one that decidedly dives into the materialities 
of music-making, focusing on what to do with these things, how to reactivate 
them, searching for the yet unseen virtual components that they possess, ask-
ing which potentialities they have, and how to express them anew. The first 
approach remains hopelessly imprisoned in the past; the second creatively 
and productively designs new futures for past musical objects and things. The 
first relates to conventional scholarly research and disciplines, the second—so 
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I claim—to new modes of research, primarily to artistic research, a mode in 
which the artistic dimension is quintessentially needed and requested. In the 
place of a reiteration of uncritically inherited performance practices, or patro-
nising instances of survey and control, this perspective offers a methodology 
for unconventional, critical renderings that expose the variety and complexity 
of the musical materials available today. More than repeating what one already 
thinks one knows about a given work, it claims the pure unknown as the most 
productive field for artistic practices. Rather than accepting a reproductive 
tradition, it argues for an experimental, creative, and vitalist attitude. 
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Assemblage, Strata,  
Diagram*
1. Musical works as assemblages
The new image of musical work presented in Chapter 1, with its actual and virtual 
components, implies a broader milieu of individuation, one in which its material, 
aesthetic, and social constitutive parts can be better situated, both in general 
terms, and in their relations to each other. If the dominant classical paradigm of 
the work concept implies a conceptual environment populated by the notions 
of the author’s intentions, fidelity to the score, authenticity, urtext edition, interpretation, 
autonomy of the artwork, or its truth content, the new image of musical work requires 
a totally renewed conceptual ecology. This is because “a tool or a machine . . . 
should not be studied in isolation without taking into consideration the milieu 
of individuation that surrounds it and allows it to function. No machine or 
technical tool exists by itself . . . they only function in an assembled milieu of 
individuation, which constitutes [their] conditions of possibility: there is no 
hammer without a nail, and thus the interaction between a multitude of technical 
objects makes the fabrication of hammers and nails possible, while also forming 
the conditions of their utilisation and the practices and habits associated with 
them” (Sauvagnargues 2016, 186). 
In Chapter 1, I presented some important features of the “musical work as 
assemblage”; however, I mainly focused on the first part of the phrase—“the 
musical work”—the whole chapter being a critique of classical images of work 
and a proposal for a new mode of considering them. This was necessary, in 
order to expose the current state of affairs, and to emphasise the urgency 
of a new vision of musical entities. Yet, as a result, the second part of the 
phrase—“assemblage”—was only briefly mentioned, awaiting exploration. 
The concept of assemblage is absolutely central to my new image of work 
because it is, in my view, the best currently available concept to explain the 
mutations, transformations, and reconfigurations of any far-from-equilibrium 
system (which I claim musical works to be). Moreover, assemblages are made of 
	 * Earlier formulations of the ideas contained in this chapter, focusing on specific aspects of its topic, were 
presented in three editions of the Deleuze Studies Conferences: in Istanbul (2014), Stockholm (2016), 
and Rome (2017). I am grateful for the questions raised by audience members, and for the discussions 
issuing from them, particularly to Ian Buchanan’s feedback after my presentation in Rome. Additional-
ly, I had the opportunity to discuss this topic with Kamini Vellodi, Laura Cull, John Ó Maoilearca, and 
David Savat during three different study days at the Orpheus Institute (2016, 2017). 
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actual and virtual components, an aspect that is central to my appropriation of 
the term for music, as my proposed new image of work is based precisely on the 
interplay between its actual and virtual parts by means of intensive processes of 
individuation. The actual things and the virtual diagrams described in Chapter 
1 resonate with (and were inspired by) the notions of strata, concrete machine, 
diagram, and abstract machine, which are some of the basic components of the 
concept of assemblage as it has been described and applied in the last two dec-
ades in post-Deleuzian discourses.
Moving beyond the question of being and identity, and insisting on an 
approach to musical entities based on a perspective that privileges processes 
of permanent change and becoming, my new image of work poses the ques-
tion not so much in terms of a conventional ontology, but rather in terms of 
ontogenesis and of productive operations with historically inherited materials. 
Thus, the problem shifts from ontology to epistemology, and to the modes by 
which musical works can be apprehended in the real world. They are perceived 
and known always through concrete performative operations that (re)construct 
them anew every single time one is confronted with them. Such operations bring 
to the fore well-known structures, but also, and crucially, zones of indetermin-
acy, grey spots, cracks in the structure that no identity-based ontology is able to 
explain. The component parts of a musical work are not perfectly packaged and 
well formed forever. They are fluid entities, which—more than having a clear 
shape—are in permanent processes of taking shape again and again. They have 
some sort of structure but are not totally defined. Thus, any productive musical 
practice constantly deals with the construction of the means precisely needed 
for that practice. If one deals with ready-made, ready-to-use tools, one may still 
be making music, but in a reproductive, repetitive, and not particularly exciting 
mode. In this sense, my new image of work conveys a constructivist approach 
to musical practice and performance.1 Its basic posture is that musical entities 
can’t be taken as given; they are rather seen as constantly becoming something 
else, without ever attaining a fixed state or definition, and they become this 
something else by means of concrete operations done by concrete individuals. 
Additionally, they can’t appear in the world independently of their environ-
ment. On the contrary, they permanently come into the field of the visible 
and of the audible through new social, aesthetic, and cultural takes on them, 
which are also permanently changing and evolving from one state to the next. 
Thus, my proposed image of work addresses ever-changing constitutions and 
perspectives of such musical entities, as well as their corresponding subject 
positions, from where they are perceived, received, or criticised. The object is 
changing, the environment where it is posited is changing, and the subject- 
receiver is changing. This requires new forms of conceiving the overall 
ecological network around any possible formalisation of a musical work, forms 
that take into account its various components and that privilege the notion of 
permanent transformation.
 1 By constructivism, I mean literally the sense of building or assembling from parts (see Hacking 1999, 103).
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For this purpose, I propose to appropriate for music the concept of assem-
blage, and the remainder of this chapter is an introduction to the concept, par-
ticularly focusing on its emergence and development in the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari, and on its relation to the notions of strata and diagram. Moreover, 
the chapter frames the concept in relation to some of its precursors (Hjelmslev, 
Laviosa Zambotti, Foucault) and some of its interpreters (DeLanda, Nail, 
Buchanan). Thus, it is a technical chapter, presenting basic components of the 
concept and their interaction at different levels and in different practices. It 
aims to establish the foundations for future work on the notion of assemblage 
applied to music. In this sense, and in relation to all this book’s chapters being 
preliminary essays towards future books on their respective topics, this chapter 
offers seminal work towards a monograph on assemblage theory for music.
2. Agencement ,  logic of assemblage, assemblage 
theory
Since the end of the twentieth century, the concept of assemblage has emerged as 
a central concept for addressing problems of stability, instability, determination, 
and, most importantly, transformations regarding social, political, economic, 
philosophical, and aesthetic phenomena. As with previous concepts from phil-
osophy and the social sciences, such as complexity, chaos, fractals, turbulence, 
flow, emergence, or multiplicity, it has been developed as a way to move beyond 
the notion of structure, which has dominated the human and social sciences (espe-
cially in the third quarter of the twentieth century). Structure and structuralism 
clearly obtained important results and were able to explain many problems and 
phenomena, but they seemed to fail in the face of complex systems, especially 
when rapid changes, mutations, and transformations led to unforeseen and 
unpredictable events. Instead of being fixed and resistant to change, complex 
systems operate in permanent processes of becoming and individuation, which 
contribute to their resilience. Thus, in a first moment, the notion of assemblage, 
with its interplay between structure and contingency, organisation and chance, 
“can be seen as a relay concept, linking the problematic of structure with that of 
change and far-from-equilibrium systems” (Venn 2006, 107). Even if this notion 
does not fully explain such systems, it provides basic tools to grasp some sort 
of logic, revealing some of those systems’ tendencies and lines of development 
and the broad direction of their becomings. 
What is currently called assemblage theory (see DeLanda 2006, 2010, 2016; 
Buchanan 2015, 2017) comprises diverse approaches in the human and social 
sciences, which more or less explicitly refer back to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
foundational concept of agencement. Deleuze and Guattari invented this con-
cept in 1975 in their joint book on Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 1986), from 
which it emerged as a development of Deleuze’s previous notion of dis-
junctive synthesis (1969 [see Deleuze 1990]) and Guattari’s desiring machines (see 
Anti-Oedipus [Deleuze and Guattari (1977) 1983]). Crucially, and to clarify the 
ongoing debates around these notions, I think it is essential to distinguish 
between three different notions of the concept, which are often discussed 
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without the necessary distinction: (1) the concept of agencement (from 1975) 
and (2) an extended logic of assemblage (from 1980), both of which are the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari; and (3) diverse assemblage theories that emerged after 
Deleuze and Guattari. 
First, there is the original concept of agencement, which was substantially 
addressed and developed by Deleuze and Guattari in the Kafka book (first pub-
lished 1975), but also in the 1976 first publication of “Rhizome” (see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1981), and in the Dialogues (1977 [see Deleuze and Parnet 2007]). 
Second, in A Thousand Plateaus (1980 [see Deleuze and Guattari 1987]) there is 
a huge expansion of the original concept, which is used in relation to innumer-
able disciplines, fields of knowledge, problems, human practices, and non- 
human formations, including descriptions of geological formations, chemical 
compounds, biological organisms and cells, linguistic formations, paleo- 
anthropological migrations, political organisations and states, cosmic constel-
lations, war machines, and so on. The concept is extensively used and discussed 
throughout the book, defining a sort of general logic of assemblage, which is not 
intended as a fully fledged theory but as a sophisticated elaboration of descrip-
tive and operative principles in order to deal with far-from-equilibrium sys-
tems. The impressive variety of perspectives offered by Deleuze and Guattari—
together and apart—seems to contradict Manuel DeLanda (2006, 3), when 
he writes that “the relatively few pages dedicated to assemblage theory” by 
Deleuze, alone or with Guattari, “hardly amount to a fully fledged theory.” In 
my view, DeLanda is right in that Deleuze and Guattari didn’t aim at producing 
“a theory”; nevertheless, he underestimates the copious amount of pages they 
dedicate to the notion of assemblage. Symmetrically to DeLanda, but on the 
other side, Thomas Nail (2017, 21) states that “contra DeLanda, Deleuze and 
Guattari do in fact have a fully fledged theory of assemblages,” which he tries 
to convey in his essay “What Is an Assemblage?” (2017). Again, Nail is right in 
that Deleuze and Guattari wrote extensively on assemblages, but I don’t think 
they ever aimed at defining a “fully fledged theory.” I don’t think, for example, 
that Deleuze’s Logic of Sense is a “theory of sense,” nor is his Logic of Sensation a 
“theory of sensation”; even A Thousand Plateaus, which is all about multiplici-
ties, is not a “theory of multiplicities.” What Deleuze (alone or with Guattari) 
was always interested in was the definition of operative principles and fluid 
logics that could pass through and cut across different concepts, practices, 
regimes of codings, and materialities. 
Thus, I don’t think there can be a “Deleuzian” assemblage theory. But there 
are (several) assemblage theories, and this is my third point: the construction 
and definition of assemblage theories happened after and as an outgrowth of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas. Such theories are autonomous and independ-
ent of Deleuze and Guattari, who serve only as a vague referent to their expan-
sions. In this sense, I don’t think we should validate them in purely Deleuzian 
terms. They might be considered more or less legitimate, according to one’s 
willingness to accept twists in the original notions, but they strive for coher-
ence and they can be very productive in a variety of fields. However, others are 
more critical towards them. 
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In “Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents” Ian Buchanan (2015) sum-
marises many of the ongoing debates around assemblage theory. He writes that 
“assemblage theory is rapidly gathering a significant following in the human 
and social sciences” (Buchanan 2015, 382). Situated within these disciplines, 
one could claim that the emerging field of artistic research is another area of 
practice where uses and appropriations of the concept of assemblage are cur-
rently observable. If the original Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of agencement is the 
common basic denominator of such appropriations, recent developments and 
disseminations of assemblage theory also seem to be derived from two other 
sources: Bruno Latour’s and Michel Callon’s actor–network theory (ANT), 
on the one hand, and Manuel DeLanda’s (2006, 2010, 2016) analytical read-
ings of Deleuze, on the other. According to Buchanan (2015, 383), these auth-
ors “cloud our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari and in that regard call 
for our critical attention.” Buchanan identifies and analyses the “two kinds of 
error” (ibid.) which these theories, in his view, incur in appropriating Deleuze 
and Guattari: the focus “on the complex and undecidable” (ANT), and the 
focus “on the problem of emergence” (DeLanda) (ibid., 382). Although these 
“errors” are taken to derive from a wrong reading of Deleuze and Guattari, they 
might be considered as “providential errors,” in so far as they open up new lines 
of thought in their own terms (ibid., 382–83). More recent debates and essays 
(Nail 2017; Buchanan 2017) make an effort to clarify terms and definitions, in 
order to guarantee that a minimum relation to the original notions of Deleuze 
and Guattari remains, at least, plausible. Otherwise, assemblage theory risks 
becoming one of those reified generalities (like deconstruction and post-
modernism) that have lost any authorial and referential source (see Buchanan 
2017, 458). At any rate, what the ongoing debate around assemblage theory 
demonstrates is that this concept has multiple sources, which can be separately 
identified but are not easy to disentangle from one another. And it also became 
apparent that there are diverse possible appropriations of the term that, even if 
“wrong,” can be productive. 
Thus, I insist, one has to separate, on the one hand, the concept of agencement 
and a logic of assemblage, both of which are the work of Deleuze and Guattari, 
and, on the other hand, a theory of assemblages, which departs and is autono-
mous from their work. In what follows, I will not try to summarise all exist-
ing views on assemblage (which is an important task, but one that would go 
beyond the scope of this chapter), nor will I make an attempt to bring Deleuze 
and Guattari’s different definitions of assemblage together (which has been 
attempted by DeLanda [2016]). What I will do, is focus on yet another aspect: 
the intricate relations between Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of agencement, 
strata, and diagram, as they define the basic constitutive parts of the concept 
of assemblage in the first place. After a quick intermezzo on the problem of the 
translation of the French word agencement into the English “assemblage,” I will 
scrutinise the origins of the concept of agencement, trying to understand why 
in the mid 1970s Deleuze and Guattari invented this concept. Thus, I will first 
focus on the logic of assemblage that Deleuze and Guattari deployed in their own 
writings. Next, I will refer to various authors who had an impact on Deleuze 
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and Guattari’s texts (Laviosa Zambotti, Hjelmslev, and Foucault, in relation to 
the notions of strata, content/expression, and diagram, respectively) and to other 
thinkers who developed original insights or who made relevant comments on 
their views (DeLanda, Buchanan, Nail, Sauvagnargues, Krtolica, Venn, Zdebik, 
and Zourabichvili). 
Intermezzo: a note on translation 
For the sake of clarity, it is important to briefly address the issue of the English 
translation of the French word agencement as “assemblage.” As is well known today, 
this translation is problematic in many respects, especially because most people 
use it in the regular understanding of the English word (see Buchanan 2017, 458; 
but also, Alliez and Goffey 2011a; Bogue 1989; Buchanan 2015; DeLanda 2006, 2016; 
Wise 2005; Nail 2017; Phillips 2006; et al.). However, the regular understanding 
creates the incorrect impression that the concept refers to a final product and not 
to a process. As Thomas Nail (2017, 22) and Manuel DeLanda (2016, 1) precisely 
explain, both words have completely different etymological roots, the French 
agencement comes from the verb agencer (the action of matching or fitting together 
a set of components, and the result of such action), while the English assemblage 
comes from the French assemblage (not from agencer), which in both languages 
means the joining of two or more things, thus pointing to a perfectly fixed final 
product. In his book on Deleuze from 1989, Ronald Bogue (1989, 174n1) remarked: 
“for agencement, translators of Deleuze and Guattari have suggested ‘assemblage,’ 
‘arrangement’ and ‘organization,’ but no one of these is fully satisfactory.” On the 
same note, but already adding a positive aspect to the translation, Éric Alliez and 
Andrew Goffey write: “although the French agencement is something that might be 
said of the way in which elements on the page of a magazine are put together, of 
a palette of colours or of the arrangement of furniture in a room, in the use that 
Deleuze and Guattari make of it, it also conveys an active sense of agency as being 
what some or other entity does, a precious indicator of the constructivist horizon 
within which it operates. . . . The term ‘assemblage’ does not really convey this 
crucial nuance of agency, even while it does capture the function of synthesis of 
disparate elements rather well” (Alliez and Goffey 2011b, 10–11). 
The first English translation of agencement was made by Paul Foss and Paul 
Patton in 1981 (see Deleuze and Guattari 1981). They opted for “assemblage,” 
and Brian Massumi retained this word in his 1987 translation of A Thousand 
Plateaus. Meanwhile, in 1984, the American edition of a collection of essays by 
Guattari (Guattari 1984a) included a glossary especially written by Guattari for 
this purpose. In it, agencement is translated as “arrangement” in a short glossary 
entry that is worth recalling here: 
Arrangement (Agencement): This is a wider idea than those of structure, system, form, 
process, etc. An arrangement contains heterogeneous components, as well as 
biological, sociological, mechanical, gnoseological, imaginary. In the schizo-analytic 
theory of the unconscious, arrangement is conceived as replacing the Freudian 
“complex.” (Guattari 1984b, 288)
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This means that the concept of agencement has an additional (and fundamental) 
dimension that roots it in psychoanalysis, an aspect that passed mainly unnoticed 
until Buchanan’s 2015 essay, where he writes: “Despite the fact it is Guattari 
himself who defines the assemblage this way . . . the connection between Freud’s 
complex and the concept of the assemblage has been almost completely ignored” 
(Buchanan 2015, 383). Furthermore, Buchanan claims that agencement is Deleuze 
and Guattari’s personal translation “or perhaps re-arrangement would be a better 
word, of the German word Komplex (as in the ‘Oedipal complex’ or the ‘castration 
complex’)” (ibid.). Crucially, Freud’s Komplex does not necessarily require the 
consideration of a material object, thus moving the notion of agencement into 
the realm of a psychological construction. Two things are worth mentioning. On 
the one hand, it is obvious from Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature that the figure 
of Oedipus and Kafka’s relationship to his father as it is expressed in the “Letter 
to the Father” play a central role in the definition of the concept of agencement. 
Chapter 2, “An Exaggerated Oedipus,” makes that rather obvious. Additionally, 
and to complicate things a bit more, the psychoanalytical notion that Deleuze and 
Guattari explicitly mention is not complex but condensation: “The judges, commis-
sioners, bureaucrats, and so on, are not substitutes for the father; rather, it is the 
father who is a condensation of all these forces” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 12). 
On the other hand, in his glossary entry, Guattari clearly states that “Arrangement 
[agencement] is conceived as replacing the Freudian ‘complex’” (Guattari 1984, 288, 
my emphasis). Thus, agencement would not be a translation (or a rearrangement) 
of “complex” but its replacement, its overcoming. To complicate things even 
further on the psychoanalytical front, one could mention that Lacan used the 
French term assemblage in relation to set theory, and that in Seminar XX he did 
so in a sense that is not dissimilar to Deleuze and Guattari’s agencement (session 
from 16 January 1973, see Lacan 1998, 47). Therefore, in order to avoid further 
complications, I think that it is wise to stick to “assemblage” as the translation of 
agencement, making clear the link to the original formulation whenever necessary.
3. From structure to assemblage
Beyond structuralism
Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of strata, agencement/assemblage, concrete 
machine, abstract machine, machinic assemblage of bodies, collective assemblage 
of enunciation, and diagram are part of a dynamic philosophical system. They 
are not rigidly defined, and they can only be understood in continuous relation 
and interaction with one another (thus, not independently). Taken together, 
they have been integrated (crucially, after Deleuze and Guattari’s lifetimes) in 
what has been called “assemblage theory.” However, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work a theory is not constituted; rather, they create a varied ecology of concepts 
and practices that enable new understandings of dynamic processes—without 
pinning them down to analytical definitions or constraints. In particular, the 
notions of strata, assemblage, and diagram—taken in their mutual interrela-
tions—have been of the utmost relevance for them in enabling an alternative 
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to structuralism and phenomenology, to those dehistoricised structures that struc-
turalism often implied, and to those subjective phenomena that were the basis of 
phenomenological approaches.
In the late 1960s, Deleuze was looking for a perspective that could include 
the transformations and mutations of structures, mutations that were observable, 
but to which there were no adequate explanatory theories. Structuralism had 
achieved important results in linguistics (Jakobson), sociology and anthro-
pology (Lévi-Strauss), epistemology (Foucault), semiology (Barthes), psycho-
analysis (Lacan), and political theory (Althusser), offering innovative insights 
into every field of practice based upon linguistic models (“In fact, language is 
the only thing that can properly be said to have structure” [Deleuze 2004, 170]). 
But structuralism failed to account for dynamic systems, for the emergence of 
unexpected or paradoxical behaviours within a given structure. As Couze Venn 
writes (2006, 107):
Structure in the natural and social sciences grounds causal determination within 
a logic of stability and linear causality. . . . [Such logic,] which positivism and 
various forms of structuralism support, has clear pay-offs from the point of view of 
homogenizing and predicting social phenomena. . . . However, the limitations of 
approaches based on this notion of determination have been demonstrated in their 
failure to account adequately for change, resistance, agency and the event: that is, 
the irruption of the unexpected or unpredictable. . . . The problem for theory is 
that of thinking structure as well as multiplicity and indeterminacy within the same 
theoretical framework.
This is precisely what Deleuze, in response to Claire Parnet, expressed: “The 
difficult part is making all the elements of a non-homogeneous set converge, 
making them function together. Structures are linked to conditions of homo-
geneity, but assemblages are not” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 52). 
In this sense, Deleuze’s invention of a whole range of new concepts around 
the core concept of agencement can be seen to emerge from the shortcomings 
and limits of structuralism to explain far-from-equilibrium systems. Deleuze, 
in one of his most important texts, “How do We Recognize Structuralism?” 
(Deleuze 2004), manifests a deep concern for the need to include in structur-
alism an adequate theory of the mutations and transformations of structures: 
“Henceforth, a set of complex problems are posed for structuralism, concern-
ing structural ‘mutations’ (Foucault) or ‘forms of transition’ from one struc-
ture to another (Althusser)” (ibid., 191). What structuralism tended to see as 
“accidents,” as something happening to the structures from their outside, as 
something external to them, is seen by Deleuze as an interior and integral part 
of the structure, concerning not mental representations of a problem but the 
concrete and real individuation of each one of the problem’s actualisations. 
In this very special moment of any structure, namely in its events, nothing can 
any longer be reduced to an essence. The closed system of the structure must give 
place to a continuous individuation, integrating the power of heterogeneity in 
its most inner fabric. The vectors of mutation become a real internal compon-




In short, one can describe Deleuze’s conceptual trajectory between 1967 (“How 
do We Recognize Structuralism?”) and 1972 (Anti-Oedipus), as a move from 
interpretation and structuralism to machinism,2 experimentation, and desiring 
production, paving the way for a logic of assemblages that dominate his joint 
books with Guattari on Kafka (1975 [see Deleuze and Guattari 1986]), on the 
rhizome (1976 [see Deleuze and Guattari 1981]), and on multiplicities (1980 
[see Deleuze and Guattari 1987]). Such books could only have been written after 
that fundamental paradigm shift from structure to machine, the latter being an 
operative (and not descriptive) concept in relation to structure. Each individual 
not only is more than simply the result of a process but also is a milieu of poten-
tially infinite individuations. In his conceptual trajectory, and even before his 
meeting and collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze developed a philosophy of 
intensive different/ciations (Difference and Repetition, 1968 [see Deleuze 1994])
3 
and articulated a logic of sense and non-sense (Logic of Sense, 1969 [see Deleuze 
1990])4 that shows the limits of propositional knowledge, opening the horizon 
to the body and its powers of variation. His first collaboration with Guattari, “La 
synthèse disjonctive” (1970), offers a first solution to the problem of thinking about 
heterogeneity in terms of a theory of the body and a theory of thought, revealing 
the synthesis of the unconscious as operating through concrete inscriptions that 
generate a physical network of syntheses. Thus, the unconscious is no longer seen 
as being primarily psychological, but also, and inseparably, as being physical and 
noological—as an operating machine: “the unconscious does not mean anything. 
On the other hand, the unconscious constructs machines, which are machines 
of desire. . . . The unconscious does not speak, it engineers [il machine]. It is not 
expressive or representative, but productive” (Deleuze and Guattari [1977] 1983, 
180).5 This unconscious is the place par excellence of desiring-machines, a concept 
that replaced Deleuze’s notion of the larval selves (which still play a central role 
in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense), and that would be replaced, in turn, 
in 1975 with the concept of agencement. With the concept of desiring-machine, 
Deleuze and Guattari moved beyond the Freudian concept of the id, and beyond 
“the Lacanian conception of lack as the principal motor of desire” (Buchanan 
2010, 125), affirming desire as a productive, positive, and creative operator, 
definitely setting aside the traditional negative notion of desire as lack or 
need.
According to Ian Buchanan’s thorough analysis of Anti-Oedipus, “[the] ‘insist-
ence’ of desire is ultimately what Deleuze and Guattari are trying to account for 
with the concept of the desiring-machine” (Buchanan 2008, 47). In the place of 
 
 2 In relation to the notion of machinism, see Lapoujade (2017, 152–54); Sauvagnargues (2016, 193). 
 3 A first sketch of this theory (in nuce) is presented in the section “The Differential and the Singular” of 
“How do We Recognize Structuralism?” (Deleuze 2004, 176–78).
 4 Deleuze had already mentioned the relation between sense and non-sense in “How do We Recognize 
Structuralism?”: “There is, profoundly, a nonsense of sense, from which sense itself results” (2004, 175).
 5 “l’inconscient ne veut rien dire. En revanche, l’inconscient fait des machines, qui sont celles du désir. 
. . . L’inconscient ne dit rien, il machine. Il n’est pas expressif ou représentatif, mais productif ” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1972, 248).
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an unconscious, working as a theatre of representation, Deleuze and Guattari 
propose an unconscious primarily busy with desire-production and continu-
ously operating schizophrenic processes, which are seen as its basic matrix. 
Desire does not relate to something we miss, but it becomes a process, some-
thing we actively do, something that more than producing fantasies (which is 
a secondary operation) is occupied with the production of production itself 
(see Buchanan 2008, 49). Crucially, desiring-production cannot operate with-
out simultaneously producing new desiring-machines and destroying old 
desiring-machines. In its restless schizoid machinations, it cannot afford to 
stop at any frustration or joy, its impetus being to ceaselessly continue feeding 
desire-production. Thus, “desire is not desire for an object. . . . [Nor is it] a drive in 
the Freudian sense, and it is not a structure . . . in the Saussurian model adopted 
by Lacanians” (Massumi 1992, 82). The core idea of Deleuze and Guattari is that 
the basic function of desire is to produce, to assemble, and to render machinic, 
meaning that “they give desire the means to not merely express itself, but [to] 
form something constructive” (Buchanan 2010, 125). Desire becomes the pro-
duction of singular states of intensity, including disjunctive processes (which in 
the abstract machine are traversed by a “desire for abolition”6), and conjunctive 
ones (that result from the tension between free connective synthesis and fixed 
disjunctive synthesis).
Agencement
Nevertheless, and despite its obvious relevance and its power to enable a funda-
mental rethinking of structures within dynamic systems, the concept of desiring- 
machines appears only in Anti-Oedipus (first published 1972), being completely 
dropped thereafter. Its core characteristics are passed to the “new” concepts 
of abstract machines and assemblages, which vastly populate Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature (first published 1975), the Dialogues with Claire Parnet (first published 
1977), and A Thousand Plateaus (first published 1980). According to Massumi 
(1992, 82), “due to persistent subjectivist misunderstandings . . . the word was 
changed to the more neutral ‘assemblage,’” and Deleuze seems to confirm this 
in his dialogues with Claire Parnet (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 101). The general 
tendency to immediately associate desire with sexuality created particularly 
difficult problems in order to move toward wider social, political, artistic, and 
philosophical phenomena. Deleuze observes, “We do not believe in general 
that sexuality has the role of an infrastructure in the assemblages of desire. . . . 
No assemblage [agencement] can be characterized by one flux exclusively.” He 
concludes (with obvious regret), “So Félix’s fine phrase ‘desiring machines’ ought 
to be given up for these reasons” (ibid.).
 6 On the notion of desire for abolition, see Sauvagnargues (2016, 193), particularly her remark that “The 
desire for abolition only has mortifying connotations for those wedded to the schema of identity. But 
when the abstract machine functions, it fails, it always fails, it necessarily fails, because any functioning 
involves the provisional singularity and uncertain contingency of a force that becomes exhausted right 
at the moment it gets going.”
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The concept of agencement makes it appearance in 1975, in two texts: one 
co-authored by Deleuze and Guattari (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature), where 
it plays a fundamental role; the other by Deleuze alone, a review of Michel 
Foucault’s Surveiller et punir (1975), where it is first mentioned in relation to 
repression and ideology, which “explain nothing but always assume an assem-
blage or dispositif within which they operate, but not vice versa” (Deleuze [1988] 
2006, 25–26; my emphasis, translation modified7). The opening paragraphs of 
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, immediately address the basic components of 
an agencement, namely its forms of content and expression; but, interestingly, 
it is the concept of rhizome that is invoked and not agencement (see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986, 3, 4). The concept of agencement is progressively developed 
through the book, culminating in the final chapter (“What Is an Assemblage?”) 
after other notions have been exposed (minor, desire, series, connectors, inten-
sities). According to Sauvagnargues, “the concept of rhizome is a good intro-
duction to the concept of agencement, because it pedagogically insists on the 
multiplicity understood as a package of lines” (2011, 176–77, my translation). 
Such lines are mainly triple: a line of differentiation (molecular particles), a line 
of organisation (molar units), and a line of escape (the interstices between con-
tent and expression, potentiating cracks in the assemblage). With such lines, 
the rhizome (or the assemblage, or the dispositif ) gains a kinetic and dynamic 
definition that renders it fluid and flexible, able to manifest itself in highly 
coded and territorialised stratifications, as well as in decoded and deterri- 
torialised arrangements. Like a topological figure it can be stretched and 
folded, enhancing one or the other components to come to the fore. In the 
place of fixed structures, this dynamic vision makes it possible to view com-
plex systems in terms of permanent change and variation. In its origins, the 
concept of agencement is particularly indebted to the work of the Danish lin-
guist Louis Hjelmslev (whose theories will be described in more detail below), 
who Deleuze and Guattari ([1977] 1983, 243) emphatically declared (already in 
Anti-Oedipus) was the maker of “the only modern—and not archaic—theory of 
language,” a theory that “stands in profound opposition to the Saussurian and 
post-Saussurian undertaking” (242) and that operated a “concerted destruc-
tion of the signifier” (243).
Assemblage
After Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature two additional features were added to the 
concept of agencement; in my view, these features are crucial to the definition of 
a proper concept of assemblage that is wider in scope and that has more com-
ponents than the original concept of agencement. Dialogues (first published 1977) 
adds to content and expression their respective coefficients of stabilisation and 
 7 In the original translation, unfortunately, both crucial terms in this sentence—agencement and dispos-
itif—have been lost, and translated as “organization” and “system,” respectively. This obfuscates the 
intended meaning of the original concepts, as it misses an opportunity to establish a link between 
agencement and Foucault’s concept dispositif. The French original is as follows: “la répression et l’idéolo-
gie n’expliquent rien, mais supposent toujours un agencement ou ‘dispositif ’ dans lequel elles opèrent, 
et non l’inverse” (Deleuze 1986, 36). 
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Figure 2.1. The tetravalence of the assemblage after Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 89).
becoming, and A Thousand Plateaus (first published 1980) introduces the notion 
of the tetravalence of the assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 89), which already 
implies the parametrisation of the concept that DeLanda (2006, 2016) analytic-
ally describes, based upon which he constructs his social ontology. Deleuze and 
Guattari are quite explicit about this, when they write: 
On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, 
the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of 
actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on 
the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of 
incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the 
assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and 
cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away. No one is better than Kafka at 
differentiating the two axes of the assemblage and making them function together. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 88)
Let us linger on this scheme, which offers a sort of map where the components 
and connectors of an assemblage can be situated. As a map, this scheme suggests 
the possibility of navigating any assemblage under scrutiny. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “the concrete machines are the two-form [content and expres-





















































Figure 2.2. Components and connectors of an assemblage.
. . . It is as if the abstract [machine] and the concrete assemblages constituted 
two extremes, and we moved from one to the other imperceptibly” (Deleuze [1988] 
2006, 34–35, my emphasis). Importantly, let’s keep in mind that an assemblage 
is primarily defined as a multiplicity, that is, it is not “a thing” but a complex 
arrangement of material, semiotic, and social flows (see Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 22–23).8 Such flows have different degrees of coding and different degrees 
of territorialisation; they are more or less concrete, more or less abstract, more 
or less stratified, and they more or less escape the assemblage. A single semiotic 
flow doesn’t produce an assemblage; it is always necessary to have several blocks, 
series, and segments of series to create a net of connections that finally enable 
the emergence of the assemblage. Thus, an assemblage is made of components 
(series of flows that will never stop proliferating) and connectors. Figure 2.2 
schematically adds these components and connectors to Figure 2.1. 
The components are made of discursive and non-discursive forms, of forms per-
taining to the visible and to the sayable, forms of content and forms of expression. 
The first example of an assemblage presented in Kafka is “the portrait of a porter 
with his head bent” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 3). In very simple terms, in this 
assemblage, the form of content is the bent head, and the form of expression is 





















































Figure 2.3. The non-identity between content and expression.
a portrait photo. In the case of Foucault’s analysis of prisons and institutions of 
confinement, Deleuze identifies forms of expression in the physical building of 
the prison and in the penal code—the form of content being the prisoners. The 
same is true in relation to other forms of expression, such as schools, workshops, 
armies, and their respective contents: children, artisans, soldiers, and so on. 
Clearly, there is always a gap between the forms of the visible and the forms of 
the sayable: what we say is never what we do; what a code prescribes (or hopes to 
implement) is not what bodies do. As Deleuze has put it: “The concrete assem-
blages [being made of forms of content and forms of expression] are therefore 
opened up by a crack that determines how the abstract machine performs” 
(Deleuze [1988] 2006, 33).
Contrary to conventional perspectives based on the identity and endurance of 
entities, Deleuze and Guattari stress the positive power of such cracks within the 
system: “Expression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. 
When a form is broken, one must reconstruct the content that will necessarily be 
part of a rupture in the order of things” (1986, 28). What would be a problem for 
structuralism and phenomenology (the discovery of a gap in the structure or of 
an inconsistency in the phenomena), becomes a source of creative possibilities, 
opening avenues for new arrangements of things.
On the other hand, the connectors that establish links between the forms 
of content and expression are also permanently changing and reconfiguring. 
They signal special points—singularities—that have the capacity to change 
state or phase within any given arrangement. They have the power to “augment 
the connections of desire in the field of immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986, 63). These points are not subjective or aesthetic impressions that an 
assemblage may (or may not) induce in the bodies that come into contact with 
it; instead, they are markers of objects, characters, events, tendencies—they are 
by no means “impressions.” As Deleuze and Guattari (ibid., 70) say in relation 
to Kafka: “This is why subjective impressions are systematically replaced by 
points of connection that function objectively as so many signals in a segment-







(line of flight / interstice)
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mula of the artist machine or of the machine of expression must be defined in 
a completely different way. . . . Machinic definition, and not an aesthetic one.”
Thus, as the scheme of the assemblage’s tetravalence makes clear, an assem-
blage has two sides: on the one hand it is a collective assemblage of enuncia-
tion, on the other it is a machinic assemblage of bodies. But that’s not all. An 
assemblage extends itself over several contiguous segments, which may be bet-
ter described as pertaining to yet another assemblage, and any assemblage has 
points of deterritorialisation that may stop the assemblage from functioning 
altogether. Those cracks in the assemblage, its lines of escape, of flight, and of 
disarticulation, operate a continuous process of disassembly9 of the assemblage. 
Thus, assemblages include innumerable components and relate to various 
other concepts. Our only chance to grasp them, or to explain them, is to take 
them apart, in order “to examine both the elements that make [them] up and 
the nature of [their] linkages” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 53). In what follows, 
I will address the notions of strata and diagram, as they seem to configure the 
extreme cases of the concrete and the abstract machines, creating a wide field 
in which any given assemblage can take different forms and shapes, allowing 
its components and connectors to move “from one to the other imperceptibly” 
(Deleuze [1988] 2006, 34–35).
4. Strata 
The components of an assemblage that are characterised by a high degree of both 
coding and territorialisation, and that are concretely tied to a material fixation 
in the world, are called strata. They result from intensive processes of stratifica-
tion, and they are made of formed matter and operative functions. As Eugene 
B. Young (2013, 298) has put it: “While structuralism emphasises interrelations 
that are often dehistoricized, the concept of strata permits an understanding 
of layers both in terms of space and time.” Strata convey a specific, time-and-
space-bound historical dimension that reveals them as historical formations; 
and history—according to Deleuze in “Michel Foucault’s Main Concepts” 
(Deleuze 2007b)—is taken as an archive, or as a series of strata from which 
thinking draws its power and virtue. Strata are important not in themselves—not 
because of their historicity—but in so far as they give notice of intensive processes 
of individuation, processes that have the capacity to let us think their genesis 
in ever-changing arrangements and configurations: “[What is historical are] 
the formations which are stratified, made up of strata. But to think is to reach 
a non-stratified material, somewhere between the layers, in interstices” (ibid., 
241). As Deleuze underlines, Foucault referred to part of his activity as “studies 
in history,” but he insisted that these studies were not “the work of an historian” 
(ibid.). For the crucial point about the study of strata is to look at them not from 
a historical but from a philosophical and artistic perspective, checking them 
against the grain of common sense (which emphasises an idealised past against 
the present), and revealing them as (fragmentary) building blocks of a time to 
 9 The original word is démontage (see Deleuze and Guattari 1975, 146).
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come, thus contributing to their futurity. In this sense, the strata are “the affair 
of archaeology,” but only because “archaeology does not necessarily refer back 
to the past. There is an archaeology of the present” (Deleuze [1988] 2006, 50). 
Instead of looking at the strata with a nostalgic, retrospective, and regressive 
gaze, one can confront them with their own future, fostering a productive 
tension between the sedimented and dynamic parts of a particular historical 
arrangement. As Deleuze writes ([1988] 2006, 98): “On the limit of the strata, 
the whole of the inside finds itself actively present on the outside. The inside 
condenses the past (a long period of time) in ways that are not at all continuous 
but instead confront it with a future that comes from outside, exchange it and 
re-create it. To think means to be embedded in the present-time stratum that 
serves as a limit: what can I see and what can I say today?” 
But what are strata, concretely? According to Deleuze ([1988] 2006, 41), “strata 
are historical formations. . . . made from things and words, from seeing and 
speaking, from the visible and the sayable, from bands of visibility and fields 
of readability, from contents and expressions.” They are the result of temporal 
and intensive processes that captured certain forces and singularities within 
a sedimentary bed, layers, or belts. Each stratum serves as the substratum for 
another stratum, thus generating history, or at least making historical sequen-
ces of things and events graspable. In simple terms, strata “consist of giving 
form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems 
of resonance and redundancy” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 40). 
Strata proceed and take shape by means of two complementary operations, 
coding and territorialisation: “They operate by coding and territorialization upon 
the earth; they proceed simultaneously by code and by territoriality” (ibid.). 
According to Manuel DeLanda (2016, 22), who offers the most comprehensive 
and transparent analytical account of these concepts to date, “coding refers to 
the role played by expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity 
of a whole.” Examples of such “expressive components” include chromosomes, 
languages, and viruses, all of which have very strict and resilient modes of 
transmitting and reproducing their deep inscriptional tools. Further examples 
include institutional organisations, corporate regulations, and the state appar-
atus, which all have highly coded modes of expressions and behaviour: “The 
more despotic a state apparatus, the more everything becomes coded: dress, 
food, manners, property, trade” (ibid., 23). Territorialisation refers to the degree 
of homogeneity and cohesion in the components of a specific arrangement of 
things—it indicates the sharpness of its boundaries (territorialisation), or of 
their destabilisation (deterritorialisation). Importantly, territorialisation also 
relates to non-spatial processes that increase the homogeneity of an arrange-
ment, such as social, political, or racial segregation or discrimination, which 
increase the ethnic or racial homogeneity of a community. On the contrary 
“any process which either destabilizes spatial boundaries or increases internal 
heterogeneity is considered deterritorializing” (DeLanda 2006, 13). Thus, the 
notion of territorialisation doesn’t directly relate to the physical borders or 
limits of a group, community, or state apparatus, but rather to “a mobile and 
shifting centre that is localisable as a specific point in space and time” (Message 
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Figure 2.4. The double articulation.
2005, 275). Accordingly, a territory is marked by the ways movement occurs 
over a space. The famous examples of such movement presented by Deleuze 
and Guattari are the refrain of a birdcall, which encapsulates a mode of expres-
sion that draws a territory and envelops into territorial motifs and landscapes, 
and the artist’s signature, which resembles the placing of a flag on a piece of 
land and which creates a field of forces identifiable as “the author’s effect.” 
Processes of stratification happen, and concrete strata take shape, when these 
two parameters (coding and territorialisation) have high values. 
Geology ( flysch) 
The concept of strata has an obvious geological origin and figure 2.4 provides 
a simple (and simplified) illustration of its basic processes and components. 
Deleuze and Guattari introduce this notion in the third plateau of A Thousand 
Plateaus (“10,000 BC: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It 
Is?)”), where Arthur Conan Doyle’s fictional character Professor Challenger 
starts quoting sentences on strata taken from “a geology textbook” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 40). According to this (obviously unnamed) book, strata are 
the result of a double process, which they call double articulation. As Deleuze and 
Guattari explain (ibid., 40–41): 
Each stratum exhibits phenomena constitutive of double articulation. . . . The first 
articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable molecular 
or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a statistical order of 
connections and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes functional, 
compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar compounds in which 
these structures are simultaneously actualized (substances). In a geological stratum, 
for example, the first articulation is the process of “sedimentation,” which deposits 
units of cyclic sediment according to a statistical order: flysch, with its succession of 
sandstone and schist. The second articulation is the “folding” that sets up a stable 
























Figure 2.5. Double articulation at a larger scale.
Thus, the first articulation concerns the materiality of the stratum, with the 
selection of the raw materials. The form and the substance of these materials is 
that of particle flows, of molecular entities in the process of being mainly (but 
not exclusively) territorialised (the sedimentary process). On the other hand, the 
second articulation concerns the expressivity of the stratum, with the folding of 
materials, and the manifestation of emergent properties (which are not present in the 
basic particle flows). The form and substance of these strata is that of sedimentary 
beds, of molar entities with a specific set of coding. The first articulation moves 
from molecular substances to molar forms; the second articulation moves from 
molecular forms to molar substances. Each articulation operates through form 
and substance: the first selects only some materials, out of a wider set of possibil-
ities, and gives them a statistical form; the second gives these loosely ordered 
materials a more stable form and produces a new, larger-scale material entity. 
This description of the processes of strata formation captures just one 
moment within a broader dynamic and temporal sequence of events. Deleuze 
and Guattari do not explicitly discuss the distinction between scales, but they 
do suggest it. First, in relation to the co-presence of coding and territoriality in 
each articulation, they write that “each articulation has a code and a territorial-
ity; therefore each possesses both form and substance” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 41). And, they add, “substances are nothing other than formed matters” 
(ibid.), implying the existence of another double articulation, prior to the for-
mation of the “metastable molecular units” of sandstone and schist. Not only 
those units but also those “unstable particles” (the single pebbles) are already 
forms with “a code, modes of coding and decoding” (ibid.). At the same time, 
Deleuze and Guattari also refer to (micro) “territorialities and degrees of ter-
ritorialization and deterritorialization” (ibid.). Second, on a larger scale (fig-
ure 2.5), once the sedimentary rock is defined, it starts further processes of the 
accumulation of layers and tectonic foldings, leading to larger scale emergent 
entities: folded mountains like the Alps and the Pyrenees. 
Thus, what has been regarded as being molecular becomes molar, and this new 
molar entity could become molecular in relation to wider processes of transforma-
tion: “Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that the distinction between the 






Guattari 1987, 41). Now, it is the sedimented layer, which seemed stable at a certain 
scale, that becomes a metastable unit, lending itself to further processes of expres-
sion—a term that refers to the fact that something has acquired a performative 
function (see Buchanan 2017, 472).10 Contrary to the remark that “Deleuze and 
Guattari fail to make a distinction between different scales” (DeLanda 2016, 
24), they explicitly write
materials are not the same as the unformed matter of the plane of consistency; they 
are already stratified, and come from “substrata.” But of course substrata should 
not be thought of only as substrata: in particular, their organization is no less 
complex than, nor is it inferior to, that of the strata. . . . The materials furnished by 
a substratum are no doubt simpler than the compounds of a stratum, but their level 
of organization in the substratum is no lower than that of the stratum itself. The 
difference between materials and substantial elements is one of organization; there 
is a change in organization, not an augmentation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 49)
Paleo-anthropology (Laviosa Zambotti)
After discussing other examples of double articulations in chemistry, linguistics, 
zoology, and biology, Professor Challenger’s lecture secretly turns to paleo- 
anthropology, making major references to the notions of strata, substrata, 
epistrata, and parastrata, which were coined in 1947 by the Italian paleo- 
anthropologist Pia Laviosa Zambotti (see Laviosa Zambotti 1949). Deleuze and 
Guattari mention her work in two footnotes (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 522n14, 
n16), acknowledging her first use of these notions and calling attention to “her 
conception of waves and flows from center to periphery, and of nomadism and 
migrations (nomadic flows)” (ibid., 522n16). Thus, the focus changes from strata 
as geological formations, to strata as cultural interaction between populations in 
movement, encountering each other at different speeds and levels of civilization. 
Laviosa Zambotti’s main thesis is that the concept of civilisation results from a 
concentration and superimposition of cultures on top of one another, and that 
the expansion of civilisation throughout the Earth’s ecumene originated in one 
single focal point. The originality of her thought (which is stressed by Mircea 
Eliade in the preface to the French translation of her book [see Eliade 1949, i–iv, 
my translation]), was to view culture as the result of “intensive and continuous 
collaboration between different human groups” (ibid., iii), which start and 
take shape from specific centres of diffusion, which crucially she studied in a 
planetary dimension that allowed a totally renewed and dynamic view of the 
dissemination of human cultures throughout the whole of the Earth’s ecumene 
(Laviosa Zambotti 1949, 41). 
 10 Buchanan (2017, 472) writes: “for Deleuze and Guattari, expression, or better yet ‘becoming expressive,’ 
does not mean simply that something has acquired meaning(s) in the semiotic sense; rather, it refers to 
the fact it has acquired a performative function.” 
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Figure 2.6. Detail of Laviosa Zambotti’s chart on the diffusion of agriculture through  
the ecumene.
Especially in chapter four of her book, Laviosa Zambotti describes how nomadic 
populations progressively moved, marked, and occupied territories along the 
ecumene (see figure 2.6). She focuses on the interaction between such nomadic 
populations and the stable groups they encountered in their trajectories. It is 
in the moment of the encounter that Laviosa Zambotti identifies the presence 
and effect of different strata: the substrate11 that (pre)existed in the territory and 
in the configurations designed by the stable groups, and the parastrata, which 
progressively emerge through the interaction of the two populations. Figure 2.7 
schematically represents her view of the formation and interaction between the 
different strata. In the case of an encounter between a nomadic population and 
a territorially fixed community (see figure 2.7a), there is a process of interaction 
between the substrata that configure the milieu of the fixed community and the 
parastrata brought by the nomadic group. This interaction results in the formation 
of (new) epistrata. None of the strata disappear; rather, they are laid one on top 
of the other, creating superimposed, multilayered arrangements of strata. The 
other process (figure 2.7b) relates to the expansion of a given community, moving 
 
 11 Laviosa Zambotti defines substrata as follows: “In the archaeological sense, we call a substrate the 
culture that, within the process of stratification, finds itself placed underneath another one” (Laviosa 




Figure 2.7. Formation and interaction between different strata: (a, left) a nomadic popula-
tion encounters a fixed community; (b, right) expansive movement of a given community.
from a stable centre toward the periphery of their territory, where newly derived 
centres are founded. These new centres establish new connections, which result 
from the interactions between their own substrata and their newly configured 
milieu. This interaction produces parastrata, epistrata, and metastrata.12
Laviosa Zambotti focuses on precise prehistorical and historical events (mostly 
from Europe and Asia), and the notions of strata remain actually underdevel-
oped in her book. It is thanks to Deleuze and Guattari that these ideas gained 
a wider importance and were applied to other realms and topics. They retain 
three fundamental ideas from Laviosa Zambotti: first, that human populations 
always move from one radiating centre to diverse peripheries, which become (new) 
centres under their own powers, creating a new milieu: “Nomadic waves or flows 
of deterritorialization go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the 
new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching 
forth to the new” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 53). Second, they preserve the idea 
that the diffusion of culture happens through phenomena of contagion—popu-
lation A contaminating population B, and vice versa—“The central ring does not 
exist independently of a periphery that forms a new center, reacts back upon the 
first center, and in turn gives forth discontinuous epistrata” (ibid., 51). Last, and 
as a consequence, the diverse strata gain more specific functions: the substrata 
define the basic coding and territorial conditions of the encounter, the parastrata 
emphasise processes of decoding and overcoding, while the epistrata involve 
territorialisations, deterritorialisations, and reterritorialisations: “Forms relate to 
codes and processes of coding and decoding in the parastrata; substances, being 
formed matters, relate to territorialities and movements of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization on the epistrata. . . . The organization of the epistrata 
moves in the direction of increasing deterritorialization” (ibid., 53). 

















With this last characterisation of strata, we are already moving towards a 
much more fluid notion of historical contingent formations, which consist of 
populations of interacting entities that might act as a source of limitations and 
affordances for its components. It is possible for strata (like assemblages in 
general) to undergo destabilising processes affecting their materiality or their 
expressivity, or both. Therefore, they may be subject to continuous or sudden 
processes of deterritorialisation and decoding. This is because, as Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987, 55) state: “the strata are continually being shaken by phenom-
ena of cracking and rupture, either at the level of the substrata that furnish the 
materials (a prebiotic soup, a prechemical soup . . .), at the level of the accumu-
lating epistrata, or at the level of the abutting parastrata: everywhere there arise 
simultaneous accelerations and blockages, comparative speeds, differences in 
deterritorialization creating relative fields of reterritorialization.” Thus, strata 
are not perennial, and they might be opened up by a crack that determines 
how they function within a new arrangement of forces, discourses, and matters. 
This crack is real, it is part of any strata: it is the line of escape that is placed at 
the interstices of the strata’s form of expression (signs and enunciations) and its 
form of content (bodies and actions). 
Linguistics (Hjelmslev)
The terms content and expression, with their associated notions form of content, form 
of expression, substance of content, and substance of expression, were extracted by Deleuze 
and Guattari from the work of Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev, particularly from 
his book Prolegomena to a Theory of Language from 1943 (Hjelmslev [1953] 1969). 
Guattari discovered his work in the 1970s, and he convinced Deleuze that Hjelmslev’s 
linguistic theory offered a tool that would help overcome the structuralism that 
dominated French linguistics at the time: “I think it’s with Hjelmslev, maybe Peirce 
. . . on the one hand, and on the other with the founders of axiomatic theory, that 
we can find the key to ‘clearing’ out . . . structuralism” (Guattari 2006, 38). It was 
particularly Lacan’s “structuralisation” of psychoanalysis that Guattari posited 
as “the enemy” to attack and criticise. For Guattari—in contrast to Lacan’s main 
assumption—the unconscious is not structured like a language: “Lacan was 
wrong to identify displacement and condensation with Jakobson’s metaphor and 
metonymy on the level of the primary processes. He is turning everything into 
linguistics, and diachronizing, crushing, the unconscious” (Guattari 2006, 73).13 
Lacan’s structuralised psychoanalysis, which is one of the designated adversaries 
of Anti-Oedipus, leaned massively on Saussure and Jakobson. And this is the reason 
why Deleuze and Guattari made a violent critique of the Saussurian theory of 
the sign, which implied a definition of the linguistic field as transcendence turning 
around a master signifier. This linguistics of the signifier was to be replaced by 
a completely different linguistics of flux, and Guattari believed that Hjelmslev 
was the author who could provide the fundaments for such an alternative 
 13 Guattari is specifically referring to page 799 of Lacan’s essay “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du 
désir dans l’inconscient freudien” (Lacan [1960] 1966, 793–827).
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linguistics.14 Thus, Hjelmslev was “enrolled” in Deleuze and Guattari’s construc-
tion of a semiotic machine against structural semiology (see Dosse 2010, 232). 
Of all the concepts and functions developed by Hjelmslev, Deleuze and 
Guattari specifically focused on his distinction between the reversible planes of 
expression and content (which they interpreted in their own way). For Hjelmslev 
there was only a single plane of consistency, which unfolded in multiple strata, thus 
overcoming Saussure’s fundamental binarism between signifier and signified. 
This seemed to allow for a “purely immanent theory of language that shatters 
the double game of the voice-graphism domination, that causes form and sub-
stance, content and expression to flow according to the flows of desire; and that 
breaks these flows according to points-signs and figures-schizzes” (Deleuze and 
Guattari [1977] 1983, 242–43). In a highly laudatory tone, Deleuze and Guattari 
even describe Hjelmslev’s linguistics as operating the destruction of the signi-
fier: “Far from being an overdetermination of structuralism and of its fondness 
for the signifier, Hjelmslev’s linguistics implies the concerted destruction of the 
signifier, and constitutes a decoded theory of language” (ibid., 243).
Hjelmslev did indeed intend to create a new theory of language, in which the 
positioning within linguistics of the subdisciplines of phonetics, morphology, 
syntax, lexicography, and semantics could be reconsidered, evolving the disci-
pline toward a sort of algebra of language based on stratified layers of functions 
and contents. He called this new linguistics glossematics (see Hjelmslev [1953] 
1969, 59–60). Instead of the arborescent system of language’s network struc-
tures, Hjelmslev devised a stratified model, in which context (doings), seman-
tics (meanings), lexicogrammar (sayings, wordings), and phonology (sound-
ings) function as superimposed layers, defining a quasi-geological stratification 
of components. According to Guattari “the perspective opened by Hjelmslev 
. . . consisted in admitting that semantic creativity can discover its origin in 
the concatenation of figures of expression and figures of contents” (Guattari 2011, 
25, my emphasis). In his critique of structural linguistics (especially what he 
calls “orthodox Chomskyans” [ibid., 24]), Guattari insists on the centrality of 
Hjelmslev’s theories, exactly in relation to the notions of content and expression: 
“a return to Hjelmslev, or rather a detour through Hjelmslev, could be fruitful. 
It is by no means a question of renewing his project of the radical axiomatiza-
tion of language, but of setting out from some of his categories that appear to 
be the only ones to come from a truly rigorous examination of the ensemble of 
semiotic problematics, while drawing, in particular, on all the consequences 
of his calling into question of the status of content and expression” (ibid., 41). 
It was the potential of these concepts to overcome the classical (Saussurian) 
opposition between signifier and signified that most interested Guattari: “In any 
event, at the most essential level of what the glossematicians call the ‘semiotic 
 14 One should notice that Hjelmslev’s system is actually even more formal than the systems of Saussure or 
Jakobson, but Deleuze and Guattari made a very personal interpretation of his work. As François Dosse 
observed (2010, 231–32): “In fact, Hjelmslev, the inventor of ‘glossematics,’ had initiated an even more 
formal linguistics than Saussure’s, but Deleuze and Guattari had very little to do with glossematics and 
changed Hjelmslev’s ideas slightly to serve their real purpose of using him against Saussurian thinking 
by creating a truly pragmatic linguistics.”
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function,’ the form of expression and form of content contract in order to con-
stitute a ‘solidarity’ that radically relativizes the traditional opposition of the 
signifier and the signified” (ibid., 41–42). Importantly, Guattari clearly states 
the limits of Hjelmslev’s own endeavour, which is seen as regrettably remain-
ing within a Saussurian horizon of thought,15 and his claim is that his notions 
could be appropriated and expanded in his joint work with Deleuze towards 
Anti-Oedipus. 
Hjelmslev develops the notions of content and expression in relation to his 
theory of signs, particularly to what he calls the “sign function” (Hjelmslev 
[1953] 1969, 47). Contrary to the traditional understanding according to which 
“a sign is first and foremost a sign for something” (ibid.), he tries to analyse the 
sign as a purely operative function, looking at its precise internal functioning, 
and not so much at its role as a mediator between a signifier and a signified. 
This sign function consists of two functives16 that contract the function in two dif-
ferent modes: one functive is called expression, the other, content. Expression and 
content (as functives) operate a fundamental contraction of the sign function 
itself: “There will never be a sign function without the simultaneous presence 
of both these functives; and an expression and its content, or a content and its 
expression, will never appear together without the sign function’s also being 
present between them. . . . Thus, there is also solidarity between the sign func-
tion and its two functives, expression and content” (ibid., 48). An expression is 
expression only by virtue of being an expression of content, and content is con-
tent only by virtue of being the content of an expression. Therefore, there can 
be no content without an expression, nor can there be expressionless content; 
neither can there be an expression without content, or content-less expression 
(see ibid., 49). This leads Hjelmslev to conclude that “the distinction between 
expression and content and their interaction in the sign function is basic to the 
structure of any language” (ibid., 58).
Crucially, Guattari departs from language and linguistics, and discusses 
these functions, functives, and contractions in wider semiotic arrangements. 
In his 1979 book The Machinic Unconscious (see Guattari 2011), he addresses 
nonlinguistic and asignifying semiotic assemblages, looking at their molecu-
lar substances and molar units in terms of processes of coding and territor-
ialisation precisely based upon the notions of content and expression that he 
appropriates from Hjelmslev. As Guattari writes (2011, 42): “it is by semiotizing 
the most basic materials that [the] solidarity or this congruence of forms—
 15 Guattari (2011, 41) writes: “One can certainly consider it regrettable that the Hjelmslevian double of 
expression and content in fact coincides with the Saussurian couple of the signifier and the signified, 
which causes the entirety of semiotics to fall under the dependence of linguistics.” 
 16 On the notions of function and functive, Hjelmslev offers the following definitions: “A dependence that 
fulfils the conditions for an analysis we shall call a function. Thus we say that there is a function between 
a class and its components (a chain and its parts, or a paradigm and its members) and between the com-
ponents (parts or members) mutually. The terminals of a function we shall call its functives, understand-
ing by a functive an object that has function to other objects. A functive is said to contract its function. 
From the definitions it follows that functions can be functives since there can be a function between 
functions. Thus there is a function between the function contracted by the parts of a chain with each 
other and the function contracted by the chain with its parts. A functive that is not a function we shall 
call an entity” (Hjelmslev [1953] 1969, 33). 
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Figure 2.8. Components of Hjelmslev’s semiotic model of language (simplified) and its 
respective interpretation by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 43–44).
which coincides here with the abstract machinism of language—constitutes 
the substances of expression and content.” As the two basic components of 
any semiotic arrangement, they can only be defined and taken into account 
in relation to one another. With Hjelmslev’s notions of expression plane and con-
tent plane ([1953] 1969, 59), Guattari (now with Deleuze) observes that “content 
and expression are two variables of a function of stratification” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 44). This happens, because content and expression vary from 
one stratum to another, intermingling, and infinitely multiplying and dividing 
within the same stratum.
In their reading of Hjelmslev, which is conveyed through Professor 
Challenger’s eccentric lecture, Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the notion of 
stratification, which is central to Hjelmslev’s glossematics (and which is part of 
the title of his collection of essays La stratification du langage), and which allows 
them to call him “a Danish geologist.” Relating Hjelmslev’s theory to their own 
geological and paleo-anthropological consideration of the notion of strata and 
its double articulation, its form of content and its form of expression, Deleuze 
and Guattari appropriate Hjelmslev’s concepts in terms of processes of indi-
viduation and stratification of matter and flows of intensities, which tempor-
ally shape formed matters and functional structures. Figure 8 provides a sim-
plified visualisation of the basic components of Hjelmslev’s semiotic model of 
language (also called model of stratification) and its respective interpretation by 
Deleuze and Guattari, as it can be found in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, particularly 43–44). I invite the reader to look at the scheme and 
to read Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) appropriation of Hjelmslev’s termin-

































—  “Content and expression are two variables of a function of stratification” (44).
—  “[Hjelmslev] used the term matter for the plane of consistency . . . the 
unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its 
flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and 
prephysical free singularities” (43).
—  “He used the term content for formed matters, which [are] considered from 
two points of view: substance, insofar as these matters are ‘chosen,’ and 
form, insofar as they are chosen in a certain order (substance and form of 
content)” (43, my emphasis).
—  “He used the term expression for functional structures, which would also 
have to be considered from two points of view: the organization of their 
own specific form, and substances insofar as they form compounds (form 
and content of expression)” (43, emphasis adjusted).
—  The first articulation concerns content, the second articulation concerns 
expression. The distinction between the two articulations is not between 
forms and substances but between content and expression (41, my paraphrase).
—  “The distinction between content and expression is always real, in various 
ways, but it cannot be said that the terms preexist their double articulation. 
. . . On the other hand, there is no real distinction between form and sub-
stance, only a mental or modal distinction [scale]” (44, emphasis removed).
In this particular reading of Hjelmslev’s theories, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
description of the function of stratification comes close to their descriptions of 
agencement and, by extension, of assemblage. As a function, an assemblage is not 
a thing in the world. On the contrary, as Buchanan (2017, 463) reminds us, “it is 
assemblages that explain the existence of things in the world, not the other way 
round.” Things appear in the world as a result of individuating agency (human and 
nonhuman), and they contain formed matters and functional structures. Thus, 
assemblages are structured and structuring; they are not purely processual. Their 
material components must always be produced; they do not simply exist. The 
material of an assemblage is not the unformed matter of chaos; it is the formed 
and functionalised folding of matter on a plane of consistency or of composition. 
In this way, one can say that the assemblage has two faces: one looking at the 
state of things (particles/bodies, content), the other looking at a system of signs 
(functions, expression). The first gaze reveals a machinic assemblage of bodies, 
the second, a collective assemblage of enunciation. It is the interplay between 
the two gazes that defines an assemblage and that permits a productive solution 
of the problem of the relationship between content and expression. Contrary 
to what structuralism believed, it is not expression that produces content; and 
contrary to Marxism, it is not content (economic infrastructure) that produces 
expression (ideological superstructure). There is no infra- or superstructure, just 
as there is no archetypical matrix defining language and things “from above.” 
There is only a flat plane of consistency, in which contents and expression are 
articulated. The question, then, is how and under what conditions does matter 
become material? How and under what conditions is a plan of articulation defined? 
Diagram is what Deleuze and Guattari call this plan upon which contents and 
expression are articulated. As Krtolica writes (2009, 106, my translation): “The 
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diagram is the map of the balance of forces, which are incarnated in concrete 
assemblages by the means of a double differentiation: forms of content (visible) 
and forms of expression (sayable).” The concept of diagram is thus inseparable 
from the notions of strata and assemblage. Like the strata and the strata’s lines 
of escape, it is an important component of an assemblage. The diagram is the 
assemblage’s virtual part, which is real because the diagram maps functions 
and informal matters that effectively act upon the actual, and it remains virtual 
because the incarnations it implies are effectuated on the strata and not in 
the diagram itself, which remains non-representational. As a map of virtuality, 
the diagram points to all possibilities before they are actualised, it “charts the 
relation of forces that can be utilized or made manifest in various situations” 
(Zdebik 2012, 7).
5. Diagram 
Deleuze found the concept of diagram in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, where 
it is used in relation to prisons and penal codes from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In his review of that book, published in 1975 as “Écrivain 
non: Un nouveau cartographe” (Deleuze 1975), Deleuze precisely articulates 
the inseparable relation between the concept of assemblage (agencement) and 
diagram. Reflecting on the double meaning of an assemblage’s form (form of 
content, form of expression), Deleuze states that there is a correspondence 
between the meanings, which can be explained by the fact that “we can conceive 
of pure matter and pure functions, abstracting the forms which embody them” 
(Deleuze [1988] 2006, 29). This allows us to think of an abstract machine that 
“passes through every articulable function,” and that is “always concerned with 
unformed and unorganized matter and unformalized, unfinalized functions” 
(ibid.). It is this new informal dimension that Deleuze, following Foucault, calls 
“a diagram” (ibid., 30): a machine that functions “abstracted from any obstacle 
. . . or friction [and which] must be detached from any specific use” (Foucault 
1977, 205).17 The diagram is, thus, an abstract machine defined by its informal 
functions and matter. It does not make a distinction either between content 
and expression or between discursive and non-discursive formations. Highly 
unstable or fluid, the diagram is “continuously churning up matter and functions 
in a way likely to create change” (Deleuze [1988] 2006, 34). In this sense, it makes 
it possible to conceive the transformations that affect real entities, enabling a 
concrete effectivity of modulations and becomings. The diagram includes and 
encapsulates the vectors of mutation that affect any given strata and assemblage, 
directly relating to the futurity of an assemblage. As Zdebik (2012, 16) put it, “The 
diagram is an image of something to come rather than something that is already 
there.” Or, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 142) formulated it, “The diagrammatic 
or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but 
 17 Crucial for Deleuze’s reception of this point is that Foucault stress that the panopticon would be 
unsatisfactorily defined as long as it was viewed only as an architectural system. It was the combination 
of the physical space with its associated penal code that constituted a dispositif, of which the whole 
structure of surveillance acted as a function called diagram. 
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rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality.” Crucially, and 
contributing to Deleuze’s move beyond structuralism, the diagram is not a struc-
ture; it traces the flows of forces that are part of an assemblage and that are in 
permanent change and transformation. Relating to a set of relations of forces, 
it “never exhausts force, which can enter into other relations and compositions” 
(Deleuze [1988] 2006, 74). Therefore, “a true abstract machine pertains to an 
assemblage in its entirety: it is defined as the diagram of that assemblage. It is not 
language based but diagrammatic and superlinear. Content is not a signified nor 
expression a signifier; rather, both are variables of the assemblage” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 91, my emphasis). Thus, the two-form mechanism of the assem-
blage (form of expression, form of content) affects and is in turn affected by the 
informal diagram, the concrete machine affects and is affected by the abstract 
machine, creating a continuity between the diagram and the event, between the 
virtual and the actual. Assemblages are in permanent becoming, partly because 
of this promise of constant reconfigurations implied by diagrams. Between 
assemblages and diagrams, a space opens up for the ever-changing continuous 
unfolding of flows of forces, in a movement that ceaselessly goes from the virtual 
to the actual to the virtual, perpetually moving between codings/uncodings and 
territorialisations/deterritorialisations. 
At the limit, one reaches uncoded and deterritorialised abstract machines 
(the radical antipodal entities in relation to the strata, which are highly coded 
and territorialised). At this level, such machines have proper names or dates, 
which “of course designate not persons or subjects but matters and functions. 
The name of a musician or scientist is used in the same way as a painter’s 
name designates a color, nuance, tone, or intensity: it is always a question of 
a conjunction of Matter and Function. The double deterritorialization of the 
voice and the instrument is marked by a Wagner abstract machine, a Webern 
abstract machine, etc.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 142). This is the sphere of 
the “Kafka effect,” the “Webern effect,” the “Mahler’s Sixth Symphony effect,” 
or the “Kreisleriana effect.” In their abstraction such abstract machines do not 
specifically indicate any physical entity, while, at the same time, they do suggest 
a functioning and a materiality that is dependent on the concrete mapping of 
all (individually) known strata and arrangements that are part of the assem-
blage they refer to. Thus, when thinking about “Schumann’s Kreisleriana” one 
is not thinking about bar number twenty-three of its third piece, nor is one 
thinking about the vinyl recording by Yves Nat. What instantly comes to one’s 
mind is the abstract totality of all (personally) known strata that populate the 
assemblage that goes under the label “Kreisleriana, op. 16.” The population of 
things (matters and functions) that make up such an assemblage operate both 
against the assemblage and in favour of it: on the one hand, all the strata with 
their innumerable and potentially never-ending particles operate a contrario 
a unified, identitary entity, which in music would be the well-defined work 
concept; on the other hand, all possible diagrams, with their ever-changing 
reconfiguration of forces and relations of forces, operate a posteriori, outlining 
cracks and paths of escape that could lead to a redistribution of forces and to 
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a reconfiguration of the assemblage.18 In this way—and this is the last char-
acteristic of the abstract machine that I want to mention here—the abstract 
machine is profoundly contrary to structure, for it is traversed by a “desire for 
abolition” (Sauvagnargues 2016, 193). In music, where the work concept and all 
its associated concepts and practices are fundamentally based upon an image 
of the musical work as being stable and unitary with a strong identity, the 
image of work as assemblage reveals works as metastable entities, whose con-
stitutive parts (strata and diagram) actually work against an immaculate defin-
ition, pointing toward processes of destabilisation and dissolution of identity. 
This is not to be confused with deconstruction, with simple inconsistencies, 
or with any form of death drive. It is the result of a mode of thought that sees 
consistency as something always provisional and temporary. As Sauvagnargues 
(2016, 192) writes in relation to the thought of Guattari: “consistency proceeds 
through deterritorialization, not through an identificatory binding together: 
abstract machines operate within concrete assemblages through points of 
decoding and deterritorialization. It would be wrong to consider them an 
essence, a reason behind the assemblage, or a kind of structure that evaporates 
from the real: there is nothing eternal about them, as they are positioned pre-
cisely at the interstices of components that they deterritorialize by connecting. 
Presupposed by the assemblage as its condition of possibility, neither exterior, 
nor anterior, but strictly coextensive with its empirical existence.” 
6. Logic of assemblage
As the preceding sections have shown, the concepts of strata, agencement, assem-
blage, and diagram are inseparably linked to one another, defining component 
parts of what I would like to call not “assemblage theory” but more simply a logic 
of assemblage. On the one hand, it is now clear that it is not possible to take the 
concept of assemblage in isolation; on the other hand, the project of building 
a “theory” would put too much pressure on the concepts and force them to an 
over-definition that is contrary to the idea of assemblage as distributive power 
in the first place. “Logic of assemblage” points to a whole range of interrelated 
concepts, to their variable functioning, and to a mapping of loose operational 
principles that allow navigating an assemblage without the constraints of formal-
ising its components too much. Additionally, it is relevant to note that Deleuze 
himself (in his interview with Catherine Clément from 1980) considered the idea 
of assemblage to constitute the unity of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze 2007a, 177), 
referring to it as “a general logic” of assemblages: “the analysis of assemblages, 
broken down into their component parts, opens up the way to a general logic: 
Guattari and I have only begun, and completing this logic will undoubtedly occupy 
us in the future. Guattari calls it ‘diagrammatism.’” Within this framework, the 
diverse notions presented so far build a complex, yet profoundly interrelated 
 18 Probably, it is the diagram’s promise of a “real that is yet to come” that makes people wish to incarnate 
musical works again and again, through performing and listening to them. Every concrete instantiation 
or representation of a work immediately vanishes in the face of the potentiality offered by the diagram 
to re-enact it again in a different combination of matters and functions.
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ecology of concepts that enable a more vivid and productive understanding of 
dynamic systems.
To clarify my undertaking, it is important to insist once more that I am oper-
ating in the burgeoning field of artistic research in music, which is fostering 
new perspectives on the making of music and on the materials concretely used 
by musicians. As discussed in Chapter 1, traditional modes of doing and think-
ing about music (performance, composition, musicology, music analysis, music 
theory, etc.) normally insist on stable formations, entities, and structures. 
Artistic research can contribute to new modes of conceiving musical objects, 
moving beyond structural and phenomenological approaches. The notion of 
assemblage with its focus on the fluidity of matters, materials, signs, and func-
tions appears to be extremely powerful in helping us experiment with new 
modes of conceiving musical objects and practices. Thus, my research on the 
notions of strata, assemblage, and diagram takes place in the framework of a 
new mode of conceiving musical works, which are seen as being made of com-
plex arrangements of aesthetic-epistemic things, forces, intensities, and signs, 
which establish several superposed networks of historical, cultural, material, 
symbolic, and psychological dimensions. Musical works cease to be conceived 
as a set of instructions or as an ontologically well-defined structure. They 
become reservoirs of forces and intensities, dynamic systems characterised by 
metastability, transductive powers, and unpredictable future reconfigurations. 
Not only have they been the object of changes in the past (as music history 
overwhelmingly demonstrates), they will continue to observe mutations and 
transformations in the future. With a logic of assemblage, music practition-
ers and theoreticians gain new tools to grasp these changes and take an active 
part in them. Crucially, the new image of work as assemblage has the capacity 
to include the old image of work within it, as a particular case of less complex 
combinations of codings and territorialisations. 
A logic of assemblage has several consequences: the overcoming of unity in 
favour of multiplicity, of essence in favour of event, of being in favour of becoming, of 
elusive certainty in favour of informed inconsistency. As discussed above, one 
is in front of an assemblage whenever it is possible to identify a coupling made 
of an ensemble of material relations (content) and a specific regime of signs 
related to it (expression). Such couplings are not dialectically articulated, but 
they rather create two poles: a pole strata that is highly coded and territorialised, 
and a pole abstract machine (diagram) that is decoded and deterritorialised. 
Between these two poles there are infinite intermediate states and phases. The 
heterogeneity of the assemblage’s components guarantees its functioning, 
even when some components are stopped, replaced, or eliminated. Thus, the 
assemblage is a fluid entity, moving from one state to another, from one phase 
to another. As Deleuze has put it: “It is as if the abstract [machine] and the 
concrete assemblages constituted two extremes, and we moved from one to the 
other imperceptibly” (Deleuze [1988] 2006, 34–35, my emphasis). To grasp the 
nature of these imperceptible movements, Deleuze and Guattari introduced 
the notion of the tetravalence of the assemblage (see figure 2.1, above), with 
its two axes based on two scales of coding/decoding and territorialisation/ 
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deterritorialisation. They also insisted on the profound interconnection 
between all the concepts associated with these notions and axes: rhizome, 
strata, stratification, assemblage, plane of consistency, deterritorialisation, 
abstract machines, diagram, phylum, mechanosphere. Together, as they are 
presented in the last and conclusive plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, they dis-
close a logic of multiplicities that is based upon the core concept of assemblage 
and that stresses the nomadic, fluid, and problematic nature of knowledge. 
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Experimental Systems  
and Artistic Research*
1. An epistemology for artistic research?
The preceding two chapters proposed a renewed mode of thinking about past 
musical entities, presenting a new image of the musical work, crucially questioning 
traditional ontological accounts, and arguing for wider, less essentialist, and more 
practice-based ontological perspectives. Moving away from the work concept, 
and grounded in the notions of strata, assemblage, and diagram, such a perspec-
tive views musical works as multiplicities, as complex conglomerates of things and 
intensities, containing innumerable and potentially never-ending components, 
which are continuously rearranged and reassembled in their specific modes 
of appearance throughout history. Chapters 1 and 2 are thus concerned with 
ontogenetic processes of constitution, formation, and transmission of musical 
entities throughout time. The next two chapters, starting with this one, have a 
more epistemological perspective: given the entities we accept are part of our 
world of music performance, how can we concretely operate with them? How 
can we reduce their epistemic complexity? Which of their characteristic prop-
erties must we operationally retain, eliminate, or transform? How is it possible 
to open them and make them contribute to the generation of new knowledge? 
How can such new knowledge be made accessible and discussable to others? 
What kind of daily praxis can we develop that is adequate to the new image of 
work as multiplicity? How can one claim that a performance, in addition to its 
intrinsic aesthetic value, has epistemic content? 
One possible approach to start addressing these questions systematically is 
to appropriate for the arts (and for music in particular) those kinds of labora-
tory mindsets and set-ups well known from science, especially from the life 
sciences, that deal with ever changing organs, organisms, and forms of life. 
Situating my research project at the crossroads of music, philosophy, and sci-
ence, I particularly looked to post-Kuhnian epistemological discourses, such as 
those presented by Ian Hacking (1983), Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar ([1979] 
1992), Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985), and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
(1997). Crucially, all these authors move away from the hegemony of theory and 
	 * I first discussed the topics covered in this chapter at the annual conference of the Society for Artistic 
Research, Helsinki, 30 April 2017. Following the prescribed mode of presentation for that particular 
conference, a web-based exposition containing the texts of my presentation and hyperlinks to the cited 




consider science to function on a practice-driven rather than theory-driven 
basis, an aspect that intimately resonates with practice-led modes of artistic 
research. For these theorists, there is no science “in general,” only concrete, 
ever-changing, and unpredictable reconfigurations of matter, connectors, and 
functions. More than the context of justification so often addressed by scientists, 
they shift the focus towards contexts of invention and discovery. In the place of 
absolute rules and axioms, they try to clarify how knowledge is constituted in 
and through practices. Applied to art practice, with its inherently polysemic 
objects, such epistemologies allow for the questioning of their function as 
vehicles of research. How can artworks participate in the production of know-
ledge? As Borgdorff (2012, 187) has phrased it: “How can [artworks] function 
not just as objects of research, but as the entities in which, and through which, 
the research takes place—and in which and through which our knowledge, our 
understanding, and our experience grows.” 
My principal reference in this respect has been the work of the historian 
of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, particularly his notion of experimental sys-
tems (Rheinberger 1997).1 Such systems (which are described further below) are 
extremely concrete, defining units of research that operate in a specific time 
and place, with particular individuals, and under concrete social, institutional, 
technical, and instrumental arrangements. Within such systems, sequences or 
series of experimental activities take place, replicating and changing condi-
tions, parameters, scales, and observations. Given a research problem, infinite 
experimental iterations of precisely calibrated experiments generate expected 
results (predictable), but crucially also generate unexpected ones (unknown). 
Experiments are, thus, not simple methodological events made to confirm 
or reject certain hypotheses (knowledge already theoretically formulated); 
instead, they function as the actual generators of knowledge, adding know-
ledge that the system had no knowledge of before. It is through this unexpected 
and unknown part of the results that science advances, not by confirming or 
rejecting pre-existing knowledge. Thus, experimental systems become literally 
“machines for making the future,” as Rheinberger (1997, 28), quoting François 
Jacob (1988, 9), wrote. So conceived, science appears not as a distant set of laws 
and axioms, but as a very concrete operating system based upon daily experien-
ces and unpredictable experiments conducted in the lab. 
We appropriated this epistemology of the concrete for music, adopting it 
as the basic model for the daily practice of MusicExperiment21. This created 
a unique modus operandi, based upon a precise mapping of the research 
materials and components in terms of technical objects, epistemic things, the space 
 1 References to Rheinberger’s experimental systems and to their potential for artistic research have been 
pioneered by Michael Schwab and Henk Borgdorff (see Borgdorff 2012, 184–98; Rheinberger and Schwab 
2013; Schwab 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2015). I am especially indebted to Michael Schwab for 
having introduced me to Rheinberger’s thought in the first place, and for having created the conditions 
for my personal acquaintance with him on the occasion of a working meeting organised at the Orpheus 
Institute (5–6 July 2012). In addition to reading his essays, I had further conversations with Rheinberger 
during the annual conference of the Society for Artistic Research (Helsinki, 28–30 April 2017), at the 
Summer School of the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (Lausanne, 11–14 July 2017), and at the 
second international conference on Deleuze and Artistic Research (Ghent, 20–22 November 2017). 
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of representation, the space of graphematicity, and machines for making the future (on 
these notions, see Rheinberger 1997, especially 27–31, 223–29). Furthermore, it 
enabled the development of a creative notion of experimentation in the arts, 
based upon sequential series of research outcomes and performances, which 
became one of the hallmarks of MusicExperiment21 (a selection of which will 
be presented at the end of this chapter). This effective hybridisation of research 
strategies (from life sciences to artistic research), and its intrinsic search for the 
future possibilities of the materials at hand, relates to the following statement 
by Rheinberger: “The minds of inventors and scientists, much like those of 
artists, are not oriented toward recognizing what exists; they ‘turn more upon 
future possibilities, whose speculations and combinations obey an altogether 
different rule of order, described here as a linked progression of experiments 
composing a formal sequence’” (Rheinberger 1997, 80, incorporating quota-
tion from Kubler 1962, 85).
Before describing the basic characteristics of Rheinberger’s experimental 
systems, I will introduce the specific working methodology I developed (in the 
framework of MusicExperiment21) for artistic research in music. This is crucial 
in order to understand the precise place for experimental systems in my overarch-
ing research construction. They have been used in a specific moment of the 
research trajectory, namely in what I call the problematisation of the available 
materials and their reconfiguration in new combinations and arrangements. 
2. A methodology for artistic research 
As thoroughly explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the new image of work as a multi-
plicity made of actual and virtual components is crucially grounded upon the 
notion of strata and processes of stratification. In this respect, I have proposed 
a taxonomy of strata into six types, referring to musical materials that physically 
exist in the real (graspable) world: substrata (treatises, manuals, iconography, 
period instruments, descriptions of concerts, critics, archives, lists of personnel, 
payments, etc.), parastrata (sketches, drafts, first editions, letters, writings by 
composers and performers, annotations, etc.); epistrata (period editions, editions 
over time, analysis, reflexive texts, theoretical contextualisations, recordings, 
etc.); metastrata (future performances, expositions, recordings, transcriptions, 
etc.); interstrata (infiltrations and contaminations of different types of strata 
generating this hybrid type); and allostrata (materials that even if not directly 
relating to a given work can enter productive relationships with it). All these 
strata are manifest as individual singularities and can be seen as sources or 
documents in a more conventional historiographical sense. By focusing on these 
innumerable documents, musical works are considered as historically constructed 
conglomerates of things,2 a view that (quite straightforwardly) allows different 
 2 The notion of thing, which Rheinberger took from George Kubler’s The Shape of Time: Remarks on the 
History of Things (1962), is central to conveying the “not yet determined” character of research results 
and materials under investigation. As Borgdorff (2012, 190) put it, “Rheinberger has deliberately chosen 
the term ‘thing’ rather than ‘object,’ in order to signify the indeterminate, not yet crystallised status of 
the knowledge object. Epistemic things are chronically underdetermined.” 
Chapter 3
 
Figure 3.1. MusicExperiment21’s working methodology.
modes of research to be productively integrated within the creative fabric of an 
artist.
Starting from conventional research on the available things that pertain 
to a given musical work (see figure 3.1, “Archaeology: sources, documents, 
things”), one selects and isolates some of the things, subjecting them to his-
toriographical, analytical, and comparative research (figure 3.1, “Genealogy”), 
so that, finally, (figure 3.1, “Problematisation in and through practice”), they 
are exposed in unprecedented reconfigurations and arrangements. As soon as 
a new arrangement is presented, it inevitably becomes another document or 
thing, thus feeding the process circularly. This is, in its shortest formulation, 
the three-step methodology created and used by MusicExperiment21 for the 
generation of all its research outcomes (see figure 3.1). First, the innumerable 
material traces and things are archaeologically identified and retrieved for fur-
ther consideration; second, the relations and connectors they entertain with 
one another, as well as their transmission over time, are studied in terms of 
a genealogy, disclosing singularities (i.e., particular points of high energy or 
concentration of forces); and, finally, specific selections of things are brought 
together as arrangements, or, in Deleuzian language, as “concrete machinic 
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This methodology has several relevant features:
(1)   It allows the integration into performance of diverse materials that 
go beyond the score (sketches, texts, images, and videos), offering a 
broader contextualisation of works within a transdisciplinary horizon. 
(2)   It fosters new modes of conducting research in music, overcoming 
traditional divisions and boundaries between music theory or music-
ology and creative practices; the practitioner becomes profoundly 
rooted in scholarly research, and in turn this research is a meaningful 
and integral part of the artistic results. 
(3)   It creates the conditions for a unifying approach to performance and 
composition, as the three steps and their respective operations are very 
similar for composers and performers. 
(4)   It makes graspable the potential of performance and composition to 
operate as knowledge-producing activities. 
(5)   Beyond the mere (re)creation or (re)production of a musical “work,” 
it enables an understanding of musical things as objects for thought 
through performative or compositional devices.
(6)   It overcomes traditional artistic and scholarly partitions between 
“success” and “failure,” as any resulting reconfiguration results in a new 
finding being added to the system.3
The archaeological moment relates to conventional scholarly research, includ-
ing archival and source studies; genealogy calls for interpretation, semiotics, 
and transtextuality; and problematisation happens by constructing new and 
experimental arrangements. With the latter, the artistic dimension becomes 
inescapable, requiring a kind of artist and researcher who can cohabit in the same 
body. It is in this phase of the research process that the notion of experimental 
system becomes particularly relevant and fruitful. In this moment, differential 
repetitions of combinations and reconfigurations of the objects under investi-
gation take place. All the things taken into consideration to be used in the new 
arrangements (reconfigurations) must be precisely defined, calibrated, and 
evaluated from the point of view of their intrinsic energies, intensities, speeds of 
change, relation to the other components of the arrangement, and so on. This is 
the place for numerous new inscriptions, registering the unprecedented effects 
of the problematisation upon the objects under inquiry. In this sense, my appro-
priation of Rheinberger’s notion of experimental systems for music is not arbitrary, 
nor is it vague or abstract. On the contrary, it is radically material, concrete, and 
precise. To make this clearer, the following section offers a compact overview of 
the notion of experimental system, clarifying some terminology and suggesting 
modes of appropriating such systems for artistic research.
 3 Discussing the value of “results” in the sciences, Rheinberger notes the following: “What is a result?  
A—positive—result is a finding that, in principle, can be reintegrated as a component of the system and 
can thus enlarge or change the setup” (Rheinberger 1997, 135). 
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3. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s experimental systems
On the first page of his book Toward a History of Epistemic Things, Rheinberger (1997, 
1) states: “In a post-Kuhnian move away from the hegemony of theory, historians 
and philosophers of science have given experimentation more attention in recent 
years. This book is an attempt at an epistemology of contemporary experimentation 
based on the notion of ‘experimental system.’” By situating scientific practices 
and research methodologies in their respective historical periods, Rheinberger 
closely addresses the problem of historicising epistemology, which so crucially 
contributed to a movement from science-as-a-system to science-as-a-process (see 
also Rheinberger 2010, 1). This change happened in parallel with a profound shift 
of interest from a system of knowledge production based upon the finding and 
presenting of a “correct” scientific method to a more concrete interest “in what 
scientists actually do in pursuit of their specific research” (ibid., 3). Instead of 
testing theories, research happens on a daily basis, through the concrete (and still 
most often) manual manipulation of objects. Researchers appear as doers, not 
as illuminated academics delivering proof of a given theory. It was within these 
broader frameworks of interest (hybrid modes of research and materially based 
experimentation) that Rheinberger’s notion of experimental systems became so 
central to the concrete practice of MusicExperiment21, providing a basic modus 
operandi to the team and to the design of the overarching research strategy. 
Importantly, there have been two different yet complementary approaches to 
Rheinberger’s theories within MusicExperiment21. On the one hand, Michael 
Schwab—an artistic researcher and philosopher, who has been in charge of 
the project’s epistemological strand—investigated the wider epistemological 
consequences of such systems, particularly focusing on how to adapt experi-
mental systems for contemporary art. While Rheinberger’s experimental sys-
tems discuss the spaces of experimentation and the spaces of representation, 
Schwab situates contemporary art in the graphematic rather than representational 
space—as might still have been the case, arguably, for modern art (see Schwab 
2015). In this line of thought, Schwab links Rheinberger’s experimental systems 
to his own concept of expositionality (see Schwab 2014b). Notions such as the 
fragmentary, the untimely, or the contemporary are, therefore, central to his 
approach, which aims to look at transformations both in the work and in the 
system itself.4 
On the other hand, Rheinberger’s experimental systems have been used to 
design artistic-research differential instantiations, leading to a large number 
of outputs. By “differential instantiations” I mean series of different perform-
ances and/or presentations made as part of a particular research project within 
MusicExperiment21. There were, for example, twenty-six different instan-
tiations of the Rasch project, seven of Diabelli Machines, seven of Nietzsche 
Z, and so on, each of which explored different materials and arrangements. 
This approach, which I have designed and developed since the beginning 
 4 This research focus, led by Michael Schwab, generated important events and outputs, such as a study 
day (Orpheus Institute, 5–6 July 2012), an interview with Rheinberger (Rheinberger and Schwab 2013), a 
research questionnaire (Schwab 2014a), and the collective volume Experimental Systems: Future Knowledge 
in Artistic Research (Schwab 2013a).
 113
Experimental Systems and Artistic Research
of MusicExperiment21, has been focused on the concrete conditions of the 
experiments and on the generation of aesthetico-epistemic differential repeti-
tion. It looked at the distinction between technical objects and epistemic things and 
between the space of experimentation and the space of representation, and at 
the question of multimedia inscriptions resulting from and at the same time 
generating new modes of presenting artistic research. 
Rheinberger developed his theory of experimental systems in relation to the 
empirical sciences, particularly to molecular biology. However, it was Rheinberger 
himself who opened the door for other potential uses of this notion, specifically, 
for example, in relation to the activity of writing: “Writing is an experimental 
system in its own right” (Rheinberger 2007, my translation; Das Schreiben, so 
behaupte ich, ist selbst ein Experimentalsystem). That Rheinberger mentions 
“writing” [das Schreiben] as a potential field for applications of his theory cer-
tainly reflects his conception of the experimental space and of the scientific 
object itself as a complex “bundle of inscriptions” (Rheinberger 1997, 111). 
The idea of inscription might be traced back to Derrida, whose seminal book Of 
Grammatology Rheinberger translated into German (with Hanns Zischler) in 
1983. Taking Rheinberger’s own suggestions further, I propose to extend the use 
of his theory also to the performance of past musical works. 
Originally taken from the everyday practice and vernacular of mid-twenti-
eth-century life scientists, the concept of an experimental system is frequently 
used to characterise the space and scope of the research activities conducted 
by researchers in the life sciences, particularly in biochemistry and molecu-
lar biology. Importantly, this is, in the first place, a practitioner’s notion, not 
an observer’s (see Rheinberger 1997, 19). This observation is of the utmost 
relevance for any attempt to appropriate experimental systems to artistic or 
musical activities: those operating the system must be music practitioners, that 
is to say, not music historians, music sociologists, or music theoreticians. Such 
musicologists can analyse a posteriori what the practitioners did, but the doing 
itself, the making of artistic research, remains in the first instance in the hands 
of those doing music not in those observing music from outside. 
In his most succinct formulation, Rheinberger (1997, 23) states that “experi-
mental systems are arrangements that allow us to create cognitive, spatiotemp-
oral singularities.” And in a later publication Rheinberger writes, “It is only at 
the beginning of the 1990s and in the context of an ongoing replacement of 
theory-dominated perspectives of scientific change by practice-driven views 
on research that the concept of experimental systems has found entrance into 
the historical and philosophical literature on science” (Rheinberger 2004, 
2). Rheinberger, himself a molecular biologist and philosopher, developed “a 
framework in which experimentation takes meaning as a set of epistemic prac-
tices that constitute a specific kind of material culture” (Rheinberger 1997, 19). 
More specifically, experimental systems are characterised by four main fea-
tures, which Rheinberger thoroughly described on several occasions—notably 
in the prologue to Toward a History of Epistemic Things (1997) and in the essay 
“Experimental Systems: Entry Encyclopedia for the History of Life” (2004). In 
short, these features are as follows: 
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(1)   An experimental system is a specific working unit of contemporary 
research:
 Experimental systems . . . are the genuine working units of contemporary research 
in which the scientific objects and the technical conditions of their production 
are inextricably interconnected. They are, inseparably and at one and the same 
time, local, individual, social, institutional, technical, instrumental, and, above 
all, epistemic units. Experimental systems are thus impure, hybrid settings. 
(Rheinberger 1997, 2)
(2)   Within such a system, mechanisms of reproduction and repetition 
aim at the generation of differences (differential repetition):
 Experimental systems must be capable of differential reproduction . . . in order to 
behave as devices for producing scientific novelties that are beyond our present 
knowledge, that is, to behave as “generator[s] of surprises.” . . . To be productive, 
experimental systems have to be organized in such a way that the generation of 
differences becomes the reproductive driving force of the whole experimental 
machinery. (Rheinberger 1997, 3)
(3)   An experimental system is a space of representation where inscriptions 
are made in order to generate and preserve traces (graphematicity): 
 Experimental systems are the units within which the signifiers of science are 
generated. They display their meanings within spaces of representation . . . in 
which graphemes, that is, material traces . . . are produced, articulated, and 
disconnected and are placed, displaced, and replaced. . . . Scientists create spaces of 
representation through graphematic concatenations that represent their epistemic 
traces as engravings, that is, generalized forms of “writing.” (Rheinberger 1997, 3)
(4)   Finally, experimental systems can establish links to other experimental 
systems (conjunctures), be divided into several experimental systems 
(bifurcations), or merge with other experimental systems (hybridisation). 
At some point an articulation of ensembles of experimental systems might 
emerge, generating what Rheinberger calls experimental culture (see 
Rheinberger 1997, 3).
Terminologically, and to avoid conceptual misunderstandings, some explanation 
of terms is necessary here. First, Rheinberger’s use of the term system does not 
relate to an enclosed, perfectly defined set of rules and axioms, but to “simply 
a kind of loose coherence both synchronically with respect to the technical and 
organic elements that enter into an experimental system and diachronically with 
respect to its persistence over time” (Rheinberger 2004, 3). Furthermore, the 
notions of technical objects and epistemic things reveal that technicity and epistemi-
city are not ontologically opposed to each other but form an intricate relation at 
the inner core of an experimental system. Epistemic things are the entities “whose 
unknown characteristics are the target of an experimental inquiry” (Rheinberger 
1997, 238), paradoxically embodying what one does not yet know (see ibid., 28). 
Technical objects (sedimentations of earlier epistemic things) are scientific objects 
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that “embody the knowledge of a given research field at a given time” (ibid., 245); 
they might be “instruments, apparatus, and devices which bound and confine 
the assessment of the epistemic things” (Rheinberger 2004, 4).
Epistemic things are necessarily underdetermined, while technical objects 
are characteristically determined. Technical objects and epistemic things 
coexist simultaneously within the experimental system; “whether an object 
functions as an epistemic or a technical entity depends on the place or ‘node’ 
it occupies in the experimental context” (Rheinberger 1997, 30); “within a par-
ticular research process, epistemic things can eventually be turned into tech-
nical things and become incorporated into the technical conditions of the 
system” (Rheinberger 2004, 4). Between these two extremes, there is room for 
a gradient scale, for diverse degrees of hybrid things, and for vague material 
entities whose function in the experimental system changes. An example of 
such an entity, when applying these notions to music, is the score, the material 
inscription of a complex set of signs and symbols that might be considered as 
either an epistemic thing or a technical object depending on the role it plays at 
any particular point during the compositional process, the research moment, 
its performance, or its recording. 
Critically, when appropriating experimental systems for the arts, what is 
at stake are the epistemic qualities of art, and not an understanding of art as 
science, or of art as an object for science. When using the term epistemic thing, 
Rheinberger clearly avoided using “scientific thing,” denoting that these things 
are not independent of the resources and media that allow them to exist (see 
Rheinberger 2008, 13’30”–13’45”). For artistic research, the most important 
questions are related neither to quantifiable data nor to subjective phenom-
enological observations. In my view, artistic research in music should not be 
addressing (or, at least, not in the first place) measurable phenomena, which 
are the domain of performance science, performance studies, organology, phil-
ology, historiography, and applied musicology. The crucial questions of artistic 
research are of a different nature, involving the epistemic power of art and its 
transformation from an object of aesthetic appreciation to an object of and 
for thought. These are the concerns that have the potential to redefine artistic 
practices, to generate conjunctures, bifurcations, and hybridisations of forms 
and materials.
On the other hand, the four basic characteristics of experimental systems, 
taken together, enhance the constitution of “thought collectives” (Denkkollektiv), 
a term coined by Ludwik Fleck in 1935 to which Rheinberger often refers. Such 
thought collectives, each with a special “thought style” (Denkstil), are funda-
mental to the production of knowledge in artistic research, moving beyond 
the individual “genius” to more distributed modes of creativity and reflection, 
which liberate the production of knowledge from disciplinary compartmenta-
tions. They extend practice and reflection beyond disciplinary thinking, avoid-
ing what Bachelard called the “cantonisation” of science—a danger of which 
artistic researchers from any discipline should be well aware.
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4. Thought collective and ensembles of experimental 
systems: MusicExperiment21
MusicExperiment21 (2013–18) was an operative thought collective, a group of 
artistic researchers, including music performers, composers, musicologists, phil-
osophers, artists, dancers, choreographers, video-makers, and music ensembles 
working closely together, mainly within the spaces of the host institution, but 
also through web-based platforms such as Research Catalogue. To be sure, the 
project was conceived and designed by myself alone (back in 2011), but from 
its very beginning it became a collective endeavour, with almost all its outputs 
being the result of collaborative efforts in which every single researcher acted 
as a component part of complex artistic machinery. Thus, for example, when I 
commissioned six new compositions from six young composers for the project 
Diabelli Machines, the compositions were not meant to be completely autono-
mous musical works; rather, they served a specific function in a wider performance 
context. In this way, composition itself became simply one more parameter in the 
overall research trajectory—an aspect that was explained and fully accepted by 
the composers involved, who saw the potential of a working methodology based 
upon the notion of collective agency. Moreover, MusicExperiment21 had a dozen 
projects running in parallel, including projects for performance in concert halls 
(on the musics of Schumann, Beethoven, Nietzsche, Schoenberg, Nono, Maderna, 
and Stockhausen), others of a more speculative nature (on music ontology, on 
the notion of the contemporary, on the politics of performance), and others that 
were part of doctoral programmes conducted by the students within the project. 
This extreme diversity of interests and focuses of their respective research trans-
formed the idea of collective thinking into a felt necessity. Every team member 
could only work productively when situated in a complex network of connect-
ors and links between the different projects. Instead of diluting responsibility, 
this had the opposite effect, making everyone feel the distributed ownership 
of every single subproject. Each subproject, with all its numerous constitutive 
parts and its complex set of internal relations, was an experimental system in 
its own right. But if we take all the projects as a whole, which together make 
up MusicExperiment21, one can talk of an ensemble of experimental systems. Their 
intricate interactions permit us to conceive the whole as “an articulated experi-
mental network of objects and practices whose coherence, just as in the case of 
individual experimental systems, is a tinkered and patched-up coherence with 
a collateral constitution” (Rheinberger 1997, 137). What held all these subpro-
jects together, and what became increasingly “easier” to control, was not some 
kind of hidden referent to all of them but its horizontal concatenation, which 
is based upon the circulation of “model compounds, technical subroutines, 
and tacit knowledge throughout the network” (ibid.). Despite being different 
from one another, all the subprojects of MusicExperiment21 shared the same 
infrastructure, the same operating people, the same technical devices, the same 
spaces, daily schedules, and so on. In this sense, MusicExperiment21 conducted 
in artistic research in music exactly what experimental systems have done in 
biology and chemistry, enabling the “transition from the microdynamics of 
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localized and situated experimental systems to the macrodynamics of broader 
fields of experimentation. . . . Within such ensembles, the systems interact and 
remain connected through the exchange of sufficiently stabilized procedures 
and epistemically attractive objects” (ibid.). 
Finally, on an even wider level of consideration, “experimental systems come 
in populations of multiple variants inhabiting overlapping areas of investiga-
tion” (Rheinberger 1997, 133), and MusicExperiment21 didn’t exist in a bub-
ble disconnected from the world. It was placed within a research centre—the 
Orpheus Institute—and was thus a part of a wider research community and 
international endeavour that aims at grounding and developing the burgeon-
ing field of artistic research in music. In this sense, MusicExperiment21 was 
part of a research culture, part of an ensemble of other research projects, each 
of which can be seen as experimental systems in their own right: “such . . . sys-
tems tend to form ensembles that construe the experimental space, not of a 
single, localized group of scientists, but of a circumscribed scientific commun-
ity” (ibid., 136). In this light, the whole of the Orpheus Institute functions as an 
articulated experimental network of objects, concepts, and practices. It can be 
seen as an ensemble of experimental systems operating “as clusters of materials 
and practices,” which can “evolve through drift (conjunctures), fusion (hybrids), 
and divergence (bifurcations)” (ibid., 137–38). Ultimately, such complexifica-
tion of interactions leads to what Rheinberger calls experimental culture:5 clusters 
of ensembles of experimental systems, that “share a certain material style of 
research” (ibid., 138). 
Thus, MusicExperiment21’s application of Rheinberger’s terminology has 
been part of a major attempt to establish a wider horizon of practice for artistic 
research in music. At the same time, it also emphasised the need to provide as 
many concrete examples of such application as possible, and it produced copi-
ous amounts of outputs, including lectures, performances, recordings, essays, 
seminars, conferences, and books. The tripartite methodology described above 
enabled the permanent generation of differential repetition and the constant 
production of results, in the sense given to this word by Rheinberger, leading 
to the proliferation of synchronic series of experiments and diachronic modules of 
research. 
5. Series of experiments and modules of research
In 2014, Michael Schwab (2014b, 31) noted that “over the last few years, Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger’s theory of ‘experimental systems’ . . . has gained currency in 
debates around art and research. . . . [However,] it is striking that, in the literature 
to date, no coherent picture has emerged as to how his theory may productively be 
employed in this context. . . . Authors who focus on epistemological implications 
may identify ‘epistemic things’ in general within artistic practice, while failing to 
account for the specificity of experimentation in this context.” In the same text, 
 5 Critically, what Rheinberger calls experimental cultures is to be understood in the first place as an epis-
temological and not as a sociological concept (see Rheinberger 1997, 138).
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Schwab addresses the relation between Rheinberger’s notion of experimental 
systems and his own concept of exposition, which is defined as “the exposition 
of practice as research” (ibid., 35), insisting on the link between Rheinberger’s 
graphematic space of experimentation and the inherent graphematicity of any 
thinkable form of representation of the results of such experimentation. It was 
partly to address this question that MusicExperiment21 aimed to generate as 
many “results” as possible and to display them in as varied media as possible. I 
insist on the specific Rheinbergerian sense of the word results, which means “a 
finding that, in principle, can be reintegrated as a component of the system and 
can thus enlarge or change the setup” (Rheinberger 1997, 135). To keep things 
under control, a set of five simple basic rules was put in place: 
(1)  The choice of the objects of research (strata) for every single case study 
must be rigorous, taking into account their potential to act sometimes as 
a technical object and at other times as an epistemic thing.
(2)  Every case study must systematically generate differential repetition of 
some kind.
(3)  To enhance this differential repetition, every case study must be pre-
sented in a series of experiments (synchronically), which are to be num-
bered according to specific parameters (thus, not necessarily strictly 
chronologically).
(4)  Every subproject is presented in as many and diverse modes as possible 
through different modules of research (diachronically), each resulting 
from a different research method or perspective.
(5)  Research Catalogue is to be used (in addition to the performance stage) as 
one of the main channels for experimentation and public communication 
of processes and results. 
Thus, by using Rheinberger’s experimental systems as a reference, MusicExperiment21 
developed a sort of musical lab, sustained by a series of experimental perform-
ances that contributed to a substantial turn away from conventional perform-
ance practices and musicological methodologies. In all case studies, projects, 
and subprojects, MusicExperiment21 insisted on the precise definition of the 
technical objects and epistemic things at play. Considering these objects and 
things as parameters within an experimental set-up allowed for differential 
combinations, regulations, and calibrations of material things and affective 
forces. The spaces of experimentation and representation are often intermingled; 
however, as a starting position, the spaces of experimentation were considered 
to be the physical spaces of the host institution and the music halls and art gal-
leries where MusicExperiment21 performed, while the spaces of representation 
were books, journals, recordings (CDs, LPs, DVDs), and websites. In this latter 
respect, Research Catalogue took a particular position, being at the same time a 
space of experimentation and a space of representation. It was used not only to 
store, archive, and document research but also as a working tool, a virtual space 
where research can be produced as at a researcher’s desk.6 
 6 An example of such “working use” can be seen in Schwab (2014c).
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Unfolding Waves
A good example of the diachronic model of modules of research presented in 
parallel is MusicExperiment21’s first official publication, an article published in 
the Journal for Artistic Research titled “Con Luigi Nono: Unfolding Waves” (Assis 
2014). From an epistemological point of view, one of the journal article’s goals is 
to contribute to the development of artistic research methodologies and innov-
ative modes of communicating knowledge that include aesthetic components. 
Therefore, it is organised around a modular structure with a very simple idea: to 
show the fluidity, flexibility, and continuity of the borders between “academic” and 
“artistic” practices and outputs. The numerical sequence of the modules (1 to 7, or 
left to right as they appear on the entry page) indicates a progressive displacement 
from factual historiographical and analytic data to creative/imaginative appropri-
ations of the researched materials. Thus, Module 1 is mainly historiographical, 
Module 2 archaeological, Modules 3 and 4 analytical, Module 5 interpretative, 
and Modules 6 and 7 creative and exploratory. On the one hand, the modules 
move from “more scholarly” towards “more artistic.” On the other hand, each 
module enacts a different balance between these polarities, stressing that there 
can be neither a “pure” scholarly approach (without any creativity) nor any “pure” 
artistic practice (without any contextualisation and references). Additionally, the 
writing within the exposition is also experimental. Different modules have differ-
ent types of writing, including conventional musicological discourse (Modules 
1 and 6), spoken presentation (Module 2), diagrammatic inscriptions (Modules 
3 and 4), and absence of text altogether (Modules 5 and 7). In respect to modes 
of writing, it is worth mentioning another MusicExperiment21 project, Nietzsche 
5: The Fragmentary (Schwab and Assis 2015): the writing is also experimental in 
this exposition, yet a completely different approach is taken that enhances the 
fragmentary character of the research object. Thus, MusicExperiment21 experi-
mented with context-situated solutions, looking for suitable formats and not 
aiming to develop a single solution that could fit all case studies. 
Rasch
As for the principles of synchronic series of experiments, seriality, and differential 
repetition, the best example from MusicExperiment21 is the project Rasch (see Assis 
2017), which consists of a potentially infinite series of mutational performances 
based upon two basic materials: Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana, op. 16 (1838, 
1850), and Roland Barthes’s 1979 essay “Rasch,” which is exclusively dedicated to 
Kreisleriana (see Barthes 1985). To these materials other components may (or not) 
be added for each particular version: visual elements (pictures, videos), other texts 
(such as Barthes’s further essays on music, on Beethoven, and on Schumann), 
or further aural elements (recordings, live electronics, etc.). The main goal is to 
generate an intricate network of aesthetico-epistemic cross-references, through 
which the listener has the freedom to focus on different layers of perception: 
be it on the music, on the texts being projected or read, on the images, on the 
voices, and so on. Situated beyond interpretation, hermeneutics, and aesthetics, the 
twenty-five instantiations (so far) of Rasch have been emblematic of what might 
be labelled experimental performance practices. These practices productively deviate 
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from conventional (repetitive) performative strategies transforming familiar 
artistic objects into objects for thought. For an overview of all instantiations of 
this project, including video recordings of the majority of them, see “RaschX” 
(Assis 2017).
Powers of Divergence
Powers of Divergence constitutes a particularly interesting case in as much as 
it is a substantial research project that was conceived, designed, and realised by 
the doctoral student Lucia D’Errico, working within MusicExperiment21. While 
all the other projects were essentially conceived before MusicExperiment21’s 
official starting date, Powers of Divergence was made afterwards, benefiting 
from but also challenging the notions and practices MusicExperiment21 had 
already put in place. In its nine subprojects—dedicated to music ranging from 
Nicola Vicentino’s Madonna il poco dolce (1555) to Schumann’s Kreisleriana no. 4 
(1838)—Powers of Divergence “consists [of ] a series of performances, each of which 
takes as [its] departure point a given piece of notated music from the Western 
tradition (the ‘primary work’),” which functions more as a “generator of affects, 
of vectorial forces that impinge upon the here-and-now of the performer,” than 
it does “something to be literally mirrored in performance” (D’Errico 2018). In 
her work with past musical objects, D’Errico (a classically trained guitarist and 
composer) does not aim to reproduce already known configurations of those 
objects. She is interested in performance “as a way to reflect, through practice, on 
the commonsensical limits of the interpretational approach to scores, in order to 
move beyond them” (ibid.). Embracing the notion of simulacra—as theorised by 
Gilles Deleuze in the first two appendices of The Logic of Sense (1990)—D’Errico 
radically departs from the scores of the pieces she performs, cutting the link with 
any illusion of an “original” sound and focusing on the concrete materiality of 
sound and of the performative gesture, which happens in the radical here and 
now of the performative event. This creates a state of suspension of accepted 
aesthetical codes and rules, enabling a glimpse into infinite other com-possible 
configurations of sounds and matter, generating an “encounter that exceeds both 
the (supposed) objectivity of the sign and the (supposedly existent) subjectivity 
of the performer,” pointing to modes of “resemblance through non-resembling 
means” (D’Errico 2018).
Further examples from MusicExperiment21 are available online through a 
“portal” entry, from where it is possible to find all instantiations of the diverse 
projects, including audio and video recordings of most of them.7 These pro-
jects are the results of series of experiments conducted in light of the notion 
of experimental systems as explained above. However, one critical notion for 
the functioning of experimental systems has not yet been discussed in detail—
the notion of complexity and its derived notion of reduction of complexity, without 
which no experimental set-up could possibly function, since the existing data 
related to any musical piece vastly exceeds what can be exposed within a per-
formance or within an essay. Thus, the reduction of complexity, especially the 
 7 See https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/470651/470652/3203/428.
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reduction of epistemic complexity while keeping the ontic and systemic complexity of 
a given system intact, is of paramount relevance for the productive generation 
of results and new insights into the objects under investigation. The next chap-
ter addresses these concepts, making links to similar processes in biology and 
computer science.
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Epistemic Complexity  
in Music Performance*
1. Complexity and epistemic complexity
In his essay “Experimental Complexity in Biology: Some Epistemological and 
Historical Remarks,” Rheinberger (1997a, S245) states that the “reduction of 
complexity is a prerequisite for experimental research.” In other words, the 
overall context of research is characterised by complex configurations and 
arrangements of complex things that must be filtered and precisely selected to 
become part of the experimental set-up. A vast quantity of components, inter-
actions, behaviours, and embedded knowledge precede the experimental research 
itself. In order to do research and arrive at some kind of result, the ontic and the 
systemic complexities of the research object have to be reduced, while retaining 
its fundamental and specific epistemic complexity. Despite the title of his article, 
Rheinberger does not really address the topic of complexity, since his central 
concern is with the experimental situation itself. Even when Rheinberger (1997a, 
S247) writes that “experimental systems are machines for reducing complexity,” 
he does not enter into a discussion of exactly what characterises this complexity, a 
characterisation that would inform the epistemic horizon that enables the research 
in the first place. Further elaboration of the notion of complexity, and particularly 
of epistemic complexity, seems thus pertinent.
Biologist Ladislav Kováč and philosopher Subrata Dasgupta—working sep-
arately and in different disciplines—have produced stimulating reflections on 
the topic of epistemic complexity. This chapter explores their different yet com-
plementary understandings of this topic, relating and applying their under-
standings to music performance. According to Kováč (2007, 65), “biological 
evolution is a progressing process of knowledge acquisition (cognition) and, 
correspondingly, of growth of complexity. The acquired knowledge repre-
sents epistemic complexity.” Dasgupta (addressing technology and complexity) 
uses the same term in relation to artificial (i.e., human-made) things, defining 
complexity as “the richness of the knowledge that is embedded in an artifact” 
(Dasgupta 1997, 116). Upon closer reading, their understandings, definitions, 
and characterisations of epistemic complexity share an astonishingly large 
number of common traits. In the next two sections, I briefly present Kováč’s 
and Dasgupta’s theories in order to introduce the possible translation of those 
theories into music and music performance. 
 * A previous version of this chapter was published as Assis (2013, 151–65).
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2. Epistemic complexity in biology 
Inspired by Hans Kuhn’s (1972, 1988) understanding of life as an unceasing process 
of accumulation of knowledge that starts with self-copying nucleic acids, Ladislav 
Kováč (1986) developed a bottom-up approach to epistemological problems—an 
approach that may be associated with cognitive biology1 and that conceives life as 
“epistemic unfolding of the universe” (Kováč [2000] 2018, 1). Biological evolu-
tion, which is based on a logic of self-replicating entities, is a continual growth 
of knowledge that involves the “creation of subjects with ever greater embodied 
knowledge” (ibid., 19, emphasis added). This principle presupposes that “there 
are levels of complexity in the living world and that, in the course of biological 
evolution, there has been a continuous growth of complexity” (ibid., 15). This 
tendency toward the epistemic unfolding of the universe constitutes what Kováč 
calls the epistemic principle (ibid., 14–20). According to this view, there is a general 
tendency toward ever more complex organisms. However—and importantly 
rejecting any positivist notion of progress—there is no teleology and no guiding 
principle with a clear end. What are observable are several teleonomic processes 
that simply produce complex products without any guiding foresight. The 
simplest teleonomic system (a self-copying molecule, for example) is already a 
subject facing the world as an object. A system (in this case a biological species) is 
situated in a given environment with (1) surroundings (the part of the environment 
that interacts with the system and has a detectable influence on it), and (2) an 
Umwelt (the specific part of the surroundings that interacts with the sensors of 
the system).2 However, only that part of the Umwelt that is experienced by the 
subject (Husserl’s Lebenswelt) is effectively internalised as the basis for construc-
tion(s) and operationally used as the initial input for solving problems (see Kováč 
2007, 66). As Kováč says: “At all levels, from the simplest to the most complex, the 
overall construction of the subject, the embodiment of the achieved knowledge, 
represents its epistemic complexity. It is the epistemic complexity which continu-
ally increases in biological evolution, and also in cultural evolution, and gives 
the evolution its direction” (Kováč [2000] 2018, 18). (One must remember that 
direction here is not meant to have any teleological character.) 
 1 According to Boden and Zaw (1980, 25), “a cognitive biology would be one in which biological phenom-
ena were conceptualized for theoretical purposes in terms of categories whose primary application is 
in the domain of knowledge.” Moreover, to quote Kováč ([2000] 2018, 1), “knowledge is embodied in 
constructions of organisms, and the structural complexity of those constructions which carry embodied 
knowledge corresponds to their epistemic complexity.”
 2 The subtle differentiation between surroundings and Umwelt goes back to the work of Jakob von Uexküll 
(see Uexküll 1982). Jesper Hoffmeyer (2012) describes this difference as follows: “In everyday German, 
Umwelt means simply ‘surroundings’ or ‘environment,’ but through the work of the German biologist 
Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) the term, at least in scientific literature has acquired more specific 
semiotic meanings as the ecological niche as an animal perceives it; the experienced world, phenomen-
al world, or subjective universe; and the cognitive map or mind‐set.”
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3. Epistemic complexity in technology 
Coming from a completely different field of inquiry, with a background in computer 
science, artificial intelligence, and cognitive sciences, Subrata Dasgupta’s theories 
on systemic and epistemic complexity open up new avenues for understanding 
human creativity and its tendency to continuously generate new artefacts. Whereas 
Kováč focuses on biological species and entities, Dasgupta’s interests revolve 
around human-made artefacts and their origins, evolution, and epistemic content. 
According to Dasgupta, artefacts are “useful things that are produced or consciously 
conceived in response to some practical need, want or desire” (Dasgupta 1996, 
9). But artefacts possess another fundamental and interesting property, one that 
relates to Kováč: “like organisms, they manifest evolution” (Dasgupta 1997, 114). The 
production of things and their evolution over time are, therefore, central topics 
of his reflections. In approaching these topics, Dasgupta distinguishes systemic 
complexity from epistemic complexity. Referring to Herbert Simon’s (1962) article 
“The Architecture of Complexity,” Dasgupta (1997, 113) argues that “a system . . . 
is said to be complex if it is composed of a large number of parts or components 
that interact in nontrivial ways.” Complexity depends, then, on quantitative char-
acteristics and on intricate operational behaviours—aspects that tell us what the 
nature of an artefact is. Dasgupta calls this kind of complexity systemic complexity. 
It does not tell us how that artefact assumed the form it did, nor does it give us 
any clues about what it might produce in the future. Dasgupta’s crucial claim 
is that beyond systemic complexity there is another, deeper kind of complexity in 
the universe of human-made things: “the richness of the knowledge that is embedded 
in an artifact. I shall call this epistemic complexity. It consists of the knowledge that 
both contributes to, and is generated by, the creation of an artifact” (Dasgupta 
1997, 116). Any artefact is, therefore, surrounded by knowledge that is prior to 
its emergence and knowledge that appears only after the artefact was made. In 
addition to these ex-ante and ex-post moments, the specific moment of invention 
or design is itself a knowledge-rich, cognitive process. Furthermore, artefacts 
themselves are also knowledge: a design embodies and encapsulates one or 
more operational principles, to start with. “And, in the case of true invention, 
when the artifactual form is original in some significant sense, the operational 
principles it encodes constitute genuinely new knowledge” (ibid., 117). Whereas 
the systemic complexity of an artefact requires it to be made up of a large number 
of parts or components that interact in complicated, non-trivial ways, epistemic 
complexity adds to it two wholly new dimensions: the artefact’s capacity for 
producing unexpected behaviour; and the amount, variety, and novelty of the 
knowledge embedded in it. It is this embedded knowledge that Dasgupta calls 
“the epistemic complexity of an artefact” (ibid., 118). 
Epistemic complexity, in the sense exposed by Dasgupta, is also linked to 
creativity and original thinking. Even if systemic and epistemic complexity are 
not necessarily coupled, “epistemic complexity is entirely related to the ori-
ginality of artifacts and, hence, to the creativity of the artificer” (Dasgupta 1997, 
130). Someone doing “normal design” or working within a “mature technol-
ogy” is certainly creating artefacts of potentially considerable systemic com-
plexity; but if that system is an exercise in normal design, it will not be original 
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but will be simple, epistemically speaking. Epistemic complexity is also avoided 
when the designer takes recourse in well-established styles or when a chosen 
style is adapted to the specific needs of the technological problem at hand. On 
the other hand, when the designer rejects several traditional solutions, striving 
for truly original configurations, knowledge may emerge in wholly surprising 
contexts. In such cases, “epistemic complexity is, then, a measure of the mak-
er’s creativity” (ibid., 131). However, the question of how such complexity can 
be assessed is not sufficiently addressed. 
Dasgupta (1997, 135) proposes the identification and enumeration of the 
“significant knowledge ‘tokens’” that constitute an artefact as a first step 
toward an evaluation of its epistemic complexity. However, the risk is that such 
an enumeration will stay within the limits of the artefact’s systemic complexity, 
conveying “nothing of the intricacy of the interactions of these knowledge tok-
ens, nor the manner in which they came to participate in the cognitive act, nor 
(in the case of old knowledge) why they were invoked at all” (ibid., 136). Here 
is where my proposed new image of work, with its associated notions of strata, 
assemblage, and diagram (see Chapter 2) seems to be extremely useful, as it 
allows us to better identify and situate the “significant knowledge tokens” at 
hand. At the same time, the practical use of Rheinberger’s notion of experi-
mental systems in its appropriation for music performance (as explained in 
Chapter 3) permits a precise calibration of the diverse objects/things involved 
in the experimental set-up, leading to the generation of graphematic outputs 
that enable the traceability and the constitution of new things, thus involv-
ing epistemic gain. Rheinberger’s experimental systems have been described 
in the previous chapter, but to fully grasp their use in music performance it is 
necessary to address the question of what epistemic complexity might mean 
in music.
4. Epistemic complexity in music 
Borrowing the notion of epistemic complexity from the sciences (Dasgupta 1997; 
Kováč [2000] 2018, 2007), and considering musical works as highly complex 
artefacts, this section explores different elements involved in music performance 
in terms of epistemic complexity. During the twentieth century, and especially 
since the 1990s, the performance of musical “works” became an increasingly 
complex articulation of different types of data, information, and knowledge—
retraceable in diverse material sources (including a growing quantity of available 
sketches, instruments, editions, and recordings), in reflective discourses (in, on, 
and about music), and in multifarious performance styles (historically informed, 
Romantic-modernist, or Classical-modernist, actualising-mode, experimental, 
etc.). The continuous accumulation and sedimentation of these kinds of know-
ledge translates into an exponential growth of complexity that involves technical, 
artistic, aesthetic, and epistemic components. By breaking down musical works 
into their constitutive strata (see Part 1 of this book), the tokens of their respective 
and variable complexity emerge as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 1989), 
 127
Epistemic Complexity in Music Performance
objects that change their ontological and epistemological nature depending 
on the context in which they are used.3 Consequently, musical works no longer 
have an indisputable ontological character (Goehr [1992] 2007; Kramer 2011; 
Chapters 1–2, above), which is now seen as transient and dependent on their 
epistemic complexity, contextualisation, and use.
If we conceive musical works in terms of the characteristics of epistemic com-
plexity described by Kováč and Dasgupta, one can observe that musical works 
are highly elaborated, complex semiotic artefacts with intricate operational func-
tions. Additionally, they are made of a variable and normally large number of con-
stitutive parts that interact in non-trivial ways. This gives them, in the first place, 
systemic complexity. But they are also the products of invention and embed a rich 
array of interconnected knowledge encapsulating one or more operational principles. 
Their conception, creation, and concrete making (and/or performing) inher-
ently involve pre- and post-knowledge, as well as a vast combination of refined 
cognitive processes. Like organisms, they also manifest evolution (which doesn’t 
necessarily imply “progress”), doing this in three ways: (1) in terms of “pure” 
creation, that is, new, original compositions; (2) in terms of re-creation, that is, 
the performance of past musical works; and (3) in the sophisticated process of 
their preservation over time (editions, recordings, theoretical reflections, etc.). 
Taking a closer look at the history of musical things (without adhering to trad-
itional visions of music history, compartmentalised in styles and periods) and 
adapting George Kubler’s statement regarding a history of things, a history of 
musical things would include both material artefacts and aesthetic positions, 
both replicas and unique examples, both tools and expressions—in short all 
materials worked by human hands under the guidance of connected ideas 
developed in temporal sequence (see Kubler [1962] 2008, 8). New pieces are 
a combination of old knowledge with new cognitive extensions, and—in the 
most interesting cases—with unexpected and surprising elements. In addition 
to their systemic complexity, musical things aim at producing unprecedented 
events embodying new knowledge. In this sense, through the amount, variety, 
newness, and richness of the knowledge that they embed, they have a consider-
able epistemic complexity, being artistic examples of what Rheinberger (talk-
ing about experimentation and following François Jacob) designates “a machine 
to make the future” (Rheinberger 1997b, 33). As Dasgupta writes: “Paintings, 
sculptures, novels, poems and plays, symphonies, fugues and ragas are all 
infused with epistemic complexity, especially in the intricate ways their cre-
ators summon the past and integrate it into their works” (Dasgupta 1997, 137). 
Just like technological artefacts, musical artefacts are characterised by systemic 
and epistemic complexity.
 3 On the concept of boundary objects in the context of artistic research, see Henk Borgdorff ’s interview 
with Michael Schwab (Borgdorff 2012, 174–83, particularly 177). Borgdorff attributes the concept of 
boundary object to Thomas F. Gieryn. However, Gieryn’s concept is that of boundary work, which has 
a different meaning, referring to instances in which frontiers, boundaries, limits, and demarcations 
between fields of knowledge are created, established, advocated, or reinforced (see Gieryn 1983). Borg-
dorff ’s use of the notion appears to be situated somewhere between boundary work and boundary object in 
the way I use the term here, which follows Star and Griesemer (1989).
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Musical works are surrounded by and encapsulated in specific epistemic set-
tings, which are made of elaborated collections of historically produced (and 
inherited) things, such as sketches, drafts, first editions, recordings, or essays 
concerning a given musical work. After two centuries in which the work concept 
dominated (see, among others, Goehr [1992] 2007), in recent decades atten-
tion has turned to what may be called an extended work concept that takes into 
consideration the deconstruction of musical works into their graspable consti-
tutive elements, revealing them as complex accumulations of singularities and 
as multi-layered conglomerates of things with the utmost diversity (see Kramer 
2011, chapters 11 and 14). The closer one gets to such constitutive things, the 
clearer the epistemic complexity of musical works and performances becomes. 
From the perspective of a performer dealing with a musical work from the 
past (which might also be a very recent past), types of relevant objects loaded 
with variable degrees of epistemic complexity include: 
—  Materials generated by the composer (sketches, drafts, manuscripts, first 
prints, revisions of prints, etc.) —  Editions of a “piece” throughout time
—  Recordings of works
—  The reflective and conceptual (musicological, philosophical, analytical, 
etc.) apparatus around musical works (including theses, articles, books, 
etc.)
—  The organological diversity; that is, the instruments in use (for example, 
historical versus contemporary)
—  The performative/aesthetic orientation of the performer (historically 
informed practice, “Romantic interpretation,” “new objectivity,” “moder-
nising approach,” etc.)
—  Arrangements of works
—  The practitioner’s own body, which is biologically, technically, and cultur-
ally organised
One important observation is that until quite recently many of the items in this list 
were not generally available since they were the “property” of an exclusive group 
of experts. In today’s increasingly democratised knowledge society, more and 
more people have access to them. The items on the list are just the main tokens 
of a musical work’s epistemic complexity and may be extended by potentially 
infinite further sub-tokens. They build a complicated network of things with 
embedded knowledge. At some point, they have all been reifications or sedi-
mentation of a specific creative or reflective situation. Now, they might function 
as (1) objects of inquiry (What are they? How many parts do they have? How do 
they function?) or as (2) things for further inquiries (How can they become pro-
ductive again? How can they build reconfigurations of the work they belong to? 
What futures do they enhance?). The first approach concerns a work’s systemic 
complexity, the second, its epistemic complexity. Moreover, making explicit the 
epistemic complexity of musical works allows us to understand works as being 
made up of myriad boundary objects (see also Star and Griesemer 1989). To make 
performances using selections of such boundary objects is an act that discloses 
open-ended possibilities for new assemblages. Crucial to these new assemblages—
and necessary to enhancing their epistemic complexity—is the inclusion of a 
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productive not-yet-knowing, the creation of room for what is yet unthought and 
unexpected. In this light, processes of becoming appear as more productive than 
statements of being. Works, just like objects of knowledge, remain essentially open. 
The fundamental incompleteness of any attempt to “close” or narrow down a 
human-made invention becomes the starting point for epistemic games. As 
Knorr Cetina (2001, 181) states: “I want to characterize objects of knowledge 
(‘epistemic objects’) in terms of a lack in completeness of being that takes away 
much of the wholeness, solidity, and the thing-like character they have in our 
everyday conception.” In the place of a clear-cut ontology of the artwork, we find 
an unfolding becoming, where experimentation and the concrete production of 
new incomplete arrangements become the central artistic activity. 
5. Experimentation in music performance:  
how to make the future?
As shown in Chapter 3, by applying Rheinberger’s terminology and architecture 
of research (from biology) to music performance we are attempting to establish a 
wider common ground for artistic research in music performance. This applica-
tion is not obvious, nor is it straightforward. Rheinberger developed his theories 
in a very specific field of inquiry. In transferring these theories to other fields 
(especially to artistic and creative areas), one must proceed cautiously. This said, 
however, there are several musical entities that might be considered as technical 
objects and/or epistemic things, depending on the specific use and context of their 
presentation. Accepting the risk of applying Rheinberger’s theories to music, 
one might say that scores, instruments, or tuning systems, for instance, may be 
seen as technical objects that are brought into particular constellations (such 
as a concert or a CD recording), to produce art. The same entities may, how-
ever, operate as epistemic things, whose qualities can be divided into two main 
groups: those already known and those still to be known (discovered). Musical 
works participate, therefore, in two different worlds: one related to their past 
(what constitutes them as recognisable objects), another related to their future 
(what they might become). If we require performance to be an idealised act of 
interpretation (be it hermeneutic or performative4) and if we reduce it to the 
repetition of the score (understood as an instrumental technical object), we take 
away the possibility for epistemic things to emerge or to unfold into unforeseen 
dimensions. We would be dealing mainly with the work’s past. If we want to give 
credibility to performance as an instance, among others, of epistemic activity, we 
need a concept such as experimentation that creates space in relation to the score 
(which would otherwise overdetermine and close down the epistemic potential 
of performance practice), allowing unpredictable futures to happen. And we 
also need Rheinberger’s experimental systems as a basic methodological tool 
to frame our artistic experimental approach.
From this perspective, experimentation, methodologically conducted 
 4 For the distinction between hermeneutic and performative interpretation see Hermann Danuser’s entry 
“Interpretation” in the German encyclopaedia MGG (Danuser 1994–2007). 
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through experimental systems, might allow for making the future of past musical 
works, something of which interpretation is far less capable. Moreover, artistic 
experimentation has the potential to bring together the past and the future of 
things, enabling and concretely building (constructing) new assemblages—of 
which non-artistic modes of knowledge production are less capable.
But how can such new assemblages appear? Under what conditions and 
responding to which criteria? How can we evaluate their quality? How can we 
assess their constitutive parts and define them as contributions to knowledge? 
To suggest possible lines of answer to these questions, a brief summary of the 
concepts and practices exposed so far in this chapter—as well as a reference to 
the Foucauldian concepts of archaeology and problematisation—will help better 
situate and explain not only the concept of experimentation in use in this chapter 
but also my own conception of artistic research and its role in our knowledge 
society.
The first fundamental concept presented in this chapter was that of epistemic 
complexity as defined and developed by Kováč and Dasgupta. For Kováč epi-
stemic complexity is the result of the epistemic unfolding of the universe (epi-
stemic principle), while for Dasgupta it concerns the richness of the knowledge 
that is embedded in an artefact. If we think in terms of simple time coordin-
ates, such as past–present–future, these two perspectives share one character-
istic: both scrutinise things (biological organisms or human-made artefacts), 
looking at and analysing their respective pasts. What things are in the present is 
understood to be an accumulation of epistemic features throughout time, from 
the past until the present. Even if this approach might inform us how an organ-
ism or an artefact might behave in the near future, these two authors’ main 
concern is not with the future but with identifying, articulating, and evaluating 
the (past) evolution of such things.
 The second central topic developed in this chapter was the concept of 
things as developed by Rheinberger, who was inspired by Kubler. This concept 
allowed me to consider the epistemic complexity of the natural and human 
worlds as a potentially infinite galaxy of things, entities that escape closed 
definitions and that might have different functions according to the context 
in which they are temporarily immersed. Next, I mentioned some graspable 
examples of things that constitute musical works, things that I defined as tok-
ens of a musical work’s epistemic complexity. This breakdown of the epistemic 
complexity of musical works into its manifold constitutive elements (things) is 
crucial because it enables open-ended possibilities for new arrangements. 
In this constellation of potentially infinite things the concept of archaeology, 
as elaborated by Michel Foucault, becomes a helpful methodological tool. 
According to Clare O’Farrell (2007), “‘Archaeology’ is the term Foucault used 
during the 1960s to describe his approach to writing history. Archaeology is 
about examining the discursive traces and orders left by the past in order to 
write a ‘history of the present.’ In other words archaeology is about looking at 
history as a way of understanding the processes that have led to what we are 
today.” In this sense, archaeology is a way to look at the past from the present, 
with the goal of better situating/understanding the present (and, crucially, not 
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the past). It describes a boomerang-like route: from the present to the past, 
and back from the past to the present. It does not aim at disclosing “how things 
really were” but rather “why things are what they are” today. In Foucault’s words:
Archaeology does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, aimed at, 
experienced, desired by men in the very moment at which they expressed it in 
discourse. . . . It does not try to repeat what has been said by reaching it in its very 
identity. It does not claim to efface itself in the ambiguous modesty of a reading 
that would bring back, in all its purity, the distant, precarious, almost effaced light 
of the origin. It is nothing more than a rewriting: that is, in the preserved form of 
exteriority, a regulated transformation of what has already been written. It is not 
a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it is the systematic description of a 
discourse-object. (Foucault 1972, 139–40) 
The link to Michel Foucault is explicit in Rheinberger’s writings and is very 
important to his theories of experimental systems in several regards, particularly 
to the definition of epistemic thing: “[Foucault’s] ‘discourse-object’ is what I call 
an epistemic thing” (Rheinberger 1997b, 8). For Rheinberger, epistemic things 
are “things embodying concepts” that “deserve as much attention as generations 
of historians have bestowed on disembodied ideas” (ibid.). To give epistemic 
things the attention they deserve is (1) to extract them out of the chaos of systemic 
complexity, and (2) to allow them to contribute to the formation of new entities, 
new epistemic things that, in turn, will add new things to the archaeology of epi-
stemic things, that is, to epistemic complexity. From this perspective, archaeology 
appears almost as a necessary consequence of epistemic complexity. 
But Foucault’s discourse-object not only is to be described but also must be 
productively resituated, involving problematisation, another Foucauldian con-
cept that gained increased relevance in Foucault’s late works: “The notion 
common to all the work that I have done since Histoire de la Folie is that of prob-
lematization” (Foucault 1998, 257). With this concept Foucault refers to the 
work one does to direct one’s thought toward present practices that were once 
seen as stable but which the researcher shows to be problematic in some crucial 
sense. “Problematization doesn’t mean the representation of a pre-existent 
object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It is 
the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something 
into the play of the true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought” 
(Foucault 1998, 257). 
Problematisation, therefore, concerns objects, things that are archaeologically 
retraced and transmuted from neutral objects into objects for thought. In the con-
text of the present chapter, archaeology and problematisation go hand in hand, 
and they both work as problematisation of the aesthetico-epistemic complexity 
described above. Epistemic complexity, things, archaeology, and problematisation are 
notions that relate to concrete material practices that scrutinise things (bio-
logical organisms, human-made artefacts, concepts) by enquiring into their 
past. The notion of problematisation can be understood in two ways: (1) as a 
highly elaborated form of interpretation of historical data, and (2) as a critical act 




the past. Applied to music, it is perfectly recognisable in disciplines such as 
music history, music analysis, music theory, historical organology, music phil-
ology, and biographical studies—in fact, in the majority of all musicological 
sub-disciplines. In the second sense, however, it opens up new modes of prob-
lematising things, modes that, rather than aiming to retrieve what things are or 
were, search for new ways of productively exposing them within a contempor-
ary situation. These are modes of acting upon the available materials, which 
instead of critically looking into the past, creatively project things into their 
possible futures. 
Such is the final proposal of this chapter: to reverse the perspective from 
looking into the past to creatively designing the future of past musical works. In my 
view this is precisely what artistic research could be about—a creative mode 
that brings together the past and the future of things in ways that non-artis-
tic modes cannot do. In doing this, artistic research must be able to include 
archaeology, problematisation, and experimentation in its inner fabric. The 
making of artistic experimentation through Rheinberger’s experimental systems 
becomes a creative form of problematisation, whereby through differential repeti-
tion new arrangements of things are materially handcrafted and constructed. 
In a deeper sense, experimentation is not the act of conducting experiments 
(and even less of testing). Aesthetic experimentation relates primarily to a com-
pletely new orientation of the senses and of reason, aiming to reconfigure the 
sensible. As phrased by Ludger Schwarte (2012, 187, my translation): “Aesthetic 
experimentation starts when the parameters of a given aesthetic praxis are 
broken, suspended, or transcended, in order to work out a particular mode of 
appearance that reconfigures the field of the visible and of the utterable.”
That such reconfigurations are only possible after a profound consideration 
of the epistemic complexity of aesthetic things is the inevitable and necessary 
condition for creative problematisation—that is to say, for artistic research. 
From this perspective, artistic research therefore happens when: (1) the epi-
stemic complexity of a given object of inquiry is scrutinised; (2) the constitutive 
things of such objects of inquiry are identified and isolated; (3) an archaeology 
of such things is explored; (4) the results of this exploration are problematised 
with the purpose of enabling their projection into the future; (5) the problem-
atisation happens in precisely calibrated frameworks (experimental systems); 
(6) inside an experimental system differential repetition is stimulated, enhanced, 
and achieved; (7) new arrangements of things emerge as the result of a con-
structive (and not only theoretical) endeavour; (8) this construction of new 
arrangements is made by bodies-in-action, involving a renewed perspective on 
the kind and mode of energies at play in those actions. Such energies, as well as 
their processes of transmission are the object of the next chapter, dedicated to 
Gilbert Simondon’s notion of transduction. 
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and the Body  
as a Transducer*
Transduction is Gilbert Simondon’s key concept for understanding processes of 
differenciation and of individuation in several fields, including scientific disci-
plines, social and human sciences, technological devices, and artistic domains. 
Originating in the sciences and critically developed in its philosophical impli-
cations by Simondon, transduction refers to a dynamic operation by which energy 
is actualised, moving from one state to the next, in a process that individuates 
new materialities. This chapter appropriates this concept for musical practice, 
seeking to establish a foundational conceptual layer for a broader research effort 
that crucially includes artistic practice—both composition and performance—as 
its starting and end points. After an introductory depiction of what transduction 
might mean for a music performer, this chapter focuses on the presentation of 
different definitions of transduction, mainly stemming from Simondon him-
self, but including two further extensions: one to Deleuze’s concept of haecceity 
(and via Deleuze, to my own micro-haecceity), and the other to Brian Massumi’s 
notion of corporeality. Keeping in mind the potential of these definitions for 
music-making, this chapter explores eight different, yet complementary, ways 
of thinking through notions of transduction, which are presented in a growing 
scale of complexity from the incandescent light bulb (3) to the intricacies of 
decision-making in living organisms (10), passing by the question of time and 
temporality (4), thermodynamics (5), information theory (6), a redesigned theory 
of haecceities (7), Riemannian topology (8), and corporeality (9). All these topics 
are presented here, in short, as opening gates to wider fields of inquiry, suggesting 
future avenues of research, rather than claiming to offer finished thought.
 * This chapter is the fifth instantiation of a series of presentations and communications on the subject 
of the relation between Simondon’s concept of transduction and performative musical practices. Each 
of these instantiations have in common a set of references and an overall approach to transduction; 
however, they differ from one another in their particular medium (oral communication, written essay, 
performance) and specific focus (respectively: musical flows of intensities, immanence, modulation, 
action-bodies). “Transduction 1” was a spoken presentation held in Vienna (Assis 2016); “Transduction 
2” is a journal article (Assis 2017); “Transduction 3” is a book chapter in a collected volume on the 
notion of transposition (Assis 2018); and “Transduction 4” was a set of seven performances, Rasch 15–22, 
made in collaboration with Lucia D’Errico and performed on 7 May 2016 at Angewandte Innovation 
Laboratory (AIL), University of Applied Arts Vienna, as part of the exhibition DA-TA, curated by Ger-
hard Eckel, Michael Schwab, and David Pirrò (see Assis and D’Errico 2017).
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1. Transduction in music performance: relaying 
flows of intensities
Imagine a young pianist just about to go onstage to perform Robert Schumann’s 
piano fantasy Kreisleriana, op. 16 (1838, 1850). The performance will start in a few 
minutes, the piano is perfectly tuned, and the audience members are already 
seated, ready to listen; a stage manager will soon provide a sign to go onstage, 
and our soloist’s mind is probably fully concentrated on the first two pages of 
the score, on the electrifying agitation of the piece’s very beginning with its 
daunting restless triplets on the right hand. In this particular moment, in the 
very last seconds before going onstage, the whole piece—its overall form and 
all its pitches, rhythms, instrumental colours, dynamic ranges, tempi, pedalling, 
fingerings, gestures—is vividly present in the pianist’s body and mind, being 
concretely felt as a huge virtual diagram. This virtuality relates to a virtual that is 
not to be understood as a kind of virtual reality, but, on the contrary, as something 
absolutely real, something that exists and that is perceived in this very moment—
just before starting the performance—as tension, as an infinite reservoir of 
topological singularities, some of which will happen, and which will start happening 
as soon as the pianist’s second finger of the right hand touches the middle A of 
the keyboard. For a musician, this is one of the best situations in which to feel, to 
grasp, and to understand the complex relations between the Deleuzian concepts 
of the virtual and the actual.1 Everything a musician knows and feels about a given 
musical work is viscerally present in such moments as highly energetic clouds 
of potentialities. As soon as the pianist starts performing—physically touching 
the keyboard, attentively listening to the acoustic result in the here-and-now 
of the performance—all those potentialities go through a process of synthesis, 
leading to the radical here-and-now of every single fraction of a second, which 
one by one, one after the other, in closest vicinity and rapid pace, produce 
concrete actualisations of forces and materials. Once the concert officially starts, 
what our young pianist and the listeners experience in real time is the passage 
from a “just already” constituted assemblage of forces, intensities, and energies 
to another one, still in the process of being constituted. Something—a force, a 
signal—is being transmitted from one instant to the next, at light speed, without 
any break or loss of energy. A continuous process of differenciation happens 
and takes place in front of our eyes and ears. This process happens operationally: 
something is at work, something is emerging from a vast field of pre-individual 
and impersonal tensions, which constitute the metastable horizon of the piece and 
of the performers, an operation that leads to the emergence of new tensions, 
which are generated in the radical here-and-now of the performance, without 
univocal determinism or absolute predictability. At the interstices between what 
the performer intends to do, what really occurs, and what is intended immedi-
ately afterwards, an impulse of virtuality runs from one actualisation to another. 
Flows of intensities unfold throughout time in the specific here-and-now, in 
the highly accelerated and hyper-energised Erewhons of music performance. It 
 
 1 On the terminological couple virtual–actual, see chapter 1, especially, pp. 49–50.
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is this particular process of music-making, communication, transmission, and 
emergence of intensities that I propose to call performative transduction—appro-
priating for musical practice the term introduced by the French philosopher of 
science Gilbert Simondon in the 1950s.2
Simondon’s overarching goal was the development of a dynamic theory of 
technology, replacing ontology with ontogenesis and structure with embryo-
genesis. His effort resonates with and has been inspirational for my own 
ongoing work towards a dynamic theory of musical works and their perform-
ance. Simondon’s concept of transduction is extremely promising for musi-
cians because it seems to have the potential to afford new ways of conceiving, 
problematising, and doing artistic activities on the basis of intense temporal 
processes, such as music performances and compositions. Both in the moment 
of composing or in the act of performing, but also while simply reading a 
score or studying a sketch, several transducers and transductive processes 
can be identified. The main transducer (interface), however, is a human body 
(notating a score, playing an instrument, vibrating vocal cords), a complex liv-
ing organism inhabited by diverse layers of information and by innumerable 
drives, which, working together, shape the actual rendering of musical events. 
Considering bodies, instruments, body-instruments, scores, recordings, con-
cert halls, and audiences as different types of transducers, this chapter aims 
to lay the foundations for a novel approach to music-making, defining an 
experimental regime characterised by ensembles of transducers and their 
respective relaying of affects and intensities. Such an approach enables and 
enhances a decisive shift from the static opposition between work and perform-
ance, between score and expected image of work, between archetypal generalities 
(the work) and contingent particulars (a performance), to a zone that is energetic 
and molecular.
The appropriation for music of Simondon’s concepts and terminology fur-
ther enables an urgently needed move away from historically situated, but 
problematically still operative, formalistic and subjectivity-based approaches to 
music. On the one hand, music theory is dominated by formalism, dialectically 
separating form from matter (hylemorphism), focusing on fixed structures (res 
extensa, which remains the preferred field for analysis and historiography) while 
underestimating energetic potentials (res intensa, which constitutes the work-
ing habitat of composers and performers), and ignoring the energetic condi-
tions and entropic processes that lead to the shaping of any given musical form 
and expression. Formalism relies more on moulding—“an abstract conception 
that opposes matter to form” (Sauvagnargues 2016, 70)—than on modula-
tion—“a continuous assumption of form between properties of material and 
the concrete action of form” (ibid.). In this sense, it is important to stress that 
this chapter is part of a larger effort to investigate genetic operations, the processes 
of individuation of musical works, and a new image of musical objects based upon 
 2 The concept of transduction is so central to Simondon’s thought that it is present in innumerable pas-
sages of his writings. Its first official appearance in a text is probably in the introduction to Simondon’s 




the notion of multiplicity, an effort that ultimately criticises generic structures 
or archetypal images of musical works. 
On the other hand, questions about subjectivity have a propensity to ignore 
or exclude the non-human component of any transductive process. Studies of 
subjectivity tend therefore to be human, all too human. Any individual involved 
in a performance is modulating through a complex set of disparate elements, 
solving and resolving on the spot diverse disparate inconsistencies of the 
materials, operating instant syntheses (actualisations) out of a cloud of pre- 
individual singularities (the virtual) that really exist. As Anne Sauvagnargues 
(2016, 63) reading Simondon demonstrates, the individual, “whether it con-
cerns a subject or a being of any kind, is never given substantially, but is pro-
duced through a process of individuation.” Transduction permits a perspective 
in which musical objects and music performers are individuated at the same 
time, liberating the works from structural fixedness and the performers from 
psychological subjectification. Instead of operating out of a centralised, con-
trolling consciousness, the performer appears as the (human and non-human) 
link between the impersonal and pre-individual diversity of the virtual com-
ponents of any given work and its actualisation in sound and gesture. Beyond 
subjectivity, the notion of transduction enables the inclusion of a non-human 
perspective on the processes of relaying flows of intensities in music. 
2. Gilbert Simondon’s various definitions of 
transduction 
Simondon defined transduction in several ways; but, in short, transduction is a 
process whereby a disparity is topologically and temporally restructured across 
some interface or ensembles of interfaces. Thus it contrasts with the Aristotelian, 
hylemorphic scheme, which is based upon the dualism form–matter and upon 
the pre-existence of pre-formed individuated terms, Simondon radically focuses 
on processes of in-formation, claiming that any event or any individual is not just 
a result, but a milieu of individuation.
Transduction is Simondon’s key concept for understanding processes of 
individuation in a variety of fields: scientific disciplines such as physics, biol-
ogy, histology, ethology, crystallography, psychology; technological devices 
such as motors, electric tubes, lamps, telephones, mills, turbines, and cars; 
and artistic domains—an aesthetic extension of his system, which Simondon 
sketches in the third section of his 1958 thesis, “On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects” (see Michaud 2012, 121). The reasons for such impressive 
versatility are certainly many, and of different natures. First, Simondon’s pro-
ject is radically oriented towards a logic of creation: things and subjects are 
never considered as pre-constituted, and the “good form” is never stabilised 
(see Garelli 2013, 16), remaining suspended between structure and energy 
in a metastable balance. Second, the very notion of transduction thematises 
the event, insisting on the emergence of the new, on those components of 
any agency or assemblage that have the potential to change, to disrupt habits, 
stratifications, or any other forms of rigidity. Third, by focusing on energetic 
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processes, transduction carries a vitalist dimension, generating sequences of 
becoming, a becoming-intensity, whereby intensity itself can be defined as the 
creative vector of the dissolution of individuation: becoming-something is not 
becoming-this, but always becoming-something-else. All these aspects reinforce 
a modal perspective on the world, opposed to rigid essentialist or substantialist 
accounts, making the notion of transduction easily applicable in any given field 
of inquiry.
Every philosophical concept has its own precursors, predecessors, lineages 
of formation, and different definitions. Concepts are operative in specific con-
texts, and they may go out of use, disappear for a while, and reappear later on, in 
a different context, relating to different sets of problems. Like cells, organisms, 
and machines, concepts also have their own embryogenesis, being the modal 
and temporary result of an individuating process. Furthermore, they partake in 
the virtual–actual couple, and also participate in transductive operations. On 
10 November 1981, during the first session of his seminar on cinema, held at the 
University Paris VIII, in Vincennes, Gilles Deleuze made an important obser-
vation about the thickness of concepts:3 “A philosophical idea is always an idea 
with diverse layers and levels. It is like an idea and its projections. I mean, it has 
many levels of expression, of manifestations. It has a thickness. A philosophical 
idea, a philosophical concept, is always a thickness, a volume. One can take it 
at one level, then at another, and still at another one; that is not contradictory. 
But the levels are very different from one another” (Deleuze 1981, 0'55"–1'26", 
my translation).4
Simondon’s concept of transduction is a good example of a thick concept. 
Simondon himself offered diverse definitions of transduction, each time 
illuminating a particular perspective or addressing discipline-specific exam-
ples and problems. In what follows, I present, briefly, some of the different 
definitions of transduction provided by Simondon. Additionally, I present two 
further extensions: one to Deleuze’s concept of haecceity (and via Deleuze, to 
my own micro-haecceity), the other to Brian Massumi’s notion of corporeality. 
3. Discharge (potentiality)
On the simplest technical level, Simondon defined a transducer as a continuous 
electric relay that operates as a modulable resistance between a potential energy 
and its concrete place of actualisation (see Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 82). In this 
simple and eminently technological definition, transduction is presented as a 
discharge of energy from a field of potentialities toward a particular emergence 
of an event. Significantly, in this definition, the transducer doesn’t belong to 
 3 Deleuze was about to present Bergson’s concept of intuition, and the sentence I am quoting here was a 
kind of spoken footnote that prepared the audience for the density and thickness of Bergson’s concept.
 4 “Une idée philosophique, il me semble, c’est toujours une idée à niveaux et à paliers. C’est comme une 
idée qui a ses projections. Je veux dire, elle a plusieurs niveaux d’expression, de manifestation. Elle a 
une épaisseur. Une idée philosophique, un concept philosophique, c’est toujours une épaisseur, un 
volume. Vous pouvez les prendre à tel niveau, et puis à un autre niveau, et à un autre niveau, ça [ne] se 
contredit pas. Mais c’est des niveaux assez différents.”
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the domain of either the potential or the actual energy: it works as the mediator 
between these two domains, as the fringe of indeterminacy between them; and 
the indeterminacy results from information, which is a condition for actualisation 
to happen (see Simondon [1958] 2012, 143). It is in this sense that Brian Massumi 
could conclude that “transduction [is] the transmission of an impulse of virtu-
ality from one actualization to another and across them all. . . . Transduction is 
the transmission of a force of potential that cannot but be felt, simultaneously 
doubling, enabling, and ultimately counteracting the limitative selections of 
apparatuses of actualization and implantation” (Massumi 2002, 42–43). With 
the expression “a force of potential that cannot but be felt,” Massumi refers to 
the absolute reality of that “potential”: all forces that constitute Simondon’s 
potential energy are real and do exist “in this world.” Sometimes they are per-
ceived as tension, at other times they remain hidden from our senses, but they 
are measurable with technical apparatuses. 
The incandescent lamp is probably the simplest example of a transducer as 
a continuous electric relay. Electric current is available in the electric circuit as 
potential energy; the moment one switches the lamp on, a part of that potential 
energy is discharged into the bulb, which converts only 5 per cent of the total 
energy into visible light (the rest is dispersed as heat). The goal of the incan-
descent light bulb is to produce light, but the concrete transductive process 
generates light and heat, counteracting the material limitations of the tungsten 
filament and eventually destroying it by burning it. It is the modulable resist-
ance—the complete set of filaments, materials, sustainers, and gases inside 
the bulb—that changes, generates, and varies the actual rendering of energy as 
light. All those materials are not “electric current,” nor are they “light”; they are 
just the transducers, mediating between electricity and luminosity.
4. Passage (time and temporality)
A more general and broader definition of transduction is to be found in Simondon’s 
collected essays Sur la Technique (2014), where—in the context of discussing 
notions of technical progress—transduction is presented as “the passage from a 
constituted ensemble towards another one in the process of being constituted” 
(Simondon 2014, 452, my translation).5 What is striking in this definition is the 
fundamental inclusion of time and temporality as integral to the transductive 
operation. Transduction happens in time: it is a process, an operation with a 
temporal and energetic direction (even if not precisely determinable). And 
this temporal dimension unfolds from one point to the next, very close to one 
another, but not in a full continuum: “In this sense transduction is something 
transmitted little by little, something that propagates, eventually, in amplified 
form” (ibid., 452, my translation and emphasis). Simondon writes “de proche 
en proche,” translated here as “little by little” but meaning also “gradually,” 
“slowly,” “progressively,” or “step by step.” Simondon couldn’t be clearer about 
 5 This sentence was part of Simondon’s reply to a question posed by Anita Kéchickian in a 1981 interview, 
published in a reduced version in the journal Esprit (1983) and as “Sauver l’objet technique” in Simon-
don (2014, 447–54).
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the essential feature of transduction: namely, its processuality. This reflection 
lies at the heart of Simondon’s project: more important than discussing what 
things are is to consider how they come to be what they are, and what futures they 
entail. Every present, every here-and-now, every event—but also every material 
construction—is infinitely divided into past and future. 
These two first definitions of transduction—the intensive discharge of discrete 
units of potential energy, and the temporal passage from one state to another—
reveal the underlying presence of different kinds of tensions, of different fields 
of problematicity. On the one hand—energetically—not all the potential energy 
is actualised in the here-and-now of the event; there are always ample amounts 
of potential energy that remain possibilities, which, even though real (as possi-
bilities) are not concretised.6 On the other hand—temporally—not all the 
innumerable constituents of the pre-life of a thing or event can be actualised in 
their concretisations. The transductive process leads to ever-changing states that 
are, at the same time and without contradiction, more and less than their past 
or future potentials: less, because they cannot contain all virtual possibilities; 
more, because they generate new and not precisely foreseeable tensions, new 
potentials that require further processes towards equilibrium. If transduction 
involves a reduction of the potential(s) in the service of an ongoing actualisa-
tion, it also comprises a future increase of tensions (unpredictability), which 
will reinforce the field of the virtual. 
5. Energy (thermodynamics): potential, scales, 
entropy 
In contrast to classical theories of form such as the Gestalttheorie, which relates 
to stabilised forms, or the hylemorphic scheme, with its clearly distinguishable 
pair of form and matter, Simondon proposes a view of forms and matters that 
fundamentally includes the energetic dimension, fully loaded with transductions 
yet to take place. From the very first pages of his introduction to L’individuation 
(Simondon [1954–58] 2013), Simondon argues that the hylemorphic and the 
monist schemes fail to account for the energetic conditions of the constitution of 
form and matter themselves, which are inhabited by powerful energetic potentials 
and by shape-giving informational structures. A metastable system displays a 
complex balance between two major processes: degradation of energy (entropy) 
and generation of structural order (negentropy). In his consideration of indi-
viduation, both physic and psychic, Simondon regards being not as a substance, 
matter, or shape, but as a system in tension, oversaturated, something more than 
one single unity: “To think about individuation, one must consider Being not as 
a substance, or matter, or form, but as a system in tension, oversaturated, above 
the level of a unity, not constituted only in itself, and not satisfactorily grasped 
through the principle of the excluded third: the concrete being, or the whole 
 6 This is a point of contention that involves the notions of potential and real potential, which will be 
addressed in the next section. With his notion of potential, Simondon seems to exclude the Deleuzian 




being—that is, a pre-individual being—is a being that is more than one unity” 
(Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 25, my translation).
Simondon’s critique of modes of thought exclusively based upon stable 
forms of equilibrium, which impose being and exclude becoming, led him to a 
definition of metastability grounded upon three basic notions from thermo-
dynamics: (1) the potential energy of a system; (2) the orders of magnitude of a 
system (including intensive and extensive variables, and the modulation from 
micro- to macro-scales); and (3) the growth of entropy (energetic degradation 
of the system). It is upon this tripartite set of references that Simondon bases 
his exploration of the notions of preindividual, metastable system, oversaturation, 
processes of differentiation, and individuation. A form considered totally stable, or 
finished, corresponds to the highest possible level of negentropy, defining an 
immovable stratum. Opposed to this, in any given metastable system there 
are flows of oversaturated potential energies of diverse orders that, at some 
point (structural germ), produce an over-voltage of the system, from where the 
energy deteriorates (entropy) leading to processes of differentiation and indi-
viduation (negentropy). 
5.1. Potential energy 
In the conventional usage of the term in physics, potential energy refers to the 
possible or the virtual (in the traditional sense of not being real, or remaining as pure 
possibility). Often, Simondon refers to this usage, and David Scott (2014) pointedly 
described the divergence of this conception from the Deleuzian notion of the 
virtual (where the potential possibilities are real, despite remaining non-actual-
ised). Apparently, a crucial distinction between Simondon and Deleuze is implicit 
here, involving the concept of the virtual. On the one hand, “Simondon quite 
definitely rejects the notion of the virtual” (Scott 2014, 17);7 but, on the other, 
he introduces a crucial qualifier, namely the real potential, indicating that the 
potential “actually exists” (see Barthélémy 2012, 225). As Simondon writes: “The 
potential, conceived as potential energy, is real, because it expresses the reality of 
a metastable state, and its energetic situation” (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 554n8, 
as translated in Barthélémy 2012, 225). The real potential is fundamental for the 
definition of a metastable system: it is the potential that gives such a system the 
possibility of a becoming, the possibility of shifting phases from one state to the 
next. An individuation starts with an imbalance between potentials of energy, 
from which an individual emerges progressively, as the solution to a problem 
that is itself of a different nature. As Beistegui writes ([2005] 2012, 170): “An 
organism . . . is always ‘more’ than its organized and fully differentiated reality. 
This excess signals a virtual reality that can be observed at the embryonic stage.” 
 7 Scott continues: “The taking of form is the passage from real metastability to a stable state. But this 
operation, for Simondon, has nothing to do with the notion of virtuality, which he argues is composed 
by an imagined ideal state (‘Good Form’). In other words, completely opposite to Deleuze, who worries 
that one might confuse virtual and the possible [Deleuze 1994, 211–15], Simondon finds them to be 
synonymous” (Scott 2014, 17).
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5.2. Orders of magnitude (scales)
For Simondon any given portion of matter can only enter a process of new indi-
viduation if it is brought to a suitable energetic state. Against the hylemorphic 
scheme, which implies fixed forms and fixed matters, Simondon argues that “the 
coming-about of any entity equals the appearance of a metastable ‘phase of being,’ 
which constitutes its own, new ‘magnitude’” (Borum 2017, 99). The individuation 
process is thus based on singular events that establish a link between different 
orders of magnitude (today normally referred to as scales). For example, when DNA is 
transferred from one bacterium to another by a virus—a process in which, more 
generally, foreign DNA is introduced into another cell via a viral vector—the scale 
of the virus is passed to the scale of the bacterium, bringing the latter into a new 
form of individuation. Another example provided by Simondon ([1954–58] 2013) 
is the vegetative, which is presented as “an individual that puts in relation the 
order of the cosmic grandeur of sunlight—necessary for photosynthesis—and 
the molecular order of mineral salts that nourish the vegetative” (Barthélémy 
2012, 220). The crucial point is that Simondon was looking for the effects of the 
relation between orders of magnitude. For him, the individual is relation and 
not simply in relation to something external. The individual that enables these 
relations is actually defined by them; it is the relation between different orders 
of magnitude that make the individual what it is. Thus, any given individual can 
only emerge in intrinsic articulation with an associated milieu. No individual 
is autonomous. There is no autonomy. Everything is relation between diverse 
orders of magnitude: “There is individuation, because there is an exchange 
between the microphysical and the macrophysical level” (Simondon [1964] 1995, 
148, my translation).
5.3. Entropy
A metastable system displays a complex balance between two major processes: 
degradation of energy (entropy) and generation of structural order (negentropy). 
Even if, according to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy can only increase, 
most of the existing systems are ruled by negentropy and by information. As 
Beistegui (2012, 171) has put it: “A metastable system is a system that, whilst not 
contradicting the second law of thermodynamics, which stipulates that, in the 
long term, all differences of energy will be cancelled, harbours within itself a 
sufficient amount of energy—of differences of potential, in other words—to 
create order. . . . There is no form that presides over the organization of mat-
ter; there is simply a series of processes of in-formation through which matter 
organizes itself.”
To distance himself from recent developments in cybernetics and in informa-
tion theory, and from the debates about the notions of entropy and negentropy 
that involved Norbert Wiener and Claude E. Shannon, Simondon affirmed that 
“the differencing process can in no way be understood in quantitative terms, 
and is not susceptible to any kind of stable formalization” (Massumi et al. 2012, 
32). For Simondon, even if photosynthesis does coincide with the discharge of 
a measurable amount of energy, it crucially coincides with passing a threshold 
to reach a qualitatively new level of individuation. The qualitative threshold 
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is what most matters to Simondon. No doubt the system will degrade itself 
energetically, in the long run, but as long as the potential energy is not fully 
exhausted, information will counteract that dispersion, vibrantly opposing res 
intensa to res extensa. Traditional physics of substances and matter had ignored 
the problems posed by energetic distributions, focusing too much on res extensa 
(see Garelli 2013, 14). With thermodynamics, Simondon found a way to more 
adequately address the in-formation of events. An early draft of the intro-
duction to L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information reveals 
Simondon’s precise positioning within cybernetic debates of the day: “In order 
to define metastability, it is necessary to include the notion of information of a 
system . . . particularly the notion of information provided by modern physics 
and pure technology (information understood as negentropy), as well as the 
notion of potential energy, which gains a more precise meaning when linked 
to the notion of negentropy” (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 26n3, my translation).
Along the same lines, on the occasion of a public lecture at the French 
Philosophical Society (27 February 1960), Simondon offered a complete defin-
ition of transduction, including the irreversibility of information at its very core. 
Once the potential energy starts being liberated, it appears as a new structure, 
“which is like a solution to the problem; from that moment, information is no 
longer reversible: information is the organiser of direction that arises a short dis-
tance from the structural germ and that conquers the field” (Simondon [1954–
58] 2013, 538, my translation and emphasis). Entropy and negentropy define 
the fundamental coordinates of movement and directionality of the transduct-
ive operation. 
6. Information theory: structural germs and 
singularities (structuration) 
The affirmation of the complex processes of differentiation/individuation 
described so far raises the question of knowing what causes, what initiates, what 
sets them in motion. A totally stable system no longer has any internal motion; it 
is a stratum with the highest level of negentropy. At the other extreme, a totally 
unstable, chaotic system is without the capability for structure, never concretising 
all its potentials. But what causes a metastable system to start the transductive 
process? Simondon is extremely precise in identifying the initiator of this pro-
cess: it is what he calls a structural germ (see Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 77–84). 
Drawing on scientific studies of crystallisation, Simondon offers the example 
of allotropic crystals (crystals that exist in two or more different forms, though 
in the same physical state) in order to present transduction as “the name given 
to the ongoing actualization or structuring of the potentials of a metastable 
system whose constitutive, heterogeneous orders have been brought into com-
munication by a singularity functioning as a ‘structural germ’” (Bowden 2012, 
141).8 This germ is the point of departure for the whole subsequent transductive 
 
 8 Bowden’s synthetic formulation is based on Simondon ([1954–58] 2013, 78–82).
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process. It contains a singularity (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 77); and this point 
has the capacity to break the metastable equilibrium of the system, enabling 
the propagation of a transformation that runs from point to point between the 
already transformed parts and those yet to be transformed. Every future point 
is, therefore, a sort of extension or prolongation of the initial germ with its intrin-
sic singularity. As Simondon puts it: “the individual results from a process of 
amplification that is triggered by a singularity within a hylomorphic situation, 
and it [the individual] prolongs this singularity” (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 82, 
my translation). 
Recapitulating: there is a starting germ, which contains a singularity. This 
singularity is then prolonged throughout time—that is, the singularity is set in 
motion for a certain length of time, defining a surface of intensities. The sin-
gularity cannot be described in itself, or abstractly, as Simondon consistently 
avoids any kind of essence. A singularity has only a local definition, given under 
precise conditions; and these conditions are exactly those that enable (or are 
enabled by) the rupture of the metastable equilibrium. The main point is that 
the starting germ is not a form or matter, but a structural constitutive potential; 
that is, it carries some sort of information, which sets the basic conditions for an 
event to happen, information that often comes from an external system (as, for 
example, the transfer of DNA from one bacterium to another described above). 
As Simondon writes: “The effective existence of an individuated being results 
from two conditions that are independent of one another and occur simultan-
eously: an energetic and material condition derived from the actual state of 
a system, and an ‘evental’ [from “event”] condition that most often includes 
a relation to other series of events, coming from other systems” (Simondon 
[1954–58] 2013, 80, my translation). 
This quotation contains yet another crucial component of the transductive 
process. A metastable system is not only non-stable but also non-Unitarian. It 
is not One; there are always multiple series of events going through it. It is a sys-
tem capable of expansion, and it is necessarily obliged to expand out of itself 
to interact with other systems. It is neither independent nor autonomous. It 
cannot survive or subsist in exclusive relation to itself. It is a contained system: 
tense, oversaturated, superposed over itself, heterogeneous with itself. Being 
cannot be reduced to what it is; being is at the same time structure and energy 
(see Simondon [1954–58] 1989, 284), sign and potency, longitude and latitude.
The structural germ functions therefore as a component in an assemblage 
that sets it in motion, that dramatises it. The distinction between the virtual and 
the actual is not unilateral, nor is it ontologically black-boxed. The distinction 
is processual and differential, making of the “a priori and the a posteriori . . . a 
product of individuating processes rather than their condition” (Toscano 2009, 
389). In this sense, individuation (with all its actualisations) can be thought of 
as dramatisation (in a Deleuzian sense): the sudden, unexpected, and effective 
formation and emergence of a percept. As Alberto Toscano (2009, 390) writes: 
“Simondon’s theorisation of pre-individual singularities remains formative.” 
The structural germ operates as the agitator, the excavator, or the explosive trig-
ger of a spatio-temporal metastable system. It opens up new spaces and times, 
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revealing not only unpredictable futures but also unsuspected pasts—things 
that had long been there but had never previously been seen or heard.
7. Haecceity: from haecceitas (Duns Scotus) to 
eccéité (Simondon) to heccéité (Deleuze and 
Guattari) to micro-haecceity
This dramatic opening of a new space–time of possibilities has strong resonances 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of haecceity, a concept that theorises the 
emergence of a singularity at any given scale and field—from molecular encounters, 
to geological clashes, landscapes, hours of the day, human thought, arts, and so 
on. Importantly, a haecceity refers not to a fully qualified space–time, but to an 
intensive spatio-temporal dynamism. As François Zourabichvili notes, “it does 
not combine two pre-existing space-times, rather it presides over their genesis. 
It is the putting-into-communication of heterogeneous dimensions of time from 
out of which space-times are derived” (Zourabichvili 2012, 128). Thus, a haecceity 
is a passage, a singular point in space–time that dramatises space–time itself, 
curving it, folding it, giving it transient form and temporal structure. 
In “Memories of a Haecceity” Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 260–65) appro-
priated and remade the medieval concept of haecceitas to suggest a mode 
of individuation that is not confused with that of a thing or a subject (see 
Sauvagnargues 2016, 65). In response to a clarification requested by the trans-
lators of the American edition of Dialogues (Deleuze and Parnet 1987), Deleuze 
stated that “Haecceitas is a term frequently used in the school of Duns Scotus, in 
order to designate the individuation of beings. [I use it] in a more special sense: 
in the sense of an individuation which is not that of an object, nor of a person, 
but rather of an event (wind, river, day or even hour of the day)” (Deleuze and 
Parnet 1987, 151n9). The difference from Duns Scotus’s usage is crucial and 
can only be perfectly understood in light of Simondon’s (apparent) misspell-
ing of hecceité as ecceité (without the h), which gives the term a modal (rather 
than essential) quality.9 In a famous footnote to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987, 540–41n33) explained precisely this crucial difference: 
“[Haecceity] is sometimes written ‘ecceity,’ deriving the word from ecce, ‘here 
is.’ This is an error, since Duns Scotus created the word and the concept from 
haec, ‘this thing.’ But it is a fruitful error because it suggests a mode of individua-
tion that is distinct from that of a thing or a subject” (my emphasis). And in the 
main text they explain further: “A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date 
have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is 
different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that 
they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or 
particles, capacities to affect and be affected” (ibid., 261).
 9 Whereas Duns Scotus’s haecceitas is “a non-qualitative property responsible for individuation and 
identity[,] . . . [which is] supposed to explain individuality” (Cross 2014, §1), Simondon’s eccéité is modal, 
pointing to a never-finished process of emergence or appearance (“here is”). But Simondon keeps Duns 
Scotus’s focus on the “thisness” (a haecceitas, from the Latin haec, meaning “this”) as opposed to a “what-
ness” (a quidditas, from the Latin quid, meaning “what”) (see Cross 2014, §1). For a detailed introduction 
to Duns Scotus’s theory of individuation, see Sondag ([1992] 2005).
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When appropriating this terminology for the performing arts (music, dance, 
theatre, or performance), and particularly when speaking of a particular type of 
haecceities that are set in motion through highly informed structural germs, I pro-
pose the introduction of the notion of micro-haecceity, a temporal radicalisation 
of the concept, collapsing it into an infinitesimal fraction of a second, into the 
radical here-and-now of the evolving performance. Such radical micro-haec-
ceities would be characterised by intensive negentropic properties, by an 
almost instantaneous time of existence, and by following one after the other at 
very high speed. These kinds of haecceities do not suggest (stable) contempla-
tion, but rather rash and metastable actions. Deleuze’s characteristic example of 
haecceity—Lorca’s “at five in the afternoon” (see Lorca 1997, 263, 265)—has a 
scenic quality: it evokes a particular landscape, time of the day, temperature, 
sunlight, inner memories, and so on. It implies that a certain amount of time (a 
thickness of the present) is required for it to be fully apprehended. Almost all 
the examples of haecceity advanced by Deleuze and Guattari describe situa-
tions of suspended temporality within long durations of chronometric physical 
time. But the young pianist performing Schumann’s Kreisleriana—my starting 
example—is navigating high-speed successions of prolonged singularities. There 
is no time for contemplation; things must happen in the unavoidable urgency 
and imperative sequentially of the here-and-now. Micro-haecceities are high-
energy-loaded and high-speed-moving singularities that carry a force of poten-
tial from one position to the next. They make up the visible or audible part 
of artistic transductive processes. In their functioning as radical becoming 
they never appear as stable beings, remaining an impulse of virtuality from one 
actualisation to the next. If one thinks, or does, or experiences artistic perform-
ances with these operations in mind, the Deleuzian notion of capture of forces 
becomes more graspable than ever: the virtual becomes actual in order to be 
instantly dissolved into the virtual again. The pianist playing Schumann per-
fectly exemplifies such a capture: he or she is not merely reproducing a strati-
fied, pre-existing entity, but operating a capture of forces (from the virtual) that 
produces a new individuation (actual) as a highly intensive becoming, which 
immediately—as soon as it is generated—points forward to other virtual pre- 
and after-individualities. Micro-haecceities reveal, therefore, not so much the 
non-deterministic pasts of their individuated constitutive forces and energies, 
as their unpredictable futures. By so doing, micro-haecceities reveal that the 
making of art is a fundamentally problematic field—generating and enhancing 
heterogeneous tensions that produce the conditions of their own (transient) 
resolutions. Thus, micro-haecceities, like Deleuzian haecceities, thematise 
the event: the emergence of a singularity and the passage from one milieu to 
another. 
8. Topology: in-formation
With the definitions of transduction exposed so far, I have presented spatio-temporal 
energetic processes ranging from very simple electric discharges (the incandes-
cent light bulb) to highly complex thermodynamic operations, including a link 
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to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of haecceity. Thus, we have mainly remained 
within the realm of physical individuation, which corresponds, roughly, to one 
third of Simondon’s overall project. In fact, Simondon proposed other ways of 
thinking transduction, including the individuation of biological organisms, 
and of psychic and collective agencies and assemblages. It is not possible to 
cover all those aspects here, but we shall mention one further essential aspect 
of transduction, namely its topological implications. As Jacques Garelli wrote in 
the introduction to L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information: 
“Transduction, intimately linked to the discharge of the oversaturated potential 
energy of a metastable system, will emerge as the shaping of a form and, thus, 
in a double sense—topological and noetic—as in-formation” (Garelli 2013, 15, my 
translation and emphasis).
In the process of unfolding itself throughout time the transductive operation 
gives shape to a surface. Because this surface did not exist before the trans-
ductive operation itself, and because it came into existence only through the 
concrete, here-and-now inscriptions of the transductive process, one can label 
it as a surface of immanence, as opposed to any transcendental surface that 
would exist in advance (or at least as an idea of surface).10 Within the horizon 
of possibilities defined by their associated milieu and their multiple orders 
of magnitude, transductive processes generate a specific space that can be 
mapped without referring to external systems of coordinates. In parallel with 
the discharge of pre-individual potential energy, and with the interference 
between different scales, the transductive process in-forms a topological struc-
ture, generating a multi-dimensional shape. The information carried through 
the transductive movements is not to be conceived as the mere transmission of 
a coded message—perfectly sent by a sender to a receiver—but much more as 
a taking shape during the communication process itself. Information thus has 
two sides: a noetic side that carries the “structural germ,” and a topological side 
that renders this structural germ visible, audible, touchable, or perceptible in 
some other way. In its double function—noetic and topological—transduction 
integrates thought and becoming in one single dimension that is not external 
to its own terms. 
While deduction needs an external principle to solve a local problem in a given 
field, and while induction (by definition) makes generalisations by extracting the 
characteristics common to all terms in the field, transduction is the continuous 
creation of new dimensions within a system, establishing links and communi-
cation paths between its own disparate constitutive parts. Transduction engen-
ders shapes and textures. It is in this sense that one can say that transduction 
points to a new concept of space based upon multiplicities, manifolds, vectors, 
 10 Mathematically, this discussion is indebted to the work of Carl Friedrich Gauss on curved sur-
faces. Gauss started by studying curved two-dimensional surfaces using the old Cartesian meth-
od, that is to say, by embedding the two-dimensional surface in a three-dimensional space with 
its set of axes. But later, as Manuel DeLanda writes: “Gauss realized that the calculus, focusing 
as it does on infinitesimal points on the surface itself (that is, operating entirely with local infor-
mation), allowed the study of the surface without any reference to a global embedding space. . . . ‘Gauss 
advanced the totally new concept that a surface is a space in itself ’” (DeLanda 2002, 12, emphasis 
original, incorporating quotation from Kline 1972, 882, DeLanda’s emphasis). 
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and potentialities. It is not a matter of curves in a flat space, but of the curvature 
of the space itself. In the place of a transcendental space of reference—with 
its system of coordinates and its external/extensive properties—transduction 
creates a Riemannian surface, an immanent space with intensive, internal, and 
intrinsic properties. The structural germ carries a powerful vector of transport, 
whose precise speed and direction are the relentless agents responsible for 
the unfolding form and structure. Where the hylemorphic scheme imposes a 
form on matter within a metric Euclidean space of coordinates, Simondon’s 
transductive perspective enables multiplicities and differential manifolds to 
emerge within self-defined space-surfaces. Vectors and functions replace the 
traditional X–Y–Z system of coordinates. As Manuel DeLanda puts it, “while 
the points in a metric space are defined by a set X, Y, and Z values, presuppos-
ing a set of Cartesian coordinates and a transcendent global space in which the 
space being studied is inscribed, a differential manifold is a field of rapidities 
and slownesses, the rapidity or slowness with which curvature changes at each 
point” (DeLanda 2012, 227).
Topology becomes more relevant than geometry: the latter concerns meas-
urements and locations in an external system of reference, while the former 
disregards measurement and deals only with the structure of space qua space. 
Figures and shapes are not placed in space; they constitute spaces in/of their 
own. As Arkady Plotnitsky argues (2009, 203), “this view radically transforms 
our philosophy of space and matter, and of their relationships, by leading to 
a horizontal rather than vertical (hierarchical) science of space as a ‘typology 
and topology of manifolds’, which Deleuze and Guattari associate with the end 
of dialectic and extend to spaces that are philosophical, aesthetic, cultural, or 
political.” 
Such can be the powerful consequences of a topological understanding of 
transduction, leading to a non-Euclidean mode of thought—enabling indi-
viduations to become space-surfaces of potentially infinite dimensions, and 
liberating relationships from any form of transcendental determination. The 
notion of a topological space of possibilities is what allowed Deleuze to over-
come and replace the old dichotomy—which had dominated philosophy from 
Aristotle to Kant and Hegel—between the general and the particular, implying 
hierarchical (vertical) distributions of forms and matter. Deleuze replaces the 
general with a topological space of possibilities, a topological diagram that can 
be folded into another form without losing its identity (what Deleuze calls 
universal singularities). And, on the other side, the particular is considered only 
as actual populations of things (individual singularities).11 Beyond a system of 
categories, Deleuze’s actual world is populated only by such individual singu-
larities as result from transductive processes of individuation. The new topo-
logical spaces and their defining planes of reference or composition are deeply 
immanent and opposed to geometrical planes of transcendence, which always 
 11 For a thorough analysis and description of Deleuze’s notions of universal singularities and individ-




come from above, as if designed “in the mind of god . . . [and involving the] for-
mation of subjects” (Deleuze 1988, 128). In contrast, a plane of immanence has 
no supplementary dimension. Such a plane “will be perceived [only] with that 
which it makes perceptible to us, as we proceed” (ibid.). From a topological 
point of view, a plane of immanence and a plane of transcendence are funda-
mentally different—“we do not live or think or write in the same way on both 
[planes]” (ibid.). 
9. Corporeality: somatic transduction 
A further extension of the concept of transduction has been proposed by Brian 
Massumi, who, focusing on the human body, defined it as a “transducer of the 
virtual”: “In sensation the thinking-feeling body is operating as a transducer. If 
sensation is the analog processing by body-matter of ongoing transformative 
forces, then foremost among them are forces of appearing as such: of coming 
into being, registering as becoming. The body, sensor of change, is a transducer 
of the virtual” (Massumi 2002, 135). 
It follows from this that the body—every single human body—is not only the 
individuated ongoing result of transductive process but also itself a transducer; 
it is itself part of diverse transductive chains of events. The human body is no 
longer the privileged place of an idealised subjective and uncorrupted I, but 
a conglomerate of molecules thorough which impersonal and pre-individual 
singularities have the chance to become actualised in specific events such as 
cell fecundation, embryonic stage, fluid- and organ-formation, nervous system, 
brain, heart, psychic and collective modes of individuation, noetic, cultural 
and artistic expressions, and so forth. This wide-ranging body is pre-human, 
human, non-human, and posthuman, all at the same time, through different 
processes of modulation and transduction. The crucial point is the death of 
the subject, which allows the body to embrace energetic processes that enable 
unpredictable events to happen: no one will ever know what a body can do—
especially because this does not depend on any idealised will of the subject. 
In music, whether in composing or performing, the main interface or trans-
ducer between the innumerable incompatible potentials and their effective, 
acoustic concretisation is precisely the human body: a body radically ener-
gised, activated by desire production, set in motion by diverse simultaneous 
impulses, attentively listening to its own ongoing manifestations, loving what 
it does, hating what it does, and continuing in the uncertainty of the future. It 
is a transducer within a metastable system, but it is itself another metastable 
system. With the human body we enter a realm of transducers of transducers, 
something like an ensemble of transducers. A performer’s body is “a body that 
beats” (Barthes 1985, 299), an excited body just about to explode, just about 
to initiate an energetic discharge from the uncontainable tensions of music 
and somatic intensities to newly individuated tensions and sensations. Instead 
of a logic of sense (with clear forms and matters), the artist’s body operates as 
a transducer within a logic of sensation (immersed in intensive, transductive 
processes).
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The body that notates a score, vibrates its vocal cords, plays an instrument, 
or conducts an orchestra is a complex organism, inhabited by diverse layers 
of information, which modulate and shape the actual rendering of musical 
events. As every musician knows, “no one knows what a body can do”; but 
beyond this Spinozan claim, one can affirm with Deleuze (1988, 124–25) that 
“no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long affair 
of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence—a Spinozan wisdom that 
implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency.” It is the 
construction of such planes of composition, of unprecedented assemblages of 
forces and intensities, that moves the desiring body in the first place. Linguistic 
metaphors, structural analysis, or semiological studies cannot explain or inter-
pret such productions of desire. Signs, forms, and forces are not to be “inter-
preted,” but transduced and reassembled in a vital relation that allows the artist 
to become an experimenter, or, as Anne Sauvagnargues beautifully expressed 
it, an operator of forces: “A grouping of forces, an interpretation of forces, says 
Nietzsche; in other words, a mode of affection. A sign is a force as long as it 
is not interpreted, but it is felt in a living relation that allows the artist to be 
an experimenter, an operator of forces. This is where the invention of new forms 
takes place, which binds art to the exploration of margins about which it posits 
an intensive theory” (Sauvagnargues 2013, 33, my emphasis).
If we think with Simondon and use his terminology, such forces are to be 
captured from the tendentially inexhaustible reservoir of potential energy and 
from the negentropic loaded information of the structural germs. Once set in 
motion, the capture of forces prolongs itself, originating specific individuations 
of (new) forces and textures. More than for any other kind of individual, the 
human body reflects what Simondon expressed in general terms about univer-
sal individuals: “The individual, by its energetic conditions of existence, is not 
only inside its own limits; it constitutes itself at the limit of itself and exists at the limit 
of itself; it comes out of a singularity” (Simondon [1964] 1995, 60, my translation 
and emphasis). This sentence comes close to Spinoza’s famous definition from 
his Ethics: “By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself ” (Ethics I, 3, as translated in Spinoza 2002, 217; Per substantiam intelligo 
id, quod in se est et per se concipitur),12 an affirmation that had the potential to 
exclude transcendence from the realm of things.
10. Permanent transduction: being-in-the-world  and 
fluctuatio animi
The particular specificity of living organisms—that which differentiates them 
from purely technical objects—is that their transductive modes of individuation 
actually never stop (except with death, of course). While technical objects can 
cease their individuating processes, living organisms (for Simondon and Deleuze) 
 12 Reflecting on modes of performance of immanent expression, Arno Böhler (2014, 171) inspiringly inter-
preted this famous sentence by Spinoza as follows: “For Spinoza, substance does not exist in something 
else. It exists, rather, in itself such that it conceptualizes itself from within itself.”
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are individualities that simply do not cease their individuation: they are in a state 
of permanent transduction (see Borum 2017, 114n12). An example taken from brick 
manufacture shows how the transduction happens “when the heat from burning 
and the pressure from the mould cause the clay molecules to simultaneously take 
on a collective individuality, held together by potential energy” (ibid.). Once 
moulded, transduction finishes, and the brick stops being individuated; and if 
the internal resonance is incomplete, the brick will crack in the burning process, 
never achieving an individuated state. With living organisms transduction never 
stops, due to their fundamental and necessary metastability as a complex system 
inhabited by a permanent structural germ: their DNA. In addition, another 
dimension comes into play: living organisms not only emerge as a solution to 
or resolution of pre-individual tensions or of impersonal structural germs, they 
also evolve with and within processes of decision-making —processes whereby 
the resolution “is not a solution, but a decision” (Stiegler 2012, 187). Within somatic 
transductions there is a special type of structural germ, which is motivated by decision 
and proactive action in the midst of doubt and uncertainty. Simondon referred to 
it as fluctuatio animi, a term of obviously Spinozan lineage: “This condition of the 
mind arising from two conflicting emotions is called ‘vacillation,’ [Lat. fluctuatio 
animi] which is therefore related to emotion as doubt is related to imagination, 
and there is no difference between vacillation and doubt except in respect of 
intensity” (Ethics III, Prop. XVII, Scholium, as translated in Spinoza 2002, 288).
Simondon invokes this Spinozan notion in relation to the innumerable ways 
of being-in-the-world. The notion of adaptation gains an important weight as a 
qualifier of living forms of individuation: “adaptation is a permanent ontogen-
esis” (Simondon [1954–58] 2013, 211, my translation). Being in a world that does 
not coincide with itself, which can only be but apprehended through a fun-
damental disparation, living organisms have to take decisions to survive, acting 
resolutely in the midst of chaos and uncertainty. Such actions do not happen on 
one single level or field of potentialities, but on many different levels and scales 
at the same time. As Simondon writes: “The fluctuatio animi that precedes any 
resolute action is not a hesitation between different objects or different paths, 
but rather between a changing collection of incompatible sets, nearly identi-
cal but still disparate. Before acting, the subject is suspended between diverse 
worlds, diverse orders; his action is a discovery of the meaning of this funda-
mental disparity, of the reason why the particles of every set join together in a 
richer, more far-reaching set, gaining a new dimension” (Simondon [1954–58] 
2013, 210, my translation).
11. Conclusion 
This chapter was conceived as a contribution to the establishment of a founda-
tional ground for my ongoing theoretical and artistic work towards a dynamic 
theory of musical works and their performance. Gilbert Simondon’s concept of 
transduction plays a major role in this theory, offering a varied set of operational 
strategies, and suggesting new modes of conceptualising and doing musical 
performances (including composition). Crucially, it enables music studies to 
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move beyond not only formalist, analytical, historiographic, organological, 
or philological approaches (which deal with res extensa), but also sociological, 
psychological, and subjectivity-based investigations (that are concerned with 
a human, all too human “I”). With transduction the energetic dimension and 
the non-human parts of intensive musical processes gain visibility and can be 
addressed. To compose or to perform a musical work is to enter transductive 
processes; and the human body implicated in such activities functions some-
times as a transducer and at other times as the individuated entity, both within 
the larger event of ongoing music-making.
Within Simondon’s overall project to articulate a theory of individuation for 
physical matter, biological organisms, psychic and collective agencies, tech-
nology, and the arts, the latter gain a privileged position. Pre-individual clouds 
of potentiality are present in all modes of individuation, but the artistic ones 
make them experienceable, or at least almost experienceable. Individuation 
results from a potentially infinite set of topological possibilities that emerge 
in the finite actual world as an event; at the same time, this event disrupts 
the here-and-now of the empirical present, projecting it into new fields of 
future, infinite, topological singularities. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 197) 
proposed: “art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite: it lays out 
a plane of composition that, in turn, through the action of aesthetic figures, 
bears monuments or composite sensations.”
Simondon’s notion of transduction allows us to think of the plane of artistic 
creation as the material individuation of complex assemblages of forces, rather 
than as a deterministic or aleatoric stratification of the monist and hylemorphic 
conceptions. Between art and philosophy, “the role of art turns out to be crucial 
and paradoxical: it is from art, in so far as it is real experience, that philosophy 
awaits theoretical renewal, but this renewal is not produced conceptually: it is 
elaborated on the plane of artistic work” (Sauvagnargues 2016, 68). It is from 
here that I started, as a performer, and it is from here that I wish to continue: 
from the production of artistic works and events, and continuing through art-
istic means the intensive discourse developed in this essay. Even if this chapter 
is simply a transient individuation within a longer transductive process, it is a 
crucial moment, reinforcing the profound and necessary implications of mak-
ing research in, through, and for artistic practice. 
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1. The somatheme 
In 1975, in “Rasch”—an essay on Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana—Roland 
Barthes invented a new concept: the somatheme (somatème), which is presented 
in the plural (somathemes) and defined as “the figures of the body . . . , whose texture 
forms musical signifying” (Barthes 1985f, 307). “Rasch” was written for a collective 
volume dedicated to the French structural linguist Émile Benveniste (1902–76), a 
volume that included essays by other well-known linguists and semiologists of the 
day, such as Roman Jakobson, Julia Kristeva, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Nicolas Ruwet, 
and Tzvetan Todorov. Barthes’s contribution is the only one relating to music; in 
it, Barthes argues for a “second semiology, that of the body in a state of music” 
(ibid., 312). Referring to Émile Benveniste’s famous book Problèmes de linguistique 
générale (1974), Barthes particularly focused on the opposition presented there 
between two realms: the semiotic (articulated signs, each of which has a precise 
meaning), and the semantic (an order of discourse no unit of which signifies in 
itself, although the ensemble is given a capacity for signifying). Benveniste had 
posited that music belongs to semantics and not to semiotics, “since sounds are 
not signs (no sound, in itself, has meaning)” (Barthes 1985f, 311)—music here 
being defined as a language with a syntax but no semiotics. To that specific kind 
of (musical) signifying, Barthes added a radically new dimension, one steeped in 
desire (“pénétrée de désir”). It is this presence and continuous activity of desire 
and of desire production that enables a particular modality of signifying, “which 
destroys itself as it develops” (ibid., 312). This is the domain of Barthes’s second 
semiology: “let the first semiology manage, if it can, with the system of notes, 
scales, tones, chords, and rhythms; what we want to perceive and to follow is the 
effervescence of the beats [the second semiology]” (ibid.). The first semiology 
aims to understand structures and propositions (intelligibility), the second to 
perceive and follow forces and intensities (drives and desire).
 * This chapter is the twenty-sixth instantiation of RaschX, a series of artistic research outputs that explores 
Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana op. 16 (1838, 1850), and Roland Barthes’s essays on music written 
between 1970 and 1979, particularly those focused on Schumann. In ever-changing configurations, 
these materials are reworked making use of different spaces of representation, including performances, 




It is within this theoretical framework, and through a close reading of 
selected passages from Schumann’s Kreisleriana, that Roland Barthes identifies 
figures of the body, the somathemes, those musical figures that go beyond musical 
semiology and impose pulsional corporeal drives as the main referent for sig-
nifying. A “transgression” that “makes music a madness: not only Schumann’s 
music, but all music” (Barthes 1985f, 308).
“Rasch” is written in a poetic, passionate, and sexualised style that perfectly 
captures the madness of music-making as defined by the uncontrolled, uncon-
scious drives of its somathemes. As François Noudelmann (2012, 135) observed, 
Barthes’s essay engages with “a whole complex of sensations, passions, and sex-
uality,” aiming at the investigation of “the sexual power of the desire that nim-
bly leads both pianist and listener toward an unknown, disseminated jouissance” 
(ibid., 138; on jouissance see Lacan 1999, 64–77; Fink 2002). “Rasch” is one of the 
writings in which Barthes actively wants to escape from learned discourses, pri-
marily from the imperialism of semiology, a recent discipline of which he had 
become one of the heralds. In music, Barthes did not trust the search for struc-
tural codes (analysis), nor all those interminable accounts and commentaries so 
characteristic of musicological studies. Bypassing any structural decrypting of 
music, Barthes—himself an amateur pianist—became alert and vigilant to the 
transformations of his own body while playing. “Rather than being attracted 
to the structures of music, he gave himself over to passions without language 
when playing the piano. He sought the imaginary excess of the body more than 
any measurement of sound-spaces” (Noudelmann 2012, 142).
The concept of the somatheme seems to have evolved from (at least) three 
different fields: (1) from Barthes himself, the amateur pianist who played 
Kreisleriana at home and was persistently disappointed by “professional” ren-
derings of it in concert or in recordings; (2) from the overarching context of 
mid-1970s French linguistics, semiology, and semiotics—particularly in rela-
tion to the work of Julia Kristeva and her notions of chora, genotext, and pheno-
text; and (3) from early 1970s developments in psychoanalysis, especially related 
to Jacques Lacan’s mathemes, the fundamental breaks of Lacanian algebra.
The remainder of this chapter will briefly address these three influences, 
first presenting Roland Barthes at the piano, then Julia Kristeva’s impact on 
the musical thought of Barthes, and finally the relation of Barthes’s concept of 
the somatheme to Jacques Lacan’s mathemes and graphs of desire. Additionally, 
the specific fourteen somathemes that Barthes proposed in “Rasch” will be 
presented in an intermezzo.
2. Roland Barthes at the piano: musica practica
Roland Barthes was an amateur pianist who played the piano daily and who 
enjoyed sight-reading, freely wandering from one piece to the next. He did not 
memorise the music, nor did he play it in constant tempo; rather, he followed his 
limited playing ability. On the other hand, he was musicologically well informed 
and highly acquainted with the main pianistic repertoire. Piano playing accom-
panied him all his life, and it seems that it had an important function, enabling a 
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particular openness to sonic and imaginary corporealities that exist before and 
after the production of articulated meaning. In François Noudelmann’s (2012) 
view, “piano playing conjoins suspension and engagement. A refuge, a step to the 
side, an exclusive passion, the musical life of the body” (152). “Piano playing offered 
him [Barthes] a way out of codes, discourses, doxa, and the contemporary” (153). 
A fundamental distinction between the activities of listening to music and of 
(corporeally) playing it became increasingly relevant to Barthes, culminating 
in his famous lines from 1970 (in “Musica Practica”): “There are two musics (or 
so I’ve always thought): one you listen to, one you play. They are two entirely 
different arts, each with its own history, sociology, aesthetics, erotics: the same 
composer can be minor when listened to, enormous when played . . . —take 
Schumann” (Barthes 1985d, 261).
Even if the composer explicitly mentioned in this passage is Robert Schumann, 
the short essay where the passage appears was originally published in a special 
issue of the literary journal L’Arc (40, 1970) fully dedicated to Beethoven. In the 
essay, Barthes develops a notion of a certain mode of the inaudible inside the 
very fabric of the audible: “there is something inaudible in Beethoven’s music 
(for which audition is not the exact mode)” (Barthes 1985d, 264). The exact mode 
would be informed and defined by a “sensuous intelligibility” (264), an intelli-
gibility somehow perceptible in, through, and to the senses. Such a perception 
(Baumgarten’s sensuous knowledge?), would have been inconceivable “in terms of 
the old [pre-Kantian] aesthetics” (265). According to Barthes, it was Beethoven 
who inaugurated a new mode of musical intelligibility—one no longer based 
upon execution or hearing but on reading. In this mode, the body—in front of a 
keyboard, in front of a music stand—proposes, leads, coordinates: “the body 
itself must transcribe what it reads: it fabricates sound and sense: it is the scrip-
tor, not the receiver; the decoder” (261). This means that there is a fundamen-
tally practical approach to music, dependent not so much on an auditive as on 
a manual activity. At the same time, this is precisely what permits a new type of 
performer, “who can displace, regroup, combine, dispose, in a word [who] can 
structure” (265). To read Beethoven in this way, according to Barthes, consists of 
“traversing its writing by a new inscription . . . to operate his music, to lure it . . . 
into an unknown praxis” (265).
This is the basic idea and rationale of a musica practica. With it, Barthes started 
a path suggesting a phenomenology of touch at the piano, or of the grain of the voice. 
This phenomenology is informed—in the first place—by Barthes’s specular 
relation to his own playing body. He particularly recognises the power of the 
musics of Beethoven or Schumann when he himself plays them: “Schumann 
lets his music be fully heard only by someone who plays it. . . . I have always been 
struck by this paradox: that a certain piece of Schumann’s delighted me when I 
played it (approximately), and rather disappointed me when I heard it on rec-
ords: then it seemed mysteriously impoverished, incomplete” (Barthes 1985c, 
294–95). For Barthes, music had to pass through the body in order to operate 
and to be operated by individual pulsions and drives: “Schumann’s music goes 
much farther than the ear; it goes into the body, into the muscles by the beats 
of its rhythm, and somehow into the viscera by the voluptuous pleasure of its 
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melos: as if on each occasion the piece was written only for one person, the one 
who plays it; the true Schumannian pianist—c’ést moi” (ibid., 295).
Further developed in short essays of fragmentary argumentation, such as 
“The Grain of the Voice” (1972 [see Barthes 1985a]), “Rasch” (1975 [see Barthes 
1985f ]), “Music, Voice, Language” (1977 [see Barthes 1985e]), and “Loving 
Schumann” (1979 [see Barthes 1985c]), this quasi-phenomenology of the 
touch, involves a continuous move between semiology and semiotics, between 
propositional language and pulsional drive, between signifier and signifying, 
between code and jouissance, between the subject of science and the subject of 
desire. Beyond the neutrality of musical language, with its codes, systems, and 
articulated rules, Barthes affirms in relation to the voice of Charles Panzéra 
that the singer’s voice was animated by “a quasi-metallic strength of desire: it 
is a ‘raised’ voice—aufgeregt (a Schumannian word)—or even better: an erected 
voice—a voice which gets an erection” (Barthes 1985e, 283). Such allusions to 
sexualised modes of listening and playing are not infrequent in Barthes’s essays 
on music, an aspect that has largely been ignored by those criticising the essays’ 
poor musical analytical depth. Barthes’s crucial point is, precisely, to move 
beyond the wise language of pitches, rhythms, harmony, phrasing, and formal 
construction, in order to expose a more essential beating body, which manifests 
itself through implosions and explosions of forces, different speeds, accelera-
tions, and curvatures. Barthes was looking for these intensive qualities, princi-
pally within his own body, by means of inwardness, as if there were an outside 
to the inside. According to François Noudelmann (2012, 99), “Barthes’s move-
ment toward theoretical generality develops through the personal description 
of his tastes, his sensitivity, indeed his sexuality, all of which are linked to the 
piano. Besides listening to and reading music, there is also the inner playing of 
music, which carries with it a sensual understanding of the music. The piano 
player’s ears and eyes cannot overshadow his hands or fingers; through them 
his body expresses and constructs the music.”
Barthes’s essays on music do not form a philosophical aesthetics or a philoso-
phy of music, nor are they totally coherent. They extend Barthes’s embodied 
experience of music into more speculative discourses, crucially animated by his 
vast knowledge of semiology and psychoanalysis. A famous semiologist him-
self, as well as an attentive reader of Lacan, Barthes’s discourse on music comes 
close to Julia Kristeva’s notion of semanalysis, a complex merging of linguistics 
and psychoanalysis, a cross-disciplinary approach that launched the bases for an 
important renewal of semiotics. When Félix Guattari, in L’inconscient machinique 
(1979 [see Guattari 2011]), insisted upon, and even reinforced the distinction 
between semiology and semiotics, he explicitly associated Barthes (negatively) 
with the former and Charles Sanders Pierce with the latter. Guattari’s distinc-
tion between these supposedly opposed perspectives is as follows: semiology is 
understood as “a trans-linguistic discipline that examines sign systems in con-
nection with the laws of language (Roland Barthes’ perspective); and ‘semiot-
ics’ as a discipline that proposes to study sign systems according to a method 
which does not depend on linguistics (Charles Sanders Pierce’s perspective)” 
(Guattari 2011, 22). Guattari’s project was to escape from language and from 
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interpretative components in favour of symbolic (intensive) semiotics, and 
diagrammatic transformations “concerning asignifying semiotics that pro-
ceed through a deterritorialization relative both to the formalism of content 
and expression” (ibid., 20). On the one hand, this clear-cut division between 
semiology and semiotics was contested by the International Association of 
Semiotics (see ibid., 22); on the other hand, one can argue that Barthes’s texts 
on music precisely try to address the perspective advocated by Guattari, namely 
the study of particular musical figures that escape the laws of language and 
linguistics.
In fact, what Barthes thoroughly explores in “Rasch” (Barthes 1985f) is the 
central idea that beyond the first text—generated in the wise language of pitches, 
rhythms, harmony, phrasing, and formal construction—there is a more essen-
tial beating body producing its own figures (somathemes) that directly communi-
cate a second text. Barthes sometimes calls these two different layers first semiology 
and second semiology. This second semiology reveals the emergence of desire, the 
production of new agencies of musical signifying (forces, energy, power) that 
are situated both before and beyond linguistically determinable signification 
(analysis, harmony, themes, cells, phrases). In his definition of the somathemes, 
Barthes implicitly criticises semiology:
Such are the figures of the body (the “somathemes”), whose texture forms musical 
signifying (hence, no more grammar, no more musical semiology: issuing from 
professional analysis—identification and arrangement of “themes,” “cells,” 
“phrases”—it risks bypassing the body) . . . . These figures of the body, which are 
musical figures, I do not always manage to name. For this operation requires a 
metaphorical power (how would I utter my body except in images?), and this power 
can occasionally fail me: “it” stirs in me, but I do not find the right metaphor. 
(Barthes 1985f, 307)
The kind of listening to which Barthes refers is not the advent of a signified, of 
an object of recognition or deciphering. No, it is a dispersion, what he poetically 
called the “shimmering of signifiers,” “ceaselessly restored to a listening which 
ceaselessly produces new ones from them without ever arresting their mean-
ing: this phenomenon of shimmering is called signifying . . . , as distinct from 
signification” (Barthes 1985b, 259). Signification is grounded on deciphering, on 
recognition of patterns, themes, structures, on the identification of and obei-
sance to codes. Signifying requires listening to each sound one after the other, 
attentively, radically; it grants access to all forms of polysemy, of overdetermin-
ation, of superimposition, disintegrating the law that prescribes direct, unique 
listening. Signification and signifying: these are the two Barthesian words for the 
signifier and for the pulsional drives and desire. They must be understood in the 
contexts of linguistics and psychoanalysis.
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3. The impact of Julia Kristeva: phenotext and 
genotext
The epigraph to “Rasch” stems from Diderot’s imaginary philosophical conver-
sation Le neveu de Rameau (1762–64), which contains a mysterious Latin quotation 
that Diderot is supposed to have “read somewhere”: “musices seminarium accentus” 
(Barthes 1985f, 299)—“accent is the seed-bed of music” (translation based on 
Atkinson 2009, 58). Without ever telling the reader, Diderot is quoting a fragment 
from Martianus Capella’s (c.420–c.490) De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (On the 
Marriage of Philology and Mercury): “And just as there is no utterance without a 
vowel, so, too, there is none without an accent. As some assert, accent is the soul 
of utterance and the seed-bed of music, because every melody is composed of 
elevation or depression of the voice. Thus accentus is called ‘ad-cantus’—‘for the 
purpose of song’—so to speak” (Martianus Capella, Book III, De arte grammatica, 
section 268, original and translation from Atkinson 2009, 58–59).1 
Voice is presented as having two necessary components: vowels, abstract 
signs that give it structure, and accents, the elevations and depressions of the 
intonation, the plastic modulators of voice. Fifteen centuries before the inven-
tion of semiotics, Martianus Capella’s text suggests the existence of two layers: 
a coded linguistic structure that is written down, and a potentially destabilising 
pulsional utterance. Remotely, in a different context, and through the medi-
ation of Barthes (via Diderot), Martianus’s sentence can be read in relation 
to twentieth-century semiology and semiotics, particularly to Julia Kristeva’s 
notions of phenotext and genotext, which were particularly relevant to Barthes’s 
writings on music. 
Barthes had applied Kristeva’s terms to music by 1972, in his famous essay 
“The Grain of the Voice” (see Barthes 1985a). According to Barthes, some 
singers only perform phenotext, understood as the cultural, the aesthetic, the 
stylistic; whereas other singers emphasise the genotext, that is, the entire body 
functioning as a vehicle for drive energies. In Barthes’s view, when listening 
to a song, one should hear the lungs expand and contract, the heartbeat, the 
muscles grow taut and relax, and so on (see Tarasti 2002, 23). Borrowing from 
Kristeva’s genotext and phenotext, Barthes created the concepts of genosong and 
phenosong. Genosong refers to the physiological aspect of singing, the corporeal 
vocal technique that engages the whole body, while phenosong relies on the pri-
macy of language, text, and civilisation, the sublimation of the physical level to 
that of high culture (see Tarasti 2002, 169).
The notions of phenotext and genotext are thoroughly presented and 
explained in La révolution du language poétique (1974), Julia Kristeva’s state doc-
torate defended in Paris in July 1973, for which Barthes was one of the exam-
iners. Inspired by the ideas of Lacan and the emphasis he gave to the role Freud 
had assigned to language, but crucially drawing upon Ferdinand de Saussure, 
Charles Sanders Peirce, and Émile Benveniste, Kristeva not only affirmed the 
 1 “. . . et ut nulla vox sine vocali est, ita sine accentu nulla. Et est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima 
vocis et seminarium musices, quod omnis modulatio ex fastigiis vocum gravitateque componitur, ideo-
que accentus quasi adcantus dictus est.”
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necessity of taking into account the speaking subject within a social and his-
torical field for a sound textual analysis, but also advocated a transdisciplinary 
discourse that could break down the barriers that isolated related disciplines 
from one another (see Roudiez 1984, 7). Between linguistics and psycho-
analysis—sharing notions and methodologies from both of them—Kristeva 
invented a new “discipline,” namely semanalysis. Analysing texts by Mallarmé 
and Lautréamont, Kristeva points to specific manifestations of the semiotic 
disposition, showing “how closely their writing practice parallels the logic of 
the unconscious, drive-ridden and dark as it might be; such a practice thus 
assumes the privilege of communicating regression and jouissance” (Roudiez 
1984, 3). Kristeva relegates aesthetic and formalistic considerations to the back-
ground, focusing on phonological rhythms and accents. What really matters to 
her is “to give an account of what went into a work, how it affects readers, and 
why” (ibid., 5). 
In very simple terms, Kristeva differentiates two layers of a text: the phenotext 
that we have in front of us (notated through universal signs and symbols) and 
the genotext, a non-linguistic, process-driven field of drive energies (from the 
unconscious) that precedes and originates the phenotext. Those threads that 
are spun by drives and are fabricated within the semiotic disposition define 
the genotext; those issuing from societal, cultural, or grammatical constraints 
constitute the phenotext. In Leon S. Roudiez’s (1984, 5–6) expressive formu-
lation: “A mathematical demonstration is perhaps a pure phenotext; there 
are writings by Antonin Artaud that come close to being unblended genotext, 
those, in Susan Sontag’s [1981, 25] words, ‘in which language becomes partly 
unintelligible; that is, an unmediated physical presence.’ For . . . it is often the 
physical, material aspect of language (certain combinations of letters, certain 
sounds—regardless of the meaning of words in which they occur) that signals 
the presence of a genotext.”
According to Kristeva (1984, 86), the genotext reveals transfers of drive 
energy that “can be detected in phonematic devices (such as the accumulation 
and repetition of phonemes or rhyme) and melodic devices (such as intonation 
and rhythm).” Crucially, the genotext organises a space in which “the subject 
will be generated as such by a process of facilitations and marks” (ibid.). Even 
if it can be retrieved in language (through its special markers), the genotext 
is not linguistic: “it is, rather, a process, which tends to articulate structures 
that are ephemeral . . . and non-signifying (devices that do not have a double 
articulation)” (ibid.). In this sense, the genotext can be seen as the underlying 
foundation of language. Phenotext denotes language that serves communi-
cation, which can be dissected formally and quantitatively; it follows rules of 
communication and presupposes both a subject of enunciation and an addres-
see. The genotext is based on bodily drives; it is a non-linguistic, process-driven 
field of drive energies from the unconscious; and it displays an asignificant 
background of language. Obviously, as it is the articulation between the pure 
bodily and the linguistic levels of communication, the genotext must be dis-
closed and exposed, and it becomes perceptible through the phenotext. The 
signifying process includes, therefore, both the genotext and the phenotext. 
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The phenotext relates primarily to fixed positions (as represented in generative 
grammars), while the genotext is a process, something in permanent becom-
ing: the movement of a serpent through leaves . . .
4. New musical concepts: geno-song, pheno-song, 
somatheme
It is difficult, if not impossible, to underestimate the impact of Kristeva’s ideas on 
Barthes’s musical thought. We know from the newspaper Le Monde that Barthes, 
who was a member of the committee examining Kristeva’s doctorate in July 
1973, did not raise one single question. According to the reporter who covered 
the event, Barthes is quoted as having said, “Several times you have helped me 
to change, particularly in shifting away from a semiology of products to a semi-
otics of production” (Buleu 1973, 15, quoted in Roudiez 1984, 10). It seems that 
Barthes’s overall attitude was one of praise, indebtedness, and gratitude, rather 
than the stereotyped academic opposition.
Reading Barthes’s essay “Rasch,” or “The Grain of the Voice,” is illuminating 
in this respect, as one can see several Kristevean concepts being used at a deep 
level. As already mentioned above, in “The Grain of the Voice” Barthes trans-
poses the concepts of phenotext and genotext to music, calling them pheno-song 
and geno-song (Barthes 1984a, 270). They will serve, in the first moment, to help 
better locate the grain, to disengage it theoretically. According to Barthes (ibid., 
270–71):
The pheno-song . . . covers all the phenomena, all the features which derive from 
the structure of the sung language, from the coded form of the melisma, the 
idiolect, the composer, the style of interpretation: in short, everything which, in the 
performance, is at the service of communication, of representation, of expression: 
what is usually spoken of, what forms the tissue of cultural values . . . , what is directly 
articulated around the ideological alibis of a period (an artist’s “subjectivity,” 
“expressivity,” “dramaticism,” “personality”). The geno-song is the volume of the 
speaking and singing voice, the space in which the significations germinate “from 
within the language and in its very materiality”; this is a signifying function alien to 
communication, to representation (of feelings), to expression; it is that culmination 
(or depth) of production where melody actually works on language—not what it says 
but the voluptuous pleasure of its signifier-sounds, of its letters.
Between the voice as carrier of propositional statements and the voice as bodily 
utterances, a new space emerges that is characterised by the “friction between 
music and something else, which is the language (and not the message at all)” 
(Barthes 1984a, 273). First, one hears something, one is alert; hearing—with its 
indexing function—establishes a determined auditive background, a kind of 
territory to be defended (because it quickly becomes “familiar” and “domes-
tic”). Second, one starts deciphering what one hears, trying to classify all the 
sounds in terms of signs and codes, entering an oriented hearing and a first 
mode of listening (intelligible listening, which belongs to the realm of pheno-
song). Third, true listening starts happening: our brains focus on the signifiers, 
the actual producers of the sound (the voice, the body, the instruments, which 
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belong to the field of geno-song). This last mode of listening creates a friction 
with the second, because what is being said, sung, or played crucially depends 
upon how it is corporeally said, sung, or played. This is the grain. For Barthes, 
the grain is not timbre; it is the body as scriptor, as producer of frictions, of 
inscriptions (also in a psychoanalytical sense): “The ‘grain’ is the body in the 
singing voice, in the writing hand, in the performing limb” (Barthes 1984a, 276). 
Dramatically, as Barthes sharply observed as early as 1972, “aside from the voice, 
in instrumental music, the ‘grain’ or its lack persists” (ibid.). When listening to 
or judging performances, the dominant mode became the one based on the 
mainstream rules of interpretation, on the constraints of style and historically 
informed codes and systems of coding, “almost all of which belong to the pheno-
song” (ibid., 277). The “rigor,” the “brilliance,” the “respect for the score,” the 
“authenticity,” the “musicality,” the “differentiated playing” are all clichés that 
cover the absence of pulsional drives, of a radical intensity of exposing oneself 
totally, without fears, and beyond safety. Back then, in 1972, Barthes complained 
about the absence of geno-text in music performance: “there is nothing left but 
pheno-text” (ibid.). Moreover, at the end of “The Grain of the Voice” Barthes 
goes even further, announcing “another history of music [different] than the 
one we know[,] which is purely pheno-textual” (ibid.), and appeals, instead, to 
an aesthetic of musical jouissance.
Barthes developed these thoughts further three years later in “Rasch,” a 
piece of writing exclusively dedicated to one single musical work, Schumann’s 
Kreisleriana —a work of such radical corporeality that it seems to be the perfect 
line of flight for Barthes’s escape from classical semiology. Accompanied by 
several fragments extracted from the score of Kreisleriana , “Rasch” contains the 
embryonic cell of a complex geno-phenomenology of music still to be made. 
On the one hand, it returns to powerful semiotic concepts and tools, such as 
the Saussurean paragram, the anagram2 and the anagrammatic network, the screen 
of the signified, fields of signifying, signifier and referent, semantics, para-
grammatical structure, Kristeva’s chora, and Benveniste’s notions of the semi-
otic and the semantic (Barthes 1984g, 302–11). On the other hand, it is traversed 
by a pulsional body, putting forward a strongly sexualised view of music and 
playing.3 When speech becomes musical, or its instrumental substitute, it “is no 
longer linguistic but corporeal” (Barthes 1984f, 299–309, quotation from 306). 
“Music, then, is what struggles with writing. When writing triumphs, it takes 
up where science, impotent to restore the body, leaves off: only the metaphor 
is exact; and it would suffice that we be writers for us to be able to account for 
 2 On Saussurean anagrams, see Starobinski (1964); Kristeva (1969). 
 3 Some of Barthes’s wordings include the following: a body that stretches; a body that declares itself to 
someone; a body that rises; a pulsional body; a body that pushes itself back and forth; a body that turns 
to something else; a stunned body (intoxicated, distracted, ardent); a body that undergoes interrup-
tions; a body that explodes; a body that beats inside itself, against the temple, in the sex, in the belly, 
against the skin from inside, in the heart—a hallucinated body; the body as a histological fabric; a body 
that is lifted up, stretched out, erected; a body that progresses in revulsions and through incisions, en-
tering the sudden wave of the swallowing throat; a body that curls itself up into a ball in order to stretch 
itself out all the better later on. Schumann’s body strikes, collects itself, explodes, divides, it pricks, 
it weaves, it becomes arachnean, it speaks, it declaims, it doubles its voice, it leaves in breathlessness, 
haste, desire, anguish, it approaches orgasm, and it speaks but says nothing.
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these musical beings, these corporeal chimeras, in a perfectly scientific fashion” 
(Barthes 1984f, 308). This is the point where classical music semiology reaches 
its limits. Previously uninterested in the referent (the body with all its pulsional 
dimensions), conventional music analysis and music theory remained tied to 
the safety of the signified, to everything rationally explainable and dividable. 
But when one looks at music as a field of signifying and not as a system of signs, 
than a new music history, a new image of work, and new performative practi-
ces become not only possible but also necessary. Expanding his previous con-
siderations of geno-song and pheno-song, particularly focusing on the former, 
Barthes arrives at the concept of the somatheme (see Barthes 1985f, 307).
Somathemes are presented as being figures of the body, musical figures that do 
not simply relate to the metaphorical musical gesture but that fundamentally 
include the physical gesture as well. More than consciously perceivable cells, 
themes, or phrases (the traditional objects of music analysis), they generate 
complex interwoven textures grounded on “images”: “How would I utter my 
body except in images?” (Barthes 1985f, 307). These images are not to be under-
stood as visual images but very much in the sense of Freud’s imago.4 They oper-
ate at a deep psychological level, addressing the unconscious more than the 
conscious. Generating musical “signifying,” and going beyond propositional 
meaning or intelligibility, such images are fundamentally overdetermined.5 
In this sense, Barthes stated that somathemes require a not-always successful 
metaphorical power, and that they are linked to the constitution of images. And 
in the constitution of images (always singular and individual, unconsciously 
produced by the receiver) lies a fundamental element in Schumann’s music—
the episodic, the fragmentary succession of short musical entities—that John 
Daverio (2007, 71) (in a passage closely related to “Rasch”) understood as the 
imagistic essence of his music, which unfolds like “the discontinuous succession 
of frames in a film.”6
Related to the motions and movements of the human body (and/or voice), 
the figures of the body convey corporeal meanings, which—particularly in 
extreme ritardandos, in frantic, forward-rushing rhythmic lines, or in synco-
pated pulses—relate to a body “which is about to speak” (quasi parlando) with-
out saying anything. As Robert S. Hatten (2001) wrote, Barthes identified “sig-
nificant categories that differ from the linguistic in being corporeal.”
 4 Imago is the word used by Freud to describe unconscious object-representations (Rycroft [1968] 1995, 
78). The word was first presented by C. G. Jung in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (Psychology of the 
Unconscious) (1911), where it is an imaginary scheme (and not an “image”), a scheme through which the 
subject relates to the other; in this sense an imago can be an image, but also an emotion, a feeling, a 
behaviour (see Laplanche and Pontalis [1967] 2007, 196). 
 5 In psychoanalysis, overdetermination is “a symptom, dream-image, or any other item of behaviour . . . 
that has more than one meaning or expresses drives and conflicts derived from more than one level or 
aspect of personality” (Rycroft [1968] 1995, 123).
 6 Referring to Barthes’s “Rasch,” Daverio quotes him (“Music, in short, is an image, not a language” 
[Barthes 1985f, 301–2]) in order to add, “Put another way, the discursive model for much of Schumann’s 
music is less the continuous unfolding of events in a narrative than the discontinuous succession of 
frames in a film” (Daverio 2007, 70–71).
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Finally, somathemes reveal the emergence of desire, the production of new 
agencies of musical signifying (forces, energy) that are situated beyond linguis-
tically determinable signification (analysis, harmony, themes, cells, phrases). 
The “possibility of delirium” (Barthes 1985f, 309) and the centrality of desire 
production could become central functions and categories for music production 
and reception. Such openness to pulsional energies would carry a “revolution-
ary” potential, allowing for a completely different reading of music history, 
composition, and performance. Barthes’s somatheme could act as the cen-
tral concept for this revolution. Conceived as figures of the body, whose texture 
engenders musical signifying, they belong to the sphere of the geno-song, 
beyond meaning and metaphors, enabling a new musical semiotics strongly 
related to unconscious image formation, to deep psychic processes, and to 
some kind of artistic or dream work. Barthes drops this concept in the middle 
of “Rasch” without further elaboration or developments. Fundamentally, it is 
simply there, waiting for someone interested (and with the technical compe-
tence) to expand it and start working on a new musical semiotics. This new 
musical semiotics would need first to map a certain group of somathemes, 
then to engage with their specific overdeterminations, and finally to join their 
Lacanian vectors of desire in order to cut across the diachronic chains of signifying 
and of jouissance. Only if one is equipped with such tools can one ask, from an 
entirely new perspective, What can a body do?, or, more precisely, Body, what 
do you want? Che vuoi?
Intermezzo: fourteen somathemes
This intermezzo presents the fourteen musical examples offered by Roland Barthes 
in “Rasch.” They seem to function as prototypes of somathemes and suggest 
possible avenues for a geno-phenomenology of the musical body. Transcribed 
here in sequence, they are accompanied by the relevant text fragments that 
relate to them in “Rasch” (Barthes 1985f, 301–9, translation adjusted). In this 
manner, the methodological similarity between this kind of approach and the 
one proposed by Julia Kristeva in the second and third parts of La révolution du 
language poétique (1974) becomes apparent (even if Kristeva, operating in the 
field of poetry, is much more precise, detailed, and technically informed). As in 
the case of Kristeva’s methodology, Barthes is also indebted to the anagrams of 
Saussure (via Jean Starobinski).7
 7 Crucial to the topic of anagrams and anagrammatic modes of thought is the work done in the 1960s by 
Jean Starobinski, who presented Saussure’s notebooks on anagrams in diverse articles, culminating in 
his book Les mots sous les mots (1971). See Starobinski (1964, 1967, 1969, 1971); Kristeva (1969, 113–46).
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(a) The second K. begins with a scene of stretching . . . 
 
 
(b) . . . and then something (intermezzo I.) suddenly comes down the staircase of 
notes.
 
(c) Schumannian beating is panic, but it is also coded (by rhythm and tonality); and 
it is because the panic of the blows apparently keeps within the limits of a docile 
language that it is ordinarily not perceived (judging by most interpretations of 
Schumann). . . . It seems . . . that only Yves Nat and I . . . hear the formidable beating 
body of the seventh K. [this body that beats].
Figure 6.1a
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(d) The third K. . . . is not “animated” (molto animato): it is “raised” (aufgeregt), lifted 
up, stretched out, erected; one might also say . . . that it progresses through a series 
of tiny revulsions, as if, at each incision, something were coming undone, were 
turning back, were being severed, as if all the music were entering the sudden wave 
of the swallowing throat. 
 
(e) Is there a better-dreamed-of stretching . . . than that of the second K.? 
 
(f ) Here everything converges: the melodic form, the suspense harmony [by the stop 
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(g) Sometimes the body even curls itself up into a ball in order to stretch itself out all 
the better later on: in the second K. . . . 
 
(h) . . . or in the disguised intermezzo of the third, whose long stretching will vary—
by broadening or relaxing?—the pricked, swallowed, revulsed body of the beginning. 
 
(i) What does the body do, when it enunciates (musically)? And Schumann answers: 
my body strikes, my body collects itself, it explodes, it divides, it pricks, or on the 
contrary and without warning . . . , it stretches out, it weaves (like the Arachnean 
interlude of the first K.).
Figure 6.1g
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(j) . . . my body puts itself in a state of speech: quasi parlando.
(k) Quasi parlando . . . : this is the movement of the body which is about to speak. 
(l) A certain episode (event, rather) of the fifth K. obsesses me, but whose corporeal 
secret I cannot transfix [transpercer]: “it” is inscribed within me, but I don’t know 
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(m) Here are several of the “services” tonality performs for the body: by dissonance, 
it permits the beat, here and there, to “toll,” to “tilt”; by modulation (and tonal 
return), it can complete the figure of the beat, give it its specific form; it curls up into a 
ball, says the first K.; but it curls up into a ball all the better if we return to the source 
after leaving it. 
(n) Finally (to remain with the Schumannian text), tonality provides the body the 
strongest, the most constant of oneiric figures: the ascent (or the descent) of the 
stairs: there is, we know, a scale of tones, and by traversing this scale . . . the body 
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Figure 6.1a–n. Fourteen musical examples from Schumann’s Kreisleriana op. 16, used by 
Roland Barthes in “Rasch” (1985f, 301–9).
 175
Rasch26: The Somatheme
5. The impact of Jacques Lacan: signifier and 
jouissance
Roland Barthes doesn’t provide a clearly articulated definition of somatheme, 
which remains vague and underspecified. Rather than try to come to a precise 
meaning of the term, it might be more productive to explore some of the reasons 
for such loose characterisation. The quick answer is that somathemes funda-
mentally belong to the world of pulsions, drives, and desire, being primarily 
related to unconscious processes that know nothing about signifiers, codes, 
and articulated speech. It is difficult logically to articulate a discourse on the 
somatheme because it does not really belong to the sphere of logically articul-
able discourses. Moreover, Barthes repeatedly uses words and expressions that 
point towards a jouissif body: ardent, erected, breathless, approaching orgasm. It 
is extremely difficult to capture this body within traditional, articulated know-
ledge. As Lacan wrote, “The unconscious is not a thinking being, but first and 
foremost an enjoying being who does not want to know anything of it” (1999, 
sec. 95, pp. 104–5). “Knowledge beyond articulation is literally and figuratively 
‘inter-dit,’ in the double sense of the French, ‘prohibited,’ but also ‘said, evoked 
between the sayings as such.’ The question is, to which kind of Real does it give 
us access?” (Verhaeghe 2002, 121, quoting Lacan 1999, sec. 108). Interestingly, and 
in a parallel movement with Barthes, “Lacan associates this real more and more 
with the body, albeit not the body constructed through the Other. . . . ‘The real is 
the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious’” (Verhaeghe 
2002, 121, quoting Lacan 1999, sec. 118).
To this mystery, Barthes adds yet another dimension, namely the speaking 
body that does not speak, but that is about to speak, a body that outs itself in a 
state of speech (quasi parlando) without speaking or (at best) speaking but say-
ing nothing (see Barthes 1985f, 306). It is this speechless speech, this opening 
of the mouth into a vacuum of words that gives the somatheme its incredible 
force of communication. It communicates a special form of knowledge: 
This knowledge is an enigma, demonstrated to us by the unconscious. Analytic 
discourse, on the contrary, teaches us that knowledge is something articulated. 
Through this articulation, knowledge is turned into sexualized knowledge . . . , but 
the unconscious testifies especially to a knowledge that escapes the knowledge of 
the speaking being. This knowledge that we cannot grasp belongs to the order of 
experience. It is thus effected by llanguage, the motherly llanguage that presents 
us with enigmatic affects that go far beyond what the speaking being can articulate 
through his or her articulated knowledge. (Verhaeghe 2002, 121, paraphrasing Lacan 
1999, sections 125–26)
Lacan’s two kinds of knowledge (analytic discourse and enigmatic language) can be 
read as a parallel to Barthes’s pheno-song and geno-song, the former defined by the 
“wise” language of pitches, rhythms, harmony, phrasing, and formal construction, 
the latter by an intoxicated, distracted, ardent, and erected body. One belongs to 
the circle of knowledge/signifier, the other to the circle of jouissance/signifying. 
They imply a split subject—“divided between unconscious and conscious motiv-
ations, that is, between physiological processes and social constraints” (Roudiez 
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1980, 6). This split subject, which operates as the fundamental background to 
Barthes’s essays “Rasch” and “Musica Practica,” was sharply discussed by Julia 
Kristeva in Revolution in Poetic Language. As Roudiez (1986, 6) put it, “The object 
of her investigations is no longer language (as in structuralism), or discourse (as 
phenomenology would have it), or even enunciation; rather, it is the discourse of 
a split subject—and this again involves her in psychoanalysis.” Above, we already 
briefly sketched Kristeva’s notions of phenotext and genotext, which are strongly 
related to this split subject; one could also discuss her concept of chora, which 
was important to Barthes, who mentions it in “Rasch.” However, that would go 
far beyond the scope of this chapter. What is important is to note the centrality 
of the split subject to Lacan, Kristeva, and Barthes—each author focuses on 
different aspects and produces analytical variations on it.8 To situate somehow 
the somatheme in relation to this split subject, one can think of a schematic 
distribution of characteristics, following selected words by Barthes, Kristeva, 
and Lacan (see figure 6.2).
To start with, we consider the subject of signifier (figure 6.2, on the left) and 
the subject of jouissance (figure 6.2, on the right), which, very broadly, corres-
pond to Freud’s representation and affect, respectively. Kristeva’s phenotext (and 
Barthes’s pheno-song) belongs to the former, the genotext (and the geno-song) to 
the latter. The somatheme originates in, and goes back to the subject of jouis-
sance; but, even if vaguely, and even if only for a fraction of a second, it must 
appear in the realm of the visible—that is, of the signifier, the oriented world 
of meaning. Therefore, we place it at the zone of intersection between signifier 
and jouissance. This is the crucial area in which artistic transfer (the paragram-
matical structure of the musical text) starts happening—where codes begin to 
deterritorialise, where madness embryonically reterritorialises in and through 
a specific artistic medium. 
Figure 6.2 synthesises many of the topics presented so far, broadly repre-
senting two poles: the linguistically articulated, written text (knowledge/sig-
nifier), and the enunciating body (drives/jouissance). This is not meant as a 
dualism, as both layers mutually need each other and can only be grasped in 
their reciprocal interaction. Two points must be stressed: first, according to 
Barthes and Kristeva, too much emphasis had been put on the layer of the sig-
nifier in much of the analytical work happening on that level, a situation that 
unproductively kept unconscious processes at bay; second, there is a continu-
ous movement of the subject between one and the other, a movement that in 
figure 6.2 is represented by the light arrow of the vector of desire—a Lacanian 
notion that is constitutive of his theory of desire and that will be addressed in 
the next section, as it was obviously relevant to Barthes.
 8 Lacan’s Écrits, first published in 1966, seem to have had a catalytic effect, influencing a whole generation 




Figure 6.2. The split subject.
6. Lacan’s desire
Roland Barthes’s 1976 essay “Listening” (see 1985b) is clearly, and in multiple 
ways, indebted to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical discourse. The beginning of 
its third section starts with a direct paraphrase of Lacan’s most famous formula: 
“The unconscious, structured like a language, is the object of a special and . . . exemplary 
listening: that of the psychoanalyst” (Barthes 1985b, 252, my emphasis). The point 
is that psychoanalytic listening functions from unconscious to unconscious, from 
a speaking unconscious to another one, which it is assumed can hear. A similar 
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process can be said to happen with art in general, and with music in particular. 
If Barthes’s somathemes exist, they emerge from the composer’s and/or per-
former’s unconscious, addressing (in a polysemic and overdetermined mode) 
the unconscious of the receiver. In “Listening,” Barthes proposes three types 
of listening: (1) being alert, which relates to indexes and survival; (2) deciphering, 
which relates to consciously perceived signs and codes; and (3) understanding, 
which relates to the signifier and to the unconscious. Clearly, this typology 
emanates from the listening of the psychoanalyst. But it can be extended to 
musical listening, especially if taking into account the “promise of pleasure” to 
which Barthes (1985b, 248) refers: beyond the auditive background of the state 
of alert, beyond the signs and codes of articulated language, there might be a 
zone of suspended time where jouissance might reign. In that area (che vuoi?) 
one can become lost, and the great difficulty is to travel back from there to the 
prosaic auditive background where listening started. 
Tracing the extent of the influence and impact of Lacan in the writings of 
Barthes would definitely go beyond the scope of this chapter, which will only 
focus on the relation between the central notion of désir in “Rasch,”9 and 
Lacan’s vectors of desire, as expressed in his famous “graphs of desire.” The som-
atheme would remain vastly unintelligible without reference to this relation.
At first sight, there seems to be an overt etymological relation between 
Barthes’s somatheme (from 1975) and Lacan’s matheme (from 1971). Barthes 
does not mention it, and mid-1970s French academic jargon was full of sim-
ilar terms, such as mytheme, grapheme, glosseme, phoneme, morpheme, lexeme, or 
semantheme.10 Barthes only writes the word somatheme one single time, almost 
en passant, as if telling the reader not to give it too much importance, or as an 
indication of a certain point of humour, precisely playing with all the -emes so 
much en vogue. Lacan’s matheme was intended as a highly formalised construc-
tion, which, by approaching mathematical language and precision, is certainly 
to be positioned on the field of the signifier, of scientifically articulable know-
ledge. By situating the somatheme in the field of drives and jouissance, Barthes 
 9 In the last paragraph of “Rasch,” in a passage that reads like the culmination of the whole essay, Barthes 
states that “musical signifying, in a much clearer fashion than linguistic signification, is penetrated by 
desire” (Barthes 1985f, 312; translation changed because the original pénétrée does not mean “steeped 
in,” as the translator wrote, but, precisely, “penetrated,” with all its sexual connotations).
 10 There follows various telegraphic notes on some of these terms: The matheme is a term that occurred for 
the first time in a lecture Lacan delivered on 4 November 1971; it was intended as a means to introduce 
some degree of technical rigour into philosophical and psychological writing; the choice of the word 
seems to have been inspired by Levi-Strauss’s mytheme and the Greek word mathéma; in L’œuvre claire, J.-
C. Milner (1995) attempts to define the matheme on the basis of the definitions of phoneme (the linguist’s 
phonetic unit) and mytheme (part of a myth). In structuralist studies of mythology (e.g., Levi-Strauss), a 
mytheme is the essential kernel of a myth, representing an irreducible, unchanging element, a minimal 
unit that is always found shared with other, related mythemes and reassembled in various ways or linked 
in more complicated relationships. Grapheme (a word coined in analogy with phoneme) is the smallest 
meaningful contrastive unit in a writing system, which became a central concept for Jacques Derrida. 
The glosseme (Hjelmslev) is defined as the smallest irreducible unit of both the content and expression of 
planes of language. A phoneme (linguistics) is one of the units of sound that distinguish one word from 
another in a particular language. A morpheme (linguistics) is the smallest grammatical unit in a language. 
A lexeme (linguistics) is a unit of lexical meaning that exists regardless of the number of inflectional 
endings it may have or the number of words it may contain. In this list, somathemes could be defined as 
the smallest units of bodily expression.
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proposes the opposite, an analytical tool for unconsciously produced artistic 
figures. Where the matheme reduces complex unconscious processes to a 
crystal-clear formula, the somatheme will generate infinite descriptions and 
narratives, because it is fundamentally overdetermined. Both Barthes and Lacan 
are willing to depart from structural linguistics, but they do so in different ways 
and directions: Lacan towards a growing formalisation and mathematisation 
of language,11 Barthes towards a growing corporeality and “poetisation” of 
language (associations). In Lacan’s seminar from 1972–73 “Encore,” one reads 
(at section 108) that “Mathematical formalization is our goal, our ideal. Why? 
Because it alone is matheme, . . . it alone is capable of being integrally trans-
mitted” (Lacan 1999, 119). But immediately after this sentence, Lacan makes 
a crucial remark, one that comes closer to Barthes’s views: “Mathematical for-
malization consists of what is written, but it only subsists if I employ, in pre-
senting it, the language (langue) I make use of. Therein lies the objection: no 
formalization of language is transmissible without the use of language itself. It 
is in the very act of speaking that I make this formalization, this ideal metalan-
guage, ex-sist” (ibid.).12 This means that both concepts (matheme and somatheme) 
have a dynamic mode of existence, because, even if situated in opposite poles 
within the representational scheme, they share the same origin in unconscious 
processes that somehow ought to be grasped.
Barthes’s position evolved from what might be called “classical semiology” 
in the 1960s to his “second semiology” of the 1970s, a move that corresponds 
to a change of focus from the signifier to the signifying. As for Lacan, through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, more and more diagrams, graphs, and symbolisations 
appeared throughout his lectures and writings, testifying to a steadily intensi-
fying trend toward formalisation. By the late 1960s and, especially, the 1970s, 
discussions of logic, topology, and knot theory were prominent features of 
Lacanian discourse. The 1970s have been characterised as his decade of the 
matheme, a unit of formalisation (qua a mathematical-style symbolisation) dis-
tilling and fixing the core significance of a specific Lacanian analytic concept 
term. With these and other topological constructions, Lacan was able to recast 
the unconscious as an ensemble of contortions, curvings, foldings, inflections, 
twists, and turns—very much like Barthes reformulated the body of the musi-
cian as conceived through the somatheme concept. Both addressed a funda-
mentally split subject, and both were trying to find devices to capture some of 
the immanent deep processes at stake. And since Barthes is a “Lacanian,” both 
think of the unconscious as being “structured like a language” (Barthes 1985b, 
252), therefore affording some kind of “structure of the paragram” (Barthes 
 11 For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s profound critique of these developments in Lacan’s thought, 
see François Dosse (2010, 183–92). On the origins of the term, Dosse (ibid., 191) writes: “As Deleuze and 
Guattari began working on Anti-Oedipus [c.1970], Lacan was drawing away from structural linguistics 
and increasingly formalizing his thinking, using topological figures and mathemes. Lacan created a 
symbiosis between Lévi-Strauss’s notion of the matheme, the Greek word mathema (knowledge), and 
the world of mathematics.”
 12 In this respect the following remark by Andrew Cutrofello (2002, 143) is interesting: “Lacan says that a 
matheme must be written; it has the form of an écrit, but it only ‘subsists’ as matheme through a motiv-
ating discourse that has the character of spoken language (‘mon dire’).”
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1985f, 302) or “anagrammatic network” (ibid., 303), which can be identified and 
interpreted.13
According to Barthes, the musician’s body is in permanent movement, it 
never stays in one place, where one could catch it and calmly analyse it. This 
movement is a first transgression of the code, of the signifier, and it signals 
the beginning of a trajectory from the signifier towards the signifying: “the 
Schumannian body does not stay in place (a major rhetorical transgression). It 
is not a meditative body. It sometimes makes a meditative gesture, but does 
not assume meditation’s bearing, infinite persistence, and faint posture of sub-
sidence. This is a pulsional body, one which pushes itself back and forth, turns 
to something else . . . (intoxicated, distracted, and at the same time ardent)” 
(Barthes 1985f, 300). An intoxicated body (by what?), distracted (from what?), 
and ardent (which objet a?) manifests itself, and emerges on the visible surface 
of music—in its phenotext—through “symptoms” that are identified within 
the genotext. Therefore, Barthes’s beating body is not a paranoiac body, nor 
is it (at least immediately) a schizophrenic body, a body acting without rules 
and constraints. No, it is a body beating inside itself, drawing specific inner 
gestures that are idiosyncratically unique and unrepeatable—figures that urge 
permanent repetition and infinite variation (difference):
It is not a matter of beating fists against the door, in the presumed manner of fate. 
What is required is that it beat inside the body, against the temple, in the sex, in the 
belly, against the skin from inside, at the level of that whole sensuous emotivity 
which we call . . . the “heart.” “To beat” is the very action of the heart (there is no 
“beating” except the heart’s), which occurs at this paradoxical site of the body: 
central and decentered, liquid and contractile, pulsional and moral; but it is also the 
emblematic word of two languages: linguistics . . . and psychoanalysis. (Barthes 1985f, 
302)
The Barthesian body is “a body that beats.” Therefore, it is a transgressive body, 
an interiorised, intimate, and solitary body. A body that refuses gregarious, 
collective, or massive expressions of the us (power) in favour of the me (desire). 
The beats produced by this body are censored by all those “who do not want to 
hear them, or are hallucinated by one man alone, who hears nothing but them” 
(Barthes 1985f, 302). People refuse to hear the second text, people refuse to travel 
beyond the chain of signifier and code—they remain in the safe terrain of the 
sayable, of the consciously oriented world, of statements and representations, 
of science, grammar, and linguistics. Barthes’s somathemes present an offer to 
move beyond safety and move towards affect, libido, the unconscious—enhancing 
desire production and feeding pulsional drives. The price to pay is the permanent 
unfulfilment of desire and the cynical joy of the drives. 
 13 Thinking of the unconscious as being “structured like a language” is one of the major disagreements be-
tween Lacan (on one side) and Deleuze and Guattari (on the other). For Deleuze and Guattari the un-
conscious is material and by no means operates “like a language.” They see the unconscious as a factory, 
ceaselessly producing desire; viewing it as a language (or structured as one) would mean repeating the 
Freudian model of the theatre, with all its interpretive work. It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari 
strongly advocate experimentation, claiming that there is nothing to be interpreted in the unconscious.
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Figure 6.3. Topological space of the somatheme within Lacan’s completed graph of desire, 
based upon Lacan ([1977] 2001, 346, 348). Legend following the vector of desire (bottom 
right to bottom left, anticlockwise): /S—the barred subject; i(o)—the specular image; O—the 
Other (l’Autre); d—desire;  /S◊D—drive; S(Φ)—the signifier of a lack in the Other;  /S◊a—fan-
tasy; s(O)—the signification of the Other; e—the ego (moi); I(O)—the ego-ideal (Ich-Ideal).
7. Situating the somatheme within Lacan’s graphs of 
desire
Lacan’s graphs of desire14 (see figure 6.3) help us better understand the trajectory 
suggested by Barthes between the two texts: the text of the signifier and the text 
of the pulsional body. Lacan originally developed these graphs in relation to the 
structure of witticism, which was his starting point (and where the distinction 
between what is propositionally said and how it is said has an obvious impact in 
the communicative process). The graphs deal with desire, but in a special way, 
because Lacan ([1977] 2001, 335) believed that “it is precisely because desire 
is articulated that it is not articulable.” The graphs are topological, building a 
diagram that “also serves purposes other than the use [Lacan gave them], having 
been constructed and completed quite openly in order to map in its arrangement 
the most broadly practical structure of the data of our experience” (ibid.). Lacan 
created these graphs in order “to show where desire, in relation to a subject defined 
in his articulation by the signifier, is situated” (ibid.). In what follows, I discuss 
Lacan’s completed graph in relation to Barthes’s somatheme, more specifically 
how and where the somatheme can be located within the vector of desire.
 
 
The core of Lacan’s completed graph is the movement of the barred subject 
(/S), first towards the chain of signifier (supported by the vector S–S’, also called 
in the completed graph Signifier–Voice), then to the chain of jouissance (the 
vector Jouissance–Castration), entering the Che vuoi? zone, and finally (with 
difficulty) coming back through the chains of signifiers to the starting level. This 
 14 Lacan’s graphs of desire are fourfold—Graph 1, Graph 2, Graph 3 (Che vuoi?), and Graph 4 (Completed 
Graph)—growing in complexity from one to the next. Lacan started mentioning such graphs in 1957, in 
his seminar on the formations of the unconscious. They were published in 1966, as part of the Écrits, in a 
chapter entitled “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient freudien” (Lacan 1966, 
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movement—the vector of desire—defines a never-ending attempt of the One to 
assume the Other, but every attempt fails and keeps failing, thereby causing the 
insistence of the attempt as such (see Verhaeghe 2002, 131). The intersections 
of the vectors define precise points with specific functions in the overall econ-
omy of this diagrammatic representation. The crossing of the two pathways in 
the graph can be further understood to connote interference and constraint. 
Desire for the primordial object is not fulfilled except through the constraints 
of the signifying chain. The vector of desire is metaphorical, substituting vari-
ous objects for the absolutely lost primordial one, and irrupting into language 
without regard for the passage of time. As Paul Verhaeghe (2002, 129) summed 
up, “The unconscious does not know time.”
Importantly, Lacan distinguishes between desire and drive. An essential 
characteristic of desire is its restlessness, its ongoing agitated searching and 
futile striving. No object it gets its hands on is ever quite it. Whereas desire 
is stuck with its dissatisfied drifting from object to object and ever onward, 
drive derives a perverse enjoyment from this desire-fuelled libidinal circling 
around the vanishing point of the impossible-qua-unattainable. Where desire 
is frustrated, drive is gratified. Drive gains its satisfaction through vampirically 
feeding off the dissatisfaction of desire. As Suzanne Barnard (2002, 173) puts 
it, “while desire is born of and sustained by a constitutive lack, drive emerges in 
relation to a constitutive surplus. This surplus is what Lacan calls the subject’s 
‘anatomical complement,’ an excessive, ‘unreal’ remainder that produces an 
ever-present jouissance.”
As is now clear, Barthes’s first language (the one producing the pheno-song) 
belongs to Lacan’s first chain of signifiers, to the vector Signifier–Voice; this 
means that it is determined by the code of the Other, “since it is from this code 
that the subject is constituted, which means that it is from the Other that the 
subject receives even the message that he emits” (Lacan [1977] 2001, 337). To 
say it with Barthes, when he plays Schumann, what he calls “the first text” is 
the one notated by Schumann (the locus of Speech), not of Barthes, even if it 
is Barthes who is playing (addressing) Schumann. Barthes’s “second language” 
(related to the geno-song) belongs to the second chain, that of the vector 
Jouissance–Castration. Passing the Other, through the Other, and with the 
Other, desire moves away from the signifier, hoping for some sort of fulfilment 
(Barthes’s promesse du plaisir), which is always threatened by the fear of castra-
tion, of interruption or non-fulfilment of desire. From here, the jouissif body 
(che vuoi?) has to come back to its starting point, a difficult retroversion that 
unavoidably includes the signifier of a lack in the Other, which might stop the 
process (by reactions such as a state of shock, panic, tears, uncontrolled laugh-
ter, etc.) or bring it to the imaginary ego-ideal, from where the whole cycle will 
start again . . . and again. 
Barthes’s somatheme must be situated between the two transversal chains, in 
the space defined by the intersections O, /S◊D, S(Φ), s(O), including the seg-
ments of the vector of desire “d” (desire) and /S◊a (fantasy). The somatheme 
functions in both directions: it is the scriptor, the transcriber of the uncon-
scious into the coded language of the signifier. It is the disintegrating figure 
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of the signifier, of its signs and symbols that lose consistency when activated 
by pulsions and drives. This space is at the same time ordered and unordered, 
deterritorialised and coded. As Julia Kristeva wrote in relation to Mallarmé’s 
mystery in literature: “Mallarmé calls attention to the semiotic rhythm within 
language when he speaks of ‘The Mystery in Literature’. . . . Indifferent to lan-
guage, enigmatic and feminine, this space underlying the written is rhythmic, 
unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anter-
ior to judgment, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax” (Kristeva 1984, 
29).
8. Conclusion: artistic research and 
transdisciplinarity 
Focused on somathemes, this chapter presented a genealogy of the concept 
and discussed its broader implications for music, music analysis, linguistics, 
and psychoanalysis. Starting with Barthes at the piano, we suggested that this 
concept could only have been invented by someone who played an instrument. 
Next, we situated the concept in the larger context of semiology, semiotics, 
and linguistics, opening the door for a new geno-phenomenology of the body. 
Finally, the somatheme was placed inside Lacan’s graph of desire, pointing to its 
potential relevance for a field outside music. The fourteen examples sporadically 
presented by Barthes in “Rasch” were presented here in proximity, allowing a 
more effective understanding of these musical passages as somathemes.
The reader might ask why a music practitioner such as myself turns his atten-
tion to semiotics, philosophy, and even psychoanalysis. The answer is that 
I was simply looking for one very specific concept (the somatheme), which I 
found in a text about a piece I was playing at the piano. In this sense, at the 
base of this research lies a bottom-up investigation, which starting from a 
single word expanded itself to wider and more complex terrains. In practice, 
the concept and all its contextualising references have been extremely rel-
evant for a whole series of artistic and scholarly outputs generated by myself 
and by MusicExperiment21 in the last four years (see Assis 2014; Assis and 
D’Errico 2016). Of the type of presentation discussed in Chapter 3 (series of 
experimental performances), this kind of multiple-media presentation config-
ures a unique approach to artistic research in music—an approach that does 
not oppose “scholarly research” (of the type presented in the present essay) 
to “artistic work” (which leads to concrete performances). In place of a dual-
istic opposition, I see “research” and “artistry” as two parameters, which can 
have different settings in different moments of the research procedure. They 
are always in relation to each other, defining an elaborated scale, which can be 
precisely calibrated and explored by artist-researchers. Artistic research is still 
in the process of affirming itself as a new “artistic” and “scholarly” perspective, 
and this process entails many dangers—the biggest of which is the temptation 
of science: the temptation of becoming a scientific discipline with specific 
methods, strategies, codes, laws, and hierarchies. As is well known from sev-
eral examples from the past, when new disciplines were being born—such as 
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sociology, psychology, musicology, psychoanalysis, or anthropology—all went 
through a process of purging themselves of unscientific elements. This may 
have been necessary for institutional implementation and to gain academic 
credibility. Nevertheless, if in those disciplines it could still make some sense, 
in artistic research it would be highly counterproductive; for, as Lacan once 
wrote, “It is not what is measured in science that is important, contrary to what 
people think” (Lacan 1999, 128). Artistic research can be much more interest-
ing if it does not focus on “how things really were” or “how things really are” 
but, rather, on “what things can become.” More than reconstructing or inter-
preting the past, artistic research can embrace a genuinely creative approach, 
understanding artistic practices and investigations as the result of intensive 
creative processes—whose mystery, according to Guattari (2007, 102) “resides 
in [their] function and not in their interpretation.”
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The Emancipated Performer: 
Musical Renderings and 
Power Relations*
1. Music performance and power relations
Beyond spectacular buildings that host spectacular ensembles and soloists who 
play spectacular pieces in front of mesmerised audiences; beyond historically 
constructed notions of execution, recitation, interpretation, transmission, rendering, or 
reproduction; beyond theoretical, analytical, historiographical, or sociological modes 
of scrutiny; beyond transcendental instrumental virtuosity; beyond ivory-towered 
musicological discourses; beyond all that: musical performances of past musical 
works have been fundamentally determined by power relations, by accommo-
dating themselves to strong hierarchies, and by obeying highly prescriptive rules 
and authorities. This chapter aims to problematise such power relations, and to 
scrutinise their impact on performance. I will insist on the relevance of becom-
ing aware of and liberated from them and I will propose an alternative model 
for performance—one that has the potential to change the performer from a 
well-domesticated reproducer to a critically engaged, emancipated operator. This 
chapter is organised in five sections: a first, introductory section on the prevailing 
image of work and the dangers of “interpreting” music; a second section on the 
tacit authorities that survey and control musical performances; a third section 
on modes of relating to history and historical materials; a fourth section, where 
a new image of work will be briefly presented; and, finally, a fifth section on the 
main topic of this presentation, namely, the emancipated performer. 
2. The dominant image of work  and the problem of 
interpretation
While music analysis, music theory, music editions, or music philology are seen 
as fields of activity that have the right to problematise musical works from the 
past, “performance” is not thought to do so; or, in the best cases, to do so only 
 * The first instantiation of this text was written for the international conference “Performance Analysis: A 
Bridge Between Theory and Interpretation,” convened by Madalena Soveral and held at Casa da Música 
in Oporto, 4–6 October 2016. Further versions, with minor adaptations, were made for my lecture on 
“Music Performance and Politics” for the Honours Class at the University of Leiden (invited by Hafez 
Ismaili m’Hamdi), 1 November 2016, and for a group discussion at the Orpheus Research Centre’s 
General Assembly, 7 December 2016. On all these occasions, the text was intended as a positive thought 
provocation for those audiences, giving it a polemic gesture, which is retained in this chapter. 
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tangentially. The activity of performing music has been considered as a possibly 
neutral rendering of sound structures that pre-exist performance and that will 
endure it. A particular image of work has been formed historically, based upon 
the assumption that musical works—at least for the performer and from the 
performer’s point of view—are stabilised entities that have been achieved by a 
composer, that can be apprehended on “one single occasion,” that are encapsu-
lated in one score, that are commonly sanctioned by specific communities of 
people, and whose potentially infinite reproductions are recognisable as “the 
same again.” As part of this image of work, the repressor’s role has been played by 
disciplines or activities such as music history, music editing, or music criticism, 
and also by music educators and concert organisers, all of which have exerted 
different forms of intimidation and corporative legitimation (even when they are 
not perceived as such) to ensure that nothing outside the conventional image 
of work can be offered onstage as a performance of a particular musical work. 
This image of work—which derives from what I call the strong work concept, which 
I deconstructed in Chapter 1—not only was prevalent in performance but also 
effectively managed to stop performers from being creative, mobilising their 
energies toward physical endurance and resistance, machine-like technical 
dexterity, harsh competition, and finally the well-tamed domestication of their 
creative powers. Recent trends in music pedagogy and research that focuses on 
studying performances from the past or resituates analysis from the perspective 
of the performer have significantly contributed to the arrival of more informed 
performers, offering a wider understanding of what a performer does. Such 
trends are, therefore, welcome. Nevertheless, at their core lies the idea that these 
better understandings will actually help performers perform better within the 
traditional image of work, which remains essentially unquestioned. 
On the other hand, performers are generally supposed “to interpret” the 
works they play. As they are not the composers of the works they play, and thus 
are prevented by their discipline from improvising, so-called mainstream per-
formers found in “interpretation” a last refuge through which to express some 
kind of individual subjectivity. Two aspects are often unnoticed: first, that the 
notion and concrete practices of “musical interpretation” only appeared in the 
nineteenth century (see Danuser 2016; Dreyfus 2007), in a parallel wave to the 
emergence of the work concept, the growing quantity of published music, and 
the increasing number of public concerts, concert halls, and music critics; (2) 
second, that “interpretation” depends on and is limited by the conventional 
image of work mentioned above, and is therefore epochal—which makes it pos-
sible that its own specific epoch will end. 
In the twentieth century, the concept and practice of “musical interpreta-
tion” became normative for performers, listeners, and scholars (see Danuser 
1994–2007). The concept is predicated on the existence of a source text (the 
score), which preserves an idealised concept of the authorised “musical work,” 
and on a performer who brings the musical experience itself into renewed 
existence. The fact that various performances of the same piece by the same 
performer could (and to a certain extent “should”) differ from one another is 
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acknowledged within these conventions; but, at the same time, such differ-
ences are generally considered to be the result of occasional circumstances, 
not deeply affecting the constitution of a singular, consistent personal “inter-
pretation.” The idea that there is something “hidden,” something “deeper,” 
something below or beyond the apparent surface of the score, something that 
must be “interpreted,” implies a centripetal approach from the performer 
towards the supposed “essence” of the artwork (its proclaimed “truth con-
tent”). Further, this idea is strongly related to other time-bound concepts, such 
as Werktreue, authenticity, composer’s intention, and, crucially, to certain editorial 
practices, such as the urtext, or more recently the critical edition—all of which are 
expressions that sustain and enhance particular forms of exerting power, and 
of determining, controlling, and policing both the performer and the listener.
“Musical interpretation” has become a powerful weapon in the ideology of the 
work concept, its many related parallel concepts, and its inherent link to mar-
keting strategies of musical life. In this sense, the idea and practice of “musical 
interpretation” established a complex system of loyalty, discipline, and control, 
prescribing not only what can and cannot be played at one moment but also—
and more importantly—what it is possible to play. Anything outside this possible 
is not exactly forbidden, it is simply unthinkable. To reflect on what is think-
able, and why it is thinkable at any given moment in history, one has to move 
beyond currently dominant discourses on performance and music ontology, 
which, in my view, ignore the question of power relations. In the last few years 
I have been working with discourses that strongly engage with these questions, 
even if not from a musical perspective, with the goal of learning from them and 
eventually transposing them to music. In what follows, I will refer to specific 
writings by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jacques 
Rancière, bringing them into dialogue with music performance.
3. The tacit authorities: Deleuze’s “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control” 
In May 1990, Gilles Deleuze published the short essay “Postscript on the Societies 
of Control” (see Deleuze 1992, in which he discusses the way in which societies 
were moving from what Michel Foucault [1977, 193] described as a disciplinary 
society toward something new, namely, towards a society of control). Foucault’s 
analysis of various systems of surveillance and punishment from the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries led him to articulate precise descriptions of two kinds 
of societies: a former one, feudal, based upon the principle of sovereignty, and 
another one, modern, formed and sustained by discipline. Foucault’s theory was 
the crucial starting point for Deleuze’s theorisations of societies of control—a term 
he coined inspired by William S. Burroughs’s The Electronic Revolution (1970). As 
Deleuze (1992, 3) summarised:
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Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. . . . They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The 
individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each 
having its own laws: first, the family; then the school (“you are no longer in your 
family”); then the barracks (“you are no longer at school”); then the factory; from 
time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the 
enclosed environment. . . . But . . . Foucault recognized as well . . . the transience of 
this model: it succeeded that of the societies of sovereignty, the goal and functions of 
which were something quite different.
To put it succinctly: Societies of sovereignty follow feudal ways of organisation, relaying 
on the central notions of sovereignty, loyalty, punishment, and tradition. Disciplinary 
societies, which appeared with and after the Industrial Revolution, are based upon 
complex systems of training, surveillance, and punishment, using strict methods 
of control, diverse modes of confinement (prison, hospital, classroom, technical 
schools), and severe regulations (training, textbooks, codes). Finally, societies of 
control—whose appearance coincided with the emergence of neo-liberalism in 
the late 1970s—operate in open systems and networks, using floating forms of 
control: people are totally free, but totally surveilled, and complex mechanisms 
of micro-powers replace the once dominant central power display. 
If, on an economic level, the movement was from the handicrafts workshop 
(feudal) to the factory (modern), and to the company (neo-liberal), its mech-
anisms of control changed from the principle of loyalty (sovereignty) to the 
principles of training and discipline, and finally to a generalised obedience to 
the markets focusing on diverse financial strategies. Foucault’s and Deleuze’s 
purpose is not so much to provide a historical description or appreciation of 
these different societies and their respective times, but rather to investigate 
and expose the different ways by which power was exerted, imposed, and 
distributed. Their analysis is always centred upon power relations and their 
implications.
It is not my intention to analyse here Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies 
of Control,” nor to enter a philosophical explanation of these three forms of 
society. What I plan is simply to think about some of the characteristics of such 
societies in relation to the tacit authorities that exert their powers on music per-
formance, especially on the performer. Such an exercise makes sense not just 
because it is urgently needed—otherwise performers risk being marginalised 
and degraded to the role of simple reproducers, losing any creative or intellec-
tual power altogether. 
The first, and probably strongest hierarchy begins with the relation between 
composer and executant, the latter traditionally obeying the former, in a mas-
ter–slave relationship. The composer acts as the sovereign power, which must 
be entirely respected under threat of a break of loyalty—to the composer or 
to his or her supposed intentions. The widespread idea that a performer must 
be “humble” before and respectful to the score and the composer has been an 
efficient repressor of any critical thinking from the performer’s side. Another 
kind of sovereign-like power relation is recognisable in the instrumental mas-
ter–pupil relation. The master (the teacher) supposedly has the key, the secret 
 193
The Emancipated Performer
to understanding the composer’s intentions and the stylistic nuances of a given 
score; the pupil has to obey and repeat what the master tells him or her. The 
masters, be they composers or teachers, of course, always suggest that there 
is much freedom in what one can do, engendering “happy slaves,” performers 
who do not even notice their almost complete absence of creative freedom. In 
addition to these major sovereign authorities, several instances of discipline 
and surveillance are to be found in conservatoires, Hochschulen, or universi-
ties (which resemble Foucault’s institutions of confinement), or in the coded 
forms of specific music editions, particularly those resulting from the ideology 
of the urtext. They all follow the forms of admission (recruitment), training, 
surveillance, and exclusion typical of disciplinary societies. The vast majority 
of young music students do not enter these institutions in order to learn how 
to think critically or how to act creatively or spontaneously. On the contrary, 
they come to learn all the codes and rules, all the prescriptions and opinions 
that will enable them to occupy a predetermined role in society—well behaved 
and tamed. Those who dare to question what is being transmitted and how it is 
being transmitted are frequently ostracised, being recognised as bright spirits 
but ones who do not conform to the house rules.
More recently, other forms of organising music education and music con-
sumption have appeared with astonishing power: on the one hand, summer 
courses, masterclasses, and ad hoc workshops, and, on the other hand, all types 
of seasonal festivals, dominated by (mostly) popularising (if not directly “popu-
list”) programmes and marketing strategies. These are the spots where music 
students, performers, young composers, and audiences feel extremely free—
without noticing that they are totally controlled and alienated by the most sim-
ple and evident forms of marketing. When a festival offers the complete piano 
works of Schumann performed in a single day, who is listening to Schumann’s 
music? Who is articulating the aesthetic, intellectual, and epistemic power 
of these compositions? No one; people are buying tickets just to be part of a 
mass event—one that (again) they are totally free to attend, and where they are 
totally controlled in their behaviour, expectations, and consumption of goods. 
In the face of all these systems of domination, the question is, How can they 
be overcome? How can a new modus operandi be created that will allow per-
formers to be truly creative within the many constraints? How can control over 
historical inherited materials be shared? In order to propose answers to these 
questions, it is necessary to briefly reflect on ways of relating to history and to 
historical materials. I shall do this taking Nietzsche’s view of history and histor-
icity as my starting point. 
4. Nietzsche’s three modes of relation to history: 
monumental, antiquarian, critical 
In the second of the four Untimely Meditations Nietzsche thoroughly explored 
different modes of relating to history, historicity, and historical materials. 
Written in 1873/74, the second Untimely Meditation carries the title “On the Uses 
and Disadvantages of History for Life.” In it, Nietzsche describes three modes 
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of relating to history and the historical: the monumental, the antiquarian, and 
the critical. 
Monumental history is used by those who need great moments from the past 
in order to admire them, idolatrising them and generating an identity out of 
them. The antiquarian mode is used by those who like to stick to the familiar 
and are afraid of seeing their past being “ruined overnight,” to use Nietzsche’s 
expression (1997, 73). Finally, the critical mode is used by those who look for new 
habits and combat humanity’s most inborn heritage (see ibid., 68–77). Behind 
Nietzsche’s notion of a monumental history there is a “fundamental idea of 
the faith in humanity” (ibid., 68), a faith that contains some important dangers: 
the confusion between a monumentalised past and a mythical fiction, which 
easily tends towards idolatry, the cult of oeuvres and personalities, pointing to 
proto-religious processes, to mystifications, and to a generalised and uncritical 
consumption of “classics” of our culture. With the antiquarian mode of relat-
ing to history, Nietzsche means a particular type of veneration of the past, a 
fetishised relationship to past objects, goods, and achievements. This fetishism 
of past things equalises them and might blur the perfect image of monuments 
presented by monumental history. “The antiquarian sense of a man, a com-
munity, a whole people, always possesses an extremely restricted field of vision; 
most of what exists it does not perceive at all, and the little it does see it sees 
much too close up and isolated; it cannot relate what it sees to anything else 
and it therefore accords everything it sees equal importance and therefore to 
each individual thing too great importance” (Nietzsche 1997, 74). Antiquarians 
are so scared of the possibility of losing overnight everything they possess that 
they become obsessed with conserving anything and everything with equal 
care. There, where their ancestors lived, exactly there, do antiquarians wish to 
live forever. Any extra attention given to particularly salient moments (monu-
ments), or any critical remarks on their goods would be seen as profanations of 
the past, which must be banned at all costs. 
Critical history appears at first sight as the most productive in terms of making 
possible some kind of future. Its fundamental trait is the openness to “from 
time to time employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past” 
(Nietzsche 1997, 75). But Nietzsche invests it with a basic negative quality, 
defining critical history as “a history that judges and condemns” (72). Moreover, 
the process of judging and condemning is presented as “bringing [the past] 
before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it” (76). 
The difficult task for us, today, is to think with Nietzsche while focusing on 
the present, asking ourselves whether we can identify in the present (crucially, 
in our global present) those same modes that Nietzsche identified in nine-
teenth-century German culture, when history had just been invented.
Transposing to music performance Nietzsche’s three modes of relating to 
history not only is thinkable but also illuminates some of the positions cur-
rently observable. Monumentalism is clearly traceable in a particular way of 
making music history that is essentially composer-based and focused on com-
positions. It enhances a mythical function, where musical works from the past 
appear as totems, in relation to which any critical or deconstructive operation 
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is unwelcome, and preferably forbidden (taboo function). Musical works are 
seen, in practical terms, as eternal, as basically stabilised entities that share a 
coherence and continuity throughout different epochs and times. The idolatry 
associated with this vision of things leads to the cult of the work, of the com-
poser, and of the “star” interpreter. Everything must be monumentalised—
therefore, we also get larger concert halls, larger festivals, larger collections of 
“complete works,” and so on. Mainstream performers gladly adopt this vision, 
and claim to be humble servants of the composer’s superior intentions, strictly 
obeying a particular score, a specific playing tradition, or orally transmitted 
knowledge, all of which are taken as absolute and unquestionable. 
The antiquarian is obviously recognisable in all the philological and his-
toriographical attempts to bring us back to a lost paradise, to a time when things 
were supposedly in order. Such reconstructions are critical of monumentalism; 
but, at the same time, they also struggle with critically dismantling their objects 
of work, most of which are treated as enduring fetishes, often artificially con-
structed in the sense of invented traditions (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). 
Significantly, this antiquarian position is not confined to a specific historical 
period—it embraces more and more times, including our own. It is the critical 
moment that is most lacking in current performance practices; only a few 
people take the risk to dare to propose some form of serious criticality of past 
musical works within the performance itself. How can performance practices be 
created that go beyond monumentalist and antiquarian modes of representa-
tion? How can criticality be included inside the performative situation?
A crucial point is that if one remains within the traditional image of work 
and aims for conventional musical interpretations, nothing new is really possible. 
The only way to break through, to dissolve parts of the past, and to suggest 
productive futures, is to fundamentally rethink our image of work, and propose 
alternative ways of thinking what musical works are and how they operate and 
function throughout time. 
5. A new image of work
The conception of what an artwork is and of what artistic practices mean are 
thoroughly historical, in the sense that they change over time. Different epochs 
see different things as art; they also see artworks (the “same” artworks) in different 
ways at different times. There is a fundamental historical nature to ideas of art 
and to images of work. Every epoch constructs and obeys its own particular modes 
of conceiving images of work. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, by image of work, 
I mean a complex assemblage of things and parameters, a diagram that enables 
us to think about a given work from a specific point of view. It includes all the 
things that we acknowledge as belonging to the work, as “making the work,” what 
we recognise as being part of the work. It also includes all the mental categories 
through which a given epoch and a given community make sense of these works 
and their possible uses. Very broadly speaking, there are two fundamental, polar-
ising positions: images of work that consider works as solved problems, as systems 
that were stabilised by the composer (in the case of music), that evolved from 
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original chaos into final order (negentropy); and, on the other hand, images of 
work that see works as acts of problematisation, as systems that remain open for 
future encounters with the future (entropy). The first position establishes vertical 
relations between an idealised summit (the Work) and its low-order preparatory 
materials (sketches, diagrams, plans); the second implies connections that are 
more horizontal, flattening those same materials, which are considered on a 
principle of equality, and therefore open to further problematisations. The 
first position implies some mode of transcendence (with its thesis of the end 
of history, the end of art, etc.); while the second relies on immanent processes, 
inventing new configurations that might produce unexpected futures of the past. 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of the musical work has for the 
last three decades been the object of controversial debates between different 
positions, ranging from those who critically reflect upon its historically situated 
construction, to those who affirm its strong ontological (and eternal) charac-
ter; from those who place it in a chimeric transcendental universe, to those who 
only accept its immanent audible mode of appearance. Concurrently, recent 
developments in editorial practices, research on sketches, innovative modes 
of performing music, and the overarching progressive digitisation of musical 
materials contributed to a fully renewed horizon of possibilities. Between 
idealised visions of musical works as fully autonomous entities and material-
ist approaches centred on the specific conditions of music creation and per-
formance, a new space for reflection and future practices opens up precisely in 
the process of constituting. Critical to these new modes of conceiving musical 
entities is taking into consideration the innumerable material objects and 
things that enable the construction of any possible image of work in the first 
place. Before gaining their “identity,” their unmistakable modes of appearance, 
their enduring character, or their “aura,” musical works are constituted as com-
plex conglomerates of things, such as sketches, drafts, manuscripts, first and 
later editions, recordings, analytical charts, reflexive texts, performances, and 
installations. All these things are the basic elements of a multiplicity—a complex 
articulated set of documents and objects, which are open to including materi-
als beyond the specific horizon of the composition—that is, future or even 
extra-disciplinary materials. A renewed gaze upon all the innumerable things 
that actually construe a musical work opens up wider horizons of thought and 
potentiates innovative performance practices. More than what musical works 
are or what music practitioners do, material objects define musical works that 
come under closer scrutiny, enabling a complete new image of work to emerge, 
and a complete renewed horizon of practices evolving from that image. 
According to my notion of musical strata and of stratifications of knowledge, 
all these material objects can be mapped as belonging to different types of 
strata, such as substrata (socio-historical and technological contexts), parastrata 
(documentary sources produced by the composer or close collaborators), epis-
trata (editions, writings, theoretical discourses), metastrata (future perform-
ances), and allostrata (extra-disciplinary or not-directly-related materials). It is 
from these strata that different times, different traditions, and different disci-
plines extract the constitutive components of their specific assemblages of 
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things, defining varying images of work. Conversely, every given image of work 
can be de-stratified and reduced to its basic components, revealing (again) 
specific forms of organising knowledge, establishing hierarchies, and power 
relations. This is important, and one has to stress that every single discipline 
constructs its own specific image of a work. Thus, music philology, music soci-
ology, music history, or music analysis build different images of work of one and 
the same object of study. There is not one work, but a set of materials, which 
are arranged differently and are seen as being “the work”—thus, my insistence 
on the notion of image of work. “Works” do not exist once and for all—they are 
always materially rooted and psychologically driven assemblages of things and 
functions. Whereas musical works have traditionally been seen from authorita-
tive perspectives that prescribed “this score,” “this performance,” “this record-
ing,” “this analysis,” or “this essay,” I propose a fundamental redistribution of 
the available materials, exposing them to their historical, aesthetic, and epi-
stemic situatedness.
Beyond transcendental typologies, beyond extreme or qualified versions 
of Platonism, beyond functional theories of operative concepts, and beyond 
aesthetic considerations coming from certain ivory towers of scholarship and 
academia, I suggest a new image of work, crucially devised in a post-aesthetic 
regime of the arts, where works are no longer seen as static entities, but rather 
as highly elaborated manifolds with potentially infinite constitutive parts. 
In place of a reiteration of uncritically inherited performance practices, this 
perspective offers a methodology for unconventional, critical renderings that 
expose the variety and complexity of the musical materials available today. 
More than repeating what one already knows about a given work, it claims 
the unknown as the most productive field for artistic practices. Rather than 
accepting a reproductive tradition, it argues for an experimental, creative atti-
tude. This attitude requires two fundamental elements: an emancipated lis-
tener (or spectator) and an emancipated performer. 
6. The emancipated performer
The notion of an emancipated spectator is crucial to several contemporary the-
atre and dance performances, and it has been philosophically investigated in the 
last decades by Jacques Rancière, whose book The Emancipated Spectator (2009) 
suggested the title of this chapter. Rancière developed a complex discourse on 
how things become visible and shareable, and on how they are brought together 
by individuals and groups on the basis of an initial community between words, 
gestures, signs, and things. For Rancière, the creation of such assemblages is 
the work of fiction, “which consists not in telling stories but in establishing new 
relations between words and visible forms, speech and writing, a here and an elsewhere, 
a then and a now” (ibid., 102, my emphasis). According to Rancière (2009, 13): 
“Emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between viewing and 
acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure the relations 
between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domina-
tion and subjection.” Rancière insists on the perspective of spectators, who must 
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gain their freedom through emancipating themselves from those structures of 
domination. Spectators don’t receive a ready-to-digest, self-contained “work” in 
front of their eyes, but must construct for themselves some kind of meaning from 
all the materials offered to them during a performance. Obviously, this is only 
possible if the performance and the performers are offering such wider materials. 
If the performers present a “finished” product with a clearly digestible content, 
the spectators would be totally satisfied (or positively overwhelmed) and have no 
need for emancipation whatsoever. Therefore, Rancière’s emancipated spectator 
obviously first requires an emancipated performer—a performer who exposes the 
materials of his or her practice in their inconsistencies and in their potential to 
overcome good and common sense, by means of fostering a profound sense of 
dissensus (Rancière 2009, 48–49):
What there is are simply scenes of dissensus, capable of surfacing in any place and at 
any time. What “dissensus” means is an organisation of the sensible where there is 
neither a reality concealed behind appearances nor a single regime of presentation 
and interpretation of the given imposing its obviousness on all. It means that every 
situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime 
of perception and signification. To reconfigure the landscape of what can be seen 
and what can be thought is to alter the field of the possible and the distribution of 
capacities and incapacities.
Film, video art, photography, installation, music, and all other forms of art can 
rework the frame of our perceptions and the dynamism of our affects. As such, 
they can open up new passages towards new forms of political subjectivation. 
Pamphlet art or aesthetically loaded manifestos will not change society: the 
political power of art doesn’t reside in its explicit content (mots d’ordre), but 
rather in its active redistribution of the sensible, in the suggestion that things 
can be arranged differently, that our senses can be stimulated differently, that our 
relations to the world and between ourselves can be organised differently. This 
is the power of art; to apply it to music performance one needs performers who 
are emancipated from the tacit authorities and disciplinary regimes described 
above. Performance should not be a decorative ornament of our knowledge 
society. Performance is the place par excellence to problematise things and works. 
It is the ideal place to construct and to expose problems; to develop new prac-
tices, and new techniques of thought; to instigate new modes of apprehending 
historical materials; and to operate new distributions of the sensible. Instead of 
reifying works again and again, it is the place to ask questions: How are works 
constructed? How do they function? What interferes with them?
Works are not totally stable entities (as performative “tradition” normally 
assumes), nor totally unstable (as the proponents of deconstruction claimed); 
they are metastable and carry a transformational power. As metastable multiplici-
ties, they have potentialities, tensions, inconsistencies, movement, undecided 
parts, and changeable components. Performance is the place to explore these 
inconsistencies, and to make them operate productively. Beyond interpreta-
tion, performance is the place to embrace experimentation, to establish, on 
the basis of productive contradictions, the possibility of free, creative action for 
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music performers. Interpretation becomes one parameter, not the end goal of 
a performance. And the performer becomes an operator, what Carmelo Bene 
(see Giacchè 1997) called an actorial machine, machining new assemblages of 
things against the grain of their historically inherited constitutive parts. The 
fundamental step, then, is the passage from a passive reproduction of scores 
to an adventurous experimentation with all the available materials, taking real 
decisions, redistributing relations, changing how a given work is perceived, dis-
tributed, communicated.
Music performers risk becoming progressively isolated from aesthetic, intel-
lectual, and critical debates of our day. Their uncritical submission to a musical 
market with simple and clear expectations turns them into a luxurious kind 
of “happy slave,” a condition of which most are unaware. As Roland Barthes 
observed in relation to textual interpretation, one is master and slave at the 
same time: “Je suis a la fois maître et esclave” (Barthes 1979, 5; I am both mas-
ter and slave). Performers must be much more aware of and responsible for 
their actions and acts. My claim for an emancipated performer is an offer to 
change the current state of affairs in music performance of past musical works. 
I hope to contribute to this movement, suggesting modes of operating that 
make music performers a bit less like slaves and a bit more like masters, moving 
from passive modes of musical reproduction to productive, active, and clearly 
creative modes of operating. This is important not only for the performers 
themselves, but also for society in general, because it is vital to have the voice 
and the critical stance of the music practitioner. It is crucial to have perform-
ers who think, who intellectually engage with the problems and delusions of 
their own time, who creatively suggest new modes of organising knowledge, 
and that effectively operate transformations in society. These performers, as 
artists in general might think in a different register, but that register is urgently 
needed as it embraces both rationality and sensibility, logos and pathos. It is 
time to take performers seriously as engaged co-designers of our aesthetic, 
intellectual, and epistemic world; but, of course, only if the performer strives 
for emancipation, which depends on the willingness to creatively engage with 
the potentials inherent to my proposed new image of work. 
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. . . at the borders of time that 
surround our presence . . .*
1. What is the contemporary? 
When thinking about the contemporary I cannot avoid initially thinking about 
it through my own personal acquaintance with the term, an acquaintance that 
is profoundly and biographically related to music, that is to say to contemporary 
music. More than contemporary art or contemporary philosophy, it was in music 
and through the making of music that the question of the contemporary became 
relevant to me: first as a listener, then as a performer, later as a music analyst, 
and sporadically as a composer. Saying “contemporary music” automatically 
triggers in my brain several memories and associations: as a teenager, attending 
the Gulbenkian Contemporary Music Encounters in Lisbon; as a music student 
in Germany, attending the Donaueschinger Tage für Neue Musik; and as an 
advanced student and early-career pianist, in the early 1990s travelling to Venice 
for several concerts at the Biennale Musica. For me, biographically speaking, the 
contemporary is inextricably associated with a rather specific mode of conceiving 
and making art, which I associated first with a particular set of works and authors. 
In general, these are authors who strongly challenge common views on their 
specific art forms and their media, authors who are “difficult” to grasp, whose 
works seem to resist quick judgements and understandings. In this sense, (for 
me) the contemporary was always more concerned with a critical attitude towards 
conventional or common-sense understandings of art than it was with a specific 
historical period, style, or mode of marketing art products. 
The term contemporary music gained wider use in the second half (maybe, even 
more precisely, in the last quarter) of the twentieth century. Music composed 
in the first half of the century was not labelled “contemporary” but “new” (in 
German “Neue Musik”) or as “modern.” So-called modernity in music1 usually 
refers to diverse new orientations in music composition observable between 
1900 and 1933 (though the crucial events happened in a shorter period, 
probably between 1908 and 1913), including impressionism (Debussy, Ravel, 
 * This text was first written for my lecture at the Fourteenth International Orpheus Academy for Music 
and Theory 2017, dedicated to the topic of “Futures of the Contemporary,” held at the Orpheus Insti-
tute on 12 May 2017.
 1 As the music philosopher Gunnar Hindrichs (2004, 133) observed: “Generally, for music there are two 
options of interpretation [of the term “modern”]: used as an overall term, the ‘modern’ age is taken as 
the period beginning around the end of the 18th century, while in more specific usage it refers to the 
time since the start of the 20th century.”
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Dukas), expressionism (Schoenberg, Berg, Webern, Scriabin, certain works by 
Stravinsky), atonality (Schoenberg, Scriabin), and dodecaphony (Schoenberg, 
Webern, Berg). All these different perspectives, with their different techniques 
and aesthetic approaches to composition, shared a common trait: the mani-
festation of the limits (actually, “the end”) of “tonality,” of music understood in 
terms of functional harmony. They all critically reflected upon the exhaustion 
of the Classical-Romantic set of forms, harmonic material, and instrumental 
choices, and they all proposed alternative paths. These composers operated 
what Jean-François Lyotard (1984)—in relation to knowledge in general—
described as processes of “deligitimation” of previous modes of knowledge 
production and consumption. In the case of music, these included the dom-
inant structures of functional tonality, standard forms, instrumental set-ups, 
concert rules, and so on. A “second modernity” in music is usually associated 
with post-1950 developments, particularly related to the Darmstadt Summer 
Courses and their consequences. Especially between 1946 and 1961, under 
the direction of Wolfgang Steinecke, the Darmstadt Summer Courses for New 
Music (Internationale Ferienkurse für Neue Musik) became the main point of 
reference for theorising, discussing, and presenting what was then called the 
avant-garde. It included lectures by music philosophers (Theodor W. Adorno, 
Heinz-Klaus Metzger), musicologists (Carl Dahlhaus, Rudolf Stephan), 
older-generation composers (Edgard Varèse, Olivier Messiaen, Ernst Krenek), 
and young composers (Karlheinz Stockhausen, Pierre Boulez and Luigi Nono, 
and later also John Cage, Helmut Lachenmann, and Brian Ferneyhough). The 
courses functioned as the international forum for new music, the place where 
compositional strategies and concrete modes of doing were openly presented 
and analysed in detail. 
In Paris, the Domaine Musical (1954–73), founded by Pierre Boulez, had a 
different scope, mainly that of producing performances, but shared the idea 
of presenting avant-garde, cutting-edge musical works in dialogue with and 
alongside older pieces. Works by Stockhausen, Boulez, Pousseur, Berio, Kagel, 
or Boucourechliev were performed, but so too were pieces by Guillaume 
de Machaut, Dufay, Bach, Debussy, Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and Messiaen. 
According to Boulez’s foundational statement, the Domaine Musical was meant 
to “produce concerts that would enable the re-establishment of communica-
tion between composers of our time and an audience interested in the promotion of its 
own epoch” (quoted in Steinegger 2012, 107, my translation, my emphasis).2 This 
statement seems to indicate that contemporary music requires not only a spe-
cial kind of composition but also a special kind of audience, one that is “inter-
ested” in “promoting” its own time. It seems to indicate that, in the period 
in which Boulez made the statement (the 1950s), people were more inclined 
to appreciate older epochs of music history than they were the contemporary. 
Therefore, an effort was deemed necessary to “promote” the present, to sup-
port a whole new mode of making, thinking, and apprehending music. The 
 2 “créer des concerts pour qu’une communication se rétablisse entre les compositeurs de notre temps et 
le public intéressé à la promotion de son époque.”
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composers named above, as well as the concert series discussed, include the 
composers and festivals that from the late 1960s on widely became labelled 
“contemporary.” These composers lived in periods, in historical epochs, where 
in general there was little interest in their work—they thus needed a special 
kind of audience. From then on, music festivals featuring this type of music 
were known as festivals of contemporary music, and they attracted a specific 
kind of public. 
It is important to draw a distinction here between the coeval—the contempor-
aneous of a given historically situated time—and the contemporary, which has a 
fundamental critical function (on the identity of the present) and that enables 
a clinical glance (symptomatology) at one’s own time. The notion of contempor-
ary music does not apply to all music that is composed “today,” which in fact in 
the vast majority of cases is not contemporary at all. Music of today is certainly 
contemporaneous, it is coeval to us, but nobody would say that, for example, a 
composer composing a Classical symphony in the style of Haydn today is mak-
ing “contemporary music.” As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “it can be said that some 
works of art produced today somewhere in the world do not belong to contem-
porary art. If today a painter makes a figurative painting with classical tech-
niques, it will not be contemporary art; it will lack the cachet, the distinctive 
criterion of what we call ‘contemporary’” (Nancy 2010, 91). Thus, contemporary 
music, like contemporary art, implies a critical dimension, a distance from the 
everyday world, a detachment from habitus, conventions, and stratifications of 
forms and media. But what, then, is the contemporary?
A first, very simple definition is the one offered by Alain Badiou in 2014— 
actually not one, but two definitions of contemporary art: (1) contemporary art 
is a critical art that it is critical of Classical, Romantic, or even modern forms of 
artistic creation; and (2) contemporary art is an art that is separated from the real, 
and which aims at creating a new real by the mediation of new forms (Badiou 
2014, 6 '12"–6'53"). These apparently simple definitions require the acknow-
ledgement of two distances: distance from art itself, and distance from the 
world. Both distances imply the presence, and importantly the simultaneous 
presence, of diverse planes of “reality,” that is, of diverse times and spaces in 
spatio-temporal overlaying. This multiple temporality, the gap between the 
present and the present, between different planes of the present, is the main 
topic of this chapter, and I will address it in what follows from a variety of per-
spectives: first through Giorgio Agamben’s attempt to define the contempor-
ary, which is indebted to Roland Barthes’s theories of writing and to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s central notion of Unzeitgemäss (and its problematic translations into 
other languages); then through Foucault’s distinction between the present and 
the actual, Charles Péguy’s fringes of time and his notion of the aternal, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s central concept of haecceity, and my own micro-haecceity. All these 
notions and concepts share, in my view, a similar constitutive principle, namely 
the gap between the present and our presence within it, and they define differ-
ent zones of indeterminacy situated at the borders of time; finally, I will con-
clude with a plea for artistic research as the contemporaneous carrier of the 





2. Agamben’s contemporary: Barthes reading 
Nietzsche
In October 2005, Giorgio Agamben opened his seminar at the faculty of architecture 
in Venice with a presentation entitled “What Is the Contemporary?” Agamben’s 
“problem” in “What Is the Contemporary?” (2009), or, better, the question he 
poses, is, “Of whom and of what are we contemporaries?” This question could 
also be given as, How can past artists, philosophers, and artworks be considered as 
being contemporary to us? In this sense, Agamben’s major concern is the relation 
of the present to the past, how this present is defined by its own past, and how 
some moments of the past remain active in the present. Agamben’s questioning 
remains implicitly hermeneutic and interpretative, not addressing the experi-
mental production of newness outside the actuality of our present. According 
to Agamben, the contemporary relates to the present through mechanisms of 
recognition of the present (“actuality”) as something fundamentally archaic. 
Only those able to perceive and identify “the clues and signals of the archaic in 
the most modern and recent” things and events (Agamben 2009, 50) can really 
be considered one’s contemporaries. 
Beginning with a discussion of Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the untimely, 
read through the eyes of Roland Barthes, Agamben’s essay explores the con-
cept of the contemporary in relation to a poem by Osip Mandelstam, to the 
interactions of light and darkness in astrophysics, to fashion, to the notion 
of arkhē, and to the fundamental heterogeneity of different (Pauline) times. 
Strongly inspired by Barthes’s Nietzschean statement that “the contemporary 
is the untimely,”3 Agamben defines the contemporary as “that relationship with 
time that adheres to it through a disjunction and an anachronism” (Agamben 
2009, 41, emphasis removed). For Agamben, contemporariness is a paradox-
ical structure: those who are contemporary see and grasp their own time more 
clearly than others, by virtue of their very disjunction with it. This idea derives 
from Nietzsche’s introduction to his second Untimely Meditation, where he pos-
its that the untimely is that which “act[s] counter to our time and thereby act[s] 
on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come” (Nietzsche 1997, 
60). On our time, counter to our time, for a time to come. But how is it possible to be 
in our time and to act against it? Only through a disconnection and a positive 
anachronism. As Agamben (2009, 40) puts it: “precisely because of this con-
dition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they [the 
untimely] are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own 
time.” “Contemporariness,” Agamben (ibid, 41) continues, “is, then, a singular 
relationship with one’s own time, which adheres to it and, at the same time, 
keeps a distance from it.” Through Nietzsche and Barthes, Agamben stresses 
the fundamental, both existential and experienceable, gap between the present 
and the present: between the present as “what arrives to us,” our presence in it, 
 
 3 Agamben doesn’t provide a specific reference for this quotation, which seems to have been pronounced 
by Barthes during his seminars at the Collège de France in 1978–80, in which he communicated this 
idea several times. However, and despite my efforts, I couldn’t find this precise quotation in the pub-
lished volume La préparation du roman I et II: Cours au collège de France, 1978–1980 (Barthes 2003).
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and our potential departure from it. It is this gap that makes possible criticality, 
problematisation, and the invention of a new world. This gap is the untimely. To 
explore this gap creatively is to become contemporary. That’s how, for Barthes 
(as quoted by Agamben 2009, 40), “the contemporary is the untimely.”4
Barthes introduced the idea that the contemporary is the untimely in the last 
series of his seminars at the Collège de France, in 1979–80, under the general 
title of “The Preparation of the Novel.” He presented a conception of the act 
of writing as an act of resistance against the writer’s own time. In this frame, 
Barthes referred to the untimely character (what he called l’inactualité) of the 
writer as a form of marginalisation, a discrepancy between his interior time 
and the time of the world around him. In the seminar of 16 February 1980, he 
specified this relationship in detail and observed that “actuality constantly 
blackmails whoever intends to forget it” (Barthes 2003, 352, my translation). 
The writer’s responsibility is to counter this blackmail, to offer it a resistance, 
enabling the affirmation of alternative, infinite possible worlds. As Jean-Luc 
Nancy (2010) writes, criticising forms of art with explicit political or timely con-
tent: “Yes, there is form in these works, but a message precedes it and domin-
ates it” (95). Art that directly reacts to the actuality of its day is “not at all art, 
precisely because [it is] pure signification” (96). Actuality must be challenged, 
and that is one of the powers of art. The untimely then would be the result of 
such resistance against actuality. To make contemporary art would be to gener-
ate art objects that operate in an untimely manner, that create or enhance the 
gap between the world and the world, between the present and the present, 
between the I and the I. 
Barthes’s choice of words (inactuel), leaves no doubt that he is referring to 
Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation, “On the Utility and Liability of History 
for Life,” dated February 1874. As is well known, Nietzsche expresses in this 
text his annoyance at many of the most prominent features of the political, 
philosophical, and intellectual landscape of the European culture of his time. 
Central to his critique is the “cultivation of history,” which makes people live 
in a state of suffering, consumed by the “fever of history” (Nietzsche 1997, 60). 
Nietzsche translator and commentator Daniel Breazeale notes:
It was in the Untimely Meditations that Nietzsche first found the courage to “say No” 
to his age and to his fellow scholars, and, hence, to significant parts of his own self. 
(Breazeale 1997, xxv–xxvi)
A perhaps more important feature of the second Meditation is precisely the way in 
which [Nietzsche] seeks simultaneously to concede the inescapable historicity of 
human existence and to affirm the creative capacity of human beings to overcome 
themselves and their past. . . . [Nietzsche’s] project is to show how human life 
requires us to adopt both a “historical” and an “ahistorical” perspective upon 
ourselves. (Breazeale 1997, xv)




The specific use of the term “untimely” (Unzeitgemäss)—with which Nietzsche 
even signed his postcards in that period—deserves a brief commentary. He used 
it for the first time in a letter to Erwin Rhode dated 17 August 1869. In that letter, 
the subject of which is Wagner’s music, which at that time Nietzsche still admired 
unconditionally, Nietzsche looks for an explanation for Wagner’s inability to 
gain public acknowledgement. Contrary to those artists that obtain immediate 
praise from the public, Wagner is described by Nietzsche as someone clinging 
firmly to his own power, with his glance strongly fixed beyond the transient and 
ephemeral—“‘untimely’ in the best sense of the word” (Nietzsche quoted in 
Breazeale 1997, xlv). According to Breazeale: “Any doubt about how Nietzsche 
understood the term ‘untimely’ is removed by a careful reading of Strauss [the 
First Meditation], which is very largely an attack upon the sovereignty of ‘public 
opinion’ as an arbiter of taste, values and truth itself. (Ours, he reminds us in 
section 2 of Schopenhauer as Educator [the 3rd Meditation], is ‘the age of public 
opinion.’) Whereas the slave of public opinion strives always to be ‘timely,’ a 
declared critic of the same will instead flaunt his deliberate ‘untimeliness’” 
(Breazeale 1997, xlv–xlvi). 
The untimely in Nietzsche is opposed to the actual, to everything that in a 
given time contributes to strengthen the archaic structures of timeliness itself. 
It is a way to escape the enormous burden of inherited or dictated values, of 
habits and of all sorts of gregarious practices. What Nietzsche had in mind and 
what he was most powerfully attacking was his time, which was “consumed by 
the fever of history.” Of course, today things have changed significantly, and I 
think our age is even more problematically consumed by the fever not of the 
past but of the present, by the overwhelming dictatorship of the quotidian. 
But, whether we are consumed by history or the present, Nietzsche’s core mes-
sage is how to escape this consumption, how to create a line of flight, how to act 
in our time, counter to our time. 
3. Nietzsche’s untimely :  lost in translation
The translation of Nietzsche’s word untimely has been problematic in many ways, 
and one of these problems affects the translation of Agamben’s essay “What is the 
Contemporary?,” making obscure for English-speaking readers a very important 
point of his argumentation. In an early discussion of Agamben’s essay with my 
colleague Michael Schwab, I referred to the untimely as the “inactual,” as some-
thing distinct from the actual, from dominant, prevailing, and common-sense 
modes of thought. Michael listened to me and went home. Soon, he called me to 
say that what I was saying, specifically the word inactual, was not to be found in 
Agamben’s essay. Fearing I had misunderstood Agamben, I read the essay once 
more, and there it was, at the beginning of its second paragraph: “Le contem-
porain est l’inactuel [intempestivo]” (Agamben 2008b, 8); and, further down, “le 
vrai contemporain . . . se définit comme inactuel [inattuale]” (ibid., 10). I suddenly 
realised that I was reading it in French and that Michael was reading it in English. 
Thus, I checked the English translation, where to my puzzlement I discovered the 
following: “the contemporary is the untimely [intempestivo]” (Agamben 2009, 40), 
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and “those who are truly contemporary . . . are irrelevant [inattuale]” (ibid.). I went 
then to the Italian version, where it reads: “il contemporaneo è l’intempestivo,” 
and “è veramente contemporaneo colui che non coincide perfettamente con (il 
suo tempo) né si adegua alle sue pretese ed è perciò, in questo senso, inattuale” 
(Agamben 2008a). The English translator seems not to be aware of the origin of 
the word, not to know that Agamben is referring back to Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäss, 
thus eliminating from the whole text the dual dimension of actual versus inactual 
that is so crucial to the argument. Instead of a gap between the present and our 
presence in it, one is misled by the assumption that the untimely is something 
simply of the order of the irrelevant.5 
4. .  .  .  at the border of time that surrounds our 
presence . .  .
Before being investigated by Giorgio Agamben, Nietzsche’s untimely had been 
the object of important reflections by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who 
developed it from Nietzsche, Foucault, and from the French poet and essayist 
Charles Péguy. In 1980, in the section “Memories and Becomings, Points and 
Blocks” of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 291–98), just after 
describing how every musician, painter, writer, or philosopher fabricates a punc-
tual system “in order to oppose it, like a springboard to jump from,” Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987, 295) make the Nietzschean claim that “history is made only 
by those who oppose history (not by those who insert themselves into it, or even 
reshape it).” They continue: “This is not done for provocation but happens because 
the punctual system they found ready-made, or themselves invented, must have 
allowed this operation: free the line and the diagonal, draw the line instead of 
plotting a point, produce an imperceptible diagonal. . . .When this is done it 
always goes down in History but never comes from it” (ibid, 295–96). Insisting 
on the centrality of drawing a cutting plane that cuts across chaos to produce a 
plane of composition, Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of “multilinear 
assemblages, which are in no way eternal: they have to do with becoming; they are 
a bit of becoming in the pure state; they are transhistorical” (ibid., 296). In this 
sense, they continue, “there is no act of creation that is not transhistorical and 
does not come up from behind or proceed by way of a liberated line. Nietzsche 
opposes history not to the eternal but to the subhistorical or superhistorical: the 
Untimely, which is another name for haecceity” (ibid., my emphasis). 
With the notion of haecceity, we find yet another way of conceiving the 
untimely. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, haecceity is a concept developed 
by Deleuze and Guattari6 that describes the emergence of a singularity at any 
given scale and field. Crucially, a haecceity does not refer to a fully qualified 
 5 Beyond the translation of Agamben’s essay, the difficulty of translating Nietzsche’s title Unzeitgemässe Be-
trachtungen into other languages is manifest in the various attempts officially made in English: Thoughts 
Out of Season, Untimely Considerations, Unmodern Observations, Unfashionable Observations, Unconventional 
Observations, and Inopportune Speculations (with the subtitle “Essays in Sham-Smashing”). In Neo-Latin 
languages, there is always the option of going for intempestivo (Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish),  
inactual or inatuale (Portuguese and Italian), or extemporaneo (sometimes in Brazilian Portuguese).




space–time, but to a spatio-temporal dynamism. A haecceity is a passage, a 
singular point in space–time that dramatises it, curving it, folding it, giving it 
transient form and temporal structure. In this sense, haecceities can be seen as 
the piercing points, the geometric place of a perforation in a given space–time 
surface (chronos) that opens a passage, a tunnel towards an empty form of time 
(aîon). If so, a haecceity would have strong links to the notion of kairos, the 
inescapable here-and-now of the event.
In the last five years, I have appropriated this notion for the performing arts, 
applying it to music, dance, theatre, and performance. As described in Chapter 
5, particularly focusing on intense and fast moving haecceities, I introduced the 
notion of micro-haecceity, a temporal radicalisation of the concept, collapsing it 
into an infinitesimal fraction of a second, into the radical here-and-now of the 
evolving performance. Such micro-haecceities are characterised by intensive 
negentropic properties, unfolding at very high speed. These special kinds of 
haecceities do not suggest (stable) contemplation, but rather rash (metastable) 
actions. Deleuze’s characteristic example of haecceity—Lorca’s “at five in the 
afternoon” (see Lorca 1997, 263, 265)—has a scenic quality: it evokes a particu-
lar landscape, time of day, temperature, sunlight, inner memories, and so on. 
The performers acting onstage navigate high-speed successions of prolonged 
singularities. There is no time for contemplation; things must happen in the 
unavoidable urgency and imperative sequentially of the here-and-now. Micro-
haecceities are high-energy-loaded and high-speed-moving singularities that 
carry a force of potential from one position to the next. They make up the visible 
or audible part of artistic transductive processes. In their functioning as radical 
becoming they never appear as stable beings, remaining an impulse of virtuality 
from one actualisation to the next. If one thinks, or does, or experiences artistic 
performances with these operations in mind, the Deleuzian notion of capture 
of forces becomes more graspable than ever: the virtual becomes actual in order 
to be instantly dissolved into the virtual again. A performer onstage exempli-
fies such a capture: he or she is not merely reproducing a stratified pre-existing 
entity, but operating a capture of forces (from the virtual) that produces a new 
individuation (actual) as a highly intensive becoming, which immediately—as 
soon as it is generated—points forward to other virtual pre- and after-individu-
alities. Micro-haecceities reveal, therefore, the non-deterministic pasts of their 
individuated constitutive forces and energies, as much as their unpredictable 
futures. By doing so, micro-haecceities reveal that the making of art is a fun-
damentally problematic field—generating and enhancing heterogeneous ten-
sions that produce the conditions of their own (transient) resolutions. If we 
understand the untimely also as the production of micro-haecceities we access 
the now of our becoming, a radical machine capable of piercing the surface of 
our epoch, the strata of our habits, the skin of our self.
In 1991 Deleuze and Guattari once again returned to Nietzsche’s notion of 
the untimely, in What Is Philosophy?, in the context of theorising the present as 
an agencement, not as a stable entity but as an arrangement of complex relations, 
interactions, and psychological processes. For them, there is not one present 
but a simultaneous multiplicity of temporalities. In a dense page devoted to 
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the French writer and novelist Charles Péguy and his definition of an event, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 112) briefly introduce Péguy’s concept of the ater-
nal, Plato’s nun, and Foucault’s actual. Interestingly, these concepts are pre-
sented in relation to Nietzsche’s untimely, on which they seem to be variations. 
Péguy’s explanation of the event in his novel Clio led him to create a neolo-
gism, the aternal (in French l’internel), a term that describes something that “is 
no longer the historical, and . . . is not the eternal” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
111). Deleuze and Guattari write: “Péguy had to create this noun to designate 
a new concept. Is this not something similar to that which a thinker far from 
Péguy designated Untimely [Intempestif] or Inactual [Inactuel]—the unhistorical 
vapor that has nothing to do with the eternal, the becoming without which 
nothing would come about in history but that does not merge with history?” 
(ibid., 111–12). Quoting from Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation, Deleuze 
and Guattari then discuss the temporal relations between past, present, and 
future, in a passage that recalls similar paragraphs from Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, 
in which a Stoic conception of time had been presented. What is new in the 
section on Péguy in What Is Philosophy? is the link to Foucault’s notion of the 
actual, which Deleuze and Guattari derive from Plato’s nun. Nietzsche’s “acting 
counter to the past, and therefore on the present, for the benefit . . . of a future” 
points to a future that “is not a historical future, not even a utopian history, it 
is the infinite Now, the Nun that Plato already distinguished from every present: 
the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a becoming” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 112, my emphasis). To complicate things a bit more, Deleuze and 
Guattari ask whether Péguy’s aternal [internal], Nieztsche’s untimely [inactuel], 
and Foucault’s actual are not the same thing: 
But how could the concept now be called the actual when Nietzsche called it the 
inactual? Because, for Foucault, what matters is the difference between the present 
and the actual. The actual is not what we are but, rather, what we become, what we 
are in the process of becoming. . . . The present, on the contrary, is what we are 
and, thereby, what already we are ceasing to be. We must distinguish not only the 
share that belongs to the past and the one that belongs to the present but, more 
profoundly, the share that belongs to the present and that belonging to the actual. 
It is not that the actual is the utopian prefiguration of a future that is still part of our 
history. Rather, it is the now of our becoming. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 112)
Deleuze and Guattari’s very specific reference here is to chapter 5 of part 3 
of Michel Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge, significantly entitled “The 
Historical a priori and the Archive” (see Foucault [1972] 2002, 142–48). Theorising 
the archive, Foucault claims that the “the proper task of a history of thought, as 
against a history of behaviors or representations . . . [is] to define the conditions 
in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the world 
in which they live” (Foucault [1985] 1992, 10). As part of this effort, Foucault 
identified a particular zone in which problematisation occurs, a zone where 
different temporalities come into contact, friction, and eventually destruction.
The analysis of the archive, then, involves a privileged region: at once close to us, 
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and different from our present existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our 
presence, which overhangs it, and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that which, 
outside ourselves, delimits us. The description of the archive deploys its possibilities 
. . . on the basis of the very discourses that have just ceased to be ours; its threshold 
of existence is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can 
no longer say, and from that which fails outside our discursive practice; it begins 
with the outside of our own language . . . ; its locus is the gap between our own discursive 
practices. (Foucault [1972] 2002, 147, my emphasis) 
It is this gap—the gap between the present and the present, between the present 
and our presence within it (which is another way of conceiving the Lacanian gap 
between the I and the I)—that creates the conditions for a diagnosis. Not a positivist 
diagnosis that would lead to a clear prescription and cure, but a diagnosis that 
(paradoxically) creates its own problems, without which our existence would be 
infinitely less interesting and less fruitful. It is a diagnosis that “deprives us of 
our continuities; it dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to 
look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history. . . . In 
this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our identity by the play 
of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the differ-
ence of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of 
masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered origin, is this 
dispersion that we are and make” (Foucault [1972] 2002, 147–48, my emphasis).
This dispersion occurs in our lives, our activities, and our artistic practices. 
It happens as a complex arrangement of different temporalities, discourses, 
and masks—all moving at different paces (fast and slow), with different accel-
erations (stratifications and ruptures), and with different temperatures (hot 
and cold). This means that no present is ever One, no present can ever be a 
stable entity, no simultaneity can be fully grasped. As in the inner eye of a hur-
ricane, we find ourselves in a dispersive and explosive column of air rotating 
at high speed, a violent storm that doesn’t blow forward towards the future 
(Benjamin’s progress) but that revolves around itself, throwing objects, things, 
ideas, and feelings towards innumerable other compossible futures, which 
exist now. If there is progress (in Benjamin’s terms), it is convoluted rather than 
linear progress, incoherent, not unifiable, not deductible in its succession, and 
in centripetal rotation around an empty centre. 
5. Artistic research as the carrier of the 
contemporary
Barthes, Agamben, and even Foucault relate to the past. Agamben’s strongest 
examples in What is the Contemporary? are the notion of arkhē and Saint Paul. In 
relation to arkhē, Agamben (2009) writes, “only he who perceives the indices and 
signatures of the archaic in the most modern and recent can be contemporary” 
(50). And he adds, “the key to the modern [in art and literature] is hidden in the 
immemorial and the prehistoric” (51). He concludes, “to be contemporary means 
in this sense to return to a present where we have never been” (51–52). In this 
respect, my perspective is totally different: it is not about a return, but about the 
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invention of a present to which we have never been—an invention that can only 
be accomplished by what Paul Klee suggested was a people to come7—not a people 
from the future but people from today looking at our own time in a completely 
renewed way. However, Agamben does not refer to Paul Klee, nor to any kind 
of futurity, but to Saint Paul and his “being-contemporary with the Messiah, 
which he calls . . . the ‘time of the now’” (52). For Agamben, the new present is 
to be built after insightful understanding of subtle signs from the remote past, 
a perspective that implies some sort of primordial lost paradise and some kind 
of lost sense that ought to be recuperated. 
Foucault doesn’t believe that history is a product of (modern) sense. But his 
continued obsession was the archive, and its many different modes of forma-
tion, stratification, and modulation. Foucault’s archive is highly heterogen-
eous, articulating a multiplicity of historical dimensions without any clear-cut 
dialectics that would define its limits and borders. Foucault’s historical meth-
odology looks at the past not for the past’s sake, but to understand how we 
became what we are today. Even if not historiographical in conventional terms, 
his approach remains that of a historian, of someone investigating past facts, 
documents, and events. This explains his numerous histories: of madness, of 
the hospital, of the prison, of knowledge, of infamous people, of sexuality. Self-
ironically, Foucault said about himself, “I am a historian of ideas after all. But 
an ashamed, or, if you prefer, a presumptuous historian of ideas. . . . I cannot be 
satisfied until I have cut myself off from ‘the history of ideas,’ until I have shown 
in what way archaeological analysis differs from the descriptions of ‘the history 
of ideas’” (Foucault 2010, 152). 
Thus, moving beyond Agamben’s, Barthes’s, and Foucault’s relation to hist-
ory and historicity, my view and my proposal are different—they point towards 
the futures of the contemporary and its manifold possibilities of constitution, for-
mation, and reinvention of connectors. More so than other modes of research, 
artistic research has the power to reverse the arrow of research: where inter-
preters investigate the archive, looking into the past, into the arkhē, or into 
the global present, artistic researchers can look into the abysses of the present in 
order to grasp its futures, exploring the diagnostic function of art, contributing 
to a symptomatology of one’s own epoch.
Artistic research can also be conceived as performing historical or his-
toriographical research as a means to reactualise older forms, technical objects, 
or modes of expression. But my position is that artistic research’s most interest-
ing perspectives are those that more explicitly relate to the future. My quest is 
never to try to find out how things really were in the past, nor is it the Foucauldian 
 7 Paul Klee’s famous claim that modern art hadn’t yet found its “people” can be found at the end of his 
short treatise On Modern Art, which he prepared as the basis for a lecture that he delivered in Jena in 
1924 (see Read 1948, 7). More than “a people to come,” he insists on the notion of a still “missing peo-
ple.” The passage is as follows: “Sometimes I dream of a work of really great breadth, ranging through 
the whole region of element, object, meaning and style. This, I fear, will remain a dream, but it is a good 
thing even now to bear the possibility occasionally in mind. Nothing can be rushed. It must grow, it 
should grow of itself, and if the time ever comes for that work—then so much the better! We must go on 
seeking it! We have found parts, but not the whole! We still lack the ultimate power, for: the people are not with 
us. But we seek a people” (Klee 1948, 54–55, my emphasis). 
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analysis of how we became what we are today; rather, I want to discover how we can 
become today what today we aim to be. Or, how we can depart from today, even without a 
clear destination in mind or safe ports to reach. The future is contained in the present 
but remains concealed to itself. I am close to Agamben, but with a significant 
turn: my point is that to be contemporary doesn’t mean to return (Agamben) but 
to invent a present where we have never been. At the borders of time and space 
defined by the violent hurricane of the present, we need to build the future 
rather than rescue the past. This future will not solve the storm, but it will gen-
erate new tensions and new inconsistencies, as well as new points of reference, 
new singularities in the ever-expanding manifold of art, life, and society. In this 
sense, I believe that artistic research has a very important role in the art world of 
today, especially in its capacity to generate new forms and modes of expression 
that are rigorous rather than accidental and at the same time indeterminate. 
Artistic research asks how we can create in the midst of complex arrangements 
of different temporalities, how we can artistically and creatively operate inside 
the furious inner eye of the multiple hurricanes we are living in—how we can 
live at the border of time that surrounds our presence and find the courage to 
jump into the core of the hurricane, from where we return “breathless and with 
bloodshot eyes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 172). 
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Beyond Urtext:  
A Dynamic Conception  
of Musical Editing 
1. On notation and time
When considering the musician’s relation to notation in the Western music 
tradition, a fundamental distinction between two strongly connected but indeed 
different approaches should be made. On the one hand, there is the composer, 
who engenders a structure, which he or she encodes according to the codes of 
his or her own time and space; on the other hand, there is the performer, who 
decodes the message of the composer, rendering the structure that was given 
to him or her. The first approach deals mainly with writing, the second with 
reading. The first creates the bases for future performances; the second—while 
keeping the piece alive through different time/spaces—refers to and relies upon 
past compositions. The composer lives and works in a given historical time; the 
performer (and the listener) lives in a different environment, being surrounded 
by different rules and codes, which include specific performing codes as well as 
changeable listening expectations. 
The time–space of the composition (time A) is historically fixed; the time–
space of the performance/reception (time B) is movable. Consequently, time 
continuously expands between the two points. “Time B” tries to hold “time 
A” in its hands, but the relentless wind of history pushes it forward, creating 
a steady growing gap between them. “Time A” and “Time B” are connected by 
two chains. One is not notated; it is called “tradition” and aspires to guarantee 
a correct transmission of performance codes through dozens of generations, 
pretending to ignore not only that different times have different codes but also 
that any form of oral transmission unavoidably infects the original information 
with codes and perspectives inherent to its current time. The other chain is 
based on the composer’s notation, and it is (arguably) supposed to be more 
independent of tradition. This chain tries to make the original signs and sym-
bols comprehensible to the notational system of the performer, and it is called 
an “edition.” It constitutes the element where both times (A and B) converge, 
which results in the most decisive communication between composer and per-
former happening via the score. Time A is fixed and Time B is movable; thus, to 
adequately fulfil the demands of Time B, the score must also be movable (i.e., 
changeable), thus surpassing the once dominating illusion of a musical text 





The present essay aims to bring to the foreground the complex issue of music 
editing, emphasising and deconstructing its historically rooted essence and 
placing it in the realm of history. Before considering such immaterial and/or 
subjective elements as “tradition,” “analysis,” “intuition,” “mimesis,” or even 
“performance,” a thorough discussion of music “editions” is of primary import-
ance for a deeper understanding of our musical heritage. In arguing that no 
edition—existing, projected, or future—can pretend to be definitive, this essay 
points toward a dynamic conception of musical editing. Inspired by the writings 
of James Grier (1996) and Peter Gülke (2006), this conception is based upon 
the idea that the editor and the performer are invested with an unavoidable 
authority over musical texts of the past, an authority they share with the com-
poser. “Editing . . . consists of series of choices, educated, critically informed 
choices; in short, the act of interpretation. Editing, moreover, consists of the 
interaction between the authority of the composer and the authority of the 
editor” (Grier 1996, 2). The significance of each musical sign depends on con-
text and convention. When the historical moment of writing has passed, the 
specific context and ensemble of conventions at work at that time will change; 
new observers (editors, performers, and listeners) will use their own conven-
tions to interpret signs and symbols. Moreover, as Adorno (2006, 4) suggests, 
the score needs “to be derived as a memorial trace of the ephemeral sound, 
not as a fixing of its lasting meaning.” Beyond the urtext concept—meanwhile 
simply transformed into a commercial hallmark—another model is increas-
ingly imposing itself: that of transitory historical-critical editions, where the 
editor and, moreover, the performer him- or herself have to make choices 
and take decisions. Such editions are simultaneously witnesses and makers of 
a new attitude towards music from the past, an attitude that creatively con-
siders the historical relationship between composer and performer and that 
encourages performers and philologists to converge and work together. In this 
perspective, the innumerable editions of past music—originating in different 
times and spaces—might now be seen as a fascinating pile of debris: historical 
documents that are no longer in use, and are obviously dated, but that con-
tain precious information on the entangled history of a given piece. Creatively 
wandering through different sources, sketches, autographs, and first prints, as 
well as through diverse pre-existing editions, might beneficially lead to new 
editions and new, challenging interpretations of “old” works. At this point, the 
surpassed but still active urtext concept should be briefly addressed. 
2. The urtext era
The first musical editions labelled urtexts date back to 1895, when the Königliche 
Akademie der Künste Berlin published its Urtext-Ausgaben Classischer Musikwerke. 
These editions—inspired by nineteenth-century editions of literary, philosoph-
ical, or biblical texts—claimed to present a musical text free from editorial 
intervention, a “clean” text, with no performance instructions added by editors 
(as opposed to former musical editions, particularly of the second half of that 
century). Their original aim was praiseworthy, since they intended to present 
219
Beyond Urtext: A Dynamic Conception of Musical Editing
the composer’s notation in “crude” state, letting it speak for itself, and allowing 
performers, especially students, to build up their own interpretations, free from 
predetermined aesthetical directions. However, two basic objections soon troubled 
this idyllic vision, indicating that urtext editions could not achieve what they 
purported to do. Günter Henle himself noted in 1954—on his statement on the 
term urtext—that sometimes an autograph and a first edition differ considerably, 
in which case the editor must decide what to print (Henle 1954, 379); in such 
cases, the text ceases to be an urtext and becomes the editor’s interpretation of 
the available sources. On the other hand, Georg Feder stated in 1959 that urtext 
editions must be critical editions (Feder and Unverricht 1959), thus underlining 
the necessity of source studies and broader research and opening the door to 
future developments. But when an urtext edition is superseded by subsequent 
scholarship it is no longer an urtext. All these observations, among many others, 
underline the conclusion that urtext editions are not what they claim to be. They 
do not present “the composer’s written text, but the editor’s reconstruction of 
it” (Grier 1996, 11). The urtext concept also struggles with music prior to the late 
eighteenth century (there is no evidence that composers before this time were 
concerned whether autograph scores should be followed exactly or only in one 
specific way) and with the theory of the “Fassung letzter Hand” (which involves 
complex questions about when composers consider works to be complete). 
Moreover, few sources—even from the nineteenth century—can be transcribed 
into a modern notational system without editorial intervention. Therefore, the 
use of the word urtext in the context of musical editions is highly problematic, and 
its widespread usage during the twentieth century should be seen primarily as a 
time-bound editorial response to the abuses of several “interpretative editions” 
from the late nineteenth century.
3. Urtext editions: an epistemological obstacle
Although urtext editions have been widely criticised by scholars for decades, 
they have kept an aura of authenticity and legitimacy among music pedagogues 
and performers that goes far beyond a mere phenomenon of marketing. Not 
always aware of the aesthetic or philosophical implications of their choices and 
decisions, many performers are victims of the mimetic illusion of an “intuitive” 
understanding of the score—ignoring that intuition is historically (and education-
ally) moulded. By considering urtext editions to be a valid counterweight to the 
interpretative editions of late Romanticism, music pedagogues and performing 
artists persist in ignoring the possibilities more recently offered by critical and 
digital editions. Therefore, urtext editions became de facto—and using Gaston 
Bachelard’s famous notion—an epistemological obstacle: a thoughtless, unconscious, 
or simply comfortable structure, through which a community recognises important 
elements of identity, without noticing that such a structure no longer applies to 
the environment around them. According to Bachelard the history of science 
consisted in the formation and establishment of such epistemological obstacles, 
and then the subsequent tearing down of those obstacles. This latter stage is an 
epistemological rupture—where an unconscious obstacle to scientific thought is 
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thoroughly ruptured or broken away from. Although such a rupture with the idea 
of an urtext is widespread among scholars (see Grier 1996; Fellerer 1980; Feder 
1987; et al.), it is much less so among practitioners. The majority of musicians 
accept, uncritically, what they believe to be a “scientifically” thoroughly worked 
edition. Urtext editions supposedly responded both to a utilitarian conception 
(for performers, who wanted an easily readable text) and to scientific demands 
(where musicologists imposed high standards on critical apparatus and com-
ments). These critical tools were useful and trustworthy, ensuring performers 
had a reliable text where “everything” was notated. The double task of, on the 
one hand, making the unavoidable provisional character of any given edition 
appear reasonable (apparently contradicting the scientific tenet of the whole 
critical project) and, on the other hand, stimulating performers to think and 
make decisions on their own is a difficult endeavour. In many different ways, 
urtext editions create a “commodity” for the user: if the written musical text is 
“scientifically” correct, the performer does not need to consider it in any depth; 
if the fingerings are, at least to a certain extent, the composer’s originals (or 
suggested by an experienced editor), the reader trusts them, without exploring 
diverse fingerings; if there are conflicting readings, but the editor has decided 
which to print in the main text, there is no reason to read the critical notes and 
enter a world of doubt. In a nutshell: the survival of urtext editions might be 
understood to relate to convenience, to the aesthetical and technical security 
of traditional performers who don’t want to revisit their aesthetical categories 
or reconsider their “universal” instrumental technique. Interest in new forms of 
editions and the acceptance of those editions by performers, therefore, relate to 
curiosity and a mental disposition that welcomes newness, which not all prac-
titioners have. Finally, the process of getting rid of the urtext concept implies 
critical thinking, something that not all musicians consider a positive quality.
4. Critical editing of music and different types of 
editions 
The present editorial landscape offers both scholars and performers a wide range 
of editions, from facsimile prints to complex and exhaustive critical editions. 
In modern practice, some basic assumptions have become fundamental to any 
serious edition. The first such assumption is that editing is a critical activity. 
Therefore, editions constitute interpretative endeavours and cannot claim to be 
definitive. Accordingly, no edition—existing, projected, or still to come—can 
pretend to be definitive. Different editors working on the same basic materials 
will unavoidably produce different editions; the same editor, working at differ-
ent times, will also achieve different texts. As Philip Brett observed (1988, 111), 
“editing is principally a critical act; moreover it is one (like musical analysis) 
that begins from critically based assumptions and perceptions that usually go 
unacknowledged. If these assumptions were to be openly stated, if we began to 
recognize and allow for legitimate differences in editorial orientation, and if we 
ceased to use the word ‘definitive’ in relation to any edited text, then much of 
the polemics surrounding editing might subside.” 
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Moreover, different repertories require different editorial methods, which 
shows that no universal method is applicable to every piece of music. Given 
that an edition always reproduces the historical relationship between com-
poser, editor, and performer, an editor should immerse him- or herself in the 
stylistic, technical, and performing features of the composer’s time–space, 
including the piece’s rendering as a performance. 
Currently, four basic types of editions are to be found: (1) photographic fac-
similes; (2) printed editions that replicate the original notation; (3) interpret-
ative editions; (4) critical editions (including the so-called Commented New 
Urtext Edition). 
The photographic facsimile, strictly speaking, is not an “edition.” It depicts 
one of the major sources of a given piece, providing immediate visual infor-
mation and, therefore, strengthening the link to the composer’s gesture of 
writing. Many nuances of the manual graphical representation that an edited 
text cannot represent become directly visible. In addition, facsimiles are gener-
ally easier to use than a composer’s manuscripts and autographs. On the other 
hand, facsimiles are very often unsuitable for general reading since the hand-
writing may be legible only to a few specialists, as is the case with Beethoven, to 
give one example. 
Printed replicas of original notation are a form of facsimile, using printed 
fonts instead of photographic images. Keeping Beethoven’s case in mind, 
such editions turn a composer’s sketches and autographs into legible sheets 
of music. Moreover, editors have the opportunity to incorporate some of their 
critical findings, including revisions and corrections to the text, making such 
editions a step towards critical editions. Therefore, editors include some kind of 
critical apparatus, explaining and giving insight into the decisions made. 
Interpretative editions record aspects of important performer’s performing 
styles. They transmit a kind of oral tradition and have an inevitable self- 
referential (and self-legitimating) character—the editor (normally a famous 
performer) prints his or her own interpretative options and establishes them 
as canon. Such interpretative editions, particularly those of the late nineteenth 
century, motivated, in reaction, urtext editions. During the twentieth century 
(especially in the second half ), the production of interpretative editions dwin-
dled to a small number; however, recent developments in the urtext concept 
are reviving the tradition, even if these developments are limited to fingerings, 
bowings, and explicitly assumed personal opinions. This type of edition will 
probably always exist, since it records in written form significant aspects of 
the performing style of a given era. In doing so, it produces a complex artefact 
where inherited “tradition” and critical “editions” somehow melt together: 
“Great performers study with great teachers, who pass on insights into the 
meaning of the work from previous generations” (Grier 1996, 151). Given that 
increasingly more performers have a solid academic training (enabling them 
to become artist-researchers, who understand how to critically tackle different 




Critical editions are defined by their basic intention of transmitting a text 
that more closely represents the historical evidence of their sources. This evi-
dence is, however, open to interpretation and discussion, leading to different 
editions based upon the same sources. This aspect should not be understood 
as a problem, but rather as an enriching element in the fabric of music edit-
ing, which is an activity that, finally, remains in the field of human sciences. 
Such editions should aim for clarity of presentation, allowing immediate 
comprehension and coordination of the many disparate elements that are 
being communicated through the score. If too much information is given in 
the main printed text (the score to be more immediately read) the performer 
will be confused and, eventually, limited in his or her mimetic response to the 
score. Therefore, a balance between fidelity to what the editor retains as being 
essential to the music and ease of comprehension is of the utmost relevance. 
Furthermore, a detailed critical apparatus and individual readings or commen-
taries are highly desirable, for only they allow the performer to make informed 
choices. Finally, such editions should open a window to the performer’s faculty 
of judgement, rather than exempting users from thinking and taking decisions 
for themselves. This aspect, once again, highlights that performers ought to 
be adventurous and open to novelty: “Critical editions should generate critical 
users” (Grier 1996, 181). 
5. Music editing and performance practice: a dynamic 
conception 
The ideas on music editing exposed so far suggest a process by which the score is 
transformed from a static and fixed state to a state of permanent changeability. 
This conceptual shift leads to a new understanding of the roles of both editors 
and performers. According to Jerome McGann’s (1983) theory of the work of art 
as a social phenomenon, every work is a social and historical artefact; this would 
include every edition of music. If it is difficult (if not impossible) to assert a final 
authorial intention, the process of editing changes from a psychological activity 
(where the editor ought to establish “the author’s intentions”) to a historical 
endeavour. At this point, the composer’s authority comes face to face with two 
other forms of authority: that of the editor and that of the performer.
The editor’s authority has traditionally been underestimated, neglected, 
or even considered illegitimate. “Music editors are often reluctant to assume 
authority over the texts they print, wishing to give the appearance that they 
present only the text of the composer. And so they rely, or appear to rely, on 
the sources themselves instead of acknowledging their own critical initiative. 
Nowhere is this tendency more transparent than in the Urtext industry, whose 
products purport to reproduce the ‘original’ text” (Grier 1996, 4). Different 
from the composer’s text, the final edited text inevitably reflects the editor’s 
conception of the piece as it existed in its ecological (historical and social) 
environment. The performer’s authority involves more complex issues, par-
ticularly related to the concept of style, a category that directly influences the 
effect (and the judgement) of a given performance. Style, however, is not com-
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pletely extractable from the score, as it depends much more on the diversity 
of performing options that each work generates. “It is essential to incorporate 
the intermediary stage of performance into the concept of style because of the 
semiotic nature of musical notation” (Grier 1996, 29). But the authority of the 
performer does not only reside here; by placing the concept of music editing 
in the realm of history, the performer’s role becomes that of a meta-reader of a 
musical text, facing and studying continuously changing visions of one single 
work. 
An image taken from Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History” might help us clarify this point. In his ninth thesis, Walter Benjamin 
uses imagery to express his concept of history. An angel—from Paul Klee’s 
Angelus Novus—stares into the past, while a strong wind pushes him irremedi-
ably towards the future, which nevertheless he cannot see. He gazes into the 
past, terrified: “Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catas-
trophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his 
feet” (Benjamin [1968] 1999, 249, my emphasis). He longs to piece together 
what has been smashed, but the storm blowing from Paradise is so strong that 
the angel can no longer close his wings. This Angelus Novus can be seen as the 
contemporary performer. The angel is the meta-reader of infinite musical texts. 
He looks into the “past” from where uncountable musical objects and things 
look back at him, hoping to be saved from oblivion. In addition to sketches and 
manuscripts, he sees another unending pile of debris: the innumerable musical 
editions originating in different times and spaces. The impossibility of looking 
at (predicting) the future or of returning to (incarnating) the past gives him no 
other choice than to creatively wander through all the ruins of the past, study-
ing autographs and first edition prints, consulting other sources, comparing 
editions, playing period instruments, and, finally, confronting them all with 
his own contemporary condition, making decisions and moving beyond hist-
ory and historicity. Inevitably, such decisions in one way or another will depict 
the historical relationship between the time of the performer and the time of 
the composer as it is understood in the time of the performer. That some of these 
decisions may contribute to new editions of a given piece is one possible con-
sequence of this model of thought. “This succession of events demonstrates 
that editing music, far from being an exact science, presents, in fact, a mov-
ing target. As our knowledge of repertories and their sources deepens, and 
our critical appraisal of that knowledge continues, new editions are needed to 
keep pace with, and reflect, the latest developments” (Grier 1996, 9). Instead of 
rigidly insisting on the reification of a particular state of a work, this dynamic 
conception emphasises the process through which a musical work comes into 
being and thus requires creative performers whose intelligence and sensibil-
ity can contribute to a permanent renewal of the editorial landscape. Editions 
represent, therefore, nodal points on the continually changing path of musical 
scholarship and performance. Historically observed variations and differences 
in the written and performing traditions of a given piece make visible the limits 
of indeterminacy, without fixing them. Such limits will never be fixed because 
new performers will continue to challenge and redefine them. In this sense, the 
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act of communicating a piece to an audience becomes a fully relevant part of 
the creative process, entering a dialogue in which the context impinges on the 
final form and sense-making of a work. 
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The Conditions of  
Creation and the Haecceity 
of Musical Material: 
Philosophical-Aesthetic  
Convergences between Helmut 
Lachenmann and Gilles Deleuze
Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived 
experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts 
ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, 
but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-
now, or rather as an Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, different 
distributed “heres” and “nows.” (Deleuze 1994, xix)
Sound as something real and palpable, as a “natural phenomenon” taking place here 
and now, evokes a mode of listening previously excluded from the musical medium, 
or at least neglected in reflections upon it, which treats sound as a phenomenon of 
nature. (Lachenmann 2004, 64)
1. Helmut Lachenmann and Gilles Deleuze:  
an unconnected connection
Starting in 1966–67 with the radio conference “Klangtypen der Neuen Musik” 
on typology of sounds (see Lachenmann [1967] 1996),1 Helmut Lachenmann 
developed a complex set of concepts about art in general and music in particular 
that gave shape to an aesthetic methodology grounded in structural thinking 
(see Lachenmann 2004). Reflecting upon questions such as What is art?, What 
is composing?, What are the conditions of the musical material?, What are the 
political implications of art?, and How does art relate to society?, Lachenmann 
was able to build a theoretical framework based on three “theses on compos-
ing,” four “conditions of the musical material,” and five “types of sound.” Such 
a framework is intended to be not a closed system of contemporary aesthetics 
 1 The radio conference was broadcast in spring 1967 (Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Cologne), but Lachen-
mann started working on the manuscript in 1966 (see Lachenmann 1996, 429).
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but a fundamental referential tool for the concrete practice of composing—
defining Lachenmann’s own route, and giving insight into his musique concrète 
instrumentale, a music that aims to liberate the energetic potential of concrete 
(immanent) sound bodies and processes.
Several aspects of Lachenmann’s theories point to a unique understand-
ing of the conditions of creation, and to an idea of the radical immanence of 
musical material that can be productively brought into dialogue with several of 
Gilles Deleuze’s key concepts. Although references to Deleuze do not appear 
in Helmut Lachenmann’s writings (see Lachenmann 1996), and although 
Lachenmann’s name is not to be found in Deleuze’s books, it is my aim to 
enable an encounter between Deleuze’s extended ideas on the art, creation, 
and haecceity of material and elements of Lachenmann’s aesthetic/compos-
itional methodology. Thus, this text is not a hermeneutic essay on Deleuze’s 
reflections on music, nor is it a mere exposition of Lachenmann’s theor-
etical framework: it is an attempt to bring together, to produce an encounter 
between two thinkers who generated thoughts in an unnoticed neighbourhood—
to realise an unconnected connection. To do this, I first emphasise the origins 
of Lachenmann’s “aesthetic methodology,” before entering into a dialogue 
between specific elements of such methodology and specific Deleuzian con-
cepts. Through its discussion of philosophical and aesthetic convergences 
between a philosopher who wrote extensively on art and a composer with 
strong philosophical interests, this essay aims to contribute new understand-
ings of art as philosophical practice.
2. Helmut Lachenmann: toward an aesthetico-
structural methodology
During the second half of the 1960s, after studies with Luigi Nono in Venice 
(1958–60) and Karlheinz Stockhausen in Cologne (1963–65), Helmut Lachenmann 
became increasingly aware of (1) the social implications and function of music 
and (2) the centrality of the processes of concrete listening. These focal points of 
thought led to a thorough and critical reflection on the conditions of the musical 
material. Instead of embracing an existing critical theory, Lachenmann thought 
for himself, even if he took some existing philosophies and aesthetic positions 
as starting reference points (such as those of Lukács, Marcuse, Benjamin, and 
Adorno); nevertheless, he developed them into a personal construction founded 
upon structural thinking: “I personally do not believe that one can do without 
structural thinking. However, structural thinking and its techniques must con-
stantly be proved by confronting them with reality. They must lose themselves, 
find themselves, and define themselves anew. Music only has meaning when it 
points beyond its own structure to other structures and relationships—that is, 
to realities and possibilities around us and within us” (Lachenmann [1979] 1996, 
62, my translation).
Crucially, Lachenmann was able to identify “tonal” categories in the experi-
ence and perception of music composed by the most extreme avant-garde 
composers of the post–Second World War generation. In 1970 he noticed that 
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“the break with tonality—be it in the works of the Viennese atonal school, or 
in more recent serialist works—never really overthrew the tonal categories of 
perception, and the aesthetic consciousness attached to them [which functions 
as] as a last refuge for bourgeois thinking” (Lachenmann [1971] 1996a, 145, my 
translation).2 The avant-garde was suffering the consequences of the previous 
(tonal) use of musical materials and was incapable of liberating itself from 
these uses and materials. The composer’s first task, thus, needed to be a thor-
ough, critical, and uncompromising reflection on the basic materials of com-
position. From this perspective, radical reflection becomes the condition sine 
qua non for composing and art-making in general. In Lachenmann’s formula: 
“Art [understood] as the result of a radical reflection on its own aesthetic means 
and categories of experience. . . . Art as the product and witness of thought; as 
the carrier of insecurity” ([1971] 1996b, 95, my translation). 
For Lachenmann, art must be grounded in a clinical analysis of the material, 
an investigation that addresses both pre-existing layers (what he would call ton-
ality and aura) and two more self-oriented ones (corporeity and structure). The 
proximity to Deleuze’s clinical function of art3 is the first sign of a more profound 
vicinity of thought. For Lachenmann, purely constructive, additive ways of 
composing (“putting things together”), while they might generate coherent 
sound objects, do not convey any “existential experience”; on the other hand, a 
compositional strategy based on taking things apart, on an emancipated (and 
Deleuzian) becoming-minor, allows for the appearance of new connections and 
necessities: “If the act of composing is meant to go beyond the tautological use 
of pre-existing expressive forms and—as a creative act—to recall that human 
potential which grants man the dignity of a cognisant being, able to act on the 
basis of this cognition, then composition is by no means a ‘putting together,’ 
but rather a ‘taking apart’ and more: a confrontation with the interconnections 
and necessities of the musical substance” (Lachenmann [1979] 1996, 55). 
It should be noted that, in using the word substance, Lachenmann doesn’t 
propose any kind of transcendence, or a teleological purpose for artworks. On 
the contrary, he points to a radical immanence of sonic events, an immanence 
that becomes more and more significant as it increasingly breaks the sphere 
of the magic (which is understood as a summation of collective “irresistible” 
experiences).
Lachenmann’s further development of his extended reflection on the magical 
or ritualistic origins of artworks and the conditions of creativity (starting in 
19794) culminated in his central claim that “art is a form of magic, broken in and 
with spirit” (Lachenmann 2004, 56), a formula that encapsulates and implies 
important conceptual elements related to the philosophies of Herbert Marcuse 
 2 “Der Bruch mit der Tonalität, sei es in den Werken der Wiener atonalen Schule, in den Werken der 
seriellen Epoche oder in jüngster Zeit, hat die tonalen Erfahrungskategorien und das daran gebundene 
ästhetische Bewusstsein als potentiellen Schlupfwinkel bürgerlichen Denkens nie wirklich außer Kraft 
setzen können.”
 3 For an extensive discussion on Deleuze’s notion of the clinical function of art, see Sauvagnargues (2005, 
39–58 [French]; 2013, 23–36 [English]).
 4 On Lachenmann’s notion of Magie (the magical), see Mosch (2009).
 228
Appendix 2
(with his notion of beauty as the denial of habits), Georg Lukács (the com-
plete man), Walter Benjamin (aura, magic), and Theodor W. Adorno (material, 
broken magic). Even if not a professional philosopher, Lachenmann’s interest 
in philosophy has always been compelling, and his definitions, concepts, and 
theoretical tools reveal deep philosophical knowledge and an understanding 
of interconnections. To localise and clarify Lachenmann’s references in detail 
would exceed the purposes of this article. Nevertheless, and before entering 
into a dialogue with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, five genetic elements of 
Lachenmann’s approach must be clarified: 
(1)  Lachenmann’s use of the term magic seems to derive from Walter 
Benjamin’s definition in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, especially when Benjamin (2008, 13) postulates: “In 
primeval times, because of the absolute weight placed on its cultic 
value, the work of art became primarily an instrument of magic that 
was only subsequently, one might say, acknowledged to be a work of 
art.” Moreover, this concept is developed and further differentiated 
in Theodor W. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970 [see Adorno 1997]) and 
Georg Lukác’s fragmentary Ästhetik (1972), books that Lachenmann 
read thoroughly (Mosch 2009, 86).
(2)  The notion of “broken magic” (gebrochene Zauber) is indebted to 
Theodor W. Adorno, particularly his essay In Search of Wagner, in which 
Adorno writes: “Music, the most magical of all the arts, learns how to 
break the spell it casts over the characters” (Adorno [1981] 2005, 144).5 
(3)  As Lachenmann stated in 1987 ([1987] 1996, 346), the idea of “Beauty 
as the ‘denial of habit’” (Lachenmann 2004, 56) is inspired by Herbert 
Marcuse’s concept of Verweigerung (denial), extensively expressed in his 
books One-Dimensional Man (1964) and The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward 
a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (1978).
(4)  Lachenmann’s reflection on the aural charge of the material follows 
Adorno’s definition of material, in addition to Benjamin’s and Lukács’s 
concepts of aura.
(5)  Finally, Lachenmann’s foundational understanding of art as a place 
where the immanent potentiality of a general aesthetic means encoun-
ters an objective, concrete, and palpable reality is rooted in Georg 
Lukács’s aesthetics—particularly in his concept of art as a message 
from the “complete man” [“Der ganze Mensch,” “Der Mensch ganz”].6
Reflecting upon the cultural and social conditions of the production of art, while 
keeping in mind its concrete practice, Helmut Lachenmann’s aesthetic-structural 
 5 “Musik, die zauberischste aller Künste, lernt den Zauber brechen, den sie selber um alle ihre Gestalten 
legt” (Adorno [1952] 1971, 145).
 6 Lachenmann is explicit about Lukács’s impact on his own thought: “I have yet to find anywhere else a 
more comprehensive description of the relations between the immanent rules of the aesthetic medium 
and the objective reality . . . as in the Aesthetics of Georg Lukács” (Lachenmann [1976] 1996b, 109, my 
translation; Eine umfassendere Beschreibung der Wechselwirkung von immanenten Gesetzen des 
ästhetischen Mediums und objektiver Wirklichkeit (der “Mensch ganz” im homogenen Medium ästhe-
tischer Disziplinen gegenüber dem “ganzen Menschen” im vielseitig gefächerten existentiellen Alltag) 
habe ich bisher nirgendwo anders als in der Ästhetik von Georg Lukács gefunden).
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methodology constitutes a complex system of references that derive from the 
tension between cultural environment and inner experience. Such a tension 
shouldn’t simply be perceived through listening; more importantly, it should be 
confronted and critically surmounted. On the one hand, one has to resist the 
numerous temptations of mass culture and, on the other hand, one must develop 
compositional tools, which—while referring to that culture—allow for a trans-
formation of perception (see Hüppe 1996, 3). This transformation of perception 
is the fundamental goal of Lachenmann’s music. His philosophical thoughts and 
considerations work solely as clarifiers, as lighthouses signalling dangerous cliffs 
on the way to new harbours. They also help break through the mystified (and 
petrified) cultural landscape around us, opening a horizon for change and the 
possibility of (cultural) liberation. Consonant with Herbert Marcuse, it seems 
that Lachenmann’s programme aims to subvert dominant consciousness, ordin-
ary experience. This programme latently involves a political dimension, since 
it stimulates the “emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defy 
the rationality and sensibility incorporated in the dominant social institutions” 
(Marcuse 1978, 7). In the place of political pamphleteer activism or radical praxis 
(as Lachenmann saw in his teacher Luigi Nono), Lachenmann concentrates on 
the work of art as an autonomous work—converging again with Marcuse in that 
“the political potential of art lies only in its own aesthetic dimension” (ibid., xii). 
Lachenmann’s aesthetic-structural methodology is, therefore, more than a critical 
philosophical-aesthetic discourse; it is a way of escaping music in order to 
allow music to come into being. Far from being an abstract system, it contains 
extremely concrete and sound-related categories. It enabled Lachenmann to 
develop his musique concrète instrumentale, a music in which sound events are 
chosen and organised so that the manner in which they are generated is at least 
as important as the resultant acoustic qualities. In such a music, those qual-
ities, such as timbre, volume, dynamics, and duration, do not produce sounds 
for their own sake but describe or denote the concrete situation: listening, you 
hear the conditions under which a sound- or noise-action is carried out, you 
hear what materials and energies are involved and what resistance is encoun-
tered. To understand better and to have some kind of control over those ener-
gies and resistances, Helmut Lachenmann devised three “theses” on com-
posing, and four more analytical “conditions” of musical material. This essay 
will now concentrate on these elements, briefly describing each of them and 
entering a virtual dialogue with concomitant concepts by Gilles Deleuze.
3. Helmut Lachenmann’s three “theses” on composing
In 1986, in an essay dedicated to Wolfgang Rihm with the title Über das Komponieren 
(About composing), Lachenmann ([1986] 1996, 73–82) presented three “funda-
mental observations” about the act of composing. These three observations, 
full of metaphorical qualities, were presented anew, in condensed form, during 
Lachenmann’s lecture at the Orpheus Institute in Ghent, published as “Philosophy 
of Composition: Is There Such a Thing?” (2004).
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The first thesis (T1) states that composing requires a thorough reflection 
upon music and its materials: “Composing means: reflecting upon music” 
(Lachenmann 2004, 56).” Such reflection is intended in the sense of searching, 
experimenting, and sensitising oneself to the preformations of listening and 
compositional resources, whether intellectually or intuitively controlled (ibid., 
57). It concerns critical and structural thinking, since the material’s potentiality 
is to be scrutinised and its historically charged preformations (aura) are to be 
investigated. Only when this reflection is made as part of concrete daily work 
does it allow a creative estrangement of the “familiar.”
The second thesis (T2) concerns immediate creative practice, following on 
from the previous understanding of sound as the “experience” of structures. T2 
affirms that “composing means: building an instrument” (ibid., 56). This thesis, 
which constitutes the central focus of Helmut Lachenmann’s investigations, 
argues that it is necessary to establish a new system of categories in every sin-
gle new work (ibid., 57). Lachenmann conceives the very essence of composing 
as the scanning or mapping of diverse possibilities that are drawn together by 
structural similarity or functional convergences. To compose is to find, dis-
cover, or invent such similarities and convergences. In so doing, the composer is 
“building” a new instrument. Moreover, it is crucial to remember T1: that every 
sound carries its specific “history,” its “expressive” predeterminations and con-
text. To overlook this aspect is to blindly ignore and violate the material.
Finally, Lachenmann insists that music-making is carried out not “to say” 
something but “to do” something. His third thesis (T3) is that “composing 
does not mean ‘letting oneself go,’ but rather ‘letting oneself come’” (ibid., 56). 
Beyond structural analysis and mechanisms of innovation, the expressive intui-
tion is now addressed. With this third thesis, Lachenmann opens the door to 
freedom, to personal doubts and joys, to the passion of writing a score with all 
the risks and fears it might raise. But this also raises the possibility of change, of 
inner transformation and the realisation of oneself as a “whole man” (Marcuse 
1964). Moreover, the idea of “letting oneself come” carries an erotic dimension, 
which Lachenmann doesn’t evade: for him the encounter between creative will 
and sonic matter is an encounter full of fascination, passion, complementar-
ities, joy, and happiness (Lachenmann [1986] 1996, 82).
4. Gilles Deleuze’s diagnostic function of art , 
capture of forces ,  and body without organs :  first 
convergences with Helmut Lachenmann 
Deleuze’s references to art and to the phenomena of creation and creativity 
run through all his periods, but seem to be more intensely and consistently 
addressed in his last phase, particularly after Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
(1981 [see Deleuze 2003]). If his first period is dominated by philosophical and 
literary interpretation, and the second (marked by his collaboration with Félix 
Guattari) by discussions on semiotics, psychoanalysis, unconscious processes, 
and the political implications of thought, the third period is characterised by 
reflections on art, including a 1981 study on Francis Bacon (Deleuze 2003), two 
 231
The Conditions of Creation and the Haecceity of Musical Material
books, in 1983 and 1985, respectively, on cinema (Deleuze 1986, 1989), a 1988 
study of the Baroque (Deleuze 1993), a 1993 collection of articles on literature 
(Deleuze 1997), and a final collaboration with Guattari first published in 1991 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994), where art is presented, together with philosophy 
and science, as one of “three great forms” of thought (ibid., 197). However, 
Deleuze never wrote a book on music, and even when he did write about music 
his reflections are more directed toward non-musical concepts (such as terri-
tory, refrain, striated space, and smooth space, among others) than to music itself. 
Nevertheless, many musicians recognise that diverse Deleuzian concepts have a 
strong potentiality to be articulated in strictly musical terms. Several composers 
(for example, Brian Ferneyhough and Bernhard Lang) have openly discussed 
reflecting on and using Deleuzian thoughts and ideas for composing. There 
seems to be a musical potentiality within Deleuze’s philosophy that might be 
uncovered through setting up unexpected encounters with other domains and 
systems of thought. An example of one such unexpected encounter follows—an 
encounter with Helmut Lachenmann’s theses on composing. 
4.1. The diagnostic function of art
Lachenmann’s first thesis (T1: “Composing means: reflecting upon music”) permits 
a connection to Deleuze’s “diagnostic function of art.” For Deleuze, artists and 
philosophers are symptomatologists, “physicians of culture”: “artists are clinicians, 
not with respect to their own case, nor even with respect to a case in general; rather, 
they are clinicians of civilization” (Deleuze 1990, 237). Artists are not only the 
experts who diagnose the pathologies of civilization; they become the operators 
that enable new constellations of forces to emerge. As Anne Sauvagnargues (2013, 
74), referring to Deleuze’s clinical understanding of art, observes: “The work of 
art, in its aesthetic function (the kind of sensation that it reveals), takes on an 
immediate critical value, because it transforms taste, but above all because it is 
directly inscribed into customs and modulates a real relation between the work 
and the social body, which simultaneously transforms the space of its reception 
and contributes to changing the status and position of the artist.”
Inspired by Nietzsche, for whom all phenomena are signs or symptoms that 
reflect a certain state of forces, and by Spinoza, whose critique of signs revealed 
that art is not independent of systems of social domination, Deleuze comes 
to the central question of investigating how it is possible for forces to arrive at 
producing signs and forms. Without this reflection, it is impossible to study the 
power of affecting and of being affected by a given material. Here, Deleuze’s 
diagnostic function of art meets Lachenmann’s analytical scrutiny of the material. 
What Lachenmann affirms as the first foundational activity of a composer 
(reflecting upon the material) is only meaningful if the composer is capable of 
identifying the forces behind signs and forms. The mapping or active palpating 
of the sonic resources implies a diagnosis of the sonic resources’ own condi-
tions. In addition to identifying weak and strong elements in a given material, 
the composer’s job is to unveil false securities and to reveal new forces, signs, 
and forms, which bring to light previously unnoticed qualities of the material. 
If, as Deleuze says, the essence of creation resides in facing and confronting 
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chaos and in imposing a cutting plan of immanence, then the first step is to 
reflect upon, analyse, and diagnose the potential constitutive elements of such 
a plan. As for music, such an analysis is to be done through “the sense of search-
ing, experimenting, sensitising oneself to the preformations of listening and 
of compositional resources, whether intellectually or intuitively controlled” 
(Lachenmann 2004, 57). The next step, the passage from symptomatology to the 
capture of forces, leads to Lachenmann’s second thesis on composing. 
4.2. Capture of forces 
According to Deleuze, the making of art consists of the capture of forces. Many 
critics of Deleuze overlook the crucial differentiation that such forces do not exist 
in some kind of transcendental realm, from where they are extracted, but are 
generated by a radical immanence of the creative process. The idea of the capture 
of forces originated in Deleuze’s extended understanding of Simondon’s ecceité, 
Duns Scottus’s haecceité, and Spinoza’s theories on affection, before coming to a 
metaphorical formulation in the image of the Baroque fold. Briefly: the capture 
of forces is a gradual process through which intensity (latitude, energy) starts 
generating extension (longitude, matter), a process that occurs in the realms 
of artistic, philosophical, and scientific activities, in and through the concrete 
working out of artistic, philosophical, or scientific materials. The fold reveals 
the (un)folding process behind it. The entire process exists and takes place in 
terms of matter and of the radical immanence of material unfoldings—and not 
as the capture of transcendental categories. It concerns structure and the def-
inition of longitudes, extended formulae or objects (percepts), which conversely 
start liberating sensitive stimuli (affects). Lachenmann’s expression “to build an 
instrument” concerns the invention of such structures. They are not immediately 
artworks, but they appear after the reflective moment (diagnostic) and before 
the actual “doing” of the work. “To build an instrument” is to (virtually) organise 
the material to capture forces, to create a diagrammatic plane of composition 
that will allow concrete (actual) events to take place.
4.3. Body without organs 
The term body without organs (BwO) first appeared in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense, 
in the context of the relation between thought and corporeity, between literature 
and madness (see Sauvagnargues 2005, 86); with Guattari, Deleuze subsequently 
refined the term in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze used the term 
for the last time in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, after which it became figure. 
It is important to note that the concept of BwO is slightly different in the works 
of Deleuze and of Guattari. While Guattari comes from the psychoanalytical 
world, considering the BwO in the light of processes of definition of identity and 
formation of the subject, Deleuze (coming from the world of literature, in this 
case, Artaud) considers it as physicality, as an indestructible wholeness capable 
of affecting and being affected by other bodies —without a central coordinating 
device commanding diverse organs. Furthermore, Deleuze also invokes German 
biologist August Weismann’s theory of the germplasm in order to propose that the 
BwO “is always contemporary with and yet independent of its host organism” 
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(see Message 2005, 32). Deleuze’s notion of organism is that of a form, which 
moulds a body inside a predefined organisation. 
If Lachenmann’s structural organisation implied in T2 is understood as such 
a predefined organisation, as an organism potentially trying to control all its 
organs, then his third thesis (T3: “letting oneself come”) can be connected to 
Deleuze’s BwO. It is the moment where the intense corporeity of the composer 
comes into action, being contemporary with the structure, yet independent 
(and even contradictory) of it. One of Lachenmann’s fundamental critiques 
of the classical period of integral serialism (the early 1950s) concerns a certain 
negation of this liberating element. Serialism’s confidence in the given struc-
tures was so high that the body, the immanent corporeity of the writing process 
itself, was disregarded as subjective redundancy.
For Lachenmann, the definition of complex local situations has priority in 
relation to a hyper-structure (which he doesn’t refuse)—a position opposed 
to those who carry a definition of details imposed by a superstructure located 
somewhere above. The difference is exactly the same as the difference between 
a body without organs (defined by an under-determined organ) and an organ-
ism determined by clearly defined organs. “In fact, the body without organs 
does not lack organs, it simply lacks the organism, that is, this particular organ-
ization of organs. The body without organs is thus defined by an indeterminate 
organ, whereas the organism is defined by determinate organs” (Deleuze 2003, 
47). Thus, the BwO assumes two functions: (1) dealing with modes of bodily 
individuation before a centred organisation takes control, and (2) reflecting on 
the junction between art and body (taking the case of Artaud as a paradigmatic 
example). Both functions can be retraced in Lachenmann’s music and writings. 
On the one hand, Lachenmann’s third thesis functions as a liberator from and 
as a corrector of the (potentially) centralising second thesis; on the other hand, 
the metaphor of “letting oneself come” positively affirms the total connection 
between artistic structures, ideas, and materials and the idiosyncratic body 
of the composer. The satisfaction or the feeling of fulfilment that Lachenmann 
explicitly articulates in relation to his third thesis goes even further, pointing 
to a sexual connotation that opens the horizon for Guattari’s post-Freudian 
concept of desiring machines. 
Desire is one of the central terms in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, 
where it has a positive, productive, and creative meaning. Instead of desire 
being a lack of something (as it is understood in classical psychoanalysis), 
Deleuze and Guattari propose a definition based on processes of experimen-
tation on a plane of immanence. Desire is productive. Desire is projection into 
the future, not repressed unconscious analysis of the past. In the same terms, 
writing down a score is a moment of joy, of fascination, passion, and total com-
mitment to oneself. Only such a fusion of reason, passion, and bodily, tactile 
experience can lead to a music full of energy and the radical immanence of 
sonic events. After the deterritorialisation operated within T1 and T2, T3 offers 
a renewed and necessarily original reterritorialisation. That such a reterritor-
ialisation establishes a critical tension with the territory (the aesthetic apparatus) 
is the condition for newness and futurity. 
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5. Helmut Lachenmann’s four conditions of the 
musical material
Lachenmann’s fundamental concerns are perception and the conditions of 
perception; they are even more relevant to him than listening: “The concept 
of perception is more adventurous and more existential than that of listening” 
(Lachenmann 1995, 102). As a starting point, Lachenmann believes there is no 
such a thing as free, neutral, and unconditioned perception. On the contrary: 
every perception, every sounding event is charged with qualities before the com-
poser even starts to use it. The idea of a completely free and independent work 
structure (as many composers proposed during the 1950s) is for Lachenmann 
utopian and unrealistic. As a result of his reflection on perception, in 1966 
Lachenmann arrived at a first definition of four aspects that participate in the 
complex process of music perception.
Four aspects that participate in every sounding object come to the fore-
ground. These aspects may be ignored by the composer (who sometimes must 
even ignore them), but their presence a priori and their inevitable affecting 
intensity might very well work against the composer’s intentions—in which 
case, it is better to decide how and to what extent he or she wishes to integrate 
them in the work’s final form (Lachenmann [1990] 1996b, 87–88).
These four aspects, which Lachenmann later called conditions of the material, 
build up a typology of conditions and were further systematised by him in sev-
eral essays written between 1966 and 1990. They are understood as a synthesis 
of diverse socio-psychological aspects of the composer’s activity, relating both 
to society and to the individual, revealing deeper relations between them. To 
Lachenmann, the degree to which a composer is individuated depends on his 
or her capacity to diagnose and reflect upon the material— even if that cap-
acity appears at first as something intuitive that must later be analytically scru-
tinised. The four conditions establish a structural tool for such diagnosis and 
reflection. These four conditions of the musical material (CMM) are as follows 
(see Lachenmann 2004, 58): 
(a)  Tonality—almost a synonym of tradition and all its related categor-
ies and dialectics of consonance/dissonance, tonal/atonal, familiar/
unfamiliar, domestic/exotic, and so on
(b)  Corporeity—the acoustical and physical experience of sound, its bod-
ily expression, its energetic and immediately perceptible anatomy
(c)  Structure—not to be confused with ordering or organising proced-
ures, but rather the complex set of newly individuated systems, rules, 
laws, and temporally-articulated constellations; the experience of 
organisation and of disorganisation, construction and deconstruction
(d)  Aura—the history of the material in wider, musical and extra-musical 
contexts, in all spheres of our social and cultural reality, of our con-
scious and unconscious awareness, our archetypal memory, both col-
lective and individual
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6. Gilles Deleuze’s opinion, corporeity, fold ,  and 
latitude :  further convergences with Helmut 
Lachenmann
6.1. Against opinion
Strikingly, Lachenmann’s definition of his first condition of musical material 
(tonality) comes close to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus, a set of acquired schemata, 
sensibilities, dispositions, and tastes that are dependent on history and human 
memory. Tonality, understood as the whole complex of experiences related to 
inherited aesthetic conventions, has an emphatic character, because the experi-
ence of the tonal is associated with the idea of individual and social identity. 
In the same way that Bourdieu criticises those social theories that ignore such 
elements of structural dependency, Lachenmann objects to anybody who claims 
that he or she can work with music elements independently of their context, his-
tory, and memory. However, Lachenmann also criticises everyone who adheres, 
defends, and reinforces the acritical notion of a completely pre-determined 
structuration of elements, a notion that is implicit in the concept of habitus. That 
is, Lachenmann acknowledges the existence of an extended habitus (that he 
sometimes calls the monstrum of the aesthetic apparatus), but he conceives the role 
of the composer as a deconstructer, as a permanent challenger of that habitus. 
Claiming that there is no such a thing as an aesthetic habitus, or, on the contrary, 
blindly worshiping it, for Lachenmann are both limited ways of dealing with the 
responsibility inherent in art-making. According to Lachenmann, the relation to 
tradition, to the habitus, must be based on a dialectical confrontation, whereby 
the artwork identifies elements of the habitus in order to subvert them, generat-
ing a hiatus of perception—a moment of existential insecurity. Such dialectical 
confrontation shares some common features with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea 
of lutter contre l’opinion—fighting against opinion. Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that by making an artwork one extracts something out of chaos: a percept and an 
affect. An artist’s initial fight, therefore, is a struggle against chaos. But “another 
struggle develops and takes on more importance—the struggle against opinion, 
which claims to protect us from chaos itself ” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 203). 
In a visual metaphor, Deleuze and Guattari quote a passage by D. H. Lawrence 
in which an umbrella is described (ibid., 203–4).7 Under this umbrella, various 
people are sheltered; they draw a firmament and write their conventions and 
opinions on its underside. It is the function of poets and artists to make a slit in 
the umbrella, to open the sight to the firmament—even if for just a short time, 
since imitators and commentators will soon repair the fissure, restating a state 
of “familiarity,” that is, “tonality.” Therefore, the artist’s struggle is against the 
clichés of opinion: “The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither 
does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered 
with preexisting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, 
 
 7 This passage is taken from Lawrence’s essay “Chaos in Poetry” (see Lawrence [1928] 1998). 
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to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings 
us the vision” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 204).
Art’s struggle with chaos occurs in order to bring forth a vision that illumin-
ates chaos for an instant, what Deleuze calls a sensation, a radical immanence of 
forces in a specific here-and-now. In a similar way, Lachenmann’s dialectical 
confrontation with tonality aims at enabling a suspension of traditional per-
ception by creating a sound-situation full of energy and bodily expression—a 
radical immanence of forces in a specific here-and-now. 
Another Deleuzo-Guattarian concept that might relate to Lachenmann’s 
tonality is the couple major–minor, expressed in detail in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature (Deleuze and Guattari 1986). Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of major 
refers to a broader system of imprisonment, domination, and normalisation of 
creative forces. Minoritarian forces are groupings of ever-changing single events 
(molecules) that escape the instances of control drawn above them by major 
systems.8 More than a question of quantity, of number, the major is essentially 
a question of power—the distinction between major and minor art being that 
between a power (pouvoir) of constants and a power (puissance) of variables. It 
implies, therefore, a political dimension and the use of a minor language puts 
the major language into flight. A minor language deterritorialises language 
and provides an intimate and immediate connection between the individ-
ual and the political. Lachenmann’s tonality, Bourdieu’s habitus, and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s opinion and major systems seem to establish similar categories of 
power and domination, carrying potential for alienation and misuses. To crit-
ically confront power and domination, to fight against them, is Lachenmann’s 
aesthetic position. Similarly to Kafka, who made a minor use of the German 
language, Lachenmann might be seen as a composer making a minor use of 
musical elements.
6.2. Corporeality 
When Helmut Lachenmann focuses his discourse on the acoustical and physical 
experience of sound, on its bodily expression, its energetic and immediately per-
ceptible anatomy, he addresses the corporeality of the production of music. Every 
element subjected to compositional treatment can be defined as an immediate 
stimulus conveyed through physical information: sounds are composed and per-
formed as a result of direct, immediate, and concrete body actions. Such actions 
create a resistance against the aforementioned first condition of tonality. A glance 
at the physical, energetic, and immediately perceptible anatomy of sound events 
implies the exclusion of a mode of listening polished by tradition and habit. 
Every single body is unique and unpredictable. In terms of music, corporeality 
and the idiosyncrasy of the body force the material and the tradition to collide. 
Corporeality has long been an important element in the conception of 
music, but it was traditionally understood as a vehicle, as an envelope for the tonal 
aspects to be conveyed. In Lachenmann’s music, the body is no longer a vehicle 
 
 8 On the dualism major–minor, see Bouaniche (2007, 186–93).
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for the tonality. It is an energy-in-action that breaks the schemes of thought 
and perception of the major systems of opinion. The art-making body starts the 
concrete deconstruction of tonality, opinion, and habitus. Deleuze, following 
Spinoza, suggests that a body is primarily defined by its speeds and slownesses 
rather than its functions and forms. The body in its relation to its own internal 
milieu is capable of producing intensities, which will unfold into infinite affects. 
But that same body will reduce this infinity to a finite plane of immanence, risk-
ing a division in diverse bodies (becoming-schizoid) while allowing body and 
thought to come together to define the body without organs—a body independ-
ent of a centralising instance, an instrument of direct deterritorialisation.
6.3. Reterritorialisation
Lachenmann’s structurality of sound (expressed in his third condition of the 
material) as a newly individuated product of systems, rules, laws, and temporally 
articulated constellations defines a process of reterritorialisation. If the moment 
of material analysis and the moment of corporeal investigation constitute 
moments of deterritorialisation, the decisive adventure of giving a structure 
to a complex set of sensually experienced sounds re-enters the sphere of the 
finite, of the executable, of a human horizon. Whether it is a new definition of 
old territories or a construction of fully new ones, in both cases it is a process 
that reterritorialises forces and energies. Such a process for Lachenmann isn’t 
a mere organisation of acoustic events that would point to transcendence. On 
the contrary, by emphasising the energetic element carried out through bodily 
actions Lachenmann affirms the absolute immanence of his music—music 
as the permanent actualisation of virtual forces. The fundamental difference 
from transcendental conceptions of music lies in the fact that Lachenmann’s 
conception involves the composer as much as the performer and the listener.
As the result of the unfolding of the structurality of sound, Lachenmann’s 
third condition unveils a form that is defined through complex unfoldings of 
forces. These new formations of new territories aren’t, therefore, based on 
mimesis or contestation of old musical formulae. They propose completely 
new ways of reorganising functions and regrouping sensations. Forms appear 
as conglomerates of relations—probably what Lachenmann calls a polyphony of 
configurations. They are but forces engendering forms as “becomings of forces.” 
6.4. Latitude 
In “Memories of a Spinozist, II,” Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 256–60) claim: “To 
every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness grouping together an 
infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of power. To the relations compos-
ing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there correspond intensities that 
affect it, augmenting or diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from 
external parts or from the individual’s own parts” (ibid., 256).
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The degree of power (or the power to act) of a body is the crucial element of 
Deleuze’s extended reflection on art as the capture of forces. Beyond the diag-
nostic function of art (against opinion), its corporeality and structured pro-
cesses of reterritorialisation, art-making comes to its ultimate expression—the 
haecceity—in the modal aspect of qualitative degrees of power. To explore the 
movement and relations between material systems of signs and the immaterial 
ethical implications of art, Deleuze—inspired by Spinoza, and by the late 
medieval philosopher Nicholas Oresme9—makes use of two terms: latitude and 
longitude. In geophysics, latitude is an angular measurement ranging from 0° at 
the equator to 90° at the poles. Longitude is another angular distance, meas-
ured east or west from a given meridian (normally Greenwich) to another one. 
The difference is obvious: where longitude is a pure abstraction concerning the 
measurement of space, latitude has a natural basis (the distance from the equa-
tor) and implies a qualitative change of state—temperature and climate vary 
dramatically with a change of latitude. Longitude concerns the development of 
something over time or space (extension), while latitude has to do with intensi-
ties, with varying degrees of power. “We call the latitude of a body the affects of 
which it is capable at a given degree of power, or rather within the limits of that 
degree. Latitude is made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity, and longitude of 
extensive parts falling under a relation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 256–57).
On the one hand, longitude deals with extension (relations, speeds, and 
structures) while latitude deals with intensity (power, potentiality, affects); on 
the other hand, Deleuze uses these highly elaborated concepts as a means to 
propose a relation between signs (extension) and ethics (intention), between 
palpable materiality and ungraspable force. Force is the condition of sensation, 
and sensation is a relation of forces producing an image: percept and affect. “This 
is why art is a capture of forces. A force must act upon a body in order for sen-
sation to exist,” as Sauvagnargues (2013, 142) has formulated. To return to an 
example we discussed in the introduction: the “extension” horse might have 
two completely different intensities, according to whether it is a racehorse 
or a workhorse. As Deleuze stated (1988, 124): “There are greater differences 
between a plow horse or draft horse and a racehorse than between an ox and a 
plow horse. This is because the racehorse and the plow horse do not have the 
same affects nor the same capacity for being affected; the plow horse has affects 
in common rather with the ox.” 
The difficulty for art is how to distinguish the racehorse from the work-
horse before seeing them in action. Lachenmann’s third condition of musical 
material (structurality, i.e., extension) helps create a basic context for the art-
work but it is only through the scrutiny of its inherent auratic potential that the 
artist has a window to feel its intensity.
 9 Nicholas Oresme is mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari in a footnote to the tenth plateau of A Thou-
sand Plateaus (1987, 540n29). It is only through this indication that the reader learns that the theologian 
recalled in the sub-plateau “Memories of a Theologian” (ibid., 252–53) is Nicholas Oresme (1320–82), 
whose work Deleuze and Guattari knew from Pierre Duhem’s encyclopaedic work, Le système du monde 
(1913–59), especially vols 7–9 (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 540n29). 
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7. The conditions of creation and the haecceity of 
musical material: a philosophical-aesthetic Erewhon 
Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can 
reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation. This is because from the 
moment that the material passes into sensation, as in a Rodin sculpture, art itself 
lives on these zones of indetermination. They are blocs. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
173)
According to Deleuze and Guattari, “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, 
and fabricating concepts” (ibid., 2), while science and art are the inventors of 
functives and images (percepts and affects). The power of invention, of creation, is 
therefore one of Deleuze’s fundamental themes, and in the final sections of What 
Is Philosophy? the question of the conditions of creation in philosophy, science, 
and art is openly discussed. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 201–218), 
these conditions are: (a) a struggle against “opinion” (206); the promotion of a 
receptor still to be born (“un peuple à venir” [“the people to come”], 218); and 
(c) the extraction of something out of chaos (see 208).
For Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 197), “what defines thought in its three great 
forms—art, science, and philosophy—is always confronting chaos, laying out a 
plane, throwing a plane over chaos.” However, this confrontation is made dif-
ficult by an innumerable amount of clichés and triteness, small truths that give 
shape to opinion. And it is against opinion that Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 206) 
first speak: “We . . . come back to a conclusion to which art led us: the struggle 
against chaos is only the instrument of a more profound struggle against opin-
ion, for the misfortune of people comes from opinion.” Both Deleuze’s opinion 
and Lachenmann’s tonality are systems of domination and repression. They 
not only censure creativity, they also stimulate the proliferation of empty words, 
of repetitive messages, so that the status quo stays untouched. The struggle 
against opinion, the critical structural reflection upon the materials of music 
is, therefore, a first condition of creativity.
As a result of this first condition, the work of philosophers, scientists, or 
artists will always start by revealing forces, energies, and matter that were not 
previously known or noticed. Looking beyond recognition, they will write, for-
mulate, or compose works that will only be understood by a receiver still to 
come: “For the new . . . calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of 
recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, 
from an unrecognised and unrecognisable terra incognita” (Deleuze 1968, 177, as 
translated in Deleuze 1994, 136).
The intensity of the newly created object finds its equivalent in the initial 
incomprehension of the spectator. Artistic creations challenge dominant 
opinion and do not look for consensus. That’s why they steadily address a new 
audience, and are unconcerned with fulfilling pre-existent expectations of an 
empirically formed community. “There is no work of art that does not call on a 
people who does not yet exist,” said Deleuze in his famous lecture on the cre-
ative act in cinema (2007, 324). But this “people still to come” does not belong 
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to the future, whether near or far—what is meant are spectators from another 
temporality, from another perceptual universe, who the artist touches in the 
precise moment of creation, even if in an unarticulated way: “Through having 
reached the percept as ‘the sacred source,’ through having seen Life in the liv-
ing or the Living in the lived, the novelist or painter returns breathless and with 
bloodshot eyes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 172).
Lachenmann’s critical and structural struggle against a pseudo natural habit10 
of artistic experiences and perception builds another bridge to Deleuze’s phil-
osophy of art. Chaos as the excess of speed and opinion as the excess of redun-
dancy always offer us false security, captious arguments not to abandon them, 
not to abandon home, not to abandon language, not to abandon tradition, not 
to abandon “tonality,” not to abandon oneself. But without abandoning one-
self, without abandoning our world and entering new universes of perception, 
is there any art at work?
Confronting chaos and opinion is exactly what Lachenmann does when he 
builds an instrument, defines a structure, critically listens to the preforma-
tions, and reflects upon the material—and even more when he “lets himself 
come” in the form of a score, the place where his philosophy on “composition 
and the idea of retrieving the concept of art with reference to society, its ‘occi-
dentally’-based restrictions, and not least the human need for self-realisation 
through the creative process”11 more deeply reveals itself. To make music is not 
“to say” something, but rather “to do” something. This “to do” is Deleuze and 
Guattari’s extraction of something out of chaos—a concept in philosophy, a 
function in science, an image (percept and affect) in the arts.
Beyond all the philosophical-aesthetic arguments presented so far, but 
as their consequence, Lachenmann’s music is existentially energetic, reveal-
ing a fundamental corporeality that is present in the moment of compos-
ition, as well as in that of the performance and perception. Between a quasi- 
transcendence of elaborated structures (such as time grids, complex pitch 
sequences, sound families, and polyphony of dispositions) and the extreme 
physicality of the sound production, it is the energetic concreteness of every 
single event that carries the attention, revealing an immanent mode of percep-
tion. Lachenmann’s music is not to be heard sound after sound—it is to be per-
ceived with the whole body (“the whole man”) in all its energetically rhythmical 
power. Much has been written on the rich array of diverse sound production 
techniques in Lachenmann’s music. Much less has been said about the funda-
mental importance of rhythm and rhythmicality to this music. The sumptuous 
richness of indications concerning how to produce a given sound leads to a 
 
 10 Lachenmann’s reflections on habit are situated within his particular definition of beauty, which he 
defines as “an offer to break free from all security” (Lachenmann 2004, 56). For him, beauty is under-
stood as “ ‘the denial of habit’  . . . insofar as the term ‘habit’ encompasses the idea of ( . . . comfortably? 
thoughtlessly? safely? unemancipatedly?) ‘dwelling’” (ibid., 56).
 11 As stated by Lachenmann (2004, 55), this quotation was intended as the original title for his seminar at 
the Orpheus Institute Ghent, later changed to and published as “Philosophy of Composition: Is There 
Such a Thing?” (Lachenmann 2004).
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certain disdain for its rhythmical qualities. However, these are of the utmost 
relevance, since without them the entire point is missed: Lachenmann’s music 
happens here-and-now, in an existential Erewhon. It is a combination of forms 
and matter, giving shape to a becoming of forces, to the emergence of sensations 
from a radical concreteness of sound and sound production. Establishing rela-
tions between movement and rest, between molecules of sound graspable by 
the body, Lachenmann’s music liberates capacities to affect and be affected. 
Beyond molar elements virtually present in the work’s meta-structures, it is the 
molecular agitation of sonic events that gives life to his music. More than a 
plane of consistency, it creates a composition of haecceities. “The entire assem-
blage in its individuated aggregate . . . is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that 
is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently 
of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 262).
With the concept of haecceity, Deleuze and Guattari opened new avenues 
to the understanding of art. Focusing the discourse on the here-and-now of 
the effective capture of forces, they relegated hermeneutics, interpretation, 
and analysis to a second plane. The radical capture of forces in an irreducible 
Erewhon renders obsolete the quest for the author’s intentions (hermeneut-
ics), the imaginary games of interpretation, and the knowledge of the work’s 
internal structure (analysis). With the capture of forces and its implicit rela-
tion between form and matter, between sign and potentiality, a completely 
new mode of perception became possible. More than a classification of experi-
ences, what now gains momentum is the capture of becomings happening in 
real time. While perceiving the longitude of the artwork (its signs and markings), 
it is within the latitude that a new ethic of affection is captured. The concrete 
and radically immanent energy of sound events in Lachenmann’s music gives it 
the quality of an intense existential experience. The effect of this music is not 
reducible to its structural dimension. It argues for a semiotics of the moment, 
of the erewhon, of the haecceity—a true logic of sensation. 
Helmut Lachenmann and Gilles Deleuze share the idea that thinking is not 
a natural exercise but always a second power of thought, born under the con-
straint of experience as a material power, a force. Lachenmann developed a 
conception of music as existential experience while Deleuze developed a sump-
tuous philosophy of transcendental empiricism. In this essay, I have brought them 
together through diverse encounters between concepts and theories, but par-
ticularly through the concept of haecceity, a concept derived from Dons Scotus’s 
haec, “this thing.” In my view, the radical thingness of Deleuze’s philosophy 
and Lachenmann’s music allow for new modes of perception, sensation, and 
thought. This points towards a radical immanence of things in the world and 
of the world itself. It is this crucial aspect that makes the encounter between 
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